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Stephen Thomas: "Newman and Heresy: the Ang).ican_!!_d,..!;in~" 
The thesis examines the relationship between Newman's treatment of 
early Church heresies and his contemporary situation in the period up 
to 1845. 
Part I traces his view of heresy from the early Trinitarianism of 
111::. C:vc111~euc<:U perwo ana snows now it became a rhetorical tool in his 
defence of the Established Church, 1828-31, culminating in The Arians 
of the Fourth Century. His continuing use of analogies between Arianism 
and contemporary controversy is traced between 1832 and 1837, before 
an examination of the relation between rhetoric and politics in the 
years of Emancipation, Repeal and Reform <1829-32), and in the changed 
situation after 1832. 
" Part II illustrates the use Newman made of his study of Sabelli~sm 
and Apollinarianism to describe 'liberalism', which he argued to be a 
heresy developing into an underlying infidelity. His rhetoric was 
provoked by R.D.Hampd.en's view of Tests, and influenced by the example 
of his friend Blanco White's embracing of Unitarianism in 1835. Newman's 
consideration, under- the category 'Sabellian', of a- variety of systelllalic 
theologians arose out of a need to universalize Oxford controversies 
into an argument about 'rationalism' <Tract 73). He extended his 
critique both to aspects of Nicholas Wiseman 1s Roman Catholic 
apologetic, and, in his strictures upon H.H.Milman, to liberal Anglican 
historiography. 
Part III shows Newman's own past-present analogies turning inwards 
upon himself in a para lle 1 be tween his 'Via Media' and Monophys 1 tism. 
The relation of this analogy to his later reminiscences and to the 
revolution in his concept of orthodoxy and heresy in The Essay on 
Development, is considered. The modification of his general 
understand 1ng of heresy, in the light of his new-found idea of 
development, is then related to his rhetorical use of specific heresies. 
The Cone Ius ion assesses more theore t ica 11 y the imp llca t ions of 
Newman's rhetoricization of Antiquity and considers if there is a 
fundamental coherence to his heresiology during the Anglican period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To attempt a descrlption, ... using simultaneously 
the historical and the systematic methods, 
implies the obvious risk of provoking the 
dissatisfaction of both historians and 
systematic theologians. 
<John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology)' 
-l He l UJ IU U'J f,.li.L::J (,1 t::O (, J,::,t:1 WUU .lU JJa Vt:: Ut;t::ll U/J 
the one hand more strictly scientific, on the 
other hand in many of its arguments less 
pedantic, if its primary purpose had not been 
that of a doctor's dissertation. 
<Karl Marx, Foreword to his Doctoral Thes1s)2 
Newman's treatment of heresy is like a murder-mystery with too 
many clues. The first problem confronting an investigator is not, as so 
often, that there is too little data upon which to form hypotheses -
but, rather, that there is too much! Moreover, there are such diverse 
contexts for the material. A more systematic theologian than Newman 
might have restricted himself to specific treatises, which could then be 
interpreted and compared, and a theory of their relation constructed. 
Not so with Newman. Secondly, there is the problem of how to relate a 
thematic investigation <'heresy'> to historical background and biography 
<"Newman'). His treatment of heresy cannot be straightforwardly 
presented in terms of a chronological progress in his understanding: 
several ways of treating heresy c~exist; a treatment of heresy 
characteristic of one temporal point abruptly re-emerges later; some 
attitudes to heresy are there all the time. Yet, it subverts the 
character of the writings to consider them apart from the biographical. 
Thirdly, there is the literary quality of the texts themselves, whose 
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exuberance of configut'ation makes theological exposition pr-oblematic. 
Here arise questions from the domain of literary analysis and theory 
which need to be related to the domain of Newman-scholarship. 
The concept vJhich this thesis advances to the investigation, in 
order to deal with the threefold problem presented by the material, L=> 
that of rbetoric;_. It will be argued that the treatment of heresy plays 
a role in the strategies Newman adopted on various 9ccasiQ!!?... in order 
to persuade a nation over to his side. An analysis in terms of rhetoric, 
of course, takes full account, firstly, of the function of expressive 
and configural discourse: the style is no longer something to be 
surmounted in the interests of clear exposition: it is rather a 
disclosure of the use of heresy as a persuasive instrument. Secondly, 
the concept of rnetoric e~,;tablishes u relation betwP.en tne theme of 
heresy and history and biography: since a rhetorical procedure 
presupposes a public audience, a particular controversy and a 
persuasive purpose, the functionin::j of 'heresy' in Newman's discourse 
may be related to its historical bacKground. Thirdly, r-hetoric provides 
an idea by which the dis cuss ion of Newman's particular procedures may 
be generalized towards some conclusions of wider application about the 
nature and function of thea log ica 1 rhetoric. 
The Anglican period affords fertile ground for the consideration of 
Newman's rhetoric: precise public - indeed political - occasions may be 
identified as the context of his language. His Anglican rhetoric has a 
sociological dtmension, emerging from a period of convulsive change 
between 1829 and 1832, which forced Anglicanism to re-think its 
identity. 
The consideration of heL~~ discloses three distinct rhetorical 
strategies, arising from three precise public occasions: -
- '-:) -
·J 
I The period of <Roman Catholic) 'Emancipation' <1829), 'Repeal' {of 
the Test Acts), 083D,and (Electoral) Reform, 0832), during which 
Anglican hegemony was broken and the Church of England was compelled 
to justify its existence in a ne~ ... lly-contested context. 
In The Arians of the Fourth Century <1831-2>, Newman used the 
Arian heresy to re-describe the enemies of Establishment, and to defend 
the old order. After 1832, he continued to deploy a similar strategy, 
with adjustments for the new situation, well into the 1830's. 
II A local 'subscription controversy' <1834-1836), about admission of 
Dissenters to Oxford and the necessity of subscription to the 39 
Articles before matriculation. 
Newman's opposition to R.D.Ham'9den's advocacy of a re·laxation of 
subscription broadened into a general discussion of theological 
'liberalism'. He brought into play two heresies he was studying at the 
time, Sabellianism and Apollinarianism, and made them serve in his 
rhetoric against the 'liberal' tendency of his day. 
III The collapse of the 'Via Media' and Newman's Romeward trend, 
culm ina t ing in his conversion <18 45 ) , demanded public justification. He 
had to show that he had not abandoned the Catholicity of the Fathers 
but that the Roman Church was their true successor, and Tractarianism a 
partial and doomed attempt to re-appropriate them. 
Newman used the Monophysite heresy to re-describe the position he 
had once held himself and to which many of his former friends and 
allies were adhering. 
He also used 'Semi-Arianism' to re-describe and place the 'Via 
Media'. 
- I+ -
He adopted a parallel betwee..f"J Nestorianism and the l:'ationai, 
scholarly and intellectual character of Anglican theology. 
These three occasions form the core of the three parts of which 
the thesis is composed. They follow a broadly chronological scheme:-
F lrst, the early origins of Tractarianism in the Church-State crisis 
of 1829-32; 
Second, the polemic against liberalism of the 1830's; 
Third, the reformulations of Newman's 'Anglican death-bed' and 
Roman conversion in the 1840's. 
Significantly, they also coincide with the chronological order in 
which Newman studied the heresies concerned:-
First, in 1830, he investigated the history of Arianism. 
Second, in 1835, he extended his studies to Sabellianism and 
A poll inar ian ism. 
Thicd, Monophysitism, Nestorianism and 'Semi-Arianism' were the 
heresies he was reading up in the 1840's. 
As Newman came to each heresy, he found in it a rhetorical use 
appropriate to the contemporary controversies in which he was engaged. 
Each part of the thesis also describes a particular strand in 
Newman's discourse, with its own dynamic and history, stretching 
forward beyond its immediate occasion, and back to its roots. Although, 
then, the three occasions for Newman's three rhetorical strategies using 
heresy follow the biographical order, each section also to some extent 
chrono log ica 11 y over laps the other:-
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In Part I, the rhetori.c of Arians (1831-2) draws upon earlier 
methods of argument. Moreover, once Newman had forged a weapon for the 
crisis of 1831-2, he kept cutting away with it in the different 
circumstances of the mid- and late 1830's. 
Although Part II is mainly concerned with 1834--6, it shows how 
Newman re-used his critique of 'liberalism'-as-heresy as late as 1840. 
Part III is chronologically and thematically the most complicated:-
(i) Newman drew upon material from 1839 <Monoohysitism and 
Nestorianism), and 1842 <Semi-Arianism) to re-describe Anglicanism when, 
in 1844-5, he wrote the Essay on Development. He re-used it, more 
crudely, in Difficulties of Anglicans 0850). He returned to it in the 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua <1864). Characteristic of his i-<oman Catholic 
treatments of heresy in 1850 and 1864 are the rhetorical use of 
recol"lections about the origins of his conversion in experiences of 
self-doubt arising from the scrutiny of Monophysitism in 1839, and 
Semi-Arianism in 1842. 
OD The Essay on Development presents a view of the general question 
of the relation of heresy to orthodoxy, as part of his argument that 
doctrine develops: he accords heresy a role in stimulating the 
progressive construction of orthodoxy. This is a reversal of his 
position during his 'Via Media' phase <1834 - c.1840), where he used a 
static concept of fundamental orthodoxy which made heresy awkward to 
account for. 
From this complex situation, there arises, firstly, the thematic 
question: what relationship - if any - is there between Newman's use of 
specific heresies, and his general argument about heresy's relation to 
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orthodoxy·? Entailed in this is the question of the overall coherence of 
the pas i tion he had by 1845 arrived at. But, secondly, there is the 
problem of the relation of the 1839-1845 period to what came earlier 
and what came later: how did the general issue of heresy contribute to 
the eventual reversal of his Tractarian position <this takes us back to 
1834), and what relation have the Apologia and Difficulties of Anglicans 
to the period to which they retrospectively refer <this necessitates a 
limited foray beyond 1845)? 
The existence of three parts analysing three overlappin~ but 
distinct rhetorical strategies demands some consideration of the 
relation between them. The evidence often indicates that Newman himself 
had not necessarily given any thouRht to the correlation of the various 
I 
rhetorical strategies he was using. On occasions, all three may be 
found in the same work, without being explicitly related at all! This 
casts doubt upon the appropriateness of the model of intellectual 
biography in order to make Newman's treatment of heresy in te lllg ib le. 
Heresy appears rather to be a function within a shifting set of textual 
strategies, than as the persisting object of intentional reflection. ln 
order, therefore, to integrate the evidence contained in the three 
parts, it will be necessary, in a conclusion, to consider whether there 
is one rhetoric, one underlying structure, to which all the strategies 
belong. 
The terminus a quo for Newman's treatment of heresy is the period 
of his early manhood: the troubled times from Waterloo to the Reform 
Bill, which illustrate the political and social roots of his first 
treatment of the Arian heresy <1832). The transition from defence of 
Establishment (Part 1) to critique of liberalism <Part ID was a natural 
- 7 -
one: it was liberals with iJl the Chucch of Eng' land who wen~ advocating 
still further concessions to Dissent, while simultaneously proposing the 
excision from the liturgy of ancient Trinitarian for,mulae, such as the 
Athanasian Creed. Natural, too, was the equation of liberalism ·with 
in fide 1 i ty, for llbera ls were the he irs of those with in the Church of 
Eng land who sympathized with heterodox D iss en t. 
The terminus ad quem for this thesis is the end of Anglicanism for 
Newman. As Tractarian, he legitimated an Anglicanism which had lost 
political power and influence by proposing it as the inheritor and 
mediator of patristic orthodoxy - as the Catholic Church in England. 
Anglican orthodoxy was presented as a bulwark against the crypto-
infidelity of Dissent. But like all such apologists before him - like his 
seventeenth-century forebears - he had to hold a steady course in his 
-{<"O..e~.;~r,o .... ...fl\~w.-
~a..~"'sh'c.. Llest he seem to drift Romewards. By 184-5, he saw his Anglican 
position as hopelessly compromised. Thereafter, Newman proposed the 
stark alternative of Roman Catholicism as the Church of the 1--'athers, 
the only bulwark against the infidellty towards which ail other forms 
of Christianity, 'Via Media' Anglicanism included, either openly or· 
tacitly tended. Although the thesis will end at 184-5, two works from 
the Roman Catholic period will be considered, as they bear upon the 
collapse of the 'Via Media': both Difficulties of Anglicans <1850) and 
the Apologia (1864-) are sources, albeit problematic ones, for the 
period 1839-1845. 
In his Roman Catholic period (184-5-1890), Newman's interest in 
heresy waned. In the years following his conversion, he used 
Monophysitism to re-describe Anglicanism·- but this is really a sequel 
to the rhetoric of his Anglican period, as he turns his guns upon his 
former self in a final dismissive act of repudiation. Newman's obsessive 
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heresiology derives almost entirely from the embattled and contested 
background of his attempt to re-invent Catholicity for the Church of 
England. Once "safe"3 1n the Roman fold, the impulse to find heresy 
everywhere waned. 
Although "safe", he was by no means comfortable with the 
ultramontanism fashionable throughout his life in the Roman Church. The 
mind-set of ultramontanism was hostile to criticisms made even on 
patristic grounds. Newman found himself to be a liberal within Roman 
Catholicism; actually delated to Rome for heresy without his knowledge 
in 185'l,4 he was regarded by Mgr. Talbot as "the most dangerous man 
in England".5 Suspected, marginalized, cut off from the forum provided 
by his beloved Oxford, his attitude tm.rards heretics, or those suspected 
of covert heresy, mellowed. In The Trials of Theodoret, Newman cannot 
repress his sympathy for the maligned and misrepresented Theodoret of 
Cyrrhus, even though he came from Antioch, cradle of all heresy: nor can 
he stifle the suspicion that Cyril, the great Alexandrian upholder of 
orthodoxy, was, nevertheless, a bit of a scoundrel.6 Concerning assent 
to doctrines in the Roman Church, Newman cons is tent 1 y pursued the line 
allowing the greatest freedom of conscience.? On the matter of new 
definitions, such as Papal Infallibility, he was an inopportunist.8 
Always professing the most humble obedience to authority, he was often 
nevertheless regarded by his superiors much as he had himself regarded 
the latitudinarian Hampden: as a man of dangerous tendencies. Newman's 
ambiguous position as a Roman Catholic, then, is so different from his 
Anglican situation as to be a quite distinct area from the one being 
pursued in this thesis. 
Newman the Roman Catholic became a very different person from the 
intense young clergyman of Tractarian times: he had suffered, he was 
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more detached, his touch t-ras lighter. But he aid not l.o!_ant to be 
different: he lH~ed to see himself as the same as he had always been. 
Accordingly, he usually attempted to adjust his earlier texts to 
something resembling his later posit ion. He was an inveterate tinkerer. 
Sometimes, when an ear 1 ier pas it ion is hope less 1 y irreconcilable with 
Romanism, he disagrees with his earlier self in footnotes. 3 But, more 
often, he will make a minor adjustment, edit out, smooth over or 
conflate, usually without acknowledgment. As a result, the text of the 
CLongmans) Collected Edition is not necessarily a reliable guide to what 
he actually wrote when he was an Anglican. First editions, original 
articles or manuscripts have therefore been consulted and have been 
cited when they differ from the Collected Edition. The object of this 
study is Newman's Anglican period - the very tract of time which later 
he strove seductively to rhetorlcize. All efforts have been made to 
resist the seduction. 
- 10-
f1iell, old bo\1. ..vou 've made the ancients 
ncdern. 
(Rousseau to Brancusi) 
1. Heresy and Orthodox_y_l_n _ _l!l_g 'Evangelical' Period 
When Newman was only fifteen, Walter Mayers, the schoolmaster 
responsible for converting him to a form of Calvinistic Evangelicalism, 
gave him a number of standard Evangelical books to nourish his 
sanctification. 1 Two of these were to have such an important effect upon 
him that, although writ ten near 1 y half a century later, the account in 
the Apologia Pro Vita Sua still conveys a sense of idealistic youthful 
enthusiasm. One was The Force of Truth by Thomas Scott of Aston 
Sandford, "to whom (humanly speaking) 1 almost owe my soul."-<='f'he other 
was Joseph Milner's History oF the Uwrch or" Christ: he was "nothing 
short of enamoured" 3 o f the long pa tr is tic ex tracts he found there. 
In the Apologia, Newman identifies Scott as having taught him 
orthodox Trinitarianism, "that fundamental truth of religion."4 Moreover, 
Scott's own journey towards orthodoxy was made in the milieu of the 
ascendancy of heresy - Unitarianism or Socinianism: 
He followed truth >-Jherever it led him, 
beginning with Unitarian ism, and ending with a 
zealous faith in the Holy Trinity.13 
Scott's own autobiographical section in The Force of Truth records 
more about the nature of heresy, and particularly about its human 
psycho logy, than Newman's own compressed account, so that it is 
possible to elaborate upon what is only sketched in the Apologia. Scott 
relates how, when in a state vacillating between regeneration and 
apostasy, he was irtt luenced by an instrument of the devil - a Soc in ian 
commentary on the Scriotures. This soothed his conscience, so that 
despite his sinfulness, he considered himself "a very worthy 
being ."6 Th is com men tnry reduced revelation to the human unders tnnd ing, 
enabling infidelity and pride to be concca led beneath a mask of 
reason7Scott declar·es that he had been "a Socinian, or very little 
t>etter,""""having concealed my real sentiments under the mask at general 
express ions.'09 
Scott was influenced by the madera te 'Ar.ian ism' or adopt ion ism of 
Samuel Clarke 1s Scriptur--e Doctrine of the Trinity and the r-·elated 
controversy became a "favourite part" of his "study".' 0 He narrates how 
the rationalist principle, once it has beg;un to work on revelation, is 
not content with madera t ion, with the result that those wno were first 
'Arians' (believers that Christ was in some sense supernatural but only 
by adoption) will eventually become Socinians (holding that Christ was 
no more than a mere man): 
~his is the natural progress of unnumbled 
re-3.son: from Arianism to s·oc in ian ism; from 
Socinianism ".o Deism;and thence to Atheism.;; 
This is the "down-hill road" which many learned and philosophical men 
have trod "almost, if not quite, to the bottom."12 It is, then, possible 
to conclude that Newman encountered at a very early age a haunting 
vision of the potential tragedy faced by every person - the slide into 
infidelity via heresy. 
Scott does think it possible, however, "to return by the retrograde 
path, first to Arianism and then to the received doctrine of the 
Trinity."13 ln the description of such a journey towards the orthodox 
faith, Newman would have found some of his first references to the 
doctrines of the early Church. It was, for instance, t~eading the Prayer 
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Book article about the Athanasian Creed, which first made Scott, while 
still a crypto-Socinian, consider the Trinitarian orthodoxy of the 
Church to which he belonged: 
When the psalm \·Jas named, I opened the pravet· 
book to turn to it: 0ut (accidentally S~'ill I 
say, or providentialJF?) I opened uoon :he 
articles of r•? l ig ion; and the eighth, respecting 
the authority and warrant of the Athanasian 
creed, i;nmediatel'.' engaged mv attention.~1v 
disbelief of the doctrine of the Tr-initv of 
coequal persc•ns in the unity of the Godhead. 
and my pr-etensions to candour,had both 
comb~ted to excite my hatred for this creed. No 
sooner did I read the \-IOrds ... than my mind was 
greatly impressed and affected.''' 
Moreover, in his correspondence with "Mr.N.", an orthodox Calvinist, 
Scott was daunted by the demonstration that his own position had "in 
all former ages of the Church .. been branded heretical."' 5 
Only a year or so at ter Newman had acquired his copy of The Force 
of Truth, his early undergraduate diaries show the influence of Scott's 
Trinitarianism. One of his earliest private reflections, in the for·m of 
"sermonets", was composed on the subject of the Athanas ian Creed, which 
had played such a central part in Scott's autobiography.''"·I:Jy liJ19, in 
his Hints on the A than as ian Creed, Newman was asserting its importance 
by associating it with what was at that time for him the authority of 
the Reformers. In the same diary entry, he stressed the necessity of 
dogmatic belief, dismissing as absurd that, in relation to the Divinity 
of Christ, "it matters not whether men believe him such or not."' 7 The 
entry immediately following points out that Jesus condemned as "crimes" 
equally faults of conduct and errors of belief.18By 1821, Newman seems 
to have begun to approach the distinction between the econom~ of the 
human language of revelation and the subsistent distinctions within the 
life of the Trinity which the economy conveys: 
The second person of 
called the Son of 
the Blessed Trinity is 
the Father, the Only-
- 13-
oegott<~n~ not in a liter-al sense. c·ut as tha 
nean~s t ::Jnd logy in human language to conve? 
the ice a of an incomorehens ib le celation 
between the Father and the Son.1e 
Two months later, he r-ecorded a dream in which the e;{hortation of a 
"mysterious visitant" reinforced this distinction between the 
difficulties of the human language of revelation and the transcendent 
_,.,.,.... 1.: 4-! -- .J..- - L "' l • f 
_ ---~- ... .__- .,......, .. v~.a.~'-4..1. VL''--:f ~U~Lj."t 
Amon~ other things it [the 'vis i ta.n t '] says that 
it was absolutely impossible for the reason of 
man to understand the mystery <I think) of the 
Holy Trinity and in vain to argue about it; but 
that every thing in another \.Jorld \vas so ~· 
very plain th:~ t ther·e \.Jas not the s l i;Sh test 
difficulty about it.::=:o 
It would, however, be misleading to sug-gest that the statement in 
the Apologia about Scott's Trinitarian L11fluence be taken at its face 
value, and that Newman had, between 1816 and 11:$21, evolved a clearly 
articulated Trinitarian theology which he regarded as the fundamental 
Christian dogma. On the contrary, the undergraduate Newman was more 
likely to regard the doctrine of the Atonement as the "keys tone of 
Christianity";-2 1 the shift ln emphasis from Atonement to Trinity has not 
yet taken place, still less the later characteristic polemic against 
Evangelicalism whereby it is suggested that centring attention, in 
preaching, on Christ's sacrifice for humanity endangers the objectivity 
of revelation to be found principally in the Trinity. Once, it is true, 
in 1821, Newman declares himself against the preaching of the 
Calvinistic doctrines of election and perseverance with the aim of 
converting the unregenerate22 - thereby anticipating the Tractarian 
doctrine of 'Reserve'23which often made the same point about the 
doctrine of the Atonement. It is, however, generally true of the period 
1816-1821 that Newman saw the Trinity as subordinated to the 
Atonement: for example, he defends the divinity of Christ as essential 
- 14-
to a real sacrifice for the sins of the t..Jorld.2 "" 
During this early period, Newman, like Scott, regards the main 
threat to Christian orthodoxy as Socinianism, seeing it as a form of 
rationalism by which revelation is rejected if it transgresses the 
bounds of human understanding: 
should 1 ike to knm.,r what the Soc in ians 
• • ..., ...J..,....,....__, J... ~--I l- •• f-! Lt. . . . 
t.J.J.J.Ut:::"l ~ VOllU Ult:: D1U11:::! 
it is £ (perhaps the) most difficult Christian 
grace, viz. the believing of something which is 
beyond our po•.Ners of reason and con trad ic tory 
to the imaginations of our sinful nature ... They 
walk by sight.:"'""' 
It will be observed that the idea of heresy as the assertion of human 
autonomy before the givenness of revelation, so highly developed in the 
later attack upon theological liberalism, is already in place. 
However, the later antithesis between Trinitarianism as the 
fundamental of Christianity, and Socinianism as, either overtly or in 
some concealed form, its denial - an antithesis which the later 
perspective of the Apologia presupposes - is not yet evident. Rather, 
Socinianism is only indirectly a threat to the Trinity: what it really 
challenges is the Atonement, and the reality of human sin, for which 
sacrifice must be made. It is from this perspective that Newman attacks 
the Socinian denial, or modification, of the Divinity of Christ: 
It is most strange that so philosophical a sect 
as the Soc in ians should believe Christ to be a 
mere man, yet to be 'far exalted above all 
principality and power etc not only of this 
world, but also etc' and to have 'all things 
put under his feet.' For, according to their 
Creed, sin is a venial, trivial matter, nor is 
this world extraordinarily circumstanced. How 
then is it to be be 1 ieved that the A lm igh ty 
should have distinguished this little globe?26 
Newman cannot see the need for a Christ at all without the urgent need 
for Atonement. If, however, Atonement is necessary, then the full 
divinity of Christ must be upheld: 
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E::cept on the (:>t-·thodo;.: scheme, hmv is the o.?e,j 
of a ~,.~~di:1tor ezolained? If !-!e rnade no 
atonement, what need of a creature praying his 
Cceator to be merciful <to man:e \1hat on 
empty, unmeaning f m·ma l i ty, to make a being 
\•Jho t •• Jou ld be '" i thou t au thot· i ty, influence & 
etc requisite to induce God to pardon 
sinnet·s.27 
God does not pardon "without any atonement" because "the law is 
God's law without the Atonement, as the "Socinian scheme" claims, for to 
omit the Atonement is to admit adjustment in the divine standard - and 
therefore in God's very holiness.29 
Although Scott's influence may be discerned between 1816 and 1821 
to be promoting both an awareness of heresy and a sense of Trinitarian 
orthodoxy, it is not true to say that in these years Newman necessarily 
saw the importance of the Fathers and heretics in the history of the 
early Church. There is little evidence that the early impression made by 
the long extracts in Joseph Milner, to which Newman so eloquently 
testified, had any influence upon his thinking while he was an 
undergraduate, although - as will be seen later - Milner's History did 
have a marked effect upon his writing of The Arians of the Fourth 
Century. Significantly, for all his preoccupation with Socinians, the 
obvious comparison between them and fourth-century Arians is 
completely absent, nor is there any attempt to discern a similar 
Tationalism' in the heretics of the early Church. 
The series of events which was to transform Newman from an 
Evangelical into an upholder of patristic orthodoxy were under wo.._'j as 
he was writing the last of his diary notes about the "Socinian scheme": 
in late 1820, there had been the fiasco of his performance in the 
Schools,30and soon to come was the news of his father's bankruptcy in 
late 1821.31 Then followed his election to the Oriel 
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fellowship,32bringing him tnto contact with the 'Noetics', powerful 
personalities who were to cause him first to modify, then to abandon, 
his Evangelicalism. Particularly important were Edward Hawkins, who 
between 1824 and 1825 brought to Newman's attention the role of 
Tradition in 'unauthoritatively' interpreting Scripture - "the quasi-
Catholic doctrine of Tradition, as a main element in ascertaining and 
teaching the truths of Christ ian i ty"33- and Richard Whately, who first 
sowed the idea of the independence of Church from State, and the 
wrongness of '81 that double usurpation, the interference of the Church in 
temporals, of the State in spirituals."134There was also the experience 
of his first pastoral work, in the often harrowing conditions of 
St.Clement's, that convinced him "that the religion which he had 
received from John Newton and Thomas Scott would not work in a 
parish."35Calvinism was a "system" which did not answer to human 
experience, and was "unreal".36 
Towards the end of the six years, 1822-1828, of his transition 
from Evangelical to 'Apostolical', under the influence of the 'Noetics', 
Newman became aware of a dangerous drift into "the Liberalism of the 
day": a critical attitude to the creeds and disparagement of the 
Fathers. Whately accused him of "Arianizing". Such, at any rate, is the 
testimony of the Apologia.37 Here, however, his very phraseology betrays 
a later perspective: 
I was just then very strong for that ante-
Nicene view of the trinitarian doctrine, which 
some writers, both Catholic and non-Ca tho 1 ic, 
have accused of wearing a sort of Arian 
exter' ior .'''E' 
He attributes to himself the disparagement of pre-Nicene orthodoxy, 
arising from a view of the early Fathers which he himself later 
attacked in both 'liberals' and Roman Catholics. 
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The Autobiographical Memoir, compiled a decade after the Apologia, 
also adverts to his transition from Evangelicalism. Here, he describes 
his early faith as having been half-Trinitarian and Incarnational, and 
half-Evangelical. The "four doctrines" which he held as "certain truths" 
were "the Ho 1 y Trinity .... the Incarnation ... Pre destination .... and the 
Lutheran apprehension of Christ.'~39The first three, being true Catholic 
doctrine and hence matters of indefectible certitude, remained with him, 
but the last, not being Catholic doctrine, could not be held with 
certitude - and so just faded away. It hardly needs to be pointed out 
that Newman is schematizing his early life in terms of the 1870 
Grammar of Assent.40 
The Autobiographical Memoir also touches upon the 'liberal' phase 
of Newman's transitional period, but in a manner somewhat different 
from that of the Apologia: 
A cold Arminian doctrine, the fir-st stage of 
Libet'a lism, was the characteristic aspect, both 
of the high and dry Anglicans of that day and 
of the Oriel divines:• 1 
This is a unique passage in Newman: the potential slide into liberalism 
is presented not - as so often later - via Evangelicalism, 
Protestantism, popular or otherwise, or biblicism,42but via the 
upholders of creed, liturgy, establishment, Arminianism and orthodoxy -
the ''Z's",43 who are collocated with Noetics such as Whately and 
Hawkins. By contrast, the Evangelicalism from which Newman is departing 
is praised for its holiness and spirituality, and criticised, not for a 
heretical, or liberal, tendency, but for impracticality!44 From the cold 
intellectualism of Arminianism, Newman declares he was "saved" by 
"imaginative devotion" to the Fathers of the Church, gained from Joseph 
Milner's History during schooldays. As if to reinforce the impression of 
the patristic basis of even his early days, he details occasions of 
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patristic study undertaken in 1823, 1825-6 and 1828, before the 
systematic reading of the Fathers, begun in 1828.A"' 
These two accounts, taken together, raise some difficulties and 
contradictions with regard to Newman's brief 'liberal' phase. He was 
'Arianizing' and disparaging the pre-Nicene Fathers, who were at the 
same time the objects of his devoted study! Moreover, the source of his 
4~ hn ~~ ~""'"'"' .-.ln., ... • nno mlo-ht .ovn<=trt It tn hP rlPrfvPti frnm , 
'Noetics' such as Whately - yet the latter was Newman's orthodox 
accuser, while the High Church orthodox seem to share the blame for his 
liberalism. 
Some clarification is provided by reference to Newman's writings at 
the time of his 'Arianizing', which reveal a complex picture of his 
understanding of heresy and orthodoxy somewhat different again from 
the foregoing accounts. In his Journal in early 1828, he wrote as part 
of his retrospective account of the previous year: 
At Easter I had to preach the usual sermon in 
the College chapel and got in to some little 
controversy about it. The Provost Copleston 
liking it, recommended it to Whately <part of 
it was on the Divinity of Christ), who accused 
it of Arianism. Hawkins thought it dangerous, 
and Blanco White thought it systematized more 
than Scripture does. So it must have been 
faulty more or less.A"' 
The offending sermon was On the Mediatorial Kingdom of Christ , 
<No.160), preached on April 15th, 1827, which Newman did not choose to 
include in any of the volumes of his published sermons,A 7 The 
criticisms to which it was subjected in the form of marginal 
annotations made upon the manuscript by Whately, Hawkins and Blanco 
White are extant, and provide a clear picture of the varying kinds of 
censure to which Newman was being subjected. 
The!:;e cr·i t 1c isms e:en tr·ed upon the second 'point • of the sermon, "the 
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economy of the Mediatorial Kingdom of Christ - from El review of which, 
it follows ... that the Son of God, as Mediator-, is in.ferlor to the 
Father"48 Whately was the most definite of the three to say that 
Newman had 'Arianized'; Hawkins is, for example, altogether more 
cautious. Newman argued that, "whatever the or ig ina l glory and power of 
the Son of God", he is not denying His pre-existent eternity. 
Nevertheless, when we consider Him as the Mediator and restorer of 
fallen humanity, it is "more agreable" to this redemptive scheme to see 
Him as "in a subordinate character, in the form of a servant," and to 
represent Him as "inferior to the Father." Whately drew the strictly 
logical conclusion: 
This leaves no alternative be tween supposing 
Christ to be the Media tor in his human 
capacity alone <the man. Jesus) and downright 
Arianism or at least the most objectionable 
part of it.< 4 E') 
Against the central idea of the sermon - that there was a mediatorial 
Kingdom of Christ, to be distinguished from the Kingdom of God the 
Father, Whately inveighed: 
How then on your view, can He, the head of 
this kingdom, be Himself God, if He is to 
resign it in order that God may be a 11 In 
all?(AEl) 
Whately is not suggesting that Newman was deliberately Arianizing, 
but, rather, comment log upon a tendency in Newman's use of language 
when describing Christ's salvific "incomprehensible condescension" and 
self-abasement: 
the impress ion which it leaves on the fee lings 
of those who dwell on it (however cautiously 
stated) will inevitably be either Tr ithe ism, or 
such a conscious danger of it as will turn 
men's thoughts from the whole subject.( 4 En 
A note Newman himself added to the annotated sermon implies that, 
althou~h "quite awar·e" of the "difficulty" to which his approach was 
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leading. "the scanty limits of a sermon prevented my entering into it." 
lf Newman was deemed Arian, it is possible to see Whately as 
verging upon the Sabellian. Commenting upon one of Newman's quotations 
from I Corinthians, 
'To us there is but 
whom ar·e all things 
Lord Jesus Christ, 
and we by Him,' c•o, 
Whately demanded rhetorically, 
one God, the Father·, of 
and we in Him - and one 
by whom are all things 
Is not this Cas well as numberless other 
texts) against the notion of any divine 
character in the Son distinct from the 
Father who is the One God7' 48 , 
Whately's view sprang from extreme scepticism about the capacity of 
human language to express, or of the mind to comprehend, the 
Trinitarian distinctions: since no good "practical result" could accrue, 
he declares it better "to waive the discussion" and to "dwell on the 
practical doctrine of the Trinity, viz: the relations of God to us." From 
this distinctively b!hatelian position, Hawkins somewhat demurred: 
Doubt less there are hosts of texts on the 
great doctrine of the Unity - but there is 
some mysterious distinction too. ' 48 , 
Newman's main accuser, then, tended to deny Trinitarian distinctions 
upon practical grounds and to hold that the Trinity should be seen as 
the expression of certain "relations" between God and us. This 
encounter between Newman and Whately was a fateful one, for it 
provided the germ of an idea which Newman was to expand very 
considerably eight years later, when, at the height of the Hampden 
controversy, he used the concept of Sabellianism to describe theological 
liberalism."' 9 A comment written against the Journal entry of this time 
is clearly a gloss written from this later perspective - he had not 
read George Bu1"1';;0 by 1827 - although it is possible that it also 
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records the dis t inc t 1 ve l fne taken by t.he protagonists L11 discuss ions 
on the sermon at the time: 
<It [the sermon] took without knowing it 
Bull's doctrine of the 'subordinatio filii'. 
Whately, Hawkins and Blanco White were all 
then verging towards Sabellianism 
themselves. ) 51 
Another later reminisrP.nrP of thP inririPnt. virtw'lllv rPn<>Rh:o thic: ui""-'' 
It [the sermon] took the view of the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity, which I 
afterwards C i.e. in 1831, 1832) found to be 
the ante-nicene [sf~ view,especially on the 
point of the 'subordination of the Son'. 
Bull <whom at that time I had not read) 
brings it out in one of his chapters. 52 
In 1835, he identified the cause of Sabellianism as a lapse into 
modality in resulting from a failure to hold to the principatus of the 
Father.63 
Newman's Memorandum, written a little less than a month after the 
sermon itself, and therefore very close to the discussions about it, 
presents a very different picture from these accounts coloured by a 
later perspective, althoughp indeed, it shares one characteristic with 
his later remarks - an exquisite amalgam of remorse and self-abasement 
with self-justification and special pleading. Newman admits, in this 
Memorandum, that, although there is ~othing wrong" with it, the 
"partial view .. one view out of several" might, in the case of the 
Trinity, be "very inexpedient" and he admits that he ought to have 
added 
some strong sentences explicitly stating 
that the foregoing statement was only one 
view of the Scripture doctrine, one side and 
aspect of the great structure of the economy 
of the redemption. 54 
On the other hand, 
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I c!o not see at present that am wrong. ~·c. 
He justifies his peculiar position in the sermon as having been adopted 
to account for the "difficulty" presented by the idea of divine Sonshig, 
one solution being "to understand 'the Son' always of our Lord's human 
nature."5 '"'Surprisingly - in view of later developments in Newman's life 
- his view of the Trinity as a result of the discussion is almost 
1aen~1cat WlLn tnat ot ~nately, and indicates an influence of the latter 
upon him, or at least substantial agreement, which later accounts of 
the incident altogether suppress: 
as cordially dislike all discussions 
concerning the nature of God,and 
speculations about the mode of His Existence 
as three and One, as the most strong opposer 
of Bishops Pearson and Beveridge. I do not 
even like the words Trinity, Person, 
Procession etc etc - indeed any systematic 
exposition of the doctrine but what is 
relative to us and practical. 67 
The MemorandUiiJ culminates in Newman's first reflection upon the 
nature of early Church heresy, in its relation to orthodoxy: 
The Church has at times been accused of 
Arianism - Arianism (in the main) is true -
so is Sabellianism- <in its first outline) 
Unitarianism- but not the whole Truth- yet 
for particular purposes, according to 
particular occasions, it may be useful to 
represent the Catholic doctrine in this or 
that form.se 
Newman explains the process whereby he slipped into an appearance of 
heresy by reference to the calling of the preacher, his being 'all 
things to all men', in order to bring them to Christ. The preacher may, 
Newman argues, for a "particular" occasion, present a partial view of 
Christian doctrine. How, then, does the orthodox preacher differ from 
the here t ic, who also art icu la tes a partial v lew, true enough as far as 
it goes? Newman's approach to this problem anticipates his future 
bear~tngs with regacd to heresy; the orthodox is, in the best and most 
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humane sense, a rhetorician - he is adapting the material of the 
Christian Tradition, in order to persuade his audience either to 
conversion or repentance, a metanoia; yet the "form" is to be 
distinguished from "the Catholic doctrine", to which the particular 
rhetorical forms are obedient and implicitly refer.59Thus the Church on 
certain occasions -and Newman on this one - may be vindicated from 
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the latter was merely concerned "to account for a dlfficulty".60 
Newman's grasp of the importance of Trinitarian orthodoxy tightened 
during the months following the criticisms to which his sermon was 
subjected. By June, 1828, 61 for example, he was referring to the 
Doctrine of the Trinity with a wholehearted assent, very different from 
the 1827 Memorandum's reservations about 'persons' and 'processions'. In 
fact, the sermon on the Mediatorial Kingdom has been described as "the 
watershed between the mainly evangelical style at St Clement's, and the 
patristically inspired sermons at St Mary's.'062However, by 1828, events 
were beginning which were to effect a profound modification in Newman's 
view of heresy and orthodoxy. 
In conclusion, Newman absorbed the 'moderate' and Trinitarian 
Calvinism of Thomas Scott, but his own picture of his early years 
overestimates the presence of what were later positions. His own brush 
with heresy, his 'Arianizing' and the 'Sabellianism' of those who were at 
that time his friends, colleagues and accusers, was to gain importance 
in the light of future events: the break with Whately, the tragic fall, 
in Newman's v lew ,of Blanco White in to Unitarian ism .630ne might add the 
fact that one of Newman's nearest approaches to heresy on his own part 
had arisen from a peculiarly Evangelical emphasis: the presentation of 
the doctrine of the nature of Christ in terms of its redemptive effect, 
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by the preachi.ng of the Atonement. The mature Newman was consistently 
hard upon this whecever he met it, censuring it as a dangerous form of 
anthropocentric subjectivism.64Perhaps the reason is because he had 
once found it in himself. 
and its Bac~und . 
By 1828, Newman was in a state of transition 1 between 
Evangelicalism and a new position he was to create for himself -
Tractarianism. His strictures during this period upon Evangelical 
excesses resemble later Tractarian language, but are in fact no more 
than would have been acceptable to Clapham evangelicals, who were also 
appalled by the pentecostal excesses of Edward Irving.2 Neither does 
Newman's defence of the Established Church in the late 1820's 
necessarily mean that he can no longer, in some sense, be called an 
evangelical himself, for the Clap ham Sect also revered the visible, 
sacramental authority of the Church of England.3 Newman's first 
contributions towards ecclesiJtical politics at least began from a 
" 
moderate evangelical position. 
In early nineteenth-century England, legislation against 
heterodoxy, Dissent and Roman Catholicism was slowly being relaxed. In 
1812, the Conventicle and Five-Mile Acts had been repealed,4 and, in the 
same year, a Bill was passed without debate, publicly supported by the 
Primate, removing criminal penalties against those who denied the 
Doctrine of the Trin1ty.6 In 1828, upon the Repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts, what had for some years been practically admitted by 
annual acts of indemnity was finally and officially recognised, that 
those outside the Church of England could hold public office.6 This had 
passed off without widespread controversy. Such measures are an 
indication of the Church of England's sense of security, rather than of 
any impending threat.?However, alarm began to spread with the Bill to 
emancipate Roman Catholics in 1829.9 By 1832, the Reform Bill9 had widened 
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the franchise in such a way as to give power to those hostile to the 
Church, and the newly-constituted House of Commons could no longer· be 
seen as the lay synod of the Church of England, of one mind with the 
clergy, in the promotion of a national faith. Suddenly, the great cry was 
reform of the Church of England - its wealth, its sees, its liturgy, 
creeds and anathemas. The bishops, who had opposed the widening of the 
franchise in the Lords, were never more unpopular. Parliamentary 
committees, not necessarily friendly to the Church or even composed of 
its members, were being set up. It was widely believed that the days of 
the established Church were numbered. 10A political party arose, 
influenced by Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, whose 
"vital principle"11 was the destruction of the Establishment. 
Newman was first fired to defence of the Establishment over 
Catholic Emancipation in 1829. In taking a definite political stance over 
this issue, and campaigning vigorously against the re-election of Robert 
Peel, High Churchman and chosen representative of the Oxford Tories, who 
had, in 1829, executed a complete volte face, 12he was not obviously 
aligning himself with any particular ecclesiastical party: churchmen, and 
for that matter, opinion in the country generally, were divided. There 
was much sentimental loyalty to George III,13who had always opposed 
Emancipation for fear of violating his Coronation Oath. Surprisingly, 
some later seen as 'liberals' were against - for example, Copleston. The 
Evangelicals, usually unanimous on Church-State issues, were divided -
William Wilberforce was for, and suffered opprobrium from his own party 
on this account; Dan ie 1 Wilson changed his mind from against to for. 
Similarly, the High Church party failed to present a united front -
Daubeney was strongly against, but Alexander Knox was for. 14 Newman and 
Pusey campaigned on opposite sides. Blanco White and Newman both 
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switched abruptly from previously held positions. 15 
lt is therefore important to understand Newman's precise reasons 
for his venture into politics, and in order to appreciate his triumphant 
feelings at the return of Sir Robert Inglis,16 and the discomfiture of 
Peel. Newman saw such reforms as proposed by Parliament, not as goods in 
themselves, but as part of a progressive strategy to erode the authority 
of the Church of England. Writing to his sister, Jemima, in March, 1829, 
Newman explained the motivation behind his by now successful campaign: 
I am in principal {sicl Anti-Catholic - i.e. 
I think there is a grand attack on the 
church in progress from the Utilitarians and 
Schismatics - and the first step in a long 
chain of events is accidentally the granting 
of these claims. 17 
Here, Newman identifies a process of secularisation as concealed 
beneath apparently benign reforms. The potential slide into national 
infidelity is equated with an attack upon the visible Church's social 
dominance. Significantly, the rationalist and infidel prong of this 
attack ("the Utilitarians") are not distinguished from Dissenters 
("Schismatics") - they are both alike threats to the visible mediation 
of grace through ecclesial structures. 
Newman elaborates this idea in a letter to his mother, writ ten just 
over a week later than the letter to Jemima. Here, he expresses at 
length what might be described as a theory of secularisation, in order 
to make clear the principles upon which he is defending the established 
Church. He argues that the context of the "novel era" to which the 
crisis of the times is the inaugural sign is "an advance towards 
universal education."113Whereas in the past, people depended upon others 
- particularly the clergy - for their opinions, "now each man attempts 
to judge for himself ."19Although "liberty of thought" and "free inquiry" 
are not, in principle, enemies of Christianity,20 they are so at the 
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present, because they are directed towards dissolving the very 
structure by which it has been mediated, a structure functioning by 
subordination and deference. Newman therefore places Christianity and 
the autonomy of human judgment in direct antithesis one to another: 
Christianity is of faith, modesty, 
lowliness, subordination; but the spirit at 
work against it is one of latitudinarianism, 
indifferentism, republicanism, and schism. a 
~p1r1t wn1cn tends to overthrow doctrine, as 
if the fruit of bigotry,and discipline as if 
the instrument of priestcraft. 21 
This is the first occurrence in Newman of "latitudinarian", a word to be 
used in the Tractarian period as an equivalent both of theological 
liberalism and of heresy:22 it is the view that opinions on religious 
subjects are a matter of indifference, that one truth is as good as 
another. The question of orthodoxy <"doctrine"), and the latitudinarian 
challenge to it, is presented both in an ecclesial framework ("schism") 
and in a political one ("republicanism"). Newman is anticipating with 
dread the disestablishment of the Church, a "revolution" which will 
leave "the upper classes" religionless, and the clergy dependent on 
their congregations for "voluntary contributions". He also fears the 
withdrawal of parliamentary protection for the Church of England's 
doctrine.23 
Newman's list of the upholders of "liberty of thought" and enemies 
of Christianity reveals his profound social and political conservatism 
at this time: they are the uneducated or partially educated in towns 
("deistical or worse"), Utilitarians <"political economists, useful 
knowledge people"), schismatics <"in and out of the Church"), Calvinistic 
Baptists, "the high circles in London", and "political indifferentists", 
men so far gone they might become Roman Catholics or Socinians as 
circumstances dictate. Again, Dissent - the schismatics - is collocated 
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with infidelity. Calvinism is finuly repudiated - and even Thomas 
Scott's moderate Calvinism dismissed as inconsistent with itself and 
therefore likely to produce men unreliable in a crisis.24The suggestion 
that Roman Ca tho lie ism is also in some way tending to infidelity is 
explained in another letter of the same time, to his sister, Harriet: 
though I am used to think the country has 
uv" ::ov muc.;u ~;o aread trom Romanistic 
opinions, <the danger seeming to be on the 
side of infidelity), yet there is a general 
impression which Blanco White's book 
confirms, that infidelity and Romanism are 
compatible, or rather connected, with each 
other. 26 
Blanco White, himself a lapsed Roman Catholic priest, had endeared 
himself to the Establishment by his writings revealing the scepticism 
and indifferentism of continental Romanism - and Newman here accepts 
Blanco's line quite uncritically. The enemies of Christianity are, in 
fact, anything at all which is not the established Church. 
The last two paragraphs of Newman's letter to his mother take on 
an altogether more sophisticated air, as he expounds a "theory" of 
secular is at ion: 
"Listen to my theory. 26 
This 11 theory" arises from the idea to which he had first adverted, the 
link between the Church-State crisis and the spread of education: "the 
talent of the day is against the Church.'127which depends on - he admits 
it - "'prejudice and blgotry".29Upon this unpromising foundation, he 
builds a defence of the established Church, explaining how it is capable 
of mediating Christianity not only to the educated, but also to the 
ignorant. It is one of his earliest suggestions of the connections 
between, on the one hand, doctrinal truth with moral soundness, and, on 
the other, error with moral shallowness. 
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Newman begins by applying to the social sphere an argument from 
.ind i v idua 1 conscience: 
As each individual has certain instincts of 
r-ight and wrong, antecedently to reasoning, 
on which he acts and rightly so, which 
pervet-se reasoning may supplant, 1-1hich then 
can hardly be t-egained, but, if regained, 
\vill be regained from a different sout-ce, 
from reasoning, not from natut'e, so, 
Newman's later distinction between 'moral sense' and 'sense of 
obligation'30 is not yet in place: rather, he argues that individuals have 
an a priori instinct about the rightness or wrongness of specific 
act ions. If, however, a certain kind of perverse in te llectua lism tampers 
with this, the instinct will be lost, the spontaneous communing with 
''nature" broken, so that a moral code will then have to be 
reconstructed - laboriously, it is implied - by means of reason, if, 
indeed, the individual is capable of this. Newman applies this idea to 
revelation. He is not suggesting that - as with moral truths - doctrine 
is in some way innate; the point of comparison is rather the .J;acitngs~ 
of both morality and doctrine. In the case of revelation, truths have 
been unquestioningly handed down, as an implicit part of the history of 
a society - he does not call this 'Tradition': 
These [revealed truths] are transmitted as 
the 'wisdom of our ancestors', through men, 
many of whom cannot enter into them, or 
receive them themselves, still on, on, from 
age to age, not the less truths, because 
many of the generations, through which they 
are transmitted, are unable to prove them, 
but hold them either from pious and honest 
feeling (it may be) or from bigotry or from 
prejudice.:::, 
These truths are only in principle or in theo.ry rationally proveable. ln 
practice, it is "for great men alone", such as Hooker or Butler, "to 
prove great ideas or grasp them." The authority of such theologians 
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derives frrom theirr ~or:.a.J profundity. But in the field of argument what 
requires moral depth for its apprehension Hill not normally Hin the 
day: 
as moral evil triumphs over good on a small 
field of action, so in the argument of an 
hour, or the compass of a volume. 32 
This exo la ins how Brougham or Wes lev gain the advantage over Hooker or 
Butler in people's minds - Newman's premisses commit him to the 
conclusion that dissenting theology is inferior to Anglican. Thus the 
established Church mediates to the English people truths which, because 
of the proneness of the large part of humanity to shallowness, can only 
be received tacitly: 
Moral truth is gained by patient study, by 
calm reflection, silently as the dew falls, 
unless miraculously given, and, when gained, 
it is transmitted by faith and by 
'prejudice'. Keble' s book is full of such 
truths; which any Cambridge man might refute 
with the greatest ease. 33 
The final reference to Keble points to the probable ult~ate source 
of Newman's connection between the capacity to receive revealed truth 
with full assent, and moral character or ethos.34Although he had 
already, simply and briefly 1n his 1819 Journal, made this connect1on,36 
Keble's characteristic exaltation of ethos36 over intellect would have 
reinforced it, providing a powerful means of explaining the presence of 
heterodoxy. Moreover, we may see 1n Newman's advocacy here of the 
transmission of the •Hwisdom of our ancestors"', Keble's socially 
conservative reverence for the daily round of rural peasant life, 
steeped in the liturgies and traditions of the Church of England.37 
Keble's ardent disciple, Hurrell Froude. who was largely responsible 
for bringing Newman and Keble together, had in July, 1827, written On 
the Connexion between a Right Faith and Right Practice; on the Ethos of 
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Heresy. In four closely-argued pages, Froude achieves a level of 
systematic speculation upon the nature of heresy, which Newman had yet 
not attained. Froude's argument is directed against the idea that two 
distinct principles of causality, that is, right faith and right practice, 
operate in relation to salvation. Rather, the two must be connected, 
since it is possible to be as responsible for one's beliefs as for one's 
actions. Froude advances his argument in three stages. First, he asserts 
that opinion and character are "homogenous": opinions generate a 
"temper"of mind, a "temper", conversely, generates specific opinions. 
Now, when condemning an QPinJon as "vicious", we are really condemning 
"the same temper which developes [sicl itself indifferently either in 
opinions or actions."38Secondly, working from the premiss that "variety" 
of opinions cannot be accounted for by variety in the "reasoning 
faculty", he concludes that such variation must be derived from 
difference of character (ethos).39Thirdly, the partisan spirit in which 
disagreements are conducted shows that the "affections" are "engaged" -
it is not simply a question of reasoning; similarly, unity between those 
holding the same opinion is a sharing of ethos: 
we cannot suppose 
opinion, has any 
segregate. '' 0 
that opinion, quatenus 
po>-Jer to at tach or 
Moreover, some "affections" have "an essential tendency to produce 
particular opinions."41 There is, then, an ethos of heresy. 
The common atmosphere between Froude and Newman is clear: both 
identify intellectual with moral soundness, and it is likely that Froude 
influenced Newman in this instance - at least in conversation,42 if he 
had not by this time read the passage in Froude 's Occasion a 1 Though ts. 
However, Froude's last two paragraphs reveal a more definite relation to 
Newman's "theory" expounded in the letter to his mother. Froude connects 
the idea of ethos with the tacit. dimension of faith: 
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The vecy notion of right and wrong implies 
that it is wr-ong not to respect .. LL previous 
to all rational conviction concerning its 
nature. As revelation is useless without· 
reason to peeve its truth, so reason is 
worth nothing without instinct to enforce 
its suggestions. 43 
Here, Froude is discussing the rightness or wrongness of opinions - and 
his points apply to "matters of faith" as well as "questions of 
morality". As evidence for the instinctual, tacit pre-apprehension of 
truth, Froude points to the common social requirement of responsibility 
for actions demanded in the case even of those who are at the pre-
rational or infantile stage of existence; such a requirement 
at a period of our lives when we are 
incapable of appreciating any other evidence 
than the authoritative declarations of those 
who take care of us, 
of implicit faith, 
protect us from any 
vicious."' 4 
proves that the absence 
which alone can <then) 
vice, must in itself be 
Newman's ''theory" takes over this idea of the tacit moral instinct of 
infants, but applies it to the corporate life of faith in its entirety, 
where most people, with the exception of the "great", are children who 
must accept what is handed down with unselfconscious obedience. Here, 
Newman considerably modifies Froude's line: the latter is concerned with 
the individual, and specifically with heresy, the former with the social 
mediation of Christianity and the nature of the challenges to such 
mediation - Newman has not yet seen the advantages of relating this to 
heresy. 
It is the sermons between the defeat of Peel in February, 1829, 
and the composition of Arians in June, 1831, which show most clearly his 
evolving response to heresy and orthodoxy, in the context of an 
embattled Establishment. First, he is by now clear that the Church 
upholds a distinct body of patristic doctrine. His systematic study of 
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the Fathers, begun in 1828, was proceeding chronologically. By mid-1828, 
he had begun the Apostolic Fathers,45 who could hardly have been more 
relevant to his preaching programme in the late 1820's: St Clement of 
Rome and, especially, St Ignatius of Antioch,46 never tire of stressing 
the apostolic authority of the bishop, the deposit of doctrine he guards 
and teaches. and the need for visible Church unitv in the face of schism 
and heretical novelty.47 Secondly, Newman characterises the opponents of 
the Church according to a particular ethos or character, so that his 
ecclesial and doctrinal conservatism is supported by a rhetoric employing 
subtle psychological analysis, often verging upon satire. 
The call to obey the objective teaching of a visible Church body 
is clearly announced in Religious Faith Rational, preached on 24th May, 
1829.49 Here, Newman reacts strongly against the extreme 'Evangelical' 
pattern of faith, against, that is, the idea of faith as a psychological 
process whereby a person appropriates the work of Christ: 
When faith is said to be a religious 
principle, it is <I repeat) the things 
believed, not the act of believing them, 
which is peculiar to religion. 49 
The deposit of teaching may, in fact, be contrary to human experience, 
requiring the faith of Abraham, who was led "to believe God's word, even 
when opposed to his own experience."50But how, if the obedience of faith 
is contrary to experience, do we know that we are obeying God? How did 
Abraham know that he was obeying the voice of a divine command? The 
implications of these questions, which Newman faces squarely enough, 
may be translated, in the light of the historical background of the late 
1820's, as, 'How can it be shown that dissent from the established body, 
and heterodox challenging of creeds and articles, are acts of 
disobedience to God?' Newman refuses to answer this discursively: to do 
so would be to disrupt the rhetorical structure of the sermon, which 
- 35-
functions by assertion, end to introduce an agenda whereby the givGnness 
of revelation, and the authority of the Established Church as its 
mediator, might be opened out to interrogation. Instead, he sustains the 
rhetorical thrust of the sermon by an appeal to ethos, drawing upon the 
tacit grounds of obedience in innate conscience; it is a bold - and 
....... ,! .. ,.. ___ ..... 
instinctual pre-apprehension: 
We obey God primarily because we actually 
feel His presence in our consciences bidding 
us obey Him. 61 
Therefore he exhorts, in the face of troublesome questions, 
For ourselves, let us but obey God's voice 
in our hearts. 62 
But those who pursue such questions - Dissenters, sceptics, infidels or 
here tics - have an entirely different ethos: 
They set up some image of freedom in their 
minds, a freed om from the shack 1 es of 
dependence, which they think their natural 
right, and which they aim to gain for 
themselves; a liberty, much like that which 
Satan aspired after, when he rebelled 
against God. 63 
Intellectual autonomy puts the doubters outside the reach of Newman's 
rhetoric, for they have separated themselves from the tacit and 
instinctual: 
Their conscience is as their reason is; and 
it is placed within them by Almighty God in 
order to balance the influence of sight and 
reason; and yet they will not attend to 
it,64 
Somewhat crudely he states the "plain reason" for which they have cut 
themselves off: 
they love sin, - they love to be their own 
masters and therefore they will not attend 
to that secret whisper of their hearts, 
which tells them they ar-e not their own 
masters and that sin is hateful and 
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ruinous. •:;s 
Newman, then, roots deference to authority in the "secret whisper" of 
conscience, in order to legitimate the es tab 1 ished religion against the 
subversive stirrings of critical doubt. 
In a sermon of the following month, The Christian Nysteries,56 in 
which he treats of the Doctrine of the Trinitv. NP.wmRn follnwc: 
substantially the same line: in the matter of revealed truths, "religious 
light is intellectual darkness."67Reception of religious truth entails 
being "told something",59 rather than thinking something out: it is a 
matter of ethos - hence, Jesus 
spoke in parables, that they might see and 
hear, yet not understand, a righteous 
de teet ion of insincerity; whereas the same 
difficulties and obscurities, which offended 
religious men, would but lead the humble and 
meek to seek for more light. 59 
It is conscience which sustains the believer when doubts pain him, but 
it is only the one who cuts himself off from conscience who gives way. 
The strategy Wlderlying Newman°s rhetoric is made explicit in a 
sermon entitled Submission to Church Authority,60 preached towards the 
end of 1829: the precepts of the Book of Proverbs - to hold what has 
been given, 'turning neither to the left nor the right 061 - are applied 
to the contemporary situation of the beleaguered Church of England: 
the present time, when religious unity and 
peace are so lamentably disregarded, and 
novel doctrines and new measures alone are 
popular, they naturally remind us of the 
duty of obedience to the Church, and of the 
sin of departing from it, or what our Litany 
prays against under the name of 'heresy and 
schism' . 62 
Behind the outline of the embattled Establishment, Newman discerns the 
maimed form of the ancient Church. Me describes with much pathos how 
the once united "vast Catholic body" has been smashed into fragments, 
"just as some huge barrier cliff which once boldly fronted the sea is at 
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length cleft, parted, overthrown by the waves.'"'"3 Buffeted by the assaults 
of a new paganism, amidst "rebuke and blasphemy", stand the adherents of 
the Church of England, "clinging to our own portion of the Ancient Rock 
which the waters are roaring round and would fain overthrow.'064The link 
between the ancient Christianity out of which the creeds emerged, and 
~:"'- P" ~~ca'~' ~;::, !:3l,J.11 JU!:it. 111 p1ace, DU'C stramed to breaking point. 
Newman's discussion of heresy in this sermon starts from an 
examination of the New Testament texts in the epistles about 'parties' 
( 
<atpeueu;> in the earliest Christian communities: his first two texts, 
from I Corinthians and Titus, refer to what the Authorised Version 
translates as "heresies" and "heretic" ,65 but it is pass ib le that he has 
in mind the New Testament, as opposed to the early Church sense of 
c 
atpeuu;, for the third text he quotes - from Romans66 - refers to those 
who cause "divisions and offences" ("Cat; 6tJ(OU"Cauuxt; xat -ra (TJ(avliaAa>. 
Influenced by the crisis of his own times, he brings heresy close to 
schism. The threat of 'party spirit' emerges clearly in his definitions: 
heresies are "private persuasions, self-formed bodies," and a heretic is 
"one who adopts some opinion of his own in religious matters, and gets 
about him followers.'167 
Newman holds out only one hope for those who would avert 
complete .. overthrow" of the Church - obedience.69 The Church cannot 
complacently rest in the claim of infallibility, <a shaft at Rome hereD, 
and, since teaching error is, therefore, possible, the whole body of the 
faithful must, by deference and obedience, contribute to the holding 
together of that polity, the "visible Church", which transmits revelation: 
a system of laws, a bond of subordination 
connecting all in one, is the <next> best 
mode of securing the stability of sacred 
Truth. The whole body of Christians thus 
become the trustees of it, to use the 
language of the wor-ld, and, in fact, have 
thus age after age transmit ted it down to 
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Deliberate Dlsse.nt, the physkal separation from the Church of England, 
is as sinful as the intellectual separation from conscience of the 
rationalist sceptic: ''There is not a dissenter living, but, inasmuch and 
so far as he dissents, is in a sin."70Separation is an "evil" in itself. 
On the other hand, obedience is a good in itself: Hammond, the Laudlan 
was no choice at all as "the happiest state of life."71 
Newman was not only addressing the tradesmen and shopkeepers of 
Oxford while Vicar of St. Mary's - he was also from time to time 
continuing his examination of the nature of faith in the University 
Sermons, addressed to the academic community. The second of these, 
preached in April, 1830, examines more rigorously and philosophically 
than his 'parochial' sermons the relation between conscience and faith. 
Nevertheless, the line taken, as he applies himself to the problem of 
theological error, has a close relation to the approach we have already 
seen emerging in 1829. The existence of errors is explained by reference 
to a separation between, on the one hand, the abstracting power of the 
intellect and, on the other, an instinctive orientation, the unspecific, 
innate sense of obligation, which, when progressively lived out in the 
performance of moral acts, develops into a specific sense of duty, 
described as an unerring form of ethical knowledge, "moral revelation"72 
Newman's starting point, then, is the particular individual trying to live 
out concretely his or her instinct in acts, an undertaking which 
necessarily involves the soci;U. 
The discussion, later in the sermon, of the relation between the 
natural and revealed returns to the theme of the destructiveness of the 
separative intei!ect, ln or'der to explain the rise of Deism and 
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(eighteenth-century> Arianism. Revealed religion is, Newman e:ll:plains, 
concrete: its method of communication is by the impact made upon 
particular individuals, that is, by "personation"73 The Incarnation, the 
very basis of Christian revelation, is particular; consequently, the 
Church is "teaching religious truths historically, not by 
investigation."74Natural religion, on the other hand, concerns itself with 
"principle"; its abstraction tends towards a form of idolatry: 
in whatever degree we approximate towards a 
mere standard of excellence, we do not 
really advance towards it, but bring it to 
us; the excellence we venerate becomes part 
of ourselves we become a God to 
ourselves. 76 
Abstraction drives the individual into a tragic solipsistic state, 
narrow and lonely, cut off from the springs of religious life. 
Two kinds of a priori, therefore, are set in opposition to each 
other. There is, first, the approach to God through response to innate 
conscience, the orthodox ethos. Secondly, there is the application of a 
priori principles to the givenness of revelation; these principles are 
not, like conscience, integral to human nature, but the abstract 
distillations of liberal attitudes, the premisses of the heretical temper, 
a mentality which Newman had already met years before in his unstable 
brother, Charles76 
The philosophy of religious knowledge expounded in the second 
University Sermon was constantly being translated into the rhetoric of 
his parochial sermons, where characterisation, or, rather, an appeal to a 
psychological typification drawing upon common wisdom and experience, 
does the work of argument and analysis. Newman's task of popular 
exposition is, of course, made easier by the compatibility of ethos with 
character-presentation. One of his most remarkable attempts at such 
characterisation of heresy is his sermon, The Self-Wise Enquirer,77 
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pr-eached sil( months after the second University Sermon. 1 t is a 
miniature biogr-aphy, in which the 'self-wise' main character proceeds on 
an infidel's progress, terminating in the formal profession of heresy. It 
describes the life of one "in whom intellectual power is fearfully 
unfolded amid the neglect of moral truth."78The slide into what 
eventually becomes heresy begins with a "contest between our instinctive 
sense of right and wrong and our weak and conceited reason.~79The 
r-ationalistic element wins, and, now trusting in his own powers, our 
character begins to despise the given revelation; he is impatient of it, 
fearing that it will "interfere with his own imaginary 
discoveries.'080This moral and religious collapse takes place "when 
childhood and boyhood are past and the time comes for our entrance into 
life."'81 In childhood, the innate moral sense had been unquestioningly 
obeyed, <there is, perhaps, an echo of Hurrell Froude here), but the 
pressure of adult life engenders a desire to be "independent", "original" 
and "manly''. There follows "a light unmeaning use of sceptical arguments 
and assertions,"82which is really "the beginning of apostasy.'083 
The gift of reasoning, when "clear, brilliant or powerful" is dangerous 
because it causes "men of superior understanding ... to value themselves 
upon it and look down upon others.'ta4 Such people cast down "moral 
excellence" from its "proper eminence" and set up reason in its stead.85 
Then a terrible delusion takes place: having cut themselves off from the 
moral, they begin to believe that when all are intellectuals, all will be 
moral: 
they labour to convince themselves, 
men gt·ow in knowledge they will 
virtue. '"""· 
that as 
grow in 
Needless to say, such a delusive conviction screens its adherent from 
the necessity of practical virtue. The collapse of faith is now complete, 
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nor is profligacy far behind. Our character settles down into heresy in 
old age, having spent his prime in "the pursuit of wealth, or in some 
other excitement of the world."87The effort to repent according to 
orthodox Christian demands is now too much, arduous and humiliating as 
it would be; he now needs religion, but one with an accomodating creed, 
for he is unwilling to struggle against vicious habits, now entrenched. 
Heresy fits the bill: 
Thus it happens that, men who have led 
profligate lives in their youth ... not 
unfrequently settle down into heresies in 
their latter years." 88 
But what of those who, unlike the frivolous self-wise enquirer, 
have genuine doubts about orthodox dogmas? The title of a sermon of 
November, 1830, indicates Newman's response - Obedience the Remedy for 
Religious Perplexity.99 Here he holds ruthlessly to the idea of ethos: 
Revelation was not given us to satisfy 
doubts, but to make us better men. 90 
Therefore, to those who are perplexed and "who wish for light but cannot 
find it", he will give one answer only - ''Obey!" The doubter must bear 
his doubt "manfully", all the while striving "meekly" at a practical 
acquiescence in "God's will"; the more this is done, the sooner the 
"unsettled state" will vanish and "order arise out of 
confusion.'t9 1 Deference to the established, the abnegation of critical 
thought, intellectual passivity, the daily round of virtue - these are 
the qualities guaranteeing an inner spiritual order which mirrors the 
divinely-ordained polity of the established Church. Heresy, on the other 
hand, is an impatient solution to the problem of doubt; heretics are 
those who will not 'wait upon the Lord', they 
seek some new path which promises to be 
shorter and easier than the lowly and 
circuitous way of obedience ... they expect to 
gain speedy peace and ho 11 ness by means of 
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new teachers and by a new doctrine.~-
Although the sermons between 1829 and 1831 are a defence of a 
beleaguered, established, visible Church against intellectual heterodoxy 
and 'schismatic' Dissent, this is not to say that Newman was 
unequivocally_ upholding the 'powers that be'. His sermons attack 
~::::;: ==~=~! !:. ~j- • ~ .. .._ ...... : ~~,, ~uw ;-u1 ;. auU. u1 ~e J.lt!l- t..Ud 1 utuepenaence, 1:ne very 
qualities of the bourgeoisie.93 In the third of the University Sermons, 
he makes a clear distinction between a secularist morality which absorbs 
Christian ethics, accommodating it to a refined, attractive and expedient 
moral system, and the stern morality of the Gospel which is offensive to 
the world and demands heroic sanctity. Although it is true to say that 
Christian morality has beneficial social effects, a utilitarian view in 
which it is viewed only in such terms, is a "shallow philosophy".94 
Newman is, in his own Romantic way, a revolutionary, challenging the 
cherished assumptions of an increasingly bourgeois culture: 
May God arise and shake terribly the earth 
<though 1 t be an awful prayer), rather than 
the double-minded should lie hid among us, 
and souls be lost by present ease. 95 
Newman depreciates the qualities which support the restless, tampering, 
bustling spirit of bourgeois Christianity: 
Eloquence and wit, shrewdness and dexterity, 
these plead a cause well and pcopagate 1 t 
quickly. ·=-•""· 
What he is so rhetorically assailing is itself a form of rhetoric. But he 
sees its force as ephemeral, because it man ipu la tes its audience with 
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cleverness, rather than appealing to the universal stock of wisdom, 
innate to humanity: 
It has no root in the hearts of men and 
lives not out a generation. It is the 
consolation of the despised truth that its 
works endure. 97 
Newman, then, appeals to the past - orthodoxy has, as it were, been 
vindicated by time, as it has accumulatively found an answer deep 
within human hearts. His Romantic conservatism, supported by a 
philosophy and psychology of conscience, deployed in order to defend 
from reform the Anglican Church, gives an original turn to the ancient 
maxim that heresy is novelty and that novelty is always wrong. 
In March, 1831, when the rhetoric of Newman's preaching was in full 
flow, Hugh James Rose presented him with an opportunity to write a 
full-length work - what eventually became The Arians of the Fourth 
Century. Rose's conception of the kind of work Newman should write for 
the Theological Library could not be more different from the book -
ultimately "plucked'198 - which came from Newman's pen: 
I hope to see your work the standard work on 
Articles for students of Divinity. 99 
In such a dogmatic text-book, the history of the Councils was to be 
background to an exposition and defence of the articles of the 
Christian religion, taking in the meaning of doctrinal terminology and 
its relation to Scripture proof. It was to be a judicious and scholarly 
tome of High Church divinity. 
Newman's work was certainly learned and dogmatic, but it was also 
more than Rose bargained for: structurally a highly original combination 
of systematic exposition, vivid narrative and brilliant character-sketch, 
all co-ordinated, by means of ancient-modern analogies of varying point 
and subtlety, in to a rhe tor leal thrust against his eccles ia t ica 1 and 
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political opponents. His correspondence and diaries show him 
conscientiously doing his homework, intensively exploiting the patristic 
reading which had been in progress since 1828, and studying the 
standard textbooks of the day. 100 However, a tension soon emerges 
between the systematic-catechetical, and the narrative-historical method 
of presentation. In a letter to Rose in late August, 1831, Newman 
tir~·ue::; tnen tne oest metnOd oi proceeding would be to write a 
connected history of the Councils, rather than taking each Council in 
isolation and supplying a doctrinal commentary upon it. The acta of 
Councils, he argues, only give conclusions, without the process leading 
to them: the Nicene Confession cannot be properly understood by an 
article-by-article exposition: it can only be grasped by reference to 
the historical rise of Arianism. However, such a determination raises 
its own problems: how to avoid lengthy digressions and intrusive 
footnotes in the discussion of doctrine, which will disrupt the flow of 
the historical narrative. Newman's proposed solution to the dilemma is 
to consider the structure of the work from the point of view of an 
imagined reader: 
propose, then, to clear my text of 
arguments as much as may be and state my 
conclusions - and to enter so far into the 
subject matter of debate, as to explain it 
generally, connect the history, introduce 
the subjects and excite curiosity - then to 
add a series of notes or discussions under 
various heads .... In this way I think the 
book may be somewhat more attractive (if 
that is an object> - and beginners will be 
less clogged with difficulties and 
delays. 101 
Like a capable rhetorician, Newman considers, not without a certain 
diffidence, the disposition of his material with regard to the audience: 
he wants to tell a good story, to be readable, to induce his audience, 
who will not be learned but beginners, to "enter into" his subject. His 
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self-declared method is not then 'historical', in the sense of the 
impartial sifting of evidence; rather, he incorporates the historian's 
interest in causality and origins into a story in which argument and 
narrative are carefully woven to make the greatest popular appeal. 
Newman was aware of the originality of his attempt. In a letter to 
Samuel Rickards, of 30 October, 1831, he dec lares: 
1 am engaged in a history of the Principal 
Councils as illustrative of the doctrines of 
the Articles ... I am led to fancy I may be 
able to throw some light upon the 
subject. 102 
He distances himself from two main approaches: first, the huge folios 
of the "standard Divines" of the past, and, secondly, historians of the 
present. Of the former - ''Bull, Waterland, Petavius, Haronius and the 
rest" - he severely qualifies his admiration; they are 
magnificent fellows but then they are 
Antiquarians or Doctrinists, not 
Ecclesiastical HistorL:ms. ••:•:• 
Newman's popularist aim in the presentation of his subject accounts for 
his reservations about following them in their massive accumulation of 
citation. It is, however, surprising to find him so dismissive of Bull, 
who was, by his own testimony, to exert such an important influence 
upon him during the Trac tar ian period. 1 04 Whatever his feelings, he 
drew upon these earlier writers freely when he was composing Arians. 
As for the historians, he can only say of these, 
I have a very low opinion - Mosheim, Gibbon, 
Middleton, Milner etc - Cave and Ti !lemont 
are highly respectable but biographers. 106 
In their very different ways, the historians, rather than the 
"biographers" here challenged credal and patristic orthodoxy, in such a 
way as to make them unsympathetic. His dismissiveness is, nevertheless, 
again rather surprising: Gibbon and Milner both exerted, as we shall 
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see. , a profound influence upon his method of presentation in Arians. 
At this point, however, Newman saw himself treading a lone path. 
Bhat, then, wa~ the purpose behind the popular rhetoric of the 
narrative he was constructing? A letter, written three weeks before 
the exhausting process of composition had run to its end, declares that 
The one point which 
importance of the 
tests.'':.c 
I strive to show is the 
Homoouslon and similar 
It is his choice of "tests" to describe the dogmas of the ancient 
Church that is so revealing, for, until the legislative movements of the 
1820's, it was by tes1e that Dissenters and Roman Catholics had been 
excluded from full participation in the public life of the nation, and, 
in Newman's own university, still by t!'!sts excluded from admission. It 
was the value and justice of j;§?tS 107 that 'latitudinarianism' was 
challenging. At this stage there is no firm evidence that Newman held 
to the distinction, . much-used in the Tractarian period, between 
articles of faith, the universally binding articles of the ancient 
creeds, and articles of religion, such as the 39 Articles, a matter only 
of Church order and a product of a national church's history. Replying 
to Rose's original request in 1831, he shows some awareness that the 
39 Articles - "our own" - are not iden t ica 1 with the articles of the 
ancient creeds: 
I had considered a work on the Articles 
might be useful on the following plan. 
First, a defence of the articles- then, the 
history of our own. 108 
However, the nature of the difference remains undefined, while, on the 
other hand, it is clear that defence of ancient and of Anglicaf) articles 
belong to the same strategy, in that both uphold the ancient 
Christianity mediated by the Church of England. 
In The Arians of the Fourth Century, for the first time, there 
appears, clearly enunciated, the analogy' 09 between heresy and the 
forces of Newman's own time which he regarded as enemies of Church and 
Christianity. It is, indeed, the political aspect of heresy which he 
takes for his peroration, pointing to the present significance of the 
past: 
And so of the present per-ils, 1-1i th \·Jhich our 
branch of the Church is beset. as thev be.sr-
a marked resemblance to those of the fourth 
century, so are the lessons, \vhich 1ve gain 
from that ancient time. especially cheer-in-;; 
and edifying to Christians of the present 
day. Then as now, there was the prospect and 
partly the presence in the Church, of an 
Heretical Power enthralling it, exerting a 
varied influence and a usuroed claim in the 
appointment of her functionaries, 3nd 
interfering with th•:: management of her 
internal affairs. 1 ''·' 
This is the culmination of a parallel drawn throughout the text between 
Arianism and liberalism. The Ar ians, relying upon their imperial 
patronage, "were the first among Christians to employ force in the 
cause of religion."' 1 'Behind this persecuting spirit is not dogmatic 
in tolerance but in fide 1 antipathy towards the Christ ian ethos: 
the rna l evo l en•:e Ernoeror \·JaS 
peculiarly directed against t;l-,ose, •,Jhethar 
orthodox or Semi-Arians, who evinced any 
earnestness about Christian truth.' 'a 
A subtler thrust against his contemporary opponents was Newman's 
characterisation of the party centred around Eusebius of Nicomedia. 
Arius had been, at least in the beginning, an open and honest heretic, 
until he had been taken in hand and trained by courtly prelates such as 
Eusebius, who tutored him in the art of equivocation.' 13 Newman calls 
the Eusebians the "Court faction"; 1 14 they are presented as ''n?thing 
better than a political party.'" 15Arianism is essentially a political 
party, as is evinced by the disorderly and schismatical acts which 
initiated it. It directs its energies towards private ends, "a mere 
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political faction, usurping the name of reliF,ion; and, as such, 
essentially anti-christian [sicJ."' 16Arianism was undoubtedly successful 
in putting forward a plausible and reasonable face to the world and 
adept in the ways of the Court. The analogy with Newman's view of the 
reforming party - that crypto-infidelity \vas employing- parliamentary 
and democratic structures and the plea of reasonable reform to 
dismantle the Church - lurks, unspoken, just below the surface of his 
vivid descriptions. 
Newman's articulation of such an analogy manifests considerable 
rhetorical subtlety: his stylistic control of the historical material, 
and awareness of audience, enables him to integrate Arians into his 
broader strategy, the defence of the established Church. A striking 
example of this is his portrayal of the Arian prelate, Acacius: 
The patriarch is presented us, 01bove all else, a wily church-politician, 
operating from his power- base in Constantinople; he had been the "chief 
mover" in the "bus iness·• of oblique 1 y t ur ther ing the Ar ian cause by 
engineering the appointment to the see of Antioch of Meletius, 
calculatedly put forwacd because benign and amiable of disposition, and 
"deficient in sensibility in (the) practical judgment of heresy."' 16 
It is in this context that Newman first publicly announced, in the 
word, "liberalism",119his sense of the connection between ecclesio-
political reform and heresy. In this instance, the political connotations 
are strong: Arians, we are told, invoked Scripture in order to weaken 
the authority of dogma - notably of the Homoousion - which could be 
used to exclude them from power and influence in the Church. Newman 
does not make fully explicit his analogy with the attacks upon Anglican 
doctr~inal tests by a broad Protestant, or even latitudinarian, 
understanding of Scripture; with the deftness of phraseolo~w and tact 
of a satirist - and especially the mischievous drooping of the word 
"liberalism" into the heavily patristic context - he provides the 
conditions by which his reader, newspaper P~nd t!ritish Magazine at 
elbow, might pursue the parallel in detail. 
Newman's sermons between 1829 and 1831 hdve been directed against 
those who would tinker with the established Church. and this poLitical 
thrust is integrated, by an appeal to ethos, into a broader and more 
pervasive rhetoric. The same is true of '111e Arians of the Fourth 
Century. Just as in his sermons, heresy is expiained in terms of a 
rationalistic ethos, whereby the subject cuts himself otf from the 
deeper springs of his re 1 ig ious 1 i fe ana their concre t.e exnress ion in 
the demands of conscience, so in Arians, he imports these insights into 
his discussion of Arianism, in order to account for its theological 
procedures and intellectual origins. He now points to the presence of 
the 'Self-Wise Enquirer', not only in his own uge, but also in tnat of 
the Fathers. 
His rhetoric is most immediately apparent in his unstinting use of 
a dominant stream of patristic polemic against the Arians which, in 
order to account for their success, treats them as skilful but 
unscrupulous logicians. The "place of education" of Arianism was "the 
schools of the Sophists".120 Drawing freely - and uncritically - upon 
examples from the historians, Socrates and Sozomen, Newman declares, 
"adroitness in debate was the very 1 if e and weapon of heresy ." 1 2 1 The 
great Fathers of the Church are of "one voice .. in protesting against 
"the dialectics of their opponents,"122and substantiate the adage that 
Aristotle was the 'bishop of the Arians'. 
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Net-JIDan, then, just like the Fathers, rhetorically assails a form of 
rhetoric ss inauthentic Christianity. But he gives this patristic viet-J 
his ot-Jn characteristic slant: Arian rhetoric is inauthentic because it 
does not appeal to the experience of the concrete body of the Church 
as it is living out its faith, but separates and abstracts theological 
discussion from this context, compelling t-Jith the syllogism, rather than 
persuadiru:l' bv aooesl to the common stor.k of Hic:rlnm Of p.,, 1 nf' 
Samosata Wet-Jman declares, 
His heresy thus 
spread 1 tse l f by 
character. 123 
founded on a syllogism, 
instruments of a kindred 
Heretics view Christianity, as it were, from an external perspective, 
that is, the laws of argument, so that the meaning of Scripture is 
distorted: 
And from the first, it has been the error of 
heretics to neglect the information thus 
provided for them, and to attempt of 
themselves a work to which they are unequal, 
the eliciting a systematic doctrine from the 
scattered notices of the truth which 
Scripture contains. 124 
But Newman has already decided that the Arians were "unequal" to the 
total rationalistic systematisation of Christianity. In fact, for him, 
they wanted to "inquire into'", and - a value-laden word in the 1830's -
"reform" the creeds which had been "received". 1 26He sees them as 
nineteenth-century liberals, tamperers and accommodators, whose purpose 
is to modify the Christian tradition in the direction of infidelity, 
while making apparently moderate changes to its external appearance. 
The authentic, orthodox response is to point to the concrete, to 
people and things. Hence, the advice of Sisinnus to the Patriarch of 
Constantinople about how to deal with Arianism: 
to drop the use of dialect lcs, and merely 
challenge his opponents to utter a general 
anathema against all such Ante-Nicene 
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Fathers as had taught what 
denounced as false doctrine. 126 
they now 
Bhen this was tried, the heretics were reduced to silence: 
they rested their cause on their dialectic 
skill, and not on the testimony of the early 
Church. 127 
If, then, Arianism was essen t1alll y a lien to Christian 1 ty - the 
application of i\r!stotel16lll rhetoric to revelation - how did it arise 
within the Church? illeWiilan gives two, closely related, answers to this 
question. Both might suggest, as we shall see, that the Church was 
passing through a phase when love and faith had grown cold. Both have 
value as debating points in the crisis which is Newman's own context, 
not least in predisposing his audience towards the idea of revival or 
renewal. 
First, then, il!eWiilan explains how Christian theologians became 
Aristotelian rhetoricians. The practice of dialectical disputation about 
Christian truth had been early introduced into the Eastern Church, in 
order to ~prepare the Christian teacher for the controversy with 
unbel1evers.~129This resulted in an atmosphere in which heterodox texts 
were defended "by way of exercise in a.rgument."' 29This soon became 
open to abuse. Christian rhetoricians repeated the ••error of the 
Sophists",130divorcing the arguability of a tenet from its truth. This 
was the first step in the secularisatlon of Christian discourse and its 
absorption into the curriculum of .. a liberal education."131 Doctrine, 
having been separated by rhetoric from its form of life, was soon 
subjected to the criteria of the natural sciences: 
Then, however, as now, the minds of 
speculative men were impatient of ignorance 
and loth to confess that the laws of truth 
and falsehood, which their experience of the 
world furnished, could not at once be 
applied to measure and determine the facts 
of another. 132 
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'i'"fhen .. as now": Newman points the analogy with his own time when 
Christianity has been distorted by the imposition of categories derived 
from "the world", from a "liberal education", from science and from 
logic. 
He gives a second reason: the growth of an Eclectic mystico-
philosophical school incorporating elements of Platonism into 
t.nnstlanHy, which, while in many ways different from Arianism, 
nevertheless contributed to an intellectual atmosphere within the 
Church facilitating the spread of heresy. Its origin was Ammonius 
Saccas, an initiate into Christianity who, renouncing full belief "at 
least secretly", opened a syncretistic philosophical school. Arianism was 
Aristotelian, logical and scientific, while Eclecticism was Platonic and 
mystical. Newman brings them together with a sour observation on the 
nature of ecclesiatical politics, pointing to the essentially 'party 
spirit' of heresy: 
in seasons of difficulty men look about on 
all sides fot" support. 133 
Eclecticism was difficult to distinguish from orthodoxy, for it used the 
terminology of the latter in a manner only very subtly heterodox. It 
became a "seasonable refuge" for the more radical originators of 
Arianism - "the Sophists of Antioch"' - when they were under pressure 
from orthodox criticism and authority. The originators of Arianism 
could shelter under the comparative respectability of Eclecticism. When 
full-blown Arianism arose, it could claim earlier Eclecticism as a 
pseudo-Christian tradition to which it owned.134 But there was a 
profounder reason bringing Eclectics and Arians together: both. were in 
principle opposed to "mystery, in the ecclesiastical sense of the 
1110rd."135Newman means the failure, or even refusal, to recognise that 
revelation transcends the human capacity fully to comprehend it.136 
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The discussion of Eclecticism provides Newman with an opportunity 
for contemporary polemic. He compares it with 
what would now be called Neologism, a heresy 
which, even more than others, has shown 
itself desirous and able to conceal itself 
under the garb of sound religion, and to 
keep the form, while it destroys the spirit, 
of Christianity. 137 
It closely resembles orthodoxy by its use of such terms as "divine", 
"revelation", "inspiration", and professes respect for the religious 
teachings of Scripture, seeing them as, in some sense, from God. 
However, it denies a distinctively and specifically divine intervention 
in human history and may be identified by its opposition to miracle. 
Newman's notes, made in preparation for Arians, provide a precise 
definition: 
a denial of exclusive mission and peculiar 
inspiration of the Prophets and 
Evangelists. 138 
Neology lurks in the bosom of Christianity; its real danger is its 
specious resemblance to orthodoxy. This implication bears on the early 
nineteenth-century call for the waiving of "tests", for, with the 
disappearance of these would disappear also, Newman argued, all chance 
of isolating this ambiguous alien, Neology. 
The reference to 'Neology' draws upon a debate in which Newman had 
been peripherally involved, beginning in 1825 with Hugh James Roses's 
lectures on The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany.' 39 
Pusey's attempt to set right Rose's misconceptions, in his Historical 
Enquiry (1828),140provoked a controversy141 in which Rose, perhaps 
forgiveably misreading Pusey's turgid142volume, accused him of 
disbelieving the inspiration of the historical parts of Scripture.143 
Pusey, shocked to be accused of "vindicating German Neology" and of 
being" a disciple of the Neo log ians", 144 rep lied with a second part to 
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his His tor leal Enquiry, in 182 9, in which he c lar if led his position 
regarding Biblical Inspiration. Newman assisted Pusey with this latter 
task, especially with the patristic mater laP 46 , and would therefore 
have been thoroughly familiar with the terms of the debate. 
Although Newman helped Pusey defend his own orthodoxy against 
Rose, Pusey's own early sympathy, in the first part of the Historical 
Enquiry, for the Schleiermachian theology ot tee1mg as a not 
unconstructive approach to the rationalism of the eighteenth century 1 "' 6 
did not impress Newman. Indeed, it is rather the influence of Rose 
that is uppermost. 1 "'7 ln his identification of the intellectual milieu 
out of which the political attacks on the Church sprang, Newman applied 
Rose's thesis about German theology to the English scene. His 
presentation of 'rationalism' from 1829 onwards so closely resembles 
that of Rose, that it may be concluded that the latter was an 
important influence upon him. Many of Rose's sentences in The State of 
Protestant Religion in Germany are indistinguishable from Newman's 
statements in sermons and in Arlans; for example, take Rose's: 
The advocates for the supremacy of the human 
understanding ... Cnot content with judging of 
the evidences offered in support of the 
truth of the Christian system) ..... establish 
reason as the sole and sufficient arbiter of 
the truth or falsehood of the various 
doctrines which that system contains, the 
umpire from whose judgment there is to be no 
appeal in matters of religious 
controversy. 148 
Rose contended that such an approach eventually resulted in an 
attenuation of the supernatural element in revelation; it 
proceeded from the determination that 
whatever was not intelligible, was 
incredible; that only what was of familiar 
and easy explanation deserved belief, and 
that all which was miraculous and mysterious 
in Scripture must be rejected. ' 49 
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Against this -like Newman - Rose held it better to believe too much 
than too little, and advocated acquiescence in the give~. Again like 
Newman, Rose thought the bulwark against rationalism to be the 
authority-structure of a visible, established Church, with its liturgy 
and precise articles, imposed as tests. This structure the Church of 
warned, should not be taken for granted, for German rationalism was 
beginning to seep in to the Eng 1 ish Church. F ina 11 y, Rose's polemic is 
couched in terminology which is also a familiar feature of Newman's 
vocabulary throughout his life: 
the essence of Protestantism, the right of 
private judgment. 15o 
By the time of the composition of Arians, the Anglican hegemony to 
which Rose could point in 1825 was dissolving rapidly. Newman diverted 
Rose's polemic against Germany towards the English reforming spirit and 
compared it with the process by which ancient heresy arose. Not only 
did he call Eclecticism 'Neology', he also called it liberalism: 
Who does not recognise in this old 
philosophy the chief features of that recent 
school of liberalism and false illumination, 
political and moral, which is now Satan's 
instrument in deluding the nations? 151 
The earliest appearance of the word "liberalism" in Newman was 
political - this sense was prominent in Arians. However, he here uses 
the term, in its first appearance in his public discourse, to identify a 
broader phenomenon, a Geist, not only "political", but also "moral". 
Readers of the Tractarian and Roman Catholic Newman will be familiar 
with this pervasive sense of "liberalism'',152 which str"etches from Tract 
73 to the Blglietto Speech. Its early emergence fixes Newman's approach 
to it: it is compared with the "old philosophy" of Eclecticism which 
fiH:i litated the rise of heresy. 
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The crisis of the Arlen heresy, then, arose, according to Newman, 
because the Church, now lukewarm, had let in an essentially alien form 
of philosophical discourse, which masked the scepticism and infidelity 
of heretics unscrupulously consolidating their power over the 
structures of the Church. Newman's analogical presentation of this - his 
interpolations of contemporary terms such as 'Neology' and 'liberalism' -
puuu..u~ Llll:l ,.l:lHUI:ll. 111 ~;ne r1gnt a1rect1on - subsumes history into his 
rhetorical strategy. 
His rhetoric, however, finds an analogy still broader than that of 
the historical origins of heresy, that is, in the tragic failure of the 
inner man. Particularly in his concrete presentation of the characters 
involved in the Arian dispute, Newman embodies his points about the 
ethos of heresy. Prominent is the view that heresy springs from 
worldliness. Thus, the heresiarch, Paul of Samosata, is linked with a 
kind of "ceremonial Judaism"153 , an empty ritualism far removed from 
the moral zeal of the Old Testament. His "grossly humanitarian"154 
attitude to the Divinity of Christ does not surprise Newman. Similarly, 
he sees Julian the Apostate's infidelity as sharing the outlook of "men 
of the world", who fail to penetrate into the "real moving principle and 
life of the system" and whose perception is restricted to its 
"surface".155 A milder case of worldliness, that of Eusebius of 
Caesaria, serves as a means of directing a mischievous shaft at 
latitudinarianism: 
his conduct gave countenance to the secular 
maxim, that difference in creeds is a matter 
of inferior moment, and that, provided we 
confess as far as the very terms of 
Scripture, we may speculate as philosophers, 
and live as the world. 156 
Newman's satiric analogy treats Eusebius as the typical, learned Regency 
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bishop. 
On the other hand, in the case of Pope Liberius, who conceded to 
Arianism under duress, Newman discerns a weakness provoking, not 
mockery, but compassionate sympathy: his was a moral and personal 
failure, a tragedy, borne of deficiency in the heroic quality of 
martyrdom. A. brave man, worn down by exile, he was skilfully broken by 
the alternation of blandishment with mortal threat, baffled by the 
conflicting demands upon conscience of martyrdom and peace in the 
Church, a victim of the complex and ambiguous state of Church parties, 
humiliatingly held in exile by his tormenters. Yet even after his lapse, 
he constitutes, for Newman, a miserable apostasy and a warning lesson 
to compromisers.157 A gentler hint against the conciliatory spirit is his 
characterisation of Meletius, holy and orthodox, but tender towards 
heretics; his partiality towards his friends dulled his sensitivity 
towards heresy in particular instances, clouding his vision with a 
"false charitableness"' and making him a pawn of Arian plots. 1 sa 
The last two examples - Liberius and Meletius - show Newman's 
capacity to cope with the shades and complexities entailed by the 
embodiment of his rhetoric in characters. The acceptance of a degree of 
ambiguity - that not all sympathisers with heresy are grossly worldly -
is consistent nevertheless with his overall argument from ethos. 
Association with heresy must involve a character deficiency somewhere, 
however subtle, Newman argues, - and of such his imagination is a 
fertile source. 
Newman's tendency towards embodied rhetoric is also manifested in 
his treatment of groups. For example, in his depiction of the moderate 
Arian parties, he distinguishes between the followers of Eusebius of 
Nlcomedta, whose moderation concealed indifference to truth, and the 
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"Semi-Arians", whose opposition to the Athanasian Homoousion derived 
from genuine scruple. ln the latter case, his portrayals take on a 
poignant many-sidedness. The Semi-Arians were good and holy men -
"saints and martyrs" compared with the "Eusebians"159- vigorous 
missionaries of the Gospel,160 whom even the uncompromising Athanasius 
called 11bro thers ". 1 61 In fact, "the men were better than their creed." 1 62 
Why, then, did they cleave to heresy? As so often, Newman declares the 
cause to lie in the intellect: the Semi-Arians were drawn by subtlety 
of argument into the labyrinth of dialectic. They tried "to satisfy 
their intellect and conscience by refined distinctions and perverse 
reservations,"163and failed to take a "broad and commonsense view of an 
important subject,"164while Catholics evaded such difficulties by their 
"straightforward simplicity."165Here, Newman comes very close indeed to 
identifying the appetitus intellectivus with deficiency of character, 
unreflective obscurantism with the fullness of orthodox truth. Yet his 
exploitation of the pathos inherent in the picture of Semi-Arianism as 
a genuine spirituality half-stifled by rationalism transforms this 
antithesis into an evocation of the fraught ambivalence and latent 
tragedy of the Christian bourgeois intelligentsia; he detects 
amid the impiety and worldiness of the 
heretical party .... elements of a pur-er-
spirit, which gradually eJ<:erted itself and 
worked out from the corrupt mass in which it 
was embedded. ' -=·E· 
Newman also deploys a topology of heresy: he identifies Antioch as 
the source of Arianism.167 It was in this city, noted for worldly 
corruption, that the ethos of the heresy germinated: 
The history of the times gives us 'sufficient 
evidence of the luxuriousness of Antioch; 
and it need scarcely be said, that coldness 
in faith is the suce consequence of 
relaxation of morals. 168 
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He describes Antioch as imbued with the spirit of a bastardlsed Judaism 
which looked to "the promise of temporal blessings, and a more 
accomodating rule of life than the gospel revealed."169Such a 
rna ter ia lism made heresy's rise inevitable: 
When the spirit and morals of a people are 
mater-ially debased, varieties of doctrinal 
~I I Ul :::tl:-'l Lllo '-'!-'• --, .l' ................ 
rapidly propagated. 170 
Antiochene Christianity, he later adds, developed a literalist scriptural 
hermeneutic wholly in accord with its ethos.171 His condemnation of 
Antioch - a view which survived intact the revolution in perspective of 
the mid-1840's172 - is unqualified. He sees no subtle shades and 
complexities, as he did in the case of the Semi-Arians. This is probably 
because, in his eagerness at all costs to vindicate his beloved 
Alexandrian Fathers from the charge of originating Arianism, he has 
deliberately shifted the blame to Antioch.173 
The Arfans of the Fourth Century, then, proceeds by a fertile 
exploitation of analogy between ancient Church history and the 
s 
ecclesia}ical scene of the early 1830's. How did Newman come by such an 
historiographical method? The most obvious answer lies in his reading 
of the Fathers, particularly Origen and Clement of Alexandria, whose 
influence has been traced by C.F.Harrold: 
man may catch glimpses of the infinite 
through the 'parable' of nature and history, 
as well as through Scripture. 174 
The Alexandrian idea of pagan history as a preparation for the Gospel 
provided a means whereby he could see all history as, in some sense, 
parabolic.175However, behind patristic typology, an earlier influence may 
be suggested, that of 'figuration' in the Calvinist tradition of 
Scripture- interpretation. 176 
In addition to these general trends, Newman had a specific 
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historiographical model in Joseph Milner's History of the Church of 
Christ. 1 77 Just as Newman had overestimated the early influence of this 
work upon him, equally, he understated its later effect, when he 
declared that Gibbon was the only historian of ecclesiastical affairs to 
command, despite his notorious infidelity, his respect and 
admiration.178The fullest account of Milner, by J.D.Walsh, follows the 
testimony of the Apologia, concluding that "Newman nl.IDseu, Yor l:liH u= 
debt to Milner did not take him very seriously as a Church 
historlan."179 
As he progressed in scholarship, Newman may indeed have come to 
hold a low opinion of Milner as a modern, critical historian. 
Nevertheless, the History shows an uncannily close resemblance, both in 
method and detail, to The Arians of the Fourth Century. Milner's 
typically e~hteenth-century view of a uniform human nature producing 
constantly republicated patterns of behaviour throughout the course of 
history provides the basis for an analogy between ancient and 
modern. 1 80Milner's problem was how to appropriate history for his own, 
distinctively - and in the English context unusually - Lutheran 
doctrine of justification:1 81 early Church history finds, for him, its 
significance, and its heroes, in those individuals who accepted Christ 
by faith. tfuat Newman therefore found in Milner was an historiographer 
who was responding to the past, not by the attempted extinguishment of 
his personal perspective, but existentially) imaginatively, and 
po lem ica lly. 
If Milner's explicit statements about the significance of heresy are 
taken at face value, then he could not be more different from Newman, 
who turned a history of Articles into a history of heresy. Milner, on 
the other hand, wanted to minimize heresy in his account, in order to 
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concentrate on showing how the saints in every age were just if led by 
faith, so that it would be l:lbsurd to write the history of Christianity 
by reference to heresies: 
as absurd were it to suppose an his tory of 
the highwaymen that have infested this 
country to be an history of England. 182 
However, Milner's actual procedure in his History closely resembles that 
H· ulll h.o 
argued that the former adopted a rhetorical strategy abmost identical 
with that found in The Arians of the Fourth Century. 
One of Milner's major themes is the danger of pagan philosophy 
importing into Christianity a destructive rationalism. His conviction 
about the infidel tendency of philosophy was acquired through personal 
experience: born of poor parents, but a prodigy of learning, he lost his 
early Evangelical faith by exposure to Locke and Samuel Clarke, later 
undergoing a prolonged conversion from which he emerged a convinced 
enemy of the "prophane ,philosophy"193 which had deprived him of his 
faith. This experience passed into his treatment especially of heresy, 
whose origin he explains in t'erms of intellectual pride and the 
infiltration of paganism into Christian theology. Justin Martyr, praised 
for his 'Evangelical' faith, is also censured for his openness to 
"philosophy": 
he was the first sincere Christian who was 
seduced by human philosophy to adulterate 
the gospel, though in a small degree. 1 "'' 4 
Milner's definition of philosophy is precise: 
mean all along that philosophy of the 
ancients, which was founded in pride, was 
chiefly speculative and metaphysical, and at 
bottom atheistical. No one objects to those 
moral maxims of the ancient philosophers, 
which were in many instances excellent, 
though defective in principle. 18"' 
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Despite the 'moral' qualification, Milner's condemnation of philosophy 
goes further than Newman's, far enough to hand out severe criticism to 
the Alexandrians. 1 eG 
Nevertheless, the target of both Newman's Arians and Milner's 
History is identical - that modern spirit of intellectual autonomy, 
which separates the cultivated and retined be11ever . .. I r·um 1 evt::a .Lc:u "'' u -..u 
and sets him off on the road to infidelity: 
Pride and self-conceit frequently have a 
peculiar ascendancy over men who have 
acquired knowledge in private by their own 
industry. 1 "'' 7 
Like Newman, and, before him, Rose, Milner sees the abuse of reason as 
an attenuation of Christianity. Such rationalism is the origin of 
heresy; dis cussing Praxeas, Milner dec lares: 
All attempts to subvert the faith of 
Scripture on this subject arise from the 
same error, namely, a desire to accomodate 
divine truths to our narrow reasoning 
faculties:- let men learn to submit; and on 
no account strip the Almighty of His 
attributes of Incomprehensibility. 188 
Like Newman, Milner characterises Arius as a logician, noted for his 
"pride of reasoning": 
Artus evidently split on the common rock of 
all heresies, a desire of explaining by our 
reason the modes of things which we are 
required to believe on Divine testimony 
alone. 1 ~39 
Like Newman, Milner explains the presence in Christian theology of the 
corrupting influence of dialectic by reference to the Eclectic 
philosophy of Ammonius Saccas.19° Finally, like Newman, he articulates a 
parallel with modern infidelity, "the turbulent, aspiring, political sons 
of Arius and Socinus in our own times." 191 
Milner's rhetorical strategy, then, is so close to Newman's as to 
make it very probable that 1 t served as a model for· the ana log lea 1 
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rhetoric of Arians, albeit unacknowledged and perhaps unconsciously 
adopted. J.D. Walsh's description of Milner's History- if 'Cathoiic' be 
substituted for 'evangelical' - is an exact description also of Arians: 
The struggle of evangelical religion and 
rationalistic philosophy has been renewed 
again and again in new disguises .... The 
moderns comically deluded themselves on the 
modernity of their views: it was not new 
philosophy they propagated but ancient 
neresy. · -·~ 
Both Milner's and Newman's rhetoric - despite the difference of 
theology - derive from a similar political and social ideology. From 
1828 onwards, Newman was defending 'Establishment' against liberalism 
and la t 1 tud inar ian ism. His conserve t ism persisted in to the Trac tar ian 
period. Similarly, Milner was, notwithstanding his 'Evangelical' concept 
of justification, politically a Tory, opposed equally to Jacobitism and 
Dissent, writing against the ominous background of the French 
Revolution, p~oliferation of dissenting chapels, liberal politics and 
infidel philosophy. His History vigorously defends the authority of the 
s 
established Church - episcopacy, infant baptism and ecclesiatical 
A 
order.193 Here, perhaps, are the seeds of an explanation for the 
rhetorical use of history found in both men: the threat to the present 
order of things, provoking a search for authority in the remote past. 
Finally, the connection between ethos and orthodoxy exploited in so 
many different ways by Newman, is found in Milner. Although the latter, 
typically, stresses the act of faith by which the believer appropriates 
Christ's merits, he also upholds the objectivity of orthodox doctrine -
the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, the Atonement and the "efficacious 
influences" of the Holy Spirit' 94 against the objection that a good life 
is the only requirement for a Christian, by connecting true doctrine 
with right practice.'"'"" 
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Milner therefore fL'1ds himself committed to the schema: orthodoxy 
leads to virtue, heresy to vice. The Arians he depicts as dishonest, and 
violent persecutors, morally inferior to the pure, if irritable, 
A thanasius. 196He warns of the dangers of worldly prelacy in Eusebius of 
Nicomedfa,197and can point confidently to the coincidence of immorality 
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acknowledges difficulties in the application of his schema - notably 
Origen <holy but heterodox)19:!"- his presentation of ethos remains on 
the comparatively straightforward level of whether or not a Father or 
heresiarch performed good works; the History lacks the complexity of 
Newman's characterizations. 
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Newman continued the analogy between heresy and liberalism in his 
poetry from abroad, composed as the crisis deepened, and in his early 
writings of the Trac tar ian period. The issues provoking Keb le 's Assize 
Sermon, which caused in turn the celebrated meeting at Rose's Hadleigh 
__ _..J..,...- ... --..J ~-l-.J-\... .-.l-.t-~~l .... ~ ...... rl 6-\.,,.... ~ ..... --1 .... ..,..._,... ................ ,.... ..... \........,J-o.-.. ................. "".;,.....~~,.... 
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Newman in the preceding years. The issues of the crisis were epitomised 
in the threefold cry of <Roman Catholic) Emancipation, Repeal {of the 
Test Acts), and <Electoral) Reform. Connected was the proposed reduction 
in the number of Anglican sees in Ireland, in view of the overwhelmingly 
Roman Catholic allegiance of the population there, and the imminence of 
rebellion. 1 Newman regarded such parliamentary reform touching upon 
re 1 ig ion as an at tack upon Christ's very Church, and had vigorous 1 y 
opposed the re-election of the pragmatic and tergiverising Tory, Robert 
Peel, to the University's seat. It was not so much the reforms in 
themselves that he opposed, as the motives he suspected behind them.2 
In the final sentence of The Arians of the Fourth Century, Newman 
looked forward to a "destined season", when "our Athanas ius and Basi 1 
will be given us,'"3 to release the Church from its satanic oppression. It 
is tempting to conclude that he saw himself as such an Athanasius or 
Basil redivivus, as, during his Mediterranean travels, his conviction grew 
of destined "work to do in England":4 ln his poetry of this time, the 
controversies about Church-State relations in England are presented 
against the backcloth of the eternal struggle between divine truth and 
the powers of darkness: 
....................... she ,once pat tern chief 
Of faith, my Country, now gross hearted gr01-m, 
~,<i'-Jl ts but to burn the stern be fore her· ide' l's throne .c. 
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l:lut now the Enemy is ~ .. Hbl!! the Church: in Liberalism, written at Palermo 
in June, 1833, he identifies this new satanic strategem, the 'halving' of 
the truth, whereby the "dread depths of grace" and zeal for sanctity are 
discarded by "Statesmen or Sages", who are "doubters at heart" of the 
awesome and mysterious claims of traditional Christianity, 
.......................... 0 new-compassed art 
Of the ancient Foe! - but what, if it extends 
On the other hand, in The Greek Fathers, the Fathers of the Church have 
come to life as "our fathers and our guides." The depiction of Basil 
glances at what Newman regarded as the political enthraLment of the 
Church of England, 
... saintly Basil's purpose high 
To smite imperial heresy, 
And cleanse the Altar's stain. 7 
The choice of "imperial" as a fitting epithet for "heresy" is 
characteristic of Newman's attitude to England as a political power 
during this period: only ten days before he wrote this, he had described 
England as 
but, 
Tyre of the West, prosperously 
Wielding Tr-ade's master keys, 
.... glorying in the name 
More than in Faith's pur-e flame!"'' 
England is, in succeeding stanzas, compared both with Babel and Sodom. 
His poems establish the tone of the earliest Tractarian phase: the 
exclamatory style and intense diction generate what was, no doubt, 
heartfelt emotion, but the poems are also public rhetoric, with a 
clearly-envisaged audience. He was not just writing for his commonplace 
book, he was urgently sending his packets of poems to Rose for 
publication in the British Maffazine. The deployment of rhetoric, of wrdch 
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an lm por tun t lngred lent was the app lie at ion of the ancient s t r" ug-g les 
between Fathers and either heretics or imperial oppressors, to thP. 
English political ferment of Repeal and Irish Sees is the originating 
context for his treatment of heresy in the Tractarian period. 
His earliest writings on his return to England continue the trends 
found in his poetry. These were the Letters on the Church of the 
Fathers, t-~ritten in August 1833,9 and published from October onwards in 
the British Magazine. They took as their subject St Ambrose and his 
times. Newman begins his narrative of this period of Church history 
with an immediate reference to the "changes which the British 
Constitution has lately undergone," 10and anticipates a "material 
alteration" in Church-State relations. He looks back with nostalgia to 
the "former quiet and pleasant course of King George III." 1 1 Here, 
certainly, is social and religious conservatism. But there is also 
something new, as he urges his readers to consider "by what instruments 
the authority of Religion is to be supported should the patronage and 
protection of the government be withdrawn."12He is already looking 
beyond defence of establishment, hinting at a distinction between Church 
and State. Indeed, it is possible that he was exaggerating his 
conservatism in order to win over the gentry and lower clergy to the 
more innovative and popular idea of the supernatural foundation of the 
Church which the narrative expounds: 
Who at first sight does not dislike the 
thought of gentlemen and clergymen depending 
for their maintenance and their reputation 
on their flocks? of their strength as a 
vis~~le power, lying not in their birth, the 
patronage of the g1·eat and the endowment oi 
the Church <as hitherto), but in the homage 
of a multitude? I confess I have before now 
had a great repugnance to the not ion 
myself. '"'' 
It is in terms of a struggle in Antiquity between the Church of Milan 
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personified in St Ambrose and the Arian Empress, Justina, that Newman 
proposes a parallel between his own time and the ptl~t. The Stete 
demended that Ambrose cede one church for Arian use, but, 
His duty was plain: the churches were the 
property of Christ; he was the 
representative of Christ and was therefore 
bound not to cede what was committed to him 
in trust. 14 
.. ,.. ,.. 
... ,. • ......, a 'U'& ~\,., \J A ''-..L.:..:J 
analogical presentation of the "primitive church"; the story has been 
chosen 
With a view of showing the power of the 
Church at that time <not as if I would 
persuade any one to murmur at things as they 
are, but merely to prepare Christians for 
what may be and to encourage them). 16 
Newman's position is complex: he opposes the 'spoliation of the Church', 
but has gone beyond defence of establishment to discover a principle 
other than national history - that is, the apostolicity of the Church of 
England, a principle which can be deployed as part of a radical and 
spontaneous appeal to the people: 
Ambrose rested his resistance on grounds the 
people understood at once and recognised as 
irrefrageable ... They rose in a body and 
thronged the palace gate. 16 
Heresy, then, in the early Letters on the Church of the Fathers is 
deployed as an element in a broad strategy, which is not concerned with 
the theological examination of the nature of heresy, but with fashioning 
a narrative of the patristic age, in such a way that it forms a 
perspective or framework of values whereby the significance of 
contemporary issues may be discerned. It is the ability to perceive the 
polemical potential of early Church history, which lends the essays on 
Ambrose their mischievous vita 1 i ty: 
Now some reader will here interrupt the 
narrative, perhaps, with something of an 
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indignant burst ab!)ut connecting the cause 
of religion with mobs etc. To whom I would 
reply, that the multitude of men is always 
rude and intemperate, and needs restraint, -
religion does not make them so. But being 
so, it is better they should be zealous 
about religion, as in this case, than flow 
and ebb again under the irrational 
influences of this world. A mob, indeed is 
always wayward and faithless; but it may be 
acted upon. 17 
Newman, in his final sentence, balances his radical appeal to the 
populace with a more soothing prospect: the suggestion, not necessarily 
ironic, that an orthodox mob will, in fearing the judgment, be 
susceptible of social control. 
The Letters on St Ambrose are part of a strategy which finds 
expression also in other writings of the early years of Tractarianlsm. 
Dating from September, 1833, though not published until 1836, was Home 
Thoughts from Abroad, which introduces some additional motifs, 
organis~ them around the theme of heresy: 
When Arianism triumphed in the sees of the 
Eastern Church, the Associated Brethren of 
Egypt and Syria were the witnesses 
prophesying in sackcloth against it. So may 
it be again. When the day of trial comes, we 
shall be driven from the established system 
of the Church, from 1 i v ings and 
professorships, fellowships and stalls; we 
shall <so be it) muster amid dishonour, 
poverty and destitution, for higher 
purposes; we shall bear to be severed from 
possessions and connexions of this world. 18 
Here, Newman uses his anti-bourgeois strain: comfort, ease and 
compromise are associated with the 'world' to point a contrast with the 
asceticism of orthodoxy, in order to exalt rationalisation of sees into a 
matter of martyrdom, of a kind. 
The early Tracts for the Times confirm the shape of Newman's 
strategy. The fifteenth Tract, written in late 1833, provocatively 
employs the idea of the popular appeal against the ver-y figureheads of 
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the apostolic structure of the Church of England, the bishops. Again, 
Newman sets up an ana logy in which the contrast be tween heresy and 
orthodoxy in Antiquity is part of his strategy: 
it has always been agreable to the 
principles of the Church, that, if a Bishop 
taught and upheld what was contrary to the 
orthodox faith, the clergy and people were 
not bound to submit, but were obliged to 
maintain the true religion; and if 
.... ..,_, ........ t'-J 
never accounted to be cut off from the 
Church.' s• 
Luther even gets a good mention here, for his stance against the Romish 
bishops, in upholding "in main the true doctrine."20 
On the other hand, Newman's stance was not always so provocative. 
He was capable of advocating, in the face of the groundswell of 
democratic ideas, a strengthening of establishment and status quo, for 
the straightforward reason that it will be an instrument for keeping the 
lower orders under control, a more peaceable method of shoring up the 
theeatened social fabric than the militiaman's rifle or the cavalryman's 
sabre: the Church is 
confessedly a powerful instrument of state, 
a minister of untold good to our population, 
and one of the chief bulwarks of the 
Monarchy. No institution can be imagined so 
full of benefit to the poorer classes, nor 
of such prevailing influence on the side of 
loyalty and civil order. It is a standing 
army, insuring the obedience of the people 
to the Laws by weapons of persuasion. 21 
Newman wrote these words in March 1835, in his pamphlet on the 
Restoration of Suffragan Bishops. At the same time, he disclaims 
recommending "any perversion of the Church to mere political 
purposes",22since the Church's office is "doubtless far above any secular 
objects". Nevertheless, 
He who has 1 ordained the po\vers that be 1 as 
well as the Church, has also ordained that 
the Cr:urch, when in most honourable place 
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and most healthy action, should be able to 
minister such momentous service to the Civil 
Magistrate, as constitutes an immediate 
recompense of his piety towards her. 28 
It is tempting to conclude that Newman, here straining to reconcile an 
apostolic concept of the Church with one verging upon the Erastian, is, 
for the purposes of the public debate, attempting to have his cake and 
eat H. However, there is a strand in the same pamphlet which suggests 
that the underlying theme is the process of secularization of English 
society and its resistance~ ''that spirit of unbelief and system<l\.tized 
opposition to the vital and ancient doctrines of religion, which is the 
perplexity of orthodox churchmen now.'024The antithesis of "orthodox" here 
is not with 'heretical' in the sense of a precisely definable 
malformation of Christian discourse; rather, to "orthodox" is opposed a 
Geist, elusive but all-permeating, of "unbelief", and "opposition,. to the 
givenness of revelation. It is, then, from the point of view of the 
evacuation of Christianity itself that the manifestations of social and 
political disruption are regarded, rather than from the perspective of 
coherent political ideology: social disorder is a prophetic sign of the 
disintegration of Christian culture - or, to use Keble's phrase, "national 
Apostasy". 
The backcloth against which Newman presents the political crisis in 
which the Church was involved may be described as eschatological rather 
than political. His apocalypticism, residual from the period when as a 
young man he scrutinized Newton on prophecy for signs of the End,25 
identified the spread of unbelief with the dissemination of democratic 
radicalism arising from the French Revolution :26 the revolutionary spirit, 
subversive of the powers that be, and usually atheistic, was the great 
apostasy heralding the approaching Judgment. This apocalypticism 
persisted in the Tr'actarian period and emerged in The Patristical Idea 
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of Antichrist. Here the idea of heresy plays an important role. NewmAn 
presents challenges to previously established authority as signs of the 
times: 
we actually r:ave before our eyes, as our 
fathers also in the generation before us, a 
fierce and lawless principle everywhere at 
work - a spirit of rebellion against God and 
man, which the powers of government in each 
country can barely keep under with their 
greatest efforts. Whether this which we 
witness be that spirit of Antichrist, which 
one day will be let loose, this ambitious 
spirit, the parent of all heresy, schism, 
sedition, revolution and wat- - whether this 
be so or not, at least we know from prophecy 
that the present framework of society and 
government, as far as it is the 
representative of Roman powers, is that 
which withholdeth, and Antichrist is that 
which will rise when this restraint fails.';;-: 7 
While Newman protects himself with a becoming caution - "whether this 
be so or not" - he nevertheless holds up to the imagination of his 
contemporaries an apocalyptic vision of history in which heresy is 
collated with other evils. Moreover, his deployment of the Pauline idea 
of the power of the Roman Empire exercising a restraining force whereby 
the Antichrist is held back from arriving, provides a theological 
e legitimation for the beleagured Toryism to which he appeals. This 
. h 
enables a plea for the power and privileges of the Church of England, 
which is integral to the powers that be: 
the special and singular enemy of Christ, or 
Antichrist, will appear; .. , this will be when 
revolutions prevail, and the present 
framework of society breaks to pieces; 
and ... at present the spirit which he will 
embody and represent is kept under by ' the 
powers that be', but that on their 
dissolution, he will rise out of their bosom 
and knit them together again in his own evil 
way, under his own rule, to the exclusion of 
the Church. 2 '3 
The movement to which Newman here calls alarm has its roots in the 
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French Revolution, which is the fulfilment of the prophecy that the time 
of Ant ichr is t w i 11 be heralded by open infidelity. In the ritualized 
apostasy of Jacobinism, in its dogmatic atheism and worship of Liberty, 
"which scared the world some forty or fifty years ago", Newman 
recognises the spirit of Antichrist.29 
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evils preceding the End. If apostasy is a sign presaging the reign of 
Antichrist, then apostasy is presaged by heresy. He gives two examples 
of this: flrst, Arianism preceded Julian the Apostate's attempt to re-
introduce paganism to the Empire; secondly, and more dangerously, the 
fifth-century heretics preceded the rise of Islam, 
Nestorianism and Eutychianism, apparently 
opposed to each other, yet acting towards a 
common end in one way or another denied the 
truth of Christ's gracious incarnation and 
tended to destroy the faith of Christians 
not less certainly, though more insidiously, 
than the heresy of Arius ... Out of this 
heresy, or at least by means of it, the 
imposter Mohammed sprang, and formed his 
creed. Here is another special Shadow of 
Antichrist. 80 
Newman's prophetic perception of the past, in which it is read as a 
series of predictive signs, is not necessarily in conflict with an 
historical approach: he is, after all, arguing that as a matter of history 
heresy preceded apostasy by causal connection. However, the framework in 
which the kinship between heresy and infidelity, and the inevitable slide 
from one to the other, is presented is an eschatological one, in which 
Newman's almost hysterical dramatization of the contempoorary 
controversy over Church and State reaches its highest pitch. 
Newman's apocalyptic contextualization of Arianism, Nestorianism and 
Eutychianism is immediately followed by a contemporary application: 
Is thece 
Apostasy 
no reason to f eac that 
is grddually preparing, 
some such 
gathering, 
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hastening on this very day?Gt 
As his analysis of the forms of apostasy proceeds, it becomes clearer 
that he means by it a secularization of the social patterns of English 
life by means of a reforming political programme, concealing its true 
nature under the guise of the reasonable and the humane. Newman hits 
the assumptions upon which the movement to remove the established 
"'' , ,.. 
,., .. ~. ~ .... u.w puwca auu P~DI..t:: ~Wt:!l ~ ua::.eu; ~lla~ rellglon nas nol:ntng to 
do with the State, but only with a human individual's conscience; that 
social norms may be constructed solely on the criterion of "utility", so 
that expediency rather th~n Truth becomes the rule; that in matters of 
controversy, the majority will should prevail; that the Bible has a 
multiplicity of meanings making a dogmatic stance unreasonable; that 
religion is a matter of subjective, inner experience, rather than 
objective rites and doctrinal formulations. The consequences of such 
assumptions are the proposal that oaths and other religious practices be 
removed from public transactions, and that religion be removed 
ultimately altogether from education, the first stage of which will be 
the amalgamation of all religious forms into one, ~and the second the 
evaluation of religion purely in terms of its moral productivity.33 
Newman, then, shows a deep-seated antipathy towards all forms of 
utilitarian ism. 
It should by now have emerged that, if Newman may, in some sense, 
himself be described as 'radical', or even on occasions 'subversive', this 
was not in a democratic direct ion. He rather appears to have imbibed the 
Romantic reactionary spirit of his be loved friend, Hurre 11 Froude. This 
mentality survived the early years of Tractarianism, with the result that 
'heresy', along with its guilty associates - dissenters outside the 
Church and liberals within, as well as unbelievers of varying degrees of 
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frankness - became embedded in a stream of anti-democratic vituperation 
extending throughout Newman's period of activity as a 'Tractarlan'. Least 
equivocal of all was his British Critic article for October, 1837, The Fall 
of De La Mennais, in which he presents himself as the patriotic Tory 
Churchman par excellence, staunchly opposed to the encroachments of 
Roman Catholicism on one side, and of reforming I:Jhiggery on the other, 
+,~,..., ;::.:-::..-:.: -1- t' .. '--''-""' W!..::tll Ul.Jl UUWllidJ.J.j 
our ill-starred foreign brethren, in order 
to level us to themselves, and our own 
masters, to rival f01·eign spoliations. Whigs 
and Papists, the high and the low, combine, 
the one from ambition, the other from 
envy. 3 "' 
Bitter is Newman's sarcasm for those who comfort the protesters against 
State encroachment upon Church by declaring that at least their 
Patriarch is not, as with the Greeks, appointed by the Turk: 
under the feeling that we had no right to 
complain as yet, when our rulers were 
appointed, not by pagans, but only by 
schismatics, latitudinarians, profligates, 
socinians and infidels. 35 
Newman introduces with the deftly and spitefully placed adverb, "only", a 
revealing list of shibboloth: the heresy towards which he has already 
presented all contemporary liberal errors as tending, the Socinian denial 
of a revealed Trinity, is collocated with dissenting bodies (it is 
difficult to see what else "schismatics" could mean), ·ecclesiastical 
libet·als (for which "latitudinarians" was his usual term), the morally 
unsound <"profligates") and the frankly unbelieving ("infidels"). While De 
La Mennais associates the cry for democratic liberties as "the voice of 
Truth, of our best nature", Newman identifies it with sin. The rebellion 
of sin, from the superbia of pre-lapsarian Eve to the final onslaught of 
Antichrist, is identical with the spirit of political rebellion against 
the status quo.36 
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Hence, he is able to draw clos~ to th~ 
democratical party of the day, in that veq: 
point in which they most resemble 
Antichrist. 87 
De La Menna is 'philosophy has, however, an a pp 1 ica t ion for Newman closer 
to home: 
It is not wonderful that, with these 
principles, he cordially approves of what 
the Roman Church and Mr. O'ConnP.ll RrA ~A;n~ 
in Ireland, sympathizes in their struggle, 
and holds them up for the edification of the 
Pope and the Papal world. 36 
Newman here returns to the problem of Ireland as a challenge to the 
established order: De La Mennais' democratism is associated with the 
detested O'Connell and may be identified with two attitudes of mind 
often collocated by Newman with heresy - that is. utilitarianism and 
infidelity. 
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4. Conclusions: Rhetoric and Politics. 
In 1864, Newman wrote of Hugh James Rose, 
The Reform agitation followed, and the Whig 
government came in to power; and he anticipated 
in their dis tr ibu t ion of Church patronage the 
authoritative introduction of liberal opinions 
in to the country. He feared that by the Whig 
party a door would be opened in tngland to the 
most grievous of heresies, which never could 
be c lased again.' 
Although Newman distances himself somewhat from the 'Movement' by 
presenting what was Rose's view in the 1830's, rather than what was, by 
1864-, necessarily his own, the bringing together of the political 
(''Whig", "reform", ''Church patronage"), and the doctrinal <"grievious 
heresies") clearly describes that dimension of Newman's own public 
writings which we have seen between 1833 and 1837. Just as he 
identifies heresy with Whiggery, and liberalism, so orthodoxy is 
identified with the old order, on the point of collapse: 
Such was the commencement of the assault of 
Liberalism upon the old orthodoxy of Oxford 
and Eng land .2 
What might appear in Newman as individual, even eccentric, insights, 
or localized political options, may thus be regarded as the outcome of 
vaster forces. It is possible, for example, to identify him as a 
reactionary, resisting the inevitable developments of the Industrial 
Revolution - democracy, capitalism and the dec line of religion. Against 
such a 'Whig'3 interpretation of history, however, J.C.D.Clarke's recent 
"revisionist"4 account of the period 1688-1832 argues that England 
rema !ned an anc len ~g ime un t 1l the sudden, unexpected collapse in the 
early 1830's, and that, until then, England was a hegemony of nobility, 
gentry and clergy, undergirded by a theological ideology giving divine 
legitimation to the regime: 
- 78-
it was Anglican, it was ar· is tocr·a tic and it was 
monarch ica 1.'-'· 
The first characteristic was, in the 1960's and 1970's marginalized by 
social historiographers who themselves had no interest in theology. 
Clarke's account of theology-as-ideology among England's cultural 
elite between the Revolution and the Reform Bill does much to dispel 
the idea of Newman as unusually bigoted in his hostility to Dissent and 
in his insistence upon tests. Rather, his responses rna y be seen as 
arising naturally out of the contemporary climate of opinion. 
Trinitarian orthodoxy, apostolic succession, sacraments and Biblical 
prov !dent ia 1 language provided a 'story' and con tro 11 ing ideo logy, 
effective in inculcating submission to the powers that be.6 This was 
not, of course, uncontested: Dissent, both orthodox and heterodOl<, rather 
than Lockean 'contractarianism' provided the challenge.? Clarke provides 
two examples to make this point clearer. First, the Dissenters had no 
ecclesiology to validate social hierarchy; insofar, then, as Dissent 
encouraged a mode of individual self-understanding outside the 
structures of authority symbolized by bishops, it was erosive of the 
ancien reglme.8 Secondly - and more important - there were the social 
implications of Deist, and then Socinian, attacks upon the Doctrine of 
the Trinity. These heterodox theologies, in rejecting a revealed g.!ven, 
were asserting rational autonomy, which, if possible in religion, would 
a lortlori be possible also in politics.9 Clarke even goes so far as to 
say that it was ''Trinitarian Orthodoxy" which was "the intellectual 
underpinning of Church, King and Parllament." 1 0 When William Jones of 
Nayland re-asserted Trinitarian orthodoxy in The Catholic Doctrine of 
the Trinity <1756), he was, according to Clarke, upholding the fabric of 
Ang lie an theology which legitimated the Bnc len reg Jme, at a time when 
heterodoxy was increasingly challenging the dom lnan t ideo logy .1 1 This 
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challenge posed by heterodoxy increased in intensity throughout the 
late eighteenth century and reached a climax in the late 1820's and 
ear 1 y 1830's. 1 2 
Clarke's analysis explains what in Newman, Rose and Keble appear 
to the n-.odern r·eader as pt~otests vet'ging on the hysterical about the 
suppression of Irish Sees or the relaxation of tests: their 
understanding of these issues would have been bound up with allegiance 
to the ancien regime, as heterodox Dissent was attempting to dismantle 
it, with the connivance of liberalism within the Church of England. On 
this thesis, Newman may be seen to be in continuity with an orthodox 
Anglican ideology, which had functioned broadly in both Hanoverian and 
Jacobite political thought, and which, moreover, was not inconsistent 
with his early Evangelicalism.13 To this social order the great 
challenge was heresy. 
Such a sociological contextualization of theological discourse is 
helpful in explaining why so often the young Newman's discussion of 
heresy cannot be separated from defence of Established Church. He had 
himself gained access only, as it were, by adoption, in his election to 
the Oriel Fellowship, to the benefits of that world of deference, 
patronage and privilege to which the term ''ancien regime" refers. The 
ferocity with which he fought a rearguard action against all the 
reforming measures of the time - Irish Sees, Catholic Emancipation, 
marriage laws, access of Dissenters to university education - is 
perhaps a reflection of his adopted status: he would defend to the last 
the establishment which made him. 
On the other hand, it would be untrue to suggest that Newman's 
theology was deterministically controlled by the dynamics of the anclen 
r-eg Jme, in the way that Clarke some t lmes appears to suggest was the 
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case with his eighteenth-century Anglican predecessor'S. 1 4 In fact, 
Newman's theology began at the very point when, according to Clarke, 
the power of the ancien regime was irrevocably broken - the year 
1832.15 Newman's early Tracts frankly recognise that a new, contested, 
context has become necessary for the Church of England, and that the 
old system of 'deference' is a thing of the past: if, he asks the clergy, 
state support is withdrawn from the church, 
on what w i 11 you rest the claim of res pee t and 
attention which you make upon your flocks? 16 
We have already seen how, in his presentation of Ambrose's struggle 
against Arianism, Newman presents apostolic Christianity as having the 
power to appeal over the heads of the ruling authorities to the 
supernatural foundation of the Church. It is not so much that he could 
not conceptually separate the ancien regime from the supernaturally-
founded Church. Rather, he defended EstablishM'U\.-tbecause, and for as 
long as, he saw its structures as mediating Christianity to the English 
people, in a way which was - at any rate until the time of "George the 
Good" - unproblematic. 
When, however, in the 1830's, the State seemed to be withdrawing 
its support, he initiated a creative theological movement which re-
invented a concept of Catholicity. Newman's treatment of Arianism 
reflects the transition from the pre-1832 situation, in which it was 
not necessarily ~-political to defend Establishment, to the new 
situation, after Reform, in which an ecclesiastical party_ had to be 
created in the Church of England.17 It is thus that the ambivalence of 
his language may be understood, as it alternates between fierce polemic 
on behalf of the 8Jlcien regime and an ecclesiology beginning to detach 
itself from the establishment and to point to the supernatural origin 
and nature of the Church. 
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Newman's pub lie response to at tacks upon anc fen reg fmc Chr-ist ian 1 ty 
is not a sys tema t ica ll y argued presentation of the his tory of dogma 
attempting to justify theologically a practical choice over an issue of 
Church polity. It is rather a rhetorical procedure. His image of an 
apostolic Church turned upon by a persecuting State, as the re-
_ ......... ,... ... __ ... J. -&- c ........ - .... h ...,...,,..., .r:r~\... .,.... ..... ~6- ........... ..... 4-- •• --1 ..... ,..... .... _ .... ;_,...._ ...._....,_.....__.,. 
_ ... _ .. ---·· ._..__ ...... _ ... J ......... _oo--- -a-.-.. ...... - --~---J• 
proposes a startling and highly questionable analogy between antiquity 
and the nineteenth century. Thus he provokes in his contemporary reader 
a sense of present distance from, and alienation from, his Christian 
past, forcing him to come to self-consciousness about the new position 
of the established refigion as a result of the crisis of the 1830's. 
This is, as it were, Newman's primary task - to raise the alarm and to 
convince his public that any kind of alienation ha~ taken place as a 
result of the dismantling of the ancien regime. Only then will it be 
possible to move on to a second stage, in which the no longer self-
evident relation of Church and State may be re-defined. Newman can re-
examine the nature of the Church in relation to the ancient past and 
reconstruct, in a contested context, an eccles io logy and a theology, in a 
sophisticated bid for his countrymen's assent. 
It is precisely this purpose which he privately declared at the 
preparatory stage of his Letters on the Church of the Fathers: 
I am poking in to the Fathers with a hope of 
rummaging forth passages of history which may 
prepare the lmag ina t ions of men for a changed 
state of things, and also be precedents for our 
conduct in difficult circumstances.' 8 
Elsewhere, writing again privately to one of his com pan ions- in-arms in 
the struggle against liber a llsm, he dec lares the po l1 t ica 1 dimension of 
his work on St. Ambrose, 
I am 
see 
hunting into the lives of the Fathe,-·::;, to 
if I can pick up anythif\~ against the 
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Min is try. 1 ·z. 
His language here - he is 'rummaging', 'poking, 'hunting' and 'picking up' 
- discloses the rhetorical purpose of his investigations into Church 
history. The rhetorical concern is not, however, only polemical ("against 
the Ministry"), or borne of the desire to tell a rattling good yarn - it 
also arises "to prep(lrP." fnr ,. nPw c:iti!Atlnn 
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PART II 
ATTACK: Sa.bellianism and Apollinarianism - A Critique of Liberalism. 
A horde of heresies fleeing r.;ith mitres awTy. 
(James Joyce, Ulysses) 
1 . Transit ion to a new heres io logy: the mid-1830's 
Sa be 11 ian ism was a Trinitarian heresy, flour ish ing in the West in 
the late second and early third centuries 1 : Apollinarianism an Eastern 
Christological heresy of the fourth.2 Yet Newman discerned such close 
kinship between them that he found it necessary, and even inevitable, 
to pass from one to the other in his detailed patristic research of the 
mid-1830's. Moreover, he connected both with Arianism. 
Apollinarianism, with its high Christology stressing the identity of 
Christ as Divine Logos, has been suggested3 as an appropriate 
designation for Newman's own view of the person of Christ. Yet he saw 
lts ultimate source as a form of the very infidelity out of which 
Arianism had sprung. This posit ion he maintained despite the abundant 
witness to Apollinaris' suffering and struggles against Arianism at the 
side of the great Athanasius. Sabellianism, too, may be described as the 
opposite tendency to Arianism in the trinitarian field of debate: a 
concern to assert the unity of God against those very distinctions 
within the Trinity from which Arian subordination of the Logos emerged 
- certainly, Arians maintained the various forms of their theology out 
of a professed horror of Sabellianism.4 But, again, Newman discerns a 
link, and even goes so far as to suggest that Sabellianism is a form of 
Arianism! Moreover,by by way of the still-current duality of the word 
'Arianism'"', he could launch an attack on Socinlanism6 which he saw as 
the form of unbelief lurking beneath the surface of liberal theology. 
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Hetre 0 Newma.n mBSsively expands wflunt had only been hints and 
conjectures in iklans7Newuum strives to articulate the essence of all 
heresy, and to teBSe it out of its manifold histo~rical forms. The method 
he employs bears a close resemblance to that which he eventually 
applied to orthodolt doctrine :1m the 1840 •s, that is, the idea of 
deve lo:piii.en t. Most s tJrik ling is the pres en ta tllon of heresy as man. if est ing 
its true nature ever more clearly as its history progresses, so that 
its essence stands truly revealed in its later developiii.ents and 
consequences. in a '!::fay unintended by its originsltor.9 Heresies may also, 
WewmM Mgues, legitimately be di-a{;ID out logically91 to their 
consequences by a critique bringing to light their hidden essence. 
As the Fathers found surprising correspondences between new 
doctrines and old impieties. so Newman hililself, in his examination of 
trends in the theology of his time. The virtual identification of 
Socinianism with atheism10 in Newman's vocabulary had taken place at the 
time he was writing ArlBns, so that, in demonstrating Sabellianism's 
development towards the Socinianism it concealed, he was saying 
something, in his own terms, very sinister. The influence of Athanasius 
- one of the primary sources for the Arian controversy - may be 
crucial here, for he regularly describes Arianism as a form of atheism 
<auE:{Jer.a - impiety or infidellty),11 , because. in denying the Son•s 
consubstantiality with the Father, Arians are denying the Father too, 
just as Caiaphas and the Jet::rs of old, in rejecting Christ, rejected God 
also: Arianism its apostasy<mrotT'i'auwt>. the infidelity of a revived, but 
debased Judaisiii.12 - this is the very stuff of Athanasius' vituperative 
style. In Newman we can see it being transformed into an analytical 
tool. 
1\let::rman's hereslology of the m1d-1830°s marks s shift in 
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peli'Spective. His rhetoric centred upon Arrianism, delineBlied in Psrt 1, 
WS\S overwhelmingly interested fn social al!lld political developments Bind 
their relation to the ethical Bind religious. However, Newman•s use of 
SB!be llian ism and Apo 11 inar iBin ism maugura tes B1 new interest in the 
antlllysis of the •tendencies• of theologies! discoiUJrse and of the dynWii!ic 
whereby systemstizations of revesled trruth contsin s hidden logic 
bringing the!ii. dsngerously close to stheisiil.There is, it would seeiil, M 
Interaction between Wewman•s patristic research and his public 
discourse.That his Apollinarian and Ssbellisn heresiology is yet another 
rhetorical strategy emerrges clearly when the complex background, 
centred upon events in Oxford bet,een 1834 Bind 1836, is considered. 
The complicated chronology of Newman•s encounter with Sabellianism 
and Apollinarianism stretches the narrator's art to its limits. He lived 
a hectic, fraught and intense existence, as he strove, with only partial 
success. to reconcile the demands upon his time of scholarly research 
,lth public controversy. The story has all the untidiness and vividness 
of a life lived at full stretch. An attempt will be made to tell this 
story according to the broad sequence of his unfolding biography. But 
the problems of simultaneity will not be artificially smoothed out, snd 
constant cross-referenc~ will be necessary adequstely to convey the 
complexity of the background. On the other hand, in order to make 
possible a coherent theological exposition of Newman's treatment of 
heresy, this sccount has been divided into sections or stages, each 
concentrating upon a particular fscet of WewMan's hereslology or 
application of it. Conclusions about the evolution of specific aspects 
of Newman's thought, in relation to the background and influences upon 
him, have somet~es been cautious, because lt is difficult to decide if 
he was applying to the contemporary polemical scene principles 
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dis covet-ed dur-ing scholarly research, or 1 conversely 1 if the immediate 
background first affected his method of research. 
- 87-
2. The inception of patrJ.stlc research: the edition of Dionysius of 
Alexandria 
In t.'larch, 1834-,'Newm.oo began his project of en edition of the 
fragments of Dionysius. the thi.Jrd-cenlmry Bishop of iUexandria, and 
pupil of Origen, who had a notsble correspondence Hith his nemesake the 
Bishop of Rome on the subject of the Tr1nity.2 Dionysius had been 
combatting. within his o~:m diocese, a form of Sabellianism.3 Dionysius's 
defence of real distinctions within the Godhead was reJI>orted, by his 
enemies, to Rome, in such a wsy as to give the impression that he 
regarded the persons of the Trinity as three separsted substances and 
thst the Son did not exist before He was begotten - in other words, he 
seemed to anticipate a form of Arianism.4 Such an impression would have 
been exaggersted when Greek terms were translated into Latin.6 Dionysius 
of Rome therefore courteously protested agsinst what appeared to be 
heresy in the teaching of his brother bishop.6 In a celebrated passage 
from his Refutation and Apology, preserved in St.Athanasius's defence of 
him against the imputation of Arianism, Dionysius clarified to the 
Roman Pope's satisfaction, his view of the Trinitarian distinctions: just 
as the sun and its radiance are one yet distinct, and co-existent with 
each other, so the Son and Spirit are distinct from the eternally-
existent Father, yet ever one with Hi.m7 
Newman's interest in Dionysius arose out of dissatisfaction with 
the quality of research in ArlBns. As an old man, he declared, 
dramatically, that it was not even a "little" book, that it was rushed 
and that it "hit no mark at all".8 This appears an accurate reminiscence 
of what was more mutedly expressed in the 1830's: in August, 1834, he 
wrote to John William Bowden, explaining his decision to undertake the 
precise discipline demanded by patristic textual editing: 
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If you say, why edit books at all? I answer~ I 
hrwe gr-eat fears of being superficial 
nothing is a greater temptation in writing 
such a book as the Arians, [than] to take facts 
and Fa ther·s at second hand - and I wish to 
withdraw myself as much as possible from it.~· 
Net-Jman is responding he~re to an enquilry about his Arians, amd h8ls 
declared that 
an oo~ortun it~ nf rnrrprt in~ m~• Ari .. nc: ie r.+ 
course very uncertain and of distant date. 10 
There is another reason for Newman's broadening of his patristic 
research. He had originally considered Arlans as only 8l first volume -
treating of the his tory of the Doctrine of the Trinity 1 1 - to be 
followed by a second volume on the Incarnation, dealing with the 
heresies 'falling under 0 this latter category.12Moreover, when Rose 
remarked of Arians that he had got, instead of a history of Councils a 
history of heresy, Newman declared that 
The succeeding volumes, if they are to form 
one with the volumes we have seen, will be a 
His tory of Heresies. 1 "'' 
The puzzles and complexities of the way Dionysius acted as a bridge 
passage between the historically unrelated heresies of Sabellianism and 
Apollinarianism will be considered in due course. One thing, however, is 
clear: Arians was the somewhat unsatisfactory and unpredictable outcome 
of an overarching concern with the history of doctrine perceived as the 
history of heresy. 
It is therefore not surprising that Newman grasped the chance 
offered by Burton14 to edit, for the Oxford University Press, the 
fragments of Dionyslus, Bishop of Alexandria. He began in March, 1834, 
and worked hard at it until the end of August, 1835.u;He took the work 
very seriously, collating manuscripts in the BodleianH•and, in July, 
1834, asking Benjamin Harrison, who was in Paris, to consult for him 
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some manuscripts unobtainable in. England.17 In the same monthp he told 
his sister, Harriet, that he was "getting on fairly." 181By August, he felt 
that he had 0'nearly broken the neck of it00 , 19but was still working hard 
at it by November.20 It dragged on. By the Long Vacation of the 
following year, 1835 , he exclaimed, 
Dionysius whom oh that I could despatch this 
UFtrA t i"n21 
Still in August, he is 04hard at Dionysius" ,22but it only "gets on 
slow1y••.23Then at the end of the month, he declares 
Dionysius is nearly done,24 
but has to qualify his optimism, 
i.e. as far as it can be till I read more .25 
Beginning in hope and proceeding in enthusiasm, the f ina 1 draft eluded 
him, and the project fizzled out. 
Nevertheless, he kept his notes26 - they are some of his neatest -
with a Latin commentary upon the textual variants running alongside the 
Greek text. These provide precise information about his acquaintance 
with Dionysius' attack on Sabellianism. Newman edited, from Eusebius's 
Ecclesiastical History, the Second Letter on Baptism to Xystus,27Bishop 
of Rome, in which Dionysius touched on Sabellianism.28 ln a note here, 
Newman alludes to "contra Sabelllum scriptas".2 s-He worked on the 
existing fragments of Dlonysius• Refutation and Defence, especially that 
occurring in Athanasius. However, completely lacking is any recorded 
definition of Sabellianism, or any disquisition upon the nature and 
origins of that heresy. Similarly, there are no reflections upon the 
general nature of heresy. These notes are, perhaps, Newman's _only 
attempt at pure scholarship. They bore fruit, as we shall see, 
elsewhere. 
Carefully folded and bound with a pink ribbon, the sheets reside in 
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the Oratory Archive. On the first paper of the pile appears a 
retrospective comment, written by a very old man, perhaps wistfully 
leafing through the papers of his youth, 
This inchoation of <in 1834) of [sicJ en 
edition of S.Dionysius Alex, cerne to nothing. 
July 83, 
and then, 1n frail pencil, 
It was put en end to by the cornrnencernen t of 
the Movement ,cK• 
This is not an entirely accurate remark - the 'Movement' was under 
weigh even before he had started the edition - but it nevertheless 
points to the reason for its incompletion: the distraction of public 
controversy was at its height, and Newman stood poised to lay bare the 
infidelity concealed by liberalism. 
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3. The Hampden Controversy 
Newman's preoccupation with Hampden began on 20th August, 1834 0 
with the publication of the latter's Observations on Rellgious Dissent 
and continued until February, 1836 0 cutting across his patristic 
research, and forming the background for his major work during this 
period, Tract 73, On the Introduction of Rationalist Principles into 
Revealed Religion, <September, 1835). 
The controversy may be seen as perhaps Newman's last really 
serious defence of the ancien regime - the preservation by religious 
tests of Oxford University as the exclusive preserve of the Church of 
England. Thus, he lamented to Hugh James Rose, upon the publication of 
Observations, that it had destroyed Oxford's "glory", by breaking down 
the previously unanimous position of the University that subscription 
to the 39 Articles should not be waived to allow Dissenters to 
matriculate. 1 In the defence of "tests", then, Newman's stance in this 
controversy is in continuity with the rhetoric of Arians. However, his 
theological responses to Hampden have a complex history, notable for 
their indirectness, while the pamphlet he eventually wrote specifically 
concerned with Hampden, the Elucidations, is one of his slightest works. 
The ramifications of the Hampden controversy extend to all Newman•s 
activities from late 1834 to early 1836. Like an atmosphere, Hampdenlsm 
pervaded and conditioned his patristic research and his public rhetoric. 
The course of the controversy was protracted and bitter.2 lt centred 
at first upon Hampden•s Observations and the issue of admission to 
Dissenters. Newman saw the threat to Anglican hegemony at Oxford as a 
threat to Christianity itself and, in late November, 1834, wrote to 
Hampden te 11 ing h 1m that 1 t tended "a 1 together to make a shipwreck of 
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Christian faith."3 lt became a peculiarly claustrophobic feud: they were, 
after all, Fellows of the same Common Room. Hampden's feelings flared 
to fury on the occasion of a little p81i1phlet war about hil!l, involving 
Newman's protege, Henry Wilberforce. In il-1arch, 1835, Newman had 
suggested that !:Jilberforce write a pamphlet on "Socinianism at Oxford" 
as a counterblast to one by Edward Hawkins, who had come out on 
Hampden's side over subscription.4 The pamphlet eventually emerged as 
Foundations of the Christian Faith Assailed which, Wilberforce told 
Newman, was "'really yours".5 This pamphlet announces an important theme 
for the whole controversy - and for the critique of liberalism which 
eventually sprang from it: that liberal positions adopted within 
Christ ian i ty concea 1 Soc in ian ism. 
Hampden, enraged at what he regarded as a personal attack - he 
found it difficult to distinguish between exegesis of his tenets and 
odium theologicum& - demanded of Wilberforce that he acknowledge what 
was rumoured, that he had writ ten it, and, moreover, pub 1 ic 1 y reveal the 
name of his suspected accomplice7That Newman should have brought the 
pamphlet into the Oriel Common Room aggravated Hampden's grievance.8 By 
June, 1835, Hampden was addressing another angry reproach, this time 
directly to Newman, about his anonymous editing and compilation of a 
Collection of PamphletSS against him; he expresses "disgust" at Newman's 
behaviour, 
for no other feeling I am sure, is so due to 
the conduct of a person who can act w 1 th the 
d iss imu la t ion, and falsehood and dark rna lign 1 t y, 
of which you have been guilty .1 o 
One sentence in this letter was even interpreted <by Froude>. as meaning 
that Hampden would have challenged Newman to a duel.11 The picture of 
the two men exchanging pistol shots on Christ Church Meadow is a 
bizarre one indeed. The humour of the situation was not lost on Newman 
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- he was privately amuseol.12But his icy third-person reply to HB!mpden's 
rage was not cone ilia tory.' 3 
Nine months later, in February, 1836, the controversy moved into a 
second stage, when Hampden was proposed as Regius Professor. There was 
a Tractarian outcry.' 4 But by then a host of important events had 
intervened, conditioning Newman's perspective. It will therefore be 
necessary briefly to return to Hampden at a later stage in the 
narrative.15 
In the meantime, Newman had been scrutinizing Hampden's works. We 
may assume that he had read Observations on Religious Dissent by late 
November, 1834.16Hampden's pamphlet was based upon his Bampton 
Lectures of 1832, published in 1833 as The Scholastic Philosophy 
Considered in Its Relation to Christian Theology.' 7 These made no 
impression on Newman when they were delivered, for he neither attended 
nor read them at the time. It was not until March 31st, 1835, that he 
"looked into Hampden's Bampton Lectures for the first time" - that is, 
only after the controversy about the admission of Dissenters was well 
under weigh.' 9 He was, no doubt, looking for signs of Socinianlsm and 
collecting examples. During this period he was amassing the evidence of 
the virtual Socinianism of his opponent's theology, evidence which 
eventually appeared in Elucidations, his chrestomathy of Hampdenism, 
written at high speed in early 1836, but drawing upon this earlier 
readlng.19 
Beneath the university politics provoking the animus of the 
controversy was a theological issue. For Newman and his Tractarian 
allies, the whole issue of subscription was ·theological, beca~se the 
position taken over articles implied a view about their status and 
authority. Moreover, lying behind the issue of the 39 Articles, there 
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was the mo~e general issue of the a~ticles of faith of the ancient 
creeds, the Nicene ood the 'Athanasian'. Where did Dissenters stand over 
these - and what about the Unitarians? Newman's point about Socinianism 
reveals the premiss of all his argUIDents: that a dissolution of precise 
dogmatic tests would initiate a slide into denial of the Trinity. 
Hampden's position9 too, was theological. Observations was not just 
an ecclesiastico-political pamphlet: his practical conclusion, that 
Dissenters should not be _ma.de. to subscribe, was supported by a 
theology of the nature of revelation and its relation to articles. This 
theology profoundly influenced Newman by reaction: his own theology of 
revelation in the mid-1830's cannot be understood without reference to 
it, nor can his critique of liberalism as 'Sabellian'. 
What, then, was Hampden's theology? He regarded revelation as a 
collection of facts only, contained in the Bible. These facts are a 
narration of events providentially disposed by God to affect men 
mora 11 y. On the other hand, eccles ias tical definitions of doctrine are 
not themselves revealed. It therefore follows that creeds and articles, 
being essentially human formulations, are open to adjustment: Dissenters 
need therefore only to subscribe to the Bible as a collection of facts 
to be upholding what has been revealed. 
Pamphlet though it is, the Observations is a precisely-worded and 
closely-argued document. It contains a clear statement of his 
characteristic line: 
the whole revelation con ta !ned in ... [ the 
Scriptures] so far as it is revelation, consists 
of matter of fact ... there are no propositions 
concerning God in Scripture, detached from some 
event of Divine providence to which they refer 
and on which they are founded.20 
Conclusions drawn from Scripture are not revealed.21 However, Hampden 
qualifies his position here carefully. He does not mean that we must 
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restdct ourselves only to scriptural phraseology, and he would include 
as revealed conclusions by Christ or His apostles about the Old 
Testament.22Hampden's exclusion only applies to "intellectuar•, or 
speculative, or theological truth."23Yet, despite his rider, he appears 
to be excluding from the status of revealed both the Church of England 
articles and - more important - the dogmatic, as opposed to the 
narrative element in the creeds. 
Moral conclusions, on the other hand, are allowed because 
incitement to duty is the very purpose of revelation, 
Every intimation of the Holy Spirit conveyed by 
the word of God is, in its strict and proper 
application, an appeal to the heart of man; and 
each appG!a l is an argument and incitement to 
duty .2 " 
Man can make moral inferences from Scripture because there is an 
analogy between his natural moral knowledge, and the enlarged and 
elevated form of revealed morality.25The revealed facts are, then, 
intended by God as stimulations of innate moral instincts, rather than 
disclosures about the divine nature. This shift of emphasis, from the 
dogmatic to the ethical, attenuates what Newman would have called the 
mystery. Scripture has, indeed, become an 'open book' - open to what 
human beings already know about themselves as "men in the world" - a 
phrase likely to provoke instant hostility in Newman. 
Hampden's an thropocen tr ism emerges even more clear 1 y in the 
discussion of revelation in the Bampton Lectures, upon which his 
position in Observations is based: 
Scripture-arguments 
inducement addressed 
man - not merely to 
thinking and fee ling 
fellow men; - and to 
in their effect on our 
are arguments of 
to the whole nature of 
intellectual ·man, but to 
man 1 i v ing among his 
be appreciated therefore 
whole nature. 26 
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There is no element in revelation transcending the human: revelation is 
a hWilan mode of divine manifestation, 
If now we regard the Scriptures in the way of 
the Schoolmen, as having God for their proper 
subject, instead of reading them as a divine 
history of man, we naturally neglect the 
analogy of times and c1rcumstances?7 
Hampden does, however, have something positive to say about 
speculative doctrine, which in his view separates him from 
latitudinarians.26There is an issue of truth in the case of such 
articles, but opposing views need to be argued out by persuasion, in an 
atmosphere of mutual respect and tolerance - that is, without a bar 
being compulsorily imposed upon Dissenters applying to study at seats 
of learning.29This is a long-terro. process. Meanwhile dogma has a 
twofold function within each Christian denomination:3°''as guarding the 
depository of divine truth and as moderating between conflicting 
opinions."31 First, then, dogma acts as a hedge around the revealed facts 
of Scripture.32Secondly, it has a social function, in curbing the natural 
human impulse to form theological opinions, which would logically result 
in as many theologies as there were people, by imposing terms of 
cornmunion.33Both functions involve a relativity in relation to dogma: 
dogmatic formulae had an historical evolution and a sociological 
context. Although the truths dogmas guard are eternal, the dogmas, 
being relative to culture, may in the future be altered, without 
destroying their 'guarding' and 'moderating' function: 
our doctrinal system as it now stands 
expressed, cannot be more than a declaration of 
terms of communion on the part of the Church, 
subject to revision and alteration, as 
expediency may suggest - expediency I mean, in 
regard to the fundamental interests of 
Christian truth; since the very existence of 
separate communions professing certain 
theological opinions is relative to this.34 
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But if dogma is relative to the eternal truths of revelation, and if 
these eternal truths are no more than facts producing a moral 
impression, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
doctrines of the ancient Church about the Trinity and the Incarnation 
are relative only to human culture and therefore, in principle, 
adjustable. Newman certainly interpreted Hampden's drift to be 
that the articles of the Nicene and Athanasian 
Creeds are merely human opinions, scholastic, 
allowing of change, unwarrantable when imposed, 
and, in fact, the produce of a mistaken 
philosophy; and that the Apostles' Creed is 
defensible only when considered as a record of 
historical facts.86 
Hampden's contribution to an issue of university politics, then, 
involved a challenge to credal and patristic orthodoxy. It also 
challenged, quite specifically, Newman's sense of the importance of 
heresy, and its history, as applicable to the early nineteenth-century 
English scene. Just as Newman, quite radically, had re-asserted 
patristic heresiology, so Hampden proposed an equally radical re-
interpretation of traditional formulae. Both were attempting to re-draw 
the boundary-lines in the highly-contested atmosphere following the 
Reform Act. 
Hampden's treatment of heresy, in the Bampton Lectures arises from 
a temper of mind, ironically, not far from Newman's own: a mistrust of 
the reduction of revelation to system, "the fetters of a systematic 
theology".36Perhaps they f.Jere both - Newman in Arlans and Hampden in 
his Bamptons - reacting against the 'Noetics', and the logic of which 
their Common Room was reputed to stink.37 Systematization, for Hampden, 
as for Newman, was a form of rationalisin,36arising from 
the pure exertions of the mind within itself, 
conscious of its own powers, and struggling to 
push itself forth against the constringent 
force of the spiritual government.'"''=" 
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Hampden's theme is "the evil of a Logical Theology.'040 
His application of this anti-rationalism to heresy and dogma also 
has affinities with Newman's. Just as Newman in Arians blames 
rationalistic heresy for the Church's unwilling introduction of Creeds 
and technical vocabulary, so also Hampden: 
Orthodoxy was forced to speak the divine truth 
> 
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only to guard against the noveltles which the 
heretic had introduced. It was the necessity of 
the case that compelled the orthodox, as 
themselves freely admit, to employ a 
phraseology, by which, as experience proves, 
the naked truth of God has been overborne and 
obscured.41 
Again, as Newman, Hampden laments the spread of dialectic, from defence 
against heresy, to the mainstream of Christian theology.42This 
regrettable process culminated in medieval scholasticism, the residual 
effects of which he would root out of the Church of England. 
Scholasticism, pretending to "perfect science",43was really imposing 
upon revelation a priori categories extrinsic to it:44 it is a false 
systematization resulting from the fact that "the human intellect 
supposes a greater regularity and equality in things than it actually 
finds.''45 lnadequacy before the revealed is not something the mind itself 
is naturally prepared to accept, so that it "eagerly seizes on the 
truths contained in these [Scriptures], to recast them in the mould 
which its own imaginations have formed.'146 
So much for the affinities between the two men, but what of the 
differences? How did two such determined opponents of "the fetters of 
systematic theology'147end up as such irreconcilable enemies? Part of 
the answer, no doubt, lies in the political dimension of the ~ow: Newman 
wanted Dissenters kept out of Oxford: Hampden would have them in. But 
Hampden's theological position is also much more radical than Newman's, 
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even in the lstter's 'Romantic' phase in Arians. Net-:~man had indeed 
r~egretted the fixing of the faith in creeds as a descent from mysticsl 
communion to the exigencies of a public, imperial church, often nominal 
and shot through with heresy, but he also regarded the creeds as 
preserving the fillith by fixing its terrminology.46Hampden, on the other 
hand, extends the scope of 0rationalism 0 and 0systematization' to the 
doctrines themselves of Christian Antiquity, which he opposes to 
scriptural 'fact 0 : 
The only ancient, only Ca tho lie truth is the 
Scriptural fact."'··" 
Moreover, while Newman accepted the insufficiency of language to 
describe the depth of divine realities, by calling it economic, he 
nevertheless saw words as, in some sense, containing, or participating 
in, the realities they inadequately describe - the economy rooted in the 
mystery. But Hampden was radically anti-propositional: for him, it 
seems, all verbal formulations are dangerous scholasticizations of 
revelation. What, then, of Scripture, which, after all, contains 
propositions? No, says Hampden: Scripture is "a record of the divine 
dealings with the successive generations of mankind."50 lt was 
scholasticism which treated Scripture "not simply as the living word of 
God, but as containing sacred propositions of inspired wisdom.51 It must 
be remembered here, for the effect of such a statement on Newman, that 
Hampden saw as 'scholastic' not only medieval but also patristic 
theology. Newman had no brief for, and scant knowledge of, the former, 
but was, of course, an urgent defender of the latter. Hampden accepts 
Scripture - and Scripture only - as revealed in a narrative ~ense: it is 
a story of human experiences of God through history, "a divine history 
of man."52 
Hampden's understanding of the Doctrine of the Trinity, and of the 
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heresies traditionally regarded as opposed to it, follow from his 
experiential, non-propositional concept of revelation. He does himself 
profess belief in a 9factual' form of the Doctrine, that is as "a Theory 
of all revealed truth ... the combined result of all the Scripture 
facts,"but attacks its conversion into "a speculative a priori principle, 
a logical basis, froiD which all other facts of Scripture, rationalized in 
like manner might be demonstratively concluded."53Such rationalizations 
stem from analogies perceived between the working of the human mind 
and God's nature. One such analogy was particularly baneful to Hampden: 
the consideration of the "Being of God" according to the laws of 
causality, the rigorous distinction between cause and effect,E~4and the 
conception of God as 11 the principle of Efficiency."55Hampden's 
indictment of "Logical Theology" goes beyond a condemnation of medieval 
divinity to Trinitarian orthodoxy itself: 
The orthodox theory of the 
accordingly, consisted in an exact 
view of the principle of causation.56 
Trinity, 
scientific 
Heresy found itself condemned, according to Hampden, when it came 
up against this logic of orthodoxy in one of two possible ways: first, 
by offending against God, seen as an abstract principle of causation; 
secondly, by being condemned according to the ultimately logical 
conclusions that could be drawn from its own tenets. In his discussion 
of both, Sabellianism is a prominent example. 
First, then, Sabellianism was condemned by orthodox Fathers because 
lt blurred their sharp distinction between cause and effect, it 
viewed the cause in the act of trans 1 t ion in to 
effect. It supposed the Divine Being to be a 
vast tide of efflux and reflux, by which the 
Deity was, continually, and successively 
pretended from the Father, to the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit. It thus did not view the Deity 
under those negations or limitations, in which 
every thing of effect, as distinct from the 
principle of Causation, disappeared. It 
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contemplated the Deity as, in a manner, going 
out of Himself.6 ·7 
Bhereas the orthodox had a strictly logical concept of unity which 
permitted subsistent distinctions, Sabellianism tended, in view of its 
more straightforward concept of unity, to think of the personal 
distinctions only as names.59 1t is possible that Hampden found 
Sabellianism to be more sympathetic than orthodoxy: in its merging of 
cause and effect it is nearer his own idea of revelation as "facts" or 
"effects". If so, it is only by implication: Hampden is - as Newman was 
to find - a master at muddying the waters, and it would be impossible 
to find a sentence in which he explicitly declares Sabellius to be an 
ally. 
He is, however, more forthright in his discussion of the second way 
by which theologians become heretics, that is, by inference. Heretics 
were not so by intention - Trinitarian heretics, for example, "set out 
with a trinitarian [sid hypothesis"59- but fell victim to the logic of 
orthodoxy; treating of the Sabellian heretics, he declares: 
If the opinions of Praxeas, and Artemon, and 
Theodotus, of Paul of Samosata, Noetus, 
Sabellius, and others, amounted to Unitarianism, 
it was in the way of consequence or 
in f erence'-'· 0 
Hampden, in fact, distinguishes between two kinds of logic: first, 
"'consequence", the inner logic of their own intellectual history, by 
which their developing speculations concluded in an evacuation of the 
truth they intended to uphold:"they explained it away themselves by 
II 
their speculations.61 Secondly, there is "inference": they "had the 
consequences of their theories forced on them by their adversaries, as 
the principles of their belief.'062 
Like Newman, then, Hampden observes the tendency in orthodox 
Fathers to infer consequences from the propositions of their opponents, 
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but he brings to it 8 different set of premisses 8bout the authority of 
Antiquity. It is possiblep indeedp th8t the potential polemic8l V8lue of 
"inference"' t-;r6S impressed upon Newman by Hampden•s treatment of heresy 
in the lJaiilpton Lectures. Little did Hampden know, 8S he pee.cefully 
~rote ~hem ~efore the subscription controversy had broken outp that he 
~auld himseU' be made 8 heretic by inference and stand accused by 
Wewman of virtual Soc!nianism from the logical consequences of his own 
principles~ 
The significance of Haiilpden for the ramifications of Newman's 
theories of heresy is all-important. He presented an occasion. His 
writings had ideas in them which could be advantageously turned to 
Tractarian use. He forced Newman to consider what might be meant by 
'revelation' and how the particular heresies he was studying could be 
made to relate to this. He touched a nerve. 
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4-. Blanco Bh ite 
In the midst of Newman's struggle against Hampden, Blanco 1rJhite 
became a Unitarian: Newman heard the news on ~,IJarch 20th, 1835.1 Newman 
and Blanco Hhite had, before 1833, been close friends and, although they 
had drawn away from each other,2 and Blanco White had thrmm in his lot 
with the liberals under the patronage of Whately/"Newman retained a 
warm and lasting affection for him:'" It was with genuine personal 
anguish that he contemplated Blanco's embracing of what he was coming 
to see as "a deadly heresy, full of lasting evil to its wilful 
professors, and influential moreover on their moral character.5 He wrote 
to try to dissuade his friend "in great pain and much 
affection".6 Blanco's reply reflects the poignancy of the situation, 
I must fo llmv the 1 igh t that is in me. If that 
light be darkness, it is so without my being 
a\.Jare of it: without the slightest ground for 
suspecting that it is wilfully so ... I would give 
-"'ny thing to have it in my power to re 1 ieve the 
pain you suffer on my account? 
This apostasy was for Newman a horrible aberration in a friend he loved 
- he even came to see it as mental derangement.8 The trauma of Blanco's 
loss effected a change in Newman's perspective: he saw in Blanco a 
heretic acting in good faith, falling through delusion into involuntary 
error. Accordingly, Newman's treatment of heresy in terms of 
~'~consequences" - to use Hampden's vocabulary - took on a sympathy, even 
a tenderness, in the face of a tragic concept of the heretic's course. 
On the other hand, the defection of Blanco White provided a useful 
debating point, as Martin Murphy has pointed out: 
Blanco himself provided the Tractarians with 
one of their most powerful weapons against 
Hampden, for they adopted the line that 
B lance's Soc in ian ism (i.e. Unitarian ism) was 
simply the logical outcome of the liberal 
theology of his own associates, Whately, 
Hampden and 
described as 
host'.""'-' 
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Arnold - a gcoup 1r1h ich Newman 
the 'advanced guard of a black 
Blanco White could be used as a "beacon":' 0 by comparing the teaching of 
a firank Unitarian with that of Hampden, liberalism could be shown up 
for the crypto-Socinianism that it was. The rumours which had 
circulated, that Blanco White had had a part in Hampden°s Hampton 
Lectures,1 1 and that Whately might have had a hand in Blanco White's 
Second Travels of an Irish Gentleman,'-2 suggesting a complex web of 
mutual influence,13would have strengthened Newman's view about the real 
direction of liberalism.14 
It was not until four months after the news of Blanco White's 
apostasy that Newman began to study the book in which Blanco publicly 
announced his change of church allegiance,u;observations on Heresy and 
Orthodoxy, that is, just over one month before he wrote Tract 73. The 
sentence which Newman adopted from Blanco White's book, and which he 
did not tire of repeating in his lettet~s, was that "Sabellianigm ig but 
Unitarianism in disguise."16 lt was during this period, in early August, 
1835, that Newman realised that ideas in Blanco's book could be used 
against the very liberalism out of which his approach to heresy and 
orthodoxy emerged: 
It strikes me his work might be very usefully 
turned as a witness for the tendency of 
certain opinions 17 
The context of Blanco White's use of 'Sabellianism' throws light 
upon why Newman found the idea so significant. The term occurs in the 
"Preface" to Observations on Heresy and Orthodoxy, where Blanco White 
describes his spiritual journey. He arrived at Unitarianism, not by 
reading Unitarian theology, but, significantly for Newman, from 
011systema~tic study of the Scr1ptures",1 8 
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I never cead any defence of Unitar-ianism till, 
in 1818, the study of the New Testament alone 
had made me a Unitarian.'·~· 
In isolating the Bible from Tradition and credal affirmations, and 
studying it concentratedly, Blanco I:Jhite had, by as early as 1814., while 
at Oxford studying theology, begun to doubt.20His example provided 
powerful confirmation of Newman's view that ultra-Protestantism and 
liberalism were, for all their apparent differences, somehow all of a 
piece, and on the way to infidelity.21 
Although, by 1818, Blanco White had arrived at Unitarianism, he did 
not make any public avowal. By 1824, he had come round again to 
orthodoxy, not from intellectual conviction, but from the human warmth 
and influence of those he met at Oxford. But, eventually, his reason 
"resumed its operations against the system I had thus wilfully 
embraced."22His conscience was driving him unwillingly to accept the 
conclusions of his own reason, while his emotions held him to the 
Church of England. At this point, he introduces Sabellianism: 
in my a.nx ie ty to avoid a separation from the 
Church by deliberate surr-ender of my mind to 
my old Unitarian convictions, I took refuge in 
a modification of the Sa be 11 ian theory, and 
availed myself of the moral Unity which I 
be 1 ieve to exist be tween God the Father and 
Christ, joined to the consideration that Christ 
is called in the New Testament the Image of 
God, and addressed my prayers to God as 
apparently in that image.23 
This passage, which later played an ilnportant part in Tract 7324 , is 
full of pathos: clinging to a Church he loved, Blanco found in 
Sabellianism a way of deceiving himself, of concealing from himself the 
real direction in which his reason was taking him - but it was a 
"flimsy veil": 
the devout contrivance would not bear 
examination. Sa be llian ism is only Un 1 tar ian ism 
disguised in words; and as for the worship of 
an image in its absence, the idea is mast 
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unsa tis fac tocy. In this state, however~, I passed 
five or six years; but the retur·n to the clear 
and definite Un i tar· ian ism in which I had 
formerly been, was as easy as it was 
natural :"'' 5 
His friend's story was, for Newman, full of warning. 
Blanco's presentation of heresy and orthodoxy, confronted Newman 
with a clearer - and, one might say, a more honest and forthright -
form of the theology of revelation which he found in Hampden. Blanco 
White held that the Bible only is the source of all religious truth, but 
that the only certain conclusions we can draw are those assimilable in 
sense experience.'"'6 The "facts" of the Bible are, in the latter sense 
only, objective. This is pure Hampden. However, in this assessment of 
the nature of doctrine, Blanco goes a little further - far enough, 
Newman of course argued, to show the 'consequences' and legitimate 
'inferences' touching Hampden's similar theology. For Blanco, a doctrine 
about the nature of God is not open to empirical experience - it is not 
part of common public language as are facts and events - but it is a 
purely private interpretation of the one who holds it, "an impression 
which exists in his own mind."27Each person has a duty, Blanco argues, 
to convince others of his own interpretation. But the condition of 
'orthodoxy' only arises when a particular interpretation agreed by a 
group ("sect", "church", or "Christian party"> is imposed as "objective 
Christian truth".28The true interpretation of the Bible is only certainly 
known by "'the Divine mind".29Heresy is the name given by a party to the 
opposite of the opinion it is trying to impose.30Both Hampden and 
Blanco, then, see doctrine as unrevealed, but whereas the former tries 
to accord it nevertheless a regulating function of sorts in the Church, 
Blanco asserts frankly its subjectivity. 
Blanco White, then, denies that the Bible can be interpreted in 
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credal m~ dogmatic propositions. What does he affirm? The answer is 
that idea of the Bible as moral instruction which we have seen in 
Hampden. He separates doctrinal orthodoxy from "saving faith".31 The 
former is a "logical act", identifying by the powers of the mind certain 
propositions deduced from Scripture as essential - but this is to make 
salvation a matter of chance, because it would then be conditional unnn 
congenital intellectual power, or upon the education needed to perform 
the "logical act". "Saving faith" is, on the other hand, centred in will 
and trust, rather than intellectual assent, and hangs upon one 
point,"belief or trust in Christ as the moral king and instructor of 
mankind.'.32This is the "essential principle"33 of the Gospel. Genuine 
'moral' heresy is possible because some moral positions may interfere 
with the Gospel, but a latitude of doctrinal stances may be tolerated 
within Christianity. Therefore the 
way of salvation, through the Gospel, must be 
that which remains after the removal of all 
the doctrines which have been constantly 
disputed between the Orthodox and the 
Heterodox.3+ 
What remains is obedience to the moral law revealed in conscience, and 
trust in Christ as moral exemplar.36 
Blanco's very original concept of 'Sabellianism• provided Newman 
w 1 th a bridge be tween his sect ion on the ancient heresy in Ar ians and 
the possibility of using it to designate a modern heresy - liberalism -
which was concealing its essential Socinianism under the form of 
Sabellianism, Father, Son and Holy Spirit being •revealed' only in the 
sense of being images, manifestations or modes of expression of the One 
God's moral will for humanity. Blanco's apostasy took him, to Newman's 
sadness, into a sect his one-time friend abhorred above all others: 
I would not s 1 t down to dinner w 1 th a known 
Soc in ian.'~"" 
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But there were others, like Hampden, mildly disclaiming any imputation 
of Socinianism, happy to occupy the benefices, stalls and professorships 
of the Church of England and to diffuse their influence. Might not 
'Sabellianism', in Blanco's sense, be an instrument to root them out? 
The influence of Blanco upon Newman's terminology may be clearly 
discerned onlv a week after his first oerusal of Observations on Heresv 
and Orthodoxy, that is, in early August, 1835. Newman has come almost 
to identify as Sabellian the liberalism within the Church of England 
which calls for the waiving of tests and creeds: 
A cry is raised that the Creeds are 
unnecessarily minute ... Thus, e.g., Sabellianism 
has been spreading of late years because 
people have said "What is the harm of 
Sabellianism? lt is a mere name," etc ..... Well, 
\·Jha t is the consequence? \oJe just now have a 
most serious and impressive warning if we 
choose to avail ourselves of it. Poor Blanco 
White has turned Soc in ian, and writ ten a book 
glorying in it. Now in the preface of this book 
he says: 'I have for some time been a 
Sabellian, but the veil is now removed fcom my 
eyes, for· I find Sa bell ian ism is but 
Unitarian ism in disguise. 3 7 
Newman is here inveighing against the poisonous influence of the 
recently-published correspondence of Hannah More, who writes 
"slightingly" of the Niceano-Constantinopolitan creed and by her 
"scoffing" strengthens "a system of doctrine which ends in 
Unitarlanism".38 'Sabellianism• has evolved a sense quite different from 
its strictly patristic sense - the opponents of Niceano-
Constantlnopolitan orthodoxy were Arians not Sabellians - as a general 
term of broad contemporary significance. 
Yet the story of this term's origin is, ultimately, even more 
complex and tortuous. Why was Newman so swift to discern the 
usefulness of Blanco's self-declared 'Sabellianism', 1f not because a 
vaguer form of the same idea had been forming in his own mind? Six 
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months before Newman had read Blanco's Observations, and even before he 
had heard of his 'fall' or of the 'instructive' idea of Sabellianism, he 
preached a sermon on 8th March, 1835, The Humiliation of the Eternal 
S'on.390ne section of this Christological40sermon discusses the relation 
between doctrinal terminology and the spiritual life. There is a form of 
orthodoxy, Newman tells us, which consists merely in adhering to an 
imprecise form of words - such as to call Christ 'God' - which is not 
rooted in the "object of faith" behind the words. So superficial is 
such a faith that a "subtle disputant" could rob them of "the sacred 
truth in its substance, even if they kept it in name"."l 1 This is already 
quite close to Blanco's analysis of his own conversion to Unitarianism: 
a form of words conceals a shift which has already taken place without 
the subject's conscious knowledge. The "substance" of a truly orthodox 
faith is preserved only by communion with God, so that words then 
'light up' "the image of the Incarnate Son on our hearts".42Then Newman 
turns to "the theology of late centuries" which he argues has 
facilitated the erosion of true orthodoxy by providing vague 
Christological formularies, and neglecting Nicene theology; so that 
~.;hen we merely speak first of God, 
Man, we seem to change the nature 
preserving the Person."-=" 
then of 
without 
Newman's thought is not entire 1 y clear in this passage. His drift seems 
to be that the terms of patristic orthodoxy preserve the unity of 
Christ 0 divine and human in one person, while modern theology oscillates 
in its way of speaking of Christ and falls into a kind of Nestorianism. 
This argument is, however, not integrated with the view that it is 
experience of God - "communion" - which preserves the orthodoxy. At 
this point, Newman abruptly introduces Sabellianism, in the company of a 
number of other heresies. He is discussing the dangers of modern 
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theology to the literate and learned, (the illiterate being happily 
immune from temptation): 
they beg in by being Sa bell ians, they go on to 
be Nestor ians and ... they tend to be Eb ion i tes 
and to deny Christ's Divinity altogether."' 4 
It is clear that here Newman already has in mind Sabellianism as a 
resting-place on the road towards Unitarianism. 
Moreover, two weeks later, writing to Henry I:Jilberforce when the 
news of Blanco's defection was only just out in Oxford, and 
preoccupied with the virtual Socinianism of his liberal opponents there, 
Newman again touches on Sabellianism. He prompts his friend with 
headings for a pamphlet and eggs him on with regard to the targets: 
Thomas Arnold, Richard Whately and his domestic chaplain Samuel Hinds, 
N.W.Senior, another ally of Whately, and Blanco White. Sabellianism is 
in traduced with tan ta liz ing imprecision: 
Hinds, his notions about lnspiration·""·(?)and his 
Sabellianism and Nestorianism .... Whately, 
Sa be 11 ian ism, Nestor ian ism:'"'· 
The bdnging together of Sabellianism and Nestorianism"'" 7 shows Newman's 
growing sense of the underlying identity of all heresies, no matter how 
far separated in place or time; he may also have seen both as denying 
the hypostatic union of divine and human in the one Person of the I:Jord, 
which his sermon on the Humiliation of the Eternal Son had so recently 
defended. The consistent feature of this passage, however, is the 
association of the Whatelian circle with Sabellianism, Hinds and Whately 
being considered as an identical fount. 
This collocation of Sabellianism with Whatelianism originates in a 
disturbing voice from the past, when the I:Jhite Bear and the unfledged 
young Fellow took sweet counsel together and walked as friends. Bhately 
had criticized the young man's sermon, On the Mediatorial Kingdom of 
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Christ, <1828) for its Arianism:''9 lt was seven years later - they we~re 
friends no more - and Newman remembered that his cdtic tended tm,un~cts 
an opposite extreme, Sabellianism.'~0Newman had a long, if selective, 
memory. It is just possible that it would have been jogged by 
controversy surrounding the elevation of Whately to the Archbishopric 
of Dublin, in 1831. Protests were raised about his unconventional views, 
and particularly that he verged on Sabellianism.61 But, if so, there is 
no sign of it in Newman's correspondence. His one letter upon the 
subject of Whately's promotion considers what he might do, if invited to 
accompany him to Dublin.52Relations between them were still very 
cordial - dining and walking together.63Whately offered him a college 
vice-Principalship.64There seems little evidence that Newman was much 
troubled by Whately's 'Sabellianism' in 1831. By 1835, it was, of course, 
another matter. By then, they were definitely in opposite camps/~5 
In conclusion, Blanco White's theological justification of his 
conversion introduced the term 'Sabellianism' into the public discourse 
by which the issue of liberalism and dogmatism was being debated. 
Blanco had walked into the Unitarian church in Liverpool with his eyes 
open. He had taken a path in which the break with the traditional 
formularies of Christianity was overt. He had turned his back upon his 
own Sabellianism and faced, without self-deception, what it had been 
concealing. Newman saw and lamented this as a private, individual 
tragedy. On the public stage, however, he took the term 'Sabellianism' 
up, for rarely did he fail to press into his own service the material 
which came his way. Sabellianism's previous association with Whately and 
Whately's recent patronage of Blanco made easier his adoption of the 
term. Always impressed by coincidence, Newman must have read Blanco's 
narrative and been struck by 'Sabellianism' with the force of a 
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i"evelation. He was to use it to sti"ip away the delusion, as he saw it, 
that liberalism occupied a reasonable middle ground - not, of course, to 
make ambiguous waverers into Unitarians, but rather to frighten them 
back into the ancient fold. 
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5 . AP-o 11 inar ian ism 
Meanwhile, Newman had not given up his scholarly aspirations. The 
edition of Dionysius was proceding, if with interruptions. His letters 
and diaries suggest there may have been a hiatus in his work, between 
the inception of the Subscription Controversy in November, 1834, and 
July and August, 1835, when there are renewed references to his being 
'hard at it' again.1 Thus he attempted a spurt of energetic patristic 
research just before and during his reading of Blanco White's 
Observa tlons on Heresy and Orthodoxy.2 
His work took a new turn just at the time when Blanco's book was 
in his hands, that is, in early August, 1835. Suddenly, there appear, 
throughout that month, references to Apollinarianism in connection with 
his edition of Dionysius: 
At present I am hard at D ionys ius - i.e. at the 
A po 11 inar ian con travers y. 3 
Newman writes as if there is an obvious connection between the edition 
of Dionysius, where the heresy concerned is Sabellianism, and 
Apollinarianism. ln fact, there is no historical connection between them. 
Nevertheless, throughout August, 1835, he continues to write as if 
there were: 
D ionys ius ... is 
would, in to a 
controversy .4 
taking me, as expected he 
consideration of the Apo llinar ian 
But why does he 'expect' this? It is no casual reference, for, in his 
first reference to the papers on Apollinarianism which he compiled in 
August, 1835, he sees his account as emerging directly from Dlonysius: 
Dionysius is nearly done- i.e. as far as it 
can be t i 11 I read more. I have used up a 11 the 
documents on the Apo llinar ian Controversy and 
have written an account of it with references/'' 
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The answer to this puzzle must be sought in Newman's own 
theorizing, rather than in the sources he was handling. His theories are 
fully expounded in his •Apollinarianism' papers, but a theory of heresy 
is clearly already implied in the link he perceives between two such 
apparently unrelated heresies as Sabellianism and Apollinarianism: that 
is, that all heresies are particular forms of an identical underlving 
rationalism, and therefore, have hidden relations with one another, 
which may be drawn out. Newman writes to his friends in August, 1835, 
as if this hardly even needed arguing amongst his inner circle. 
Did such a theoretical understanding of heresy emerge purely_ from 
his research into the Fathers, only later being applied - for example, 
in Tract 73 - to contemporary liberalism? Or did Newman's already-
existing conviction of the underlying Socinianism of Oxford liberalism, 
and Blanco White's 'Sabellianism' condition his research, so that he 
found in the Fathers what he was looking for - an authoritative basis 
in Antiquity for the me thad he was employing in his critique of his 
opponents? Chronology suggests the latter alternative as the most 
likely one. The Hampden controversy had been raging for nine months 
before his research on Apollinarianism, the badge of Newman's party 
being that liberalism over tests conceals Socinianism. The news of 
Blanco's Unitarianism was four months old. Six days before Newman saw 
the transition from Sabellianism to Apollinarianism, he had begun to 
perceive the importance of Blanco's thesis that "Sabellianism is but 
Unitarianism in disguise" - he had "seen'06 Blanco's book, but 1 t is not 
clear whether he had yet read it thoroughly: perhaps he had only 
perused the Preface. Three days later, referring again to Blanco's book, 
he was beginning to see its value "as a witness to the tendency of 
certain views"7Then, on August 9th, came the first of his declarations 
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that study of Dionysius leads inevitably to the Apollinarian 
controversy.8 In this letter to Hurrell Froude, he also adverts to Blanco 
and Sabellianislil: that it is "a witness of the tendency of certain 
opinions" and that the idea may be 'turned'.9 0n the same day, he wrote 
to his sister, Elizabeth, about Blanco, Sabellianism, Socinianism and 
creeds.10Here, he also refers to his Dionysius edition and his patristic 
reading, declaring that his research has "far graver objects in view" 
than merely a. scholarly edition, in view of the "flood of 
scepticism'01 1 he expects to pour over the land. Doctrinal truths are 
being abandoned because people "do not understand their value".12lt is, 
therefore, clear that Newman's patristic research had merged with his 
public struggle against liberalism by the time he began to study 
Apollinarianism. 
The first attempt to treat systematically of Apollinarianism occurs 
in a rough draft written on August 15th, 1835 on the "defection of 
Apollinaris". 13 lt is an incomplete, abbreviated and much crossed-through 
document, with Newman's theses about the heresy written on the left, 
and references on the right. The first sentence, however, is written in 
full: 
The defect ion of A poll inar is from the Catholic 
Faith excites feelings of especial pain and 
[regret], both from his high character and 
former services to the Church and the 
particular cause to which it may be traced.14 
The stress upon the personal tragedy of the heretic and the pain and 
anguish his fall occasions in orthodox circles perhaps has its source in 
that other "defection" which touched Newman so nearly, that of Blanco 
~ite. The tone of this sentence will be characteristic also of many of 
his statements on heresy in August and September, 1835. It is almost as 
if, while the Hampden affair ran to its bitter close, Newman was 
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striving to break f~ee from the toils of odiufil theologicum and strike a 
note of universal pathos. 
This draft is shot through with the theory of the underlying 
identity of all heresy. Despite its incomplete and tentBltive form, the 
logic by which A.pollinarianism mBly be seen as running into Se.bellianism 
is clearly traceable~ and gives a picture of the state of NeWiilan•s 
speculations as he was making the transition from the Dionysius edition 
(and SabeHianfsm> to the two weighty and carefully written papers on 
Apo 11 inar ian ism which were soon to f o How. 
According to Newman, A.pollinaris• position was grounded in 
opposition to Arianism. Now~ Arians held that Christ - whatever else he 
was - was "'a perfect man''. But Apollinaris" "'great object" was "to 
ascertain and secure the doctrine of Christ•s divinity"' - so much so 
that he ended up denying His humanity.16Apollinaris• reasons for this 
I.ID.ba lance dis close what Newman is beginning to think might be 
rationalism, for all the heresiarch•s high Christology: Apollinaris was 
unwilling to accept that the human nous was compatible with the Divine 
logos in Christ. His "badge .. was "one person•• and he considered ~uman 
soul, or ... perfect man"' as "superfluous."16Newm.an asks himself here, 
qu[ est ion], whether he objected to the 
mystery.17 
Apollinaris cannot only be shown in this roundabout way to be 
rationalist. Newm.an•s phraseology in describing his teaching also shows 
why he could see Sabell~ism and Apollinarianism as so obviously 
connected: 
All manifestation of a perfect human nature 
seemed to him to destroy that literal 
manifestation of the Godhead which the 
Incarnation implied. The object being 
manifestation of the Unseen, ... this meant that 
the Word had but taken to him an outward form 
by which he might be seen, or as Scripture 
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itself expressed it, Flesh <John). 1 E• 
i:~ewman's presentation of ApolUnarianism here makes it out to be 
'lfirtually Sabellian,: the person of Christ manifests God and is identical 
wUh Him. There are no subsistent distinctions within the Trinity, and 
the only difference between "God" and CChrist• is the addition to the 
latter of a human body: 
according 1 y he cons ide red the body of Christ 
but as the medium of displaying Him - and the 
eikon of the Invisible.19 
But Newuum does not yet come out with what he is already hinting: his 
route to the conclusion of the Sabellianism of Apollinarianism is still 
more circuitous. 
Having outlined Apollinaris' position, Newman announces his method 
of analysis of the heresy - a method we have already seen challenged 
by Hampden: 
.. he [ApollinarisJ had 
certain consequences 
avoid.20 
entailed 
which he 
on himself 
could not 
The heresy has, as it were, taken on a life of its own, and its 
00consequences'', logical or historical, can truly define its hidden 
nature, despite the sincere disclaimers of the heretic himself. A list 
of coconsequences" follows. The body of Christ, by its unity with the 
tford and lack of a human soul, is so divinized as to be "unearthly .. , not 
a human body at all. But, conversely, the ~ord itself as long as united 
to a body was itself changed into "some thirdco, neither God nor man. 
Then, there was the problem of Christ•s sufferings: Apollinarianism 
would have to maintain either that the divine nature suffered21 or that 
no Passion, and no Atonement took place. This consequence is even more 
alarming in the case of Christ's death - did the ~ord die? At the end 
of his list of consequences, comes Sabellianism. Newman has been 
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considering Apollinaris' response to the problems presented by his vie~ 
of the relation between flesh <crap!;> and l:Jord <Acryo<;): 
.. Ap[ollinariJs went so far in simplifying his 
sys tern as to consider the aap~ as a more 
mysterious development of the divine 
essence .22 
He moves to his final point, 
;_,o:o "1y ~ia::y wt::r e 1eu -.;o ::>aoe 11 1an 1sm as mak 1ng 
human nature His e-tx~LJv.23 
The phraseology is very significant here. Firstly in "they", Newman 
considers the heresy's development in the sectaries following 
ApolUnaris - its succeeding history clarifies its original nature. 
Secondly, they are "led'': the slide into Sabellianism is inadvertent, 
they are borne along as the heresy takes its inevitable course. 
Only four days after this draft, Newman embarked upon two 
substantial documents on Apollinarianism, which remain unpublished in 
their original form. First, dated 19th August, 1835, is a continuous 
manuscript of nineteen sheets, written on both sides, entitled 
Apollinaris' history.240n the first page, above the text, in red ink, is 
written a declaration of the paper's purpose: 
N .B. The object of these papers I in tend to be 
this - to have somewhere where my authorities 
for facts and opinions are brought together 
which want so much in the Arians. The matter 
of this may be, if it so happens, cast into 
quite another shape, or contracted, or alluded 
to, or scattered here and there over another 
subject, in anything which I may actually 
publish.26 
The textual complexity promised by Newman•s intention to re-cast 
according to as yet unforeseen demands upon his rhetoric, was indeed 
fulfilled: substantial edited portions of this paper appear in a British 
Magazine article for July, 1836, which was reworked for the 1840 Church 
of the Fathers, but is familiar to readers of the collected works as 
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part of another redaction, a chapter in Primitive Christianity 0872). A 
second paper entitled Apollinarianisru is dated 22nd August,1835. It is 
part of the privately printed booklet-26 also containing a paper from 
1839 on r:lonophysitism. It bears a direct relation to the Heresy of 
flpollinaris which Newman published in 1874 in Tracts Theological and 
Ecclesiastical, but there are important changes to the 1835 version, as 
the old man, always tinkering, put in a new sentence here27 and 
conflated a paragraph there. The two 1835 papers are somewhat 
different in character . .flpollinarts• history has more of a historical and 
narrative quality, while Apollinarianism is more analytical and 
theological, but this distinction is not clear-cut: the former also has 
a highly theoretical and analytical quality, while the latter does not 
omit history and characterization . 
.flpollinaris' history opens with a rich and complex paragraph, 
reverberant with the newly-acquired sense of the heretic's tragedy: 
The fall of Apollinaris into heresy is a 
passage of eccles ias tical his tory, very pain fu 1 
and very ins true t i ve, from his high repute for 
learning and virtue, his intimacy with the 
great Catholic teachers of his day, his former 
services to the Church and the particular 
circumstances which led to it. He had suffer-ed 
and laboured for the truth's sake in a time of 
persecution; he had been a v igm·ous and 
successful opponent of Arianism during the 
ascendancy of that heresy; and he seems to 
have at length been betrayed into an opposite 
error by the unguarded zeal with which he 
encountered 1 t ,26 
There are here, perhaps, echoes of the 'painful', yet "'instructive'' 'Fall' 
of Blanco, but equally there are hints of a parallel between 
Apollinaris' and Newman's own position: was he not, too, labouring for 
the truth's sake? Did he not aspire to 'learning and virtue'? And might 
there not be 131 hidden danger in orthodox "zeal", that even a champion 
of Catholicism might be taken unawares and "betrayed into an opposite 
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error'7 The heretic is no longer - as so often in his portrayals in 
Arians- lucre-loving, shifty, shallow and base, but learned, profound, 
heroic. His theology has a fatal flaw but he does not see it, and it 
takes him he knows not where. 
After this opening flourish, the document narrates Apollinaris" 
upbringing and early education.29Then follows a detailed account, with 
long patristic quotations, of the course of the heresy. Newman dates 
its first appearance at A.D.362: while Athanasius was still living, it 
was discussed at the Council of Alexandria,30 , although it was not yet 
associated with Apollinaris' name.31 Citing a long passage from 
Athanasius' Tomus ad Antiochos, Newman works towards a definition of 
the heresy: 
... the opinion of Christ's soul being destitute 
of mind is the characteristic tenet of 
Apo 11 inar is ... ~''2 
The heresy, repressed by the weight of Athanasius' authority, "slept" 
for seven years, then emerging in Syria and Greece, by which time, 
it had run into those logical consequences 
which make even a little error a great one.'~'3 
Athanasius never suspected his ally's error - it was only after the 
patriarch's death (in 371 or 373) that Apollinaris came out. Then a sect 
was formed, and the Catholic Church condemned it. After the heresiarch's 
decease, many of the sectaries applied to the Church for 
reconciliation.34There follow illustrative passages from the heresy-
collector, Epiphanius.36The document ends with a long passage about the 
development of the heresy in its sects.36 
Parts of the document eventually found their way, with 
modifications, into the collected works: Apollinaris' biography and the 
narrative of the heresy's progress, the doctrinal passages considerably 
abbreviated, appear in Prililltive Christianity <1872).37 However, 
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completely absent in any form from this later redaction, and, indeed, 
from any of the published works. are the remarkable last three pages, 
which treat of Apollinarian sects. Here, Newman speculates most fully 
about the nature of heresy and articulates a theory of its development 
in its generality, going far beyond the Apollinarian dispute. and 
echoing the debates of his own contemporary situation.38 
The discussion of the reconciliation to the Church of certain 
Apollinarian sects vibrates with Oxford associations. Newman warns of 
the dangerous long-term effects of too readily re-admitting sectaries 
to the Catholic body, without a very strict examination of their 
beliefs. At the beginning of the fifth century, the rump of 
Apollinarianism, now restricted to Antioch, begged re-admittance to the 
Great Church. He finds the history "instructive": 
Being many of them at least scarcely sincere 
in their recantation, they cherished and 
gradually propagated those notions in the 
Church which before they had failed in 
spreading externally to it. The evil increased; 
it infected the Catholic body and the 
d iss en t ions [sic] [the ev i lJ followed which 
developed itself in the heresies of Nestor ius 
and E u tyches, the schisms and prostrations of 
the Eastern Church, a gradual preparation for 
the triumphs of Mohammedanism and the 
establishment of heretical doctrines which 
continue within the Church to this day.3 ''-" 
Newman is on stronger historical ground when he discerns a development 
from Apollinarianism to Eutychianism, than in his earlier speculations 
about the relation of Sabellianism to Apollinarianism. However, the 
imaginative and allusive character of this passage is also very strong, 
the very phraseology shaped by the subscription controversy and the 
imminent "pollution" of Oxford by Dissent. Newman universalizes his 
anxiety into a theory: heresy admitted by latitudinarian laxity, is a 
canker within, which, when through course of time, it develops into its 
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mature form, will so weaken the Church as to make it vulnerable to 
dissolution. As in the early Church, Newman implies, so now, as heresy 
makes its way within the Church in the guise of liberalism. He even 
discerns a link between Apollinarianism, via Nestorianism and 
Eutychianism, and modern heresy - "to this day'0 • We may only guess !low 
-he is not specific - but it is certain that, however tortuously, 
Hampden and Blanco White form part of the answer. In this passage, 
Newman goes beyond the limits he set himself in his declaration of 
intent. No longer is he merely gathering "authorities", "matter" to be 
deployed as the occasion arises. He has slipped into rhetoric of the 
'analogical' variety, which has been observed in Arians:~o 
In his consideration of the Apollinarian leaders, such as Vitalis 
and Valentinus, who succeeded the heresiarch, Newman expounds his 
theory of the development of heresy. The fragmentation of 
Apollinarianism was caused by the "dissensions" which are a "common 
result of separation from the Catholic body".41 Newman's point is 
conventional enough - often made by big churches against little 
ones.42He follows it with something startling: 
In truth every novelty in religion, to speak in 
general terms, starts with a doctrine short of 
that to which it legitimately leads and in 
process of time results; and in the interval it 
is necessarily inconsistent and variable, 
making statements in different times and 
persons more or less advanced towards its 
f ina 1 development, or explanations on 1 y 
experimental and perhaps temporary with a view 
how best to overcome difficulties as they 
arise, or to adjust its tenets with such 
principles, whether scriptural or philosophical, 
on which it has engaged to rest them at the 
outset.43 
Newman's expression is clumsy - the sentence had yet, no doubt, to be 
polished. Nevertheless, the 1845 idea of the development of doctrine is 
in some respects here strikingly anticipated - only in relation to 
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heretical doctrine. Apollinarian doctrine is seen as developing through 
history, and the development takes place "legitimately", so that the 
final expression of the heresy more fully and truly defines the nature 
of the original, earlier doctrine. As in the Essay on Development, 
something new is learned as a result of the process: development is not 
only greater accuracy of words, but a clearer and fuller idea. Again, as 
in the Essay, a period of confusion and debate precedes the final 
development, though there are some isolated 'early anticipations' too. 
There are, however, important differences also. In the Essay, the 
development of revelation into ever-greater fulness and precision 
~presses Newman with its unity and coherence: what has gone before is 
consolidated, not overset, and ever more firmly integrated into the one 
body of truth. But heresy's development is destructive and fissiparous, 
mercilessly exposing the initially imperceptible contradictions of its 
original formulation. It is what he would, in 184.5, call "corruption". 
The sects are embodiments of these inner contradictions: 
Had Apollinaris given birth to as many sects 
as there seem to be distinct dod tr ina lJ 
theories in his own writings, there probably 
would be more divisions among his disciples 
than there really were.d."-
Touching the doctrines of the sects, Newman will 'notice' two only. 
These he chooses because they dramatize an essence-of-Apollinarianism 
debate, arising out of the opposing tendencies originally embedded in 
the heresy: the two schools of thought 
seem to be drawn respectively from the two 
chief professions which his writings contain, 
attachment to the ancient Fathers, and 
maintenance of a novel doctrine.•s 
This oscillating quality, this inner chaos, was, of course, what the 
detractors of the ante-Nicene faith had been, since the late 
seventeenth century, attributing to the age of the early Fathers. 
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Newman is naturally opposed to such a view of patristic 9rtho9ox~ -
but happy to deploy it against ner~. 
Newman discerns a conservative and a radical wing. The party of 
Vitalis and Valentinus consisted of rather static traditionalists who 
professed to adhere to the tradition of the 
Church, [and] protested against the 
interpretations by which their rival division 
cctrr1ea out tne1r common master·s language.~·-· 
They eventually rejoined the Church. Their "rivals", whose leader was 
Polemius, were both more open to development and "more vigorous in the 
propagation of their views" - they had more 'life', as the later Newman 
might have said. Therefore they "embraced01 the consequences of the 
original heresy,"all the more detestable doctrines which have been above 
enumerated,"47conveniently for orthodox heresiologists such as Newman 
who may thereby define the true nature of the heresy by its 
extravagances. If Newman 19 more gympatheti~ to th~ ~ons~rv~tiv~ 
Apollinarians, he is nevertheless grateful for the radicals, because it 
was all too easy for the heresy with its "subtle distinctions" - one 
thinks of Hampden's slipperiness - to cloak its nature, and even to 
'shelter' behind the names of orthodox writers. Not surprisingly, Newman 
discerns the possibility of a slide from the more 'orthodox' to the more 
radical form. As an example of this, he cites the case of bishop 
Timotheus, once an intimate of Apollinaris himself, who was first 
inclined towards Vitalis, but "after a while" joined sides with the 
"adventurous divine", Po lem ius. 
The paper ends. Newman had been scribbling for two days. The last 
sentence marks a transition: 
But it is time to turn to an [in tern a lJ 
consideration of the heresy itself which has 
been the subject of this outward survey;48 
History and narrative are over: now analysis of the inner dynamics of 
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Apollinarian doctdne is to follow. This was almost certainly 
Apolllnarianism of 22nd August, 1835, commenced only two days after 
Apollinaris" history. Newman's distinction between "outward survey" and 
"internal consideration" does not quite work - he has already started 
to examine the inner logic of Apollinarianism in his first paper, while 
his second is not devoid of psychological interest. 
Apollinarianism appears in the collected works in a much later 
redaction, entitled The Heresy of Apollinari~9They share a similar 
structure: both are an examination of Apollinarian doctrines, in 
numbered paragraphs, moving from Apollinaris himself, through a 
consideration of the logical consequences of his teaching, to its 
confirmation in the theology of its sec tar ian developments. However, the 
later work expresses Newman's theories with clipped and scholastic50 
precision, while the 1835 paper contains both powerful rhetoric and 
subtle psychological analysis, which is excised from the later published 
work. The 1835 Apollinarianism therefore stands as a distinct work in 
its own right, which was never published. 
Newman immediately plunges in to his most exp lie it s ta temen t so far 
of the underlying identity of all heresy. Apollinaris' history had tended 
to stress a particular heresy's fragmentary and incoherent quality. Now, 
Newman turns to the question of the one essence of heresy, beneath the 
forms, the theory by which he explains to himself how Sabellianism 
merged, in his perception, with Apollinarianism, and how Arianism 
reveals its cloven hoof beneath the skirts of both. It would seem that 
Apollinaris' error, in view of the "unguarded vehemence with which he 
attacked the Arians", arose out of "a reaction from Arianism". Newman 
quickly dismisses this as only a superficial view - the heresy's "formal 
characteristics"; he is 
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not forgetful the \vhile, that all hecesies may 
be made upon paper to look contrary to each 
other, while in fact, \vhen analysed, all will 
rather be found to run together in to one, for 
they are a 11 really opposed to the Truth and 
The Truth a lone, I.Jh ich seems at first sight 
merely to lie in the middle between them~ 1 
Radical and extreme indeed is Newman's denial that the heresy, even 
partially, participates in truth. Apollinaris is only apparently <or 
formally) anti-Aria.n - really he is an enemy of truth and truth alone. 
The essence of heresy is, therefore, opposition to truth. But what is 
the nature of this 'opposition'? Clearly it is not the content of a 
particular heresy's teaching which Newman relegates to the formal. An 
answer begins to emerge, even in this opening paragraph, when he 
explains, by way of example, how Arianism and Sabellianism are really 
identical: 
though d iametr ica lly opposed in a drawn out 
scheme of doctrine, ltheyJ substantially agree 
together, and are at variance with the Catholic 
Faith, in that the !at ter asserts the mystery 
of a distinction of Pez·sons in the One divine 
Substance and both heresies deny it.s2 
His argument has two layers. The first draws its strength from his 
familiarity with patristic sources:63 the orthodox tendency is always to 
hold to subsistent distinctions within the very being of the Godhead, 
while heresy tends to confuse person with divine essence. This view is 
crucial, as will be seen, for his later work on contemporary error, 
which he accordingly characterised as 'Sabellian'. A Christological point 
bolsters the Trinitarian one: in a note, Newman debates whether or not 
Arians denied that Christ had a human soul, and concludes that they 
did: Apollinarians, too, then may be shown to 'run into' Arianism, for 
they had an Arian Christology!64Newman is all the while professing that 
he is treating of heresies more really than those who 'make them look 
different on paper' or who 'draw them out into a scheme of doctrine•. He 
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is, of course, - at least in this first level of argument - himself 
being highly theoretical, drawn-out and schematic. 
The occurrence of the word "mystery" announces a second layer, 
hinting at the underlying rationalism of Apollinarians. This implication 
is pursued in the terms in which he couches his opening summary of 
Aoollinaris' teaching: 
Apollinaris opposed to Arianism a strong and 
(what may be called) intelligible doctrine, 
asserting with more or less clearness, as the 
case may be, but always with a necessary 
implication, not merely that Christ was more 
than man, but that he t.Jas simply the Eternal 
Son, either without the add it ion of a human 
nature at all, or with only its nominal 
addition."'5 
A poll inar ian ism's appeal streamlines Chris to logy, sidesteps "mystery", 
makes "intelligible", strives for "clearness". This appealed to "those 
who had wearied themselves with speculations upon the mystery". They 
found in Apollinarianism "relief"; they could take "refuge" in it. It was 
a plain and broad view of the subject which, 
vJh i le rescuing them from Humanitarian ism, 
saved them also from the irritation of mind 
occasioned by that subtle orthodox phraseology 
which had been rendered necessary by Arianism 
itself .56 
There are echoes of Arians in this passage. Those embracing 
Apollinarianism are one with the Newman of 1832 who lamented the 
enforced reduction by heresy of the orthodox faith to creed and system. 
Moreover, the phrase he uses to describe their attitude - "a plain and 
broad view of the subject" - closely parallels the words actually used 
in Arians to describe the qualities lacked by heretics: a 
broad and commonsense view of an_ important 
subject67 
Did Newman see himself ominously mirrored in the "irritation of mind" 
of Apollinarian converts? He certainly wished to be rescued from 
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"Humanitarianism". His diction suggests that he sensed the dangers of 
such an attraction. 
The sympathy continues. He warms to Apollinarians as his analysis 
proceeds: they 
seemed to have some countenance for the line 
of doctrine which they were about to adopt, in 
the received teaching of the Church.se 
They began by emphasising what Newman sees as the Church's "great 
article": that the Personality59of God is in his Divine Essence, so that 
his manhood is "but an addition to his real nature". The high 
Christology of Apollinaris strikes a chord in Newman's bosom: 
'His human nature ... ', they said, and truly too, 
'must not be looked at by itself or rested on 
by the mind as having a substantive, or in 
itself independent or individual character; as 
it was ind is solubly connected with, so it 
necessarily depended on and rested in the 
Essence of the Eternal Word.'""' 0 
Newman identifies strongly enough with the heresy to dramatize its 
argument in his own terminology. His identification of what was "not so 
defensible" in Apollinarianism is equally instructive: Apollinarians 
disliked describing Christ as "man" because it suggested an "independent 
and individual nature", 
and interfered with the literal and actual 
manifestation of God in Christ.'''' 
Apollinarianism is not wrong in its dislike of describing Christ as a 
human being, but in its tendency towards Sabellianism. 
Newman moves towards ever more precise and technical definition of 
the heresy, demonstrating a control of sources independent of the 
current manuals. Apollinaris denied 'rE>.Etq<; ~Bp6lnoc; and Christ's 
rational soul for fear of introducing 
a new being or person, or thinking pr inc ip le, 
into the Sacred economy62 
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He could accept n:w::v11a in Cht~ist, for this could mean divine nature. He 
could accept r~;r1], the animal soul or principle of motion (hardly in 
principle distinct from living flesh). But he denied vom;, the 
intellectual principle. Again, there is a flash of fellow-feeling on 
Newman's part: 
Apollinarianism, then, was a denial of the 
in te llec tua 1 pr inc ip le, or no us, in Our Lord's 
human nature, and that maintained with a view 
of guarding against the doctrine of a double 
personality, or what was afterwards called 
Nestor ian ism.t"'-" 
Newman can see Apollinaris as a prophet against Nestorianism, a heresy 
Newman always categorised as of the 'humanitarian• type. 
What, then, is the positive orthodox response to Apollinarianism? To 
this question Newman now addresses himself, not without ambivalence. He 
makes a striking start - not a reasoning out of orthodoxy but the 
"thrill of horror and indignation"64experienced by the early Christians 
upon their first encounter with the heresy, a shudder"which it is 
difficult for us, with blunted feelings, to enter into."65Newman 
identifies himself with an imagined audience as he depicts the 
insouciance with which the modern mind first makes acquaintance with 
this heresy. The error seems "at first sight" but "slight": 
a foolish fancy or conceit, rather than a 
heresy y:.E. 
Over against this stands the record of an ancient orthodox frlsson 
challenging modern assumptions. Newman's method is dramatic and 
rhetorical. 
Rhetoric is, indeed, freely employed as Newman attempts to engender 
appropriate horror in his readers, and, possibly, to stimulate it in 
himself. It works upon Apollinarian "difficulties," that is, upon the 
consequences of presenting the Incarnation as a union of divine Word 
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and soulless flesh: the criticism that the union of Word and animal 
nature <r;tV)(IJ) implies change and modification in the divine nature. 
However, Newman's manner of presentation of this "difficulty" is 
rhetorical rather than logical: 
what an impiety it was to suppose that [the 
non-rational bodyJ could mingle \vith the 
Eternal Essence; that the Lord of Glory should 
clothe himselt in perrshable oust ana asnes, 
after the manner of the Avatars of the 
Oriental Deities, and be acted upon by all the 
gross influences of a material tenement?6 Y 
Newman finds even the orthodox position, that the Eternal Word "should 
take up his residence within a human soul" to be "an incomprehensible 
humiliation". But to dispense with soul is "a far different degradation 
of the Eternal essence".68He finds it difficult at this point effectively 
to argue quite why. It is, he urges, unwarranted by Scripture, but he 
has also shown that Apollinarians had few problems coping with 
Scripture. It is moreover, "without any benefit to man". This hint of a 
soteriological argument, which does get another chance a little later, 
is presently overwhelmed by another wave of rhetoric: 
If t.Je must at"gue about \vha t needs no 
argument, better it would be that He should 
have shown Himself in vision or angelic shape, 
as the Patriarchs, than that He should assume 
a mode of man if es tat ion, no more adequate, and 
far less gracious to man .6 ··3 
Apollinarianism is attacked in its underlying tendency - the "mode of 
manifestation", virtually Sabellian, which will slide into Arianism - but 
Newman's own preference for "vision or angelic shape" gives away a 
docetism, more extreme even than that of Apollinaris himself. The 
passage is overwrought, reflecting deep-seate~ uncertainties em 
Newman's part with regard to the full humanity of Christ. He was a 
happy Trinitarian theologian, but at times a somewhat uneasy 
Christological thinker. These ambivalences remained and emerged in his 
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73rd Tract for the Times. 
t<Jith the phrase, "far less gracious to man", the vessel, perilously 
close to a capsize, rights itself, taking on the ballast of a sound 
patristic principle: that what was not assumed cannot be deified. At the 
same. time, Newman's attention shifts from the humanity of Christ to the 
indigence of humanity, and especially of the human soul:70 the divine 
assumption of a soulless body would be an "incomplete tabernacle" not 
truly "our representative", since it would be ineffectual to a complete 
restoration of human nature: 
How is this to be done if the soul be om it ted 
in the ~vork? Does the soul need no cleansing? 
Is it to be left as it was before, in the 
darkness and weakness of unassisted nature?71 
The rhetoric - the voices, the accumulated questions, the 'horror', 
the hubbub of arguments - has served its purpose to re-create in the 
mind of an early nineteenth-century reader the perplexities of fourth-
century Christians: 
Such as these were the reflections \vhich 
CCO\.Jded on the mind of a Christ ian on hearing 
the gcound 'Jhich Apollinaris had taken up foe 
his in te llec tua l warfare with the Ar ians 7 2 
Now Newman moves to a consideration of the heresy's development in its 
sects. But before this, he takes a last look at Apollinaris himself: 
Apollinaris did not, and could not stop at the 
point at which he began. He had already turned 
as ide in to the by-paths of heresy, and he was 
hurried on by the pressure of argument to far 
deeper and more extravagant errors7 '"' 
Heresy develops with frightening speed: it hurries the heretic on - he 
cannot pause or call a halt - it is swifter than thought - and 
"already", before he has caught up with his own creation, he finds 
entailed upon him the grotesqueries of unimagined but inevitable 
consequences, the degradation of the Logos into a monster neither 
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divine nor human. Thus does Newman take leave of this most congenial 
of heresiarchs. It is an anguished farewell. 
As with Apollinaris" history, Apollinarianism concludes with a 
discussion of the sects, in which the latter duplicates many of the 
points made in the former, with, however, some new refinements. The two 
main parties of Apollinarianism are distinguished according to the 
degree to which they will accept development: 
if they varied, it was only by such d i ffer'ences 
as arose from their difference of acuteness or 
unscrupulousness in developing their original 
tenet.' 4 
Newman's choice this time to discuss the sects against the background 
of party expediency lends the discussion a vividness and political 
complexity perhaps derived from his own experience of Oxford party-
groupings. It also introduces some confusions: he identifies 
"unscrupulousness"76as a characteristic of the 'developmental' party, 
that of Timotheus, although it is the "more cautious" sect of 
Valentinus which was "unwilling to renounce the shelter of an orthodox 
profession, however nominal"7G 
His technique of analysis of the doctrine of the sects is by now 
familiar: he considers the logical consequences to which their 
respective positions may be drawn out. While the moderate Valentinus 
argued that Christ's human body was not changed into the substance of 
the divine, although its properties were affected by the presence of 
the divine nature, the radical Timotheus argued that through the union 
with the logos, Christ's body became consubstantial with the 
Godhead.77The consequence to be drawn from t~is, Newman summarizes in 
the words of Gregory Nazianzen: 
'Christ did not die, or else the Trinity 
suffered. '7 '"'' 
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Not surprisingly, Apollinarians wriggled upon the hook of this imputed 
consequence. The means of escape they sought was twofold: first, to say 
that only the animal soul <psyche> suffered in Christ - a denial of 
Christ's fully human and rationally expressed mental agony on the Cross: 
or, secondly, to deny that the passion took place."'·~ 1"1 the latter case, 
the Incarnation was reduced to one "simple object" ,"the manifestation of 
God.90However, Newman anticipates a "third means of escape", the 
ultimate consequence of Apollinarian Christology by which the unseen 
interrelatedness of all heresies might be revealed: 
that the Word was not God: and this they could 
not really escape from the first, violently 
opposed, as they cons ide red themselves, to 
Arianism Y ., 
Apollinarianism has passed into its opposite. This development Newman 
associates with a long passage upon "the more presumptuous side of the 
heresy",82 identified with Timotheus, whose slide from moderate to 
radical Apollinarianism he has already analysed in the preceding 
document, Apollinaris' heresy. The route to his conclusion is tortuous, 
involving the most extreme employment so far of his method of 'drawing 
out• the essence of heresy. He finds Timothean Apollinarianism to be 
tending, successively, towards Docetism, Nestorianism, and "Arianism or 
Sabellianism it matters not which.'083Heresy is all one - this he 
eventually asserts - but, first, analyses the strands within 
Apollinarian discourse which may be drawn out into the other heresies. 
It is a twisting course, and, especially in the citation of Nestorianism, 
one which leapfrogs chronology. 
The first imputation, that Apollinarians are Docetists, though no 
doubt unwelcome to the Apollinarians themselves, is hardly unexpected, 
since both heresies are a consequence of an unbalanced stress upon the 
divine nature in Christ. Newman thinks Apollinarians are Docetists 
-134-
because, although, unlike the original Docctists, they held that Christ 
had a human body, their view that it changed its substance by union 
with the divine into what is "increate and everlasting" makes him 
wonder "in what sense it [could] be considered a body at all," as 
opposed to a "phantom or dokesis." Newman is happy to make the leap, on 
Apollinarians• behalf, from "increate and everlasting" to "never ... in 
existence at all.'084 
Newman's leap to Nestorianism is surprising. How is the Nestorian 
insistence upon the co-existence of two distinct principles - the divine 
and human persons in Christ linked only by a moral union to be 
compared with Apollinarian stress upon the g~ine Logos as the 
principle of unity in Christ? Even Newman admits that Nestorianism is 
••apparently a very opposite heresy.85But by now he has warmed to his 
theory. He derives a 'Nestorian' consequence from Timotheus' profession 
that, while Christ's body had been originally human, it ceased to be so, 
once united to the Divine Word: 
This imp 1 ied that it had an existence 
previously to its conception and birth in the 
womb of the Virgin ~v1ary, which was a tenet 
closely connected with what was afterwards 
called Nestor ian ism"'"' 
Newman, then, finds what, to adopt the terminology of the Essay on 
Development, may be called an 'early anticipation' of Nestorianism. He 
admits that no Apollinarian would ever have dreamt that his theology 
entailed such a consequence. His analysis is pursued ''whether or no any 
adopted this conclusion'".87 
The Fathers' criticism of Apollinarian consequences - along very 
similar lines to Newman's - eventually pushed Apollinarians98 into an 
intentional development, a simplification of their system: 
seeing at length that the notion of a human 
body really meant nothing in their mouths, 
[theyJ simplified their view of the Incarnation 
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s t i 11 further, by relinquishing it altogether; 
and taught, that Christ's body, ins teaci of being 
born of the Virgin Mary, was but a development 
from the internal essence of the Divine \<lord, 
as if thrown out round about It for the 
purpose of a manifestation to the eyes of 
men."''"'' 
Just as, ten years later in the Essay on Development, Newman showed 
how heresy stimulated ever more precise definition in orthodoxy, so 
here he presents the converse: heresy stimulated into development by an 
orthodox critique. 
It gets more complicated still. This deliberate development upon 
the part of the Apollinarians had as its consequence a further - but 
this time unintended - development: 
Lastly, it is obvious how easily this last 
opmwn might pass into a sort of Arianism or 
Sabellianism, <it matters not which) by 
identifying the t-Jord hri th this mere 
development, which \vas external to the Godhead; 
in accordance with which they had already 
taught that he was the eikon of the Father, 
not in His Divine Substance, but in his 
earthly.·c•o 
The slide of Apolllnarianism into Arianism or Sabellianism is "obvious" 
to Newman, but the line pursued here by his critique of heresy, working 
as it does against the grain of the surface testimony of history, 
requires further exegesis. Apollinarians, then, were driven to present 
Christ simply as a manifestation of the Father, His earthly image or 
icon. If they saw this icon as not of the Divine Substance, one can 
understand Newman's concurrence with the accusation, made at the time, 
of Sabellianism. 
Since Newman envisaged, as early as 1832, a slide from Sabellianism 
to Arianism, the way is open also from Apollinarianism to Arianism. His 
method of getting from Apollinarian 'Sabellianism' to Apollinarian 
'Arianism' is particularly intricate! Having slid as far as a form of 
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Sabellianism, some "scrupled'; to go even further, as Praxeas was 
supposed to have done, and say that "the Divine Nature suffered on the 
Cross".~ 1 Since they "denied to Christ a human soul'' - the badge of all 
Apollinarians - they would have to find another way whereby Christ 
suffered, than either in His Divine nature or as a fully human being. 
Thus they could be 
easily persuaded to believe that the Word was 
not strictly God, and therefore could suffer.92 
Apollinarians, then, have ended up like Arians with a Christ neither 
fully divine nor fully human, perhaps as a consequence of an ultimately 
rather similar Christology. He does not bring out this latter point 
fully: the paper is coming to an end, and even Newman's capacity for 
discerning analogies and resemblances is perhaps wearing thin. 
Newman's heresiological method is constantly drawing upon a 
consistent general feature of patristic polemic - the drawing out of 
heresy's consequences in order to affiliate it with other, already-
existing, heresies. For the link between Sabellianism and Arianism, 
Newman's notes on the opposing page provide specific information as to 
his source: 
Vid. on the subJect TertulHian] in Prax[eanJ 
e.g.§27 ."""' 
Tertullian's treatise is directed against the 'Praxean' variety of 
Sabellianism which confounded the distinction between Father and Son in 
one Person. Tertullian traces the logical consequences, as he sees it, 
of their position. He understands Praxeas to hold that the Word became 
flesh in a total identification, rather than by uniting flesh to Himself. 
For Tertullian, this entails the flesh ce~sing. to be flesh (it ·has 
become the Word> and the Word ceasing to be divine <it has become 
flesh>: a change in substance has occurred in both cases, in flesh and 
-137-
divinity.94Tertullian saw as a consequence of this the ultimate denial 
of Christ's divinity: 
Jesus, therefore, cannot at this rate be God, 
for he has ceased to be the Word, which was 
made flesh; nor can he be Man incarnate, for He 
is not properly flesh, and it \vas flesh which 
the word became. Being compounded, there fore, 
of both, He actually is neither; He is rather 
some third substance, very different from 
Tertullian preceded Arius by 150 years, but it was easy for Newman to 
see this passage as a prophecy of Arianism. He could find in 
Tertullian's analysis of Sabellianism that humanitarian Christologies 
lurk even beneath forms of heresy appearing to stress the divine nature 
of Christ. 
The contemporary application of all this was never far from 
Newman's mind. In a note to the passage on the 'Arianism or 
Sabellianism' of Apollinarianism, he cites the writings of Athanasius as 
the subject: the phraseology of his paraphrase shows how Blanco White 
was haunting him: 
A than ... hints they wece Un i tac ians like Paul s·"•.;-. 
The document ends with a view of heresy openly dispensing with 
history; as to the sects of Apollinarianism and their developments, he 
declares: 
Which party held which tenet, it would be 
impossible to dec ide without his tor ica 1 
evidence; for, as all heresies run into one, 
when a specula tor has once de par ted from the 
narrow path of orthodoxy, it is a matter of 
accident which error he takes up with, as well 
as how long he will be con ten ted with it :::. 7 
The lack of historical evidence about the sects did not prevent him 
from boldly proclaiming his general theory: all heresies run into one, 
and the specific forms <"which error") are now a matter of pure chance. 
But so far has Newman run, that he is in serious danger here of 
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undercutting his own arguments: if the developments to which heresies 
eventually run are in the end accidental, how can the orthodox argue 
with such confidence that a heresy's ~cal tendency may be discerned? 
It is hard to avoid the suspicion that it is the orthodox jmputatio~s 
which are arbitrary, and that the whole argument is circular. Newman's 
adaptation of patristic polemic hey-e undermines his pretensions to 
logical analysis. His phrase .. matter of accident," indeed, suggests that, 
at the end of this paper , he was not entirely confident in the 
rationality or power to convince of his own arguments. In his later 
public expressions of his theory of heresy's development, particularly 
as applied to contemporary figures, Newman was more careful to keep 
concealed this Achilles' heel. 
These papers show Newman developing, against a background of 
contemporary heterodoxy, a general method of criticising heresy which 
scores its points by illustrating the relationship between heresy and 
infidelity. Its rhetorical possibilities are enormous, because they can 
be used as part of a strategy re-asserting patristic theology against 
contemporary liberalism, exposing proposals to modify ancient dogma as 
part of a vast process of secularisation. The equation of heresy and 
infidelity is not, in itself, a new stage in Newman's thinking. However, 
the method is new, in its subtlety and acknowledgment of complexity. 
Most important is the separation of a heretic's intention from the 
tendencies embedded in his language which have a life of their own. It 
is not therefore necessary for Newman to argue, baldly, that heretics 
are always in some sense, wicked. Rather, the real nature of a heresy 
is only made clear in its developments. The infidelity which he argues 
is inherent in ~W heretical position is tragically unintended. We may 
see this distinction between heretic and heresy as a result of Newman's 
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strenuous and unsuccessful efforts to extricate theological issues from 
personal acrimony in the Hampden dispute. t1e may also think of his 
personal affection for Blanco White and his horror of the Unitarianism 
which his friend had in good conscience embraced. On the other hand 9 
Neffiilan has not completely broken with the arguments from ethos: the 
heretic has, in some sense, failed! personally: there is a wealmess 
somewhere, although he does not perceive it in himself. The heretic has 
opened s Pandora's box, and the dark forMS emerging will spread and 
mutate, beyond the control of any theologian. 
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6. Tract 73: On the Introduction of Rationalist Principles into 
Revealed Reli~ 
The issues of the Hampden controversyt Blanco Bhite's 'Sabellianism' 
and Unitarianism, and the theory of heresy's development evolving during 
Newman's Apollinarian research all found an outlet in this Tract. It 
brings together an analysis of the tendencies of Protestant pietism 
with a critique of systematic theology, in order to suggest that both, 
because they are essentially anthropocentric, are reductions of the 
transcendent in revelation to human standards of judgment. Both are 
'rationalistic': systematic theologies in the more obvious sense that they 
destroy mystery by making the revealed too clearly intelligible, pietism 
in the more obscure sense of reducing revelation to its psychological 
usefulness. Newman saw both strains coalescing in liberalism, a term he 
now used to designate a 'Spirit abroad' tending to the destruction of 
revealed Christianity, rather than a politico-ecclesiastical party, as in 
1831. This is not to say that the political dimension of liberalism no 
longer threatened Newman - for the matriculation controversy raging in 
Oxford in 1835-6 was highly political. But Newman played it down: he 
came at his opponents indirectly, by implying that they might be fitted 
into a universal framework. 
Newman's treatment of Sabellianism up to this point had retained 
its significance as a Trinitarian heresy: Blanco White came, via 
Sabellianism, to a denial of the Trinity. Hampden, too, seemed to be 
approximating to Socinianism and therefore a denial of the Trinity. But 
Hampden's virtual Socinianism <as Newman sa!<:f it) arose from his general 
understanding of revelation and dogma In Tract 73, Newman consequently 
broadened the term 'Sabellianism' to apply, not only to a defective 
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Trinitarianism, but also to an inadequate, and ultimately infidel, 
theology of revelation. 
Newman therefore began to use 'Sabellianism' in a uniquely personal 
way, elusive by virtue of the breadth of its application. Nevertheless, 
the origin in patristic Trinitarian debates of Newman's peculiar use may 
be clearly discerned. Early Church Sabellianism was, in its own age, 
open to the criticism that, if the one God presents Himself to mankind 
in three ways and these three are not subsistent distinctions within 
the Godhead, then each person of the Trinity is only a mode of God's 
manifestation of an aspect of Hbnself - and that there is a fourth 
Reality which we do not know, beyond, and distinct from, the three 
persons. Can it, then, still be said that, in encountering the revelation 
of the Holy Spirit, or the Logos united to Jesus' humanity, we 
substantially encounter God? Are we not, rather, merely being educated 
about God's orientation towards, and will for, us, through the 
manifestation of the modes or persons? This opens the way for a 
broader application: so Newman argued. He used 'Sabellianism' as an 
analogy for theologies of revelation which are, in a certain sense, 
modal, that is, they present revelation as as an educative demonstration 
of certain divine qualities. But Newman asserted revelation to be a 
breakthrough into the empirical structure of human knowledge, 
intractable to the human understanding precisely because it is more 
than human. 
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(a) Thomas Erskine of Linlathen and 'Internal Ev~dencin~ 
Newman first used the idea of Sabellianism in this unique way in 
Tract 731 ,in his commentary upon Erskine's Remarks on the Internal 
Evidence for the Truth of Revealed Religion.2 First published in 1820, 
this book made a sensa t ion a 1 impact, going in to nine edit ions in as 
many years and being translated into French <1822) and Ge~rman 
<1825).3 lt was widely influential. Newman is therefore addressing 
himself to an established trend. 
Erskine's distinctive approach to "evidences04 of Christianity4 will 
provide a preliminary classification of the 'Sabellian' direction of his 
theology, identified by Newman. Erskine was calling in question the 
external-evidence approach, which tried to prove Christianity's truth by 
miracles, fulfilled prophecies and the veracity of witnesses, presenting 
them as empirical evidence.5 This was a well-trodden path, going back to 
the controversies with Deism.6 lntemal evidencing, on the other hand, 
moves away from a discussion of the authority of the document or 
witness, to argue that the content of the document rings true to its 
reader. As Steve Gowler expresses it, internal evidencing relies on 
the intimate relation, or 'fittingness', which 
inheres between the mode of being recommended 
in the Bible and the moral, physical and mental 
constitution of human beings.'l 
Thomas Chalmers had distinguished two kinds of 'internal evidence': 
first, there was the way the subject is impressed by a narrative's 
consistency and air of authenticity; secondly, there is that kind 
which is founded upon the reasonableness of 
the doctrines or the agreement which is 
conceived to subsist between the nature of the 
Christian religion and the character of the 
Supreme being. We have experience of man, but 
we have not experience of God.8 
Gowler points out that Erskine would have denied this last 
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sentence,asserting, rather 1a point of contact between God and the moral 
life.9 His apologetic is based upon the authority of revelation 
considered solely in its impact upon human beings: it is the believing 
subject's response which vindicates the claims of revelation. 
Newmcm was 1 of course, in his argument from consci.ence to the 
existence of God,10 himself in a sense an exponent of internal 
evidencing. Erskine's view of the moral as an existential encountell" 
between God and human individuals is, surely, similar to Newman's. The 
difference is only in the placing of such moral arguments: Newman 
restricts its application to a form of natural theology or a priori 
apologetic, while Erskine applies it to revelation itself. Newman was, 
moreover, repelled by the external evidencing of the school of Paley11 , 
with its reliance upon miracles and glib teleology. Yet, at the same 
tbne, he often strongly asserted that it was only upon external 
evidence that an unbeliever should come to acceptance of Christianity.12 
Newman's position upon evidencing is, therefore, by no means 
straightforward and further clarification is necessary in order to 
explain why he associated internal evidencing with heresy. 
Newman's dislike of internal evidencing in the 1830's arose from 
his increasing alarm at evangelical emotionalism and its preaching of 
the Atonement to reach the heart and effect conversion. He consistently 
regarded this as a sort of affective utilitarianism, implying as it did 
that the content of revelation was explicable purely in terms of its 
emotional use.13 It was along these lines that, in 1834, he wrote a 
paper, still extant though unpublished, which he may have delivered at 
that time to a clergy meeting, on the subject of Erskine's precursor, 
Thomas Chalmers - the Critical Remarks upon Dr.Chalmers' Theology.14 lt 
does not deal with 'internal evidencing', but it does explore the 
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approach to revelation which, in Tract 73, Newmnn was to describe as a 
'rationalistic principle'. He sees Chalmers as ''the most moderate and 
sensible'01 5 exponent of "a religious system exerting a considerable 
influence among us" and exemplifying a tendency, which in the later 
Tract he calls "rationalism'' and "liberalism": this '"system" 
may be described in various ways, according to 
t.hP ~ if'iA nn { .. rh i rh r.Ja tr i c:u.1 ; for" ~.-.-""'""" + -l.-.. 1 
characteristic.16 
The paper is, however, more than a critique. It contains a positive 
statement of Newman's "own view". 17 lt is a more definite statement of 
his underlying position in Tract 73 than we find there and may be used 
to complement it. Particularly useful is its exposition of the 
distinction between natural and dogmatic theology and its strictures 
upon the practical ills of the conflation of natural and revealed in the 
preaching strategy of evangelical Protestantism. Newman's comments upon 
lbnits of the theological task go some of the way towards explaining 
why in Tract 73 he is more of an effective critic than a positive 
theologian. 
Newman's "own view" is an exposition of the relation between the 
natural and the revealed in relation to conversion. He sees factors 
external to revelation - "conscience, tradition and the visible world 
moral and physical" - as bringing before man 
a certain creed, whether he obeys or neg lee ts 
it"' s 
By cacreed10 , he means a belief-system derived from nature, and preceding 
the reception of revelation. It excites in those who heed it - for all 
have it in some form or another - "chiefly fear, yet some hope" and a 
desire to do one's ·duty 19 before God. When the Gospel, ''Ghrist and his 
satisfaction" is proposed to such a one, he receives it, but this 
effects no change in the "kind" of his religion. He is, as it were, 
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already converted before the reception of revelation. His natural state 
accounts for the fact that he receives what is revealed: 
He cannot but pass from one to the other - not 
by a revolution of sentiment, but a 
completion.2 c' 
It follows that the Gospel should not be used to effect conversion, for 
this is the job of natural theology:2 1 There is "nothing" in the Gospel-
doctrines "to convert the heart'0: 
a man who does not obey God under natural 
religion, will not under the Law, nor under the 
gospel22 
Newman's emphasis upon natural religion seems to leave little for 
revelation to do. He is happy, in this mood, to put it on a high shelf 
where it cannot be easily taken down and used: 
Should it be inquired what the peculiar 
message of mercy in the gaspe 1 has done for 
him, I reply it has given him encouragement -
encouragement su ff ic ien t to au twe igh the 
preponderating fears of nature, and the new 
disclosures which the Bible gives of sin""" 
Newman is not entirely convinced even about this: over the final words, 
he adds, 
scarcely here?2 • 
Nevertheless, his overall drift is clear enough: the Gospel initiates the 
believer into a higher level of "degree and excellence",26where "hope 
and joy" predominate over fear, but this is not a conversion different 
Jn kind from nature. He is most happy for the Gospel to 
be "unreservedly" proclaimed to infants in the rite of 
baptism:26 The Gospel, then, is best proclaimed where it can have least 
effect. 
It is particularly in relation to the Doctrine of the Atonement 
that Chalmers offends: 
He maintains that till a man receives the 
gospe 1 he canna t love God - that the message 
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of pat-don is that in the gaspe l which makes 
him love God, opens his heart etc. - so that 
an appeal to the affections, not the 
conscience, is the charactet-istic and sole 
instrument ordinarily by which the Christian 
religion is heartily embraced .... that the 
peculiar doctrine of the gospel, the love of 
God in sending His Son to die for us, the 
economy of the Atonement, is the doctrine 
exciting this gratitude - i.e. The instrument 
of conversion.•'=7 
Precisely this view will re-appear in the examination of Erskine and 
Abbott in Tract 73: the presentation of the Atonement as a persuasive 
device dangerously humanises revelation and evacuates its transcendent 
quality. This Newman will associate with 'Sabellianlsm'. 
The Chalmers document gives us the theology of revelation 
underlying his heresiology, but it does not make the link with heresy 
as such.In March, 1835, however, Newman did establish a relation between 
(internal> evidencing and heresy, in a fleeting reference in his letter 
to Henry ~ilberforce, to 
Hinds, his notions about Inspiration (?) and his 
Sabellianism and Nestorianism.~'"' 
The reference is to Samuel Hinds' An Enquiry into the Proofs, Nature 
and Extent of Inspiration and into the Authority of 
Scripture <1831>.29Hinds was a progressive clergyman, in the van of 
liberal Anglican theology, a client of Whately <his domestic chaplain in 
Dublin) 0 who was eventually rewarded with the episcopal throne of 
Norwich. Newman had associated Whately's view of the Trinity with 
Sabellianism since 1827.30 Hinds's book was concerned with revelation, 
not the Trinity - and reading it may have provided Newman with the 
link between Trinitarian Sabellianism and the liberal theology of 
revelation. 'Nestorianlsm' remains, however, a puzzle. 
Hinds's treatise begins with a very old-fashioned ring for such an 
apparently avant-game theologian: in setting out to counter "slow-
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corroding scepticism,"31 he declares the only proof to be expected frmu 
any writer pretending to divine revelation is authenticating miracle.32 
This is warmed-up Paleyism - he even later in the book invokes proof 
from Old Testament prophecy - but it is not internal evidencing. Hinds's 
appeal is, in fact, external: he refers to the "chain of external 
evidence".33His criteria for the evidence of a writing's Inspiration are 
either, I. That some miracle be imp 1 ied in the 
authorship; or II That there be satisfactory 
testimony, that the writings were recognised as 
works of inspiration, by persons who must have 
been assured of this on the evidence of 
miracles34 
Internal evidencing soon comes in, however, although Hinds is throughout 
cautious about its use. The task of establishing whether or not there 
-!-o 
is miraculous attestation amounts, in practice, examining "numerous 
A, 
links of proof"35 - which is impossible for all but the most scholarly. 
If "external evidences" are "the boast and bulwark of Christianity", 
nevertheless 
it is to the in tern a l that the Christ ian most 
appeals in secret for his own satisfaction and 
bosom comfort. Here he is at home.""'· 
Internal evidencing has a more direct appeal to the ordinary person at 
a time when "the mechanic and day-labourer'','37are through the spread of 
education, beginning to question the authorities for things. External 
evidences such as Lardner's or Paley's are, in these circumstances, 
either too unwieldy or, 1n abbreviated form, "a vague consideration of 
the original sources of proof''.39This will not do - a working system of 
evidencing is required, which is "unexceptionable". This is internal 
evidencing, which Hinds has somewhat deviously arrived at.39He thinks it 
possible, and he invokes St.Paul's authority for it, for Christians to 
exercise judgment about what Scripture is: in I cm~inth1ans, Paul, Hinds 
argues, appeals to the 'prophets and spiritual persons' to decide 
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whether Pau 1 had writ ten the uncontrolled 
suggestions of his own mind; or the commands 
of the Lord - in other words, whether the 
Epistle was or \vas not in Scripture.'~0 
This sounds •rationalist', in Newman's sense, but this is not quite 
Hinds's drift: he is calling attention to the testiiDony of the Christian 
community, living in the 'spirit• and 'power', and particularly of those 
n~£U1filQ.J-~,... t,..,,.a-#.,,..;,.a,.,..,l,... ...... ....,_ .... -"' to-,...-- ....... 4--...- .,..../:' _ ...... ._.£ .......... _..~-- A.L. .... -- .... -.-- 1!1--
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miracles".41 They are qualified to recognise the supernatural or 
transcendent character of the apostle•s message. 
From this position, Hinds drifts into one which could with greater 
accuracy be described as a reduction of revelation to human 
preconceptions, in Newman's sense. He points to the purity and 
perfection of ••the moral instruction contained in Scripture [as] a proof 
of inspiration," because its excellence may be judged as miraculous: 
that the authors of the New Testament should 
embody in their writings ethical instruction 
more pure, and far more practical, than ever 
before had been addressed to mankind, is 
equally impossible t-Jithout the intervention of 
human help. 4 ' 2 
Hinds does not see this as reductionist. Indeed, his point is that New 
Testament morality cannot be explained as a product of merely human 
powers; it is 
unaccountable, on any view, which the ordinary 
course of man's intellectual nature enables us 
to form. 4 !3 
However, it might be suggested that the decision that New Testament 
morality is of an excellence beyond human power to devise draws upon 
an already-existing human standard of moral excellence, against which 
moral codes, including that of Scripture, may be judged. Hinds comes 
close to this: 
The estimate we form of the au thor i ty of the 
Gospel as evidence depends, for example, on the 
view we take of man's intellectual powers - of 
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the character, age and country 
individuals who wrote Scripture 
contemporary progress of ethical 
elsewhere.44 
of the 
of the 
knowledge 
Nevertheless, Hinds• position is very moderate. He does not wish to 
rely entirely upon the psychological authority of internal evidencing. 
He rather advocates a combination of both~6The inquirer "should place 
proof but the combined ~result of all.0046 In view of this, Newman's 
identification of him, albeit hesitantly, as heretical requires 
explanation. In fact, Hinds was indicted by association - as an ally of 
tlhately. Moreover, Hinds, like Hampden, held that the only authority 
being Scripture, doctrinal "tests .. were merely "judicial" matters, and 
the "Fathers" ''human authorities":~7He therefore belonged to the 
theological party at Oxford, directly opposed to the Tractarians against 
whom Newman was egging Henry Wilberforce to write a pamphlet. 
There is little evidence that Newman had read Hinds' book carefully 
or with discrimination. No notes or papers on it exist. The lack of 
material here suggests that Newman's somewhat tentative conclusion that 
the author was in some way heretical does not arise from a systematic 
working through of his treatise. It is more likely that the idea arose 
as part of a whole series of intuitive, highly speculative remarks made 
on the wing - for the private consumption of his inner circle of 
friends. Nevertheless, the reference to Hinds is very important, because 
lt is the first occasion when Newman associates Sabellianism with a 
theology of revelation, rather than considering it, classically, as a 
Trinitarian heresy. Blanco White had shown how Sabellianism concealed 
Socinianism from its deluded adherent. Hinds' book, with its combination 
of internal evidencing and latitudinarianism, may have been the first 
step towards the idea, only clearly expressed in Tract 73, that the 
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slide to infidelity via Sabellianism is not only a matter of Trinitarian 
error, but that, beneath the latter and accounting for it, there lies a 
heresy regarding revelation, which is also, in an analogous sense, 
'Sa be llian '. 
IDten NeWIDan came to Erskine in Tract 73, he found in his internal 
evidencing an approach to revelation which epitomised the best of 
theological liberalism, in a form articulated clearly enough to be made 
the object of a critique. Newman presents Erskine as a typical exponent 
of "'liberalislil" but uses the term in a broader sense than the 
characteristic polemical use as the denial of religious tests which has 
been so prominent between 1829 and 1833. Here, Newman considers 
liberalism as a tendency which explains all the ills which the Church of 
England was heir to in the 1830's, the expression of a shallow 
religious temperament refashioning revelation into a glibly optimistic 
pseudo-religion, and sacrificing ancient and difficult truths to the 
spirit of modernity. Not that he sees Erskine as, personally, glib or 
unreligious - he is, rather, a victim of his own method, which, as with 
the Apollinarians, leads to consequences unforeseen by its exponent. If 
Erskine is himself rationalistic, it is unconsciously and the rationalism 
lies in the unexamined depths of his character. 
In his treatment of liberalism in Tract 73, Newman is attempting to 
universalise the debates over tests and doctrines of the 1830's. Lee 
H.Yearley 0s definition of Newman's understanding of liberalism as a 
"'type of religiosityo• comes nearest the mark here.48Although Yearley by 
and large ~ores the detail of the historical background and 
systematises Newman according to the phenomenalist typology of such 
comparative religionists as van der Leuw and Otto,49hfs 
analysis is an apt description of Newman's idea of 
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liberralisrn50 in his discussion of Erskine. Yearley 
argues that, for Newman, there is only eithet~ true religion or atheism, 
while liberalism attempts to occupy a middle ground, accommodating 
Christirutity to the assumptions of an increasingly infidel culture.51 • 
Yearley omits to mention that the attempts to construct such a 
'halfway house' are by Newman identified with the Sabellian heresy; this 
heresy is not so much an erroneous direction in Christian theology, as 
a concealed form of infidelity within the Church. Liberalism is 
characterised by Ye81rley according to six first principles - and the 
fourth is particularly relevant to Sabellianism: "Revelation as a 
Manifestation not a Mystery'', the view that 
any particular revelation indicates an ever-
present situation; that reve 1a t ion's encasement 
in ambiguous his tor ica 1 events makes its 
meaning dependent on the observer's ab i 1 i ty to 
perceive; and that part leu 1ar revelations need 
to be criticized and systematized because 
revelation's object is, at least in theory, 
completely understandable.52 
The word ''Manifestation'' had appeared in his Notes on Apollinarianism 
as a description of the way Apollinaris presented Christ as a 
"manifestation of the Godhead" - a step in the slide from a high 
Christology, via Sabellianism, to Arianism.53Newman's definition of 
"manifestation" in Tract 73 marks a development: it is 
a system comprehended as such by the human 
mind,54 
and his reference is not just to patristic Trinitarian and lncarnational 
formulations, but, more inclusively, to the whole question of revelation: 
!;!the revelation" of the "truths" found in Scripture. He has effected a 
transition to a critique of theological liberalism by a broadening of 
his patristic heresiology. The assumption behind the liberal 
'manifestation• theology is that revealed truths are by their very 
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nature fully comprehensible, and that the intelligibility of the 
revealed object is a condition of belief in it. It is thus that Newman 
paraphrases Erskine's 'tendency': 
That is, I cannot believe anything that I do 
not understand; therefore true Christianity 
consists, not in 'submitting in all things to 
God's authority', His written Word, whether it 
be obscure or not, but in understanding his 
~rtc GS 
The acts of the economy of salvation, then, on Erskine's theory, being 
addressed to man on his terms, must, in these very terms, be understood 
before being received. Newman will eventually, not without caution, lead 
on to the conclusion that this is a kind of 'Sabellianism': revelation is 
envisaged by liberals as modal. 
Against this manifestation-theology, Newman advocates his own 
theology of mystery. There is a disclosure66 to humanity of the hidden 
life of God, but it is not cognitively assimilable - it becomes 
problematic at the moment of its unfolding.57Human language is the 
medium of the revelation, but it cannot express perspicuously what it 
carries hidden within it: 
a doctrine 1 y ing hid in language, to be 
received in that language from the first by 
every mind, whatever be its separate power of 
understanding it; entered in to more or less by 
this or that mind, as may be.ss• 
Newman's negative theology here - that we must hang on to the language 
no matter how unintelligible to us for the sake of what is hidden in it 
- is a development of what will be familiar from his treatment of 
Chalmers: revelation is closed to human enquiry, it comes to us and we 
must accept it in obedience. On the other hand, there is a posJtlve side 
too: the human language of revelation brings man into contact with its 
breadth and richness , -, in which he can, by reverent 
sensitivity participate, and thereby be himself enlarged: 
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To believe in Objective Truth is to thrm.J 
ourselves forward upon that \vh ich we have but 
partially mastered or made subjective.E':~· 
This is why the language must not be touched by an attempt to 
accomodate it to modernity, for then the mystery contained in it might 
be lost. At first, it would seem as if liberalism afforded more 
opportunities for fulfiUnent60 than the passive obedience required by 
New-man's kind of orthodoxy. However, a revelation completely 
intelligible does not enlarge the categories of human understanding, 
but is content with their immediately perceived limits, whereas Newman 
suggests that revelation as Mystery provides limitless possibilities to 
expand the human consciousness: 
It [revelation] must ever be small and 
superficial, viewed only as t~eceived by man; 
and is vast only when considered as that 
ex terna 1 truth in to which each Christ ian may 
grow continually and ever find fresh food for 
his sou!."", 
Newman's aversion to this constricting, reductive tendency of the 
rationalist approach to revelation is expressed in his attitude to 
"system"62 in theology. Here he lay down a challenge to the systematic 
c.~\ -C! "'ell.> VI \0\ \1'\ 
trends in the theology of his German and _ contemporaries, to 
that impulse towards a presentation of Christianity coherent in terms 
of modern philosophy and scientific theory, which was flourishing in 
Schleiermacher, and which found a powerful expression, in English, in 
the theology of Erskine. Newman presents revelation as dissonant, rather 
than harmonious in its interaction with man. Although there may be a 
relation between revealed truths, that relation has not itself been 
revealed, and, Newman suggests, perhaps could not have been: 
Revelation ... is not a revealed system, but 
consists of a number of detached and 
incomplete truths belonging to a vast system 
unrevealed, of doctrines and injunctions 
mysteriously connected together; that is, 
connected by unknown media, and bearing upon 
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unknown portions of the system.c:·.,,, 
The rationally coherent coordination of these "detached" elements, each 
~isolated from the rest, unsystematic, connected with the rest by 
unknown, intermediate truths, and bearing upon subjects unknown," 
involves the introduction of governing principles derived from human 
understanding, and not themselves revealed, so that the result is 
impoverishment, a reduction to system: 
Arrange and 
systematize 
in te 11 ig ib le 
harmony with 
contrast them we may and 
<that is, reduce them into 
dependence on each other, 
each other) we may not"' 4 
do; 
an 
or 
There is a further consequence of "rash theorizing and 
systematizing'cs6 : not only is there impoverishment, but also distortion. 
At this point Newman's polemic against rationalism, as so often, merges 
with an attack upon extreme evangelical Protestantism, "the popular 
)) --theology of the day,""""as, at bottom, itself rationalistic. It is self-
centred: it makes human experience the sole principle of interpretation, 
The Rat ion a 1 is t makes himself his own centre, 
not his Maker; he does not go to God, but he 
implies that God must come to him.';:. 7 
The exagger ated and exclusive emphasis upon the 'economic' dimension 
results in the foregrounding of the one revealed truth which is thought 
to affect man most, the Atonement; this becomes "the chief doctrine of 
the Gospel'0, but 
not as a wonder in heaven, and in its re 1a t ion 
to the attributes of God and to the unseen 
world, but in its experienced effects on our 
minds, in the change it effects when it is 
believed. o:.e 
Newman has already attacked this view in. his .paper on Chalmers. Here, 
he uses the principle of the transcendentality even of what is revealed 
to attack the centralization of all doctrine upon the Atonement, for 
soteriological reasons69 
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But is all systematic theology rationalist? This would suggest a 
radical pessimism about the human capacity to respond rationally to 
revelation, and a desperate clinging to traditional forms of words, we 
know not why. There are strands of Tract 73 which give this negative 
impress ion: 
we should religiously adhere to the form of 
,,.,......,..._~,_ .......... A .&-\...- -.-..J.:------ ~ ~L ! -~-
[ revelation] comes to us, and apart from which 
Revelation does not exist, there being nothing 
else given us by which to ascertain or enter 
into it7° 
Even allowing for Newman's acute sense that Christianity itself was 
threatened by systematic approaches, his account of what theologians 
cannot do with the Trinity goes further than caution, into an extreme 
apopha tic ism, 
the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity is a mere 
juxtaposition of separate truths, which to our 
minds in vo 1 ves in consistency, when viewed 
together; nothing more being attempted by 
theologians, for nothing more is told us.71 
On the other hand, Tract 73 gives a long list of how reason can 
legitimately be applied to revelation. It is a list which would seem to 
admit the most systematic and rationalist of theologians: reason can 
find out what is, or is not, attainable by reason; it can enquire into 
tru.ths of religion from nature, in the absence of an "express 
revelation"; it can establish what truths are necessary of a given 
revelation; it can "reject a revelation on the plea of insufficient 
proof0'; it can investigate the meaning of a revelation and interpret its 
language; it can "use its doctrines, as far as they can be fairly used, 
in inquiring into its divinity"; it can compar~ and connect doctrines 
with our previous knowledge, "to make them parts of a whole"; and it 
can bring doctrines into dependence on each other, trace their mutual 
relations and "pursue them to their legitimate issues .. 7 2 How, then, is 
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Erskine's systematising a rationalist distortion, for he seems to be 
doing no more than Newman declares is permissible? 
Newman's answer to this question appears unpromising and at first 
suggests an unresolved ambivalence in his attitude to systematic 
theology. At this point, his diction is emotively charged: we may not 
"explain it [revelation] away", "refuse to let it speak for itself'', 
"stumble at partial knowledge", "accept one half of what has been told 
us and not the other half", "to frame some gratuitous hypothesis", "to 
garble, gloss and colour ... to trim, chip, pare ·m\fay and twist .. " "to bring 
into conformity with the idea to which we have subjected them."79Yet 
this emotive and rhetorical language, while seeming to obscure the 
issue, provides a clue suggesting a way into Newman's subtle, eiastlc 
8nd intensely per~un8l concept of rationalism. The language points, not 
so much to the theoretical limits of reason in theology, as to the 
context of the theologian himself, and the danger to which he is 
exposed by the desire to make Christianity intelligible. The coloured 
language - the 'garbling', 'glossing', 'colouring', the 'trimming' , 
'clipping', 'twisting' and 'paring' - suggests that the systematic 
theologian can easily become a victim of a partial and anthropocentric 
view, resulting in religious shallowness unperceived even by himself. 
Newman has, in fact, discovered the contemporary rhetorical use of 
the developmental theory of heresy he worked out in his Apollinarian 
papers: he can apply to Erskine the idea of a distinction between 
deliberate intention on the one hand, and, on the other, the tendency 
which may be drawn out of his theological discourse. This enables an 
oblique attack against liberalism which cirn, at the same time, disclaim 
any interest in personal polemic. It lets Newman out of some of the 
difficulties he got into over attacking Hampden. Thus, it is the 
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direction of Erskine's approach~ the ultimate logical consequence of his 
theological method that Newman is concerned to identify. At no point 
does he impugn Erskine's personal orthodoxy. Newman argues that there 
are two attitudes to revelation which, though distinct, are so close, 
that a transition is possible between them. First, there is Erskine's 
own method, of examining truths of revelation in relation to their 
conformity with what is humanly perceived as true and good, in order to 
recommend revelation as very likely to be true. Secondly, there is the 
more radical position: whatever is not in conformity with what we 
regard as true and good is not revelation. Newman~ procedure here is 
familiar, both from his early treatment of Sabellianism, and his papers 
on Apollinarianism: there are two positions, the first more orthodox -
even, apparently, innocuous, and the second a definitely heretical or 
rationalist position which can be arrived at by holders of the first. 
The t~o reasons given for the slide from the first to the second 
positions are also by now familiar. The first is to suggest a subtle 
modification from the argument of ethos: the 'slide' takes place because 
of a rationalism so deeply embedded that it is concealed from the 
heretic. The second is to argue the autonomous power to develop of 
heretical discourse. In Erskine's case, Newman advances both. Erskine 
exemplifies the rationalism of a well-intentioned theologian deploying a 
revisionist scheme with regard to the traditional orthodox formulae: 
But it is the way with men, particularly in 
this day, to generalize freely, to be impatient 
of such concrete truth as existing 
appo in tmem ts contain, to attempt to dis engage 
it, to hazard sweeping assertions, to lay down 
pr inc ip les, to mount up above God's visible 
doings. and to subject them to tests derived 
from our own speculations7 4 
The more radical tendencies of a theological discourse thus established 
will develop, Newman predicts, in a way unforseen by their originator. 
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He is using the theory of heresy which he expounded in his treatment 
of the Apollinarian sects: 
Mr.Erskine has been led on, from the plain 
fact, that in Christianity there is a certain 
general bearing of faith in doctrine upon 
character, and so far a proof of its 
consistency which is a token of divine working, 
- led on to the general proposition, that in a 
genuine Revelation all doctrines revealed must 
, • •• 1 • ' 
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enjoined by it; and next to the use of this 
proposition as a test for rejecting such 
alleged doctrines of the Gospel, for instance 
the Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity, as do not 
manifestly satisfy it75 
It is in this context - of the application to contemporary 
liberalism of his theories about patristic heresy - that we find 
Newman's first very cautious employment of the term "Sabellian". On 
both the occasions that he associates Sabellianism with Erskine, he 
presents it as a development or consequence of Erskine's theology, 
rather than a consciously-held tenet. On the first occasion, Newman is 
considering the influence of Erskine's "leading idea", the ''habit of 
thought" engendered by "the silent influence of such books as this of 
Mr. Erskine's." At this point, Newman uses the term "Socinian" in harness 
with "Sabellian": he does not clarify his view of their relation until 
later in the Tract 73. He declares that Erskine's method will lead 
.,pretty nearly to Socinianism", and will render smooth the path to 
"'Sabellianism": 
Now, I would ask, - do we never hear it asked, 
- have we never been tempted ourselves to ask, 
- 'What is the harm of being, for instance, a 
Sabellian?'76 
This is a subtle variation upon his theory of heresy's development: he 
imagines the state of public theological language after an injection of 
liberalism of Erskine's kind, and envisages it as facilitating or 
encouraging dangerous habits of mind. It shews his sense of theology as 
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rhetoric~ operating in the public sphere and moulding public opinion77 
His analysis in Tract 73 moves beyond that of his Apollinarianism 
papers, where the argument takes place between theologians, the logical 
consequences of whose tenets may be drawn out, to the seething world 
of early nineteenth-century religion, with its voracious appetite for 
pamphlets, sermons, journals and religious literature of all kinds. 
Language is, as it were, the atmosphere breathed by believers - and 
Erskine's 'tendencies' have changed the quality of that atmosphere. 
Newman is, indeed, obsessively concerned with the purity of the air. His 
own rhetoric is not reactionary, however: the process unconsciously 
engendered by Erskine cannot be reversed. Newman's aim is, rather, to 
stimulate awareness of the subtle, unconscious workings of religious 
self-understanding as it is affected by the currents of the times. One 
might say that he was attempting to bring liberal ideolQgy to self-
consciousness. 
So far, in Tract 73, the terms "Socinianism" and "Sabellianism" have 
not been employed in any special sense: he is alluding to them as 
Trinitarian heresies. Socinianism would, of course, be a familiar enough 
term - often one of abuse - to the reader of the 1830's. "Sabellianism" 
wo~ld have been a somewhat more mysterious term to all but those 
versed in the history of doctrine78 It is, indeed, probably for this 
reason that he uses the two terms in conjunction - "Socinian" as it 
~ere, glossing the more unusual "Sabellian". On the second occasion 
~hen he describes Erskine as "Socinlan" and "Sabellian'', the point of 
departure is, still, the classical doctrine of the Trinity. Newman is 
considering a passage in which Erskine contrasts what he regards as 
the abstract formulations of the Doctrine of the Trinity, which makes 
011no address either to our understandings, or our feelings, or our 
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consciences'", with the moral effect of such texts as 'God so loved the 
world that He sent his only-Begotten Son'79 Erskine's antithesis, as 
Newman describes it, derives from his experiential or affective theology 
of revelation. Newman is, therefore, now pointing towards an underlying 
cause for Erskine's exaltation of Atonement at expense of Trinity. 
Needless to say, this 'tendency' in Erskine is neither deliberate nor 
foreseen, but arises in its consequences. Newman exposes the 'tendency' 
by placing theology in a rhetorical context - demanding how Trinitarian 
orthodoxy may in practice be advocated, in the light of Erskine's 
'developments •: 
Now I do not say that such a passage as this 
is a denial of the Athanasian Creed; but I ask, 
should a man be dis posed to deny it, b_Q~ would 
the writer refute him? Has he not, if a 
Trinitarian, cut away the ground from under 
him? Might not a Socinian or Sabellian convince 
him of the truth of their doctrines, by his own 
arguments? Unquestionably ."' 0 
His questions are themselves rhetorical, and lest anyone should read 
him otherwise, he answers them unequivocally himself. 
Erskine's apologetic principle whereby doctrines are advocated leads 
him to seem to be saying, Newman argues, that t~evelation must always 
be perceived as reasonable - and that, by 'reasonable', is meant 'morally 
useful', so that, for Erskine, the Trinity 
is on 1 y in flu entia l as it exhibits the moral 
character of God~ 1 
Here Newman finally identifies the broader 'Sabellianism' of Erskine's 
theology of revelation which underlies and accounts for his treatment 
of Trinity. The persons of the Trinity are reduced to modes or 
manifestations exhibiting God's "moral charact'er", and the depth of the 
Trinity, rooted in the infinity of the Godhead, is rendered shallow, and 
the persons are cut off from any intrinsic relation to the essential 
divine life: 
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He has cut out the doctrine by its roots, and 
has preserved only that superficial part of it 
which he den om ina tes a 'Man if es tat ion', - on 1 y 
so much as bears visibly upon another part of 
the system, our moral character, - so much as 
is perceptibly connected with it, - so much as 
may be comprehended.82 
f~eWilsn°s use of 0'f.1Mifestat:l.on°0 here moves beyond his identification of 
its historical !Use by SabelUsns Jln patristic sou~rces, eno'l the 
apprmdmation to this sense by some Apollinerians. He now employs U: to 
descri.oo a systematizaUon of revealed truths which 0 by the application 
of 1l:he moral as a principle of organisation and explanation, subsumes 
revealed to natural knowledge, thus destroying the transcendent element 
ehich0 Neffiilan argues, will Btlways remBtin epistemologically intransigent. 
Newman's treatment of Erskine has been notable for its tentative 
and sensiUve probing of a liberal position. But Newman is not himself 
systematic. Indeed his technique is almost impressionistic as he picks a 
sentence here, a paragraph there from Erskine"s book. The term 
CSabellianism 0 which he uses to establish the subtle connection between 
modern Trinitarian heresy and liberal theologies of revelation is 
introduced with a diffidence appropriate to his ilnformal, experimental 
method of analysis: Newman floats an uneasy question and urbanely 
passes on. The mentions of Sabellianism have the calculated casualness 
of the throw-away line. Perhaps for this reason 0 the important place of 
the concept of Sabellianism in the rhetorical strategy of Tract 
73,un:lfying Erskine0s tendencies, diagnosing them 0 and distancing them 
from the immediate context 0 has gone unnoticed by commentators upon 
this Tract.This impressionism and diffidence of tone in the handling of 
Erskine shows Newman modifying polemic into a critique which sounds 
not unfriendly 0 and avoiding the imputation of Tractarian bigotry which 
some of his less equivocal contributions to contemporary debate had 
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provoked.a:a 
In Tract 73, then 0 the method of analysis derived from his 
Apollinarian papers enables Newiilan to make an advance on what was, in 
his treatment of A~ianism 0 often a crude identification of heresy with 
personal moral weakness. Me can now come to terms more adequately with 
the tragic dUDension of heresy as a destructive error elaborated in 
good conscience loy the heretic. This is a theme to which he returns 
more fully, in the second part of the Tract, in his treatment of Jacob 
Abbott. 
(b) Jacob Abbott and Popular Evangelicalism 
The Corner Stone by Jacob Abbott,94 the prolific American writer of 
popular religious books for the young, was a new arrival on the English 
scene. The Congregationalist theologian, John Pye Smith,95 in his preface 
to one of the three editions of The Corner Stone-"'6 published in London 
in 1834, received favourably the work of an author previously 
unfamiliar to him.87 lt was this edition which attracted a hostile review 
in the Tractarian organ, The British Critic,98 in 1836, and to which, in 
1835, Newman referred in Tract 73, following his analysis of Erskine 
with a section on Abbott. 
The Corner Stone is addressed to the "young Christian'',89employ1ng 
a combination of narrative, poetic description of nature, homiletic and 
argument, to inculcate virtues such as hard work, abstemious habits and 
obedience to parents.90The later part of the book might be termed 
'revivalistO, aiming to stimulate an emotional conversion experience, 
describing in extended narrative one such revival, at Amherst 
College.91 Although the book is frankly popular, it has a systematic 
-163-
dimension, treating of the main themes of Christian theology: God, 
nature, eU"il 0 providence and punishment, Christology, the Atonement and 
salvation, and the work of the Holy Spirit. 
Newman presents Abbott as "applying0092 what is only a 'Sabellian' 
tendency in Erskine "br~ging out the tendency of Mr. Erskine's 
argWllent"/3' 3 so that 'SabeBianism• may be seen Sls a true development of 
t-Jhat Erskine !has not~ taught:94 
They are evidently of the same school.95 
There is oo historicSJl Unk between Erskine and Abbott, albeit tenuous; 
in a letter to Erskine from Professor Noah Porter of Yale, in 1866, 
Erskine's Internal Evidence is acknowledged as a direct influence over 
the theology of the Andover school.95Since Abbott attended Andover in 
the early 1820's,97 it is not improbable that the Internal Evidence 
directly influenced him. This may be Newman's meaning, although his 
scant knowledge of other details of New England theology makes this 
unlikely.98A more plausible explanation is that he is speaking more 
loosely: Erskine•s tendency has entered theological discourse and been 
absorbed and developed by Abbott. Abbott and Erskine are "of the same 
schooP' in the sense of participating unwittingly in the underlying 
movement of thought and sentiment, for which '"liberalism'1199 is Newman's 
collective term, 1 00 in that 
scornful, arrogant, and self-trusting spirit, 
which has been unchained during these latter 
ages, and waxes stronger in power day by day, 
till it is fain to stamp underfoot all the host 
of heaven. 101 
Abbott, then, stands in relation to Erskine, as the sect of Timotheus to 
Apollinaris. Abbott is the more explicit development of the spirit to 
which Erskine has given a more orthodox expression. A modern heresy 
has been "unchained", and, as it develops, it progresses ineluctably 
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towarrds infidelity. 
Abbott's more explicit heresy arises from a radical application of 
revelation as "a Manifestation of the Divine Character." He regards 
revelation as "a collection of facts" 1 02considered entirely as a history 
J?rovidentially designed for their moral effects on human beings. 
__ Erskine, BlS we have seen, admitted a transcendent or irreducible 
element !nto his system; bUlt Abbott, Newman arglJles, eliminates this 
altogether: 
Mr.Erskine admits into the range of his Divine 
facts such as are not of this world, as the 
voluntary descent of Christ from heaven to 
earth, and His Incarnation, whereas Mr.Abbott 
virtually limits it to the witnessed history of 
Christ upon earth. 1 c·~• 
Newman, straining in his efforts to stress the orthodox element in 
Erskine104 in order to contrast him with Abbott, attributes to the 
former a view somewhat approaching his own 10doctrine lying hid in 
language": 
Mr.Erskine supposes the orthodox doctrine, or 
what he considers such, to be conveyed in the 
facts·• 06 
For Abbott. on the other hand. the facts themselves only, considered as 
events affecting hWDa.n hearts, are separated from doctrines about them. 
Newman's presentation of Abbott's teaching is conditioned by his 
previous encounter with Hampden's distinction between revealed biblical 
facts and unrevealed ecclesiastical doctrines. Yet Hampden is not 
mentioned. This is skilful rhetoric - Newman can glance at Hampden 
without disturbing the pretension to be pursuing an enquiry of more 
universal relevance. 
It is in relation to Abbott's revelation-as-facts that Newman 
catches him making a 'Sabellian' statement in his reference to 
'the three great Man if es tat ions of Himself to 
man which the one Unseen All-pervading Essence 
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has made and exhibited to us in the Bible. and 
in our experience and observation .11 oc 
Newman's cmnment accords with what has already been shown about his 
use of the term csabellian', that it can be applied not only to false 
teaching about the Trinity but also to certain views of revelation, and 
that the one goes with the other: 
This sentence, be it observed in oassin~. 
savours strongly of Sabellianism; he has spoken 
of what he calls three Manifestations of 
Almighty God, as our natural Governor, as 
influencing the heart, and as in Jesus Christ, 
without there being anything in his way of 
speaking to show that he attributed these 
Manifestations respectively to Three 
Persons. 1 07 
Even here, Newman is tentative < ..savours"):it is the result of his "way 
of speaking", rather than of the contumacy of the heretic. 
Newman finds Socinianism108 lying hidden beneath the Sabellian forms 
of Abbott's expressions. The distinction between orthodoxy and 
Socinianism is, in any case, according to Newman, a fine one: the 
difference between presenting the 'Economy' as containing otherworldly 
elements, and limiting it to "the witnessed history of Christ upon 
earth.109Abbott•s approach, like Hampden's, concentrating upon the latter 
aspect, would, in the case of the Incarnation, naturally stress the 
humanity of Christ, rather than his Divinity. Newman argues that a 
Christology which begins from the statement, 'Man is God', will -
although this is in itself orthodox - slide into the view that the 
Trinitarian persons mean no more than certain characteristics or 
dignities of God, that is, into Socin1anism.11 0 The Socinianism which 
Newman discerns arises as a consequence of Abbott's radical and 
untrammelled employment of a manifestation-theology which is also to 
be found in a less uncomprmnising form in Erskine. Erskine taught a 
c:Jdouble manifestation",111 that in the Incarnation, its history and 
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there is also a divine breakthrough, "of the Son of God personally in 
human nature~,112even though he underplays this latter element at the 
expense of the former. Newman argues that Abbott, by contrast, 
ellininates the divine breakthrough and presents the person of Christ 
entirely as an expression of God's mercy, so that Christ was 
not more than a man aided by God, just as the 
conversion of the world was a human work aided 
and blessed by God. 1 1 '3 
Newman is now beginning to clarify his view of the relation 
between Sabellianism and Socinianism, along the lines of his patristic 
theory of heresy's development. Just as Erskine tends towards 
Sabellianism without consciously embracing it, so Abbott, definitely 
Sabellian, tends towards Socinianism: he is '"within a hair's breadth of 
Socinlanism";1 ' 4 his manifestation-theology is "a poorly concealed 
Socinianism"1 n•. Newman suggests along lines familiar from his work on 
Apolllnarianism, both that Abbott•s Sabellianism conceals Socinianism, 
and that the former has in itself the capacity to develop into the 
latter. Although, therefore, Sabellianism at first hides its real 
Socinian essence, it also ultimately discloses it. The slide or 
development from a specious, or moderate, position into an infidel one 
is an inevitable feature of heretical discourse - and, Newman warns, 
may drag down its unwitting exponent, and those influenced by him, into 
something very close to atheism. 
Thus Newman, although establishing a firm distinction between a 
heretic's intention and the meaning of his discourse, nevertheless is 
able to re-introduce a personal element, in the unwitting - and 
potentially tragic - fall of the heretic. Here he uses the passage from 
Blanco's t-Jhite•s Observations, which had so struck him when he first 
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read the book, in which it is declared that 'Sabellinnism is only 
Unitarianism disguised in words' 1 ' 6 
Newman had been eager to use this idea as soon as he had heard 
about it, but its deployment seems, initially, feeble, in view of the 
fact that he has already declared Abbott's Socinianism to be "poorly 
concealed"; Sabellianism can hardly be an appropriate designation for 
tne maaen aangers of liberal theologies, if the disguise is so 
transparent. But Newman•s point is subtle: Sabellianism conceals one's 
mm infidelity fmm oneself, deluding one - as Blanco deluded himself 
~hen an Anglican - that one is at least subscribing to something like 
orthodoxy, when one has in fact already departed from revealed 
Christianity: 
This passage of Blanco White proves this much, 
not perhaps, that the philosophising in 
quest ion leads to Soc in ian ism but may be hid, 
even from a man's own consciousness.' 17 
Newman's 'turning' of Blanco's testimony of Unitarianism into a warning 
against the Sabellian tendency of liberalism involves a shift of 
perspective upon the idea of the development of heresy: he presents 
Socinianism, not so much as the next stop on the road leading from 
Sabellianism, as an already-present but unperceived condition: the 
apostasy has already taken place, without the consent, or even the 
consciousness, of the apostate. 
This 'turning' of Blanco is a powerful rhetorical instrument against 
liberals within the Church of England. The explicit profession of 
orthodoxy on the part of such theologians may, of course, be discounted 
- for they may be deluded. And this leaves free a large field of 
inference for the Tractarian critics. It is a strategy designed to 
engender unease. 
Up to this point, Newman•s picture of the stages in the liberal 
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heresy's development has been relent less: in terna 1 evidencing to 
Sabellianism, Sabellianism to Socinianism, and thence to Unitarianism. Of 
these depths there is a lower still, as Newman edges nearer to the 
conclusion that this nexus of heterodoxy will lead to an almost 
complete evacui3!.tion of revealed Christian theism. Newman does not call 
Abbott, or his tendencies, 'atheistic', but he does impute to The Co!71er 
Stone something close. He discerns "pantheism"' 1 a in Abbott's concept of 
God: God's nature is so closely associated with the man if es tat ion of His 
qualities in creation thBlt Abbott•s language, at any rate in Newman's 
understanding of it, seems to identify God and Nature, 
he speaks of God in pantheistic language. as an 
Anima Mundi, or universal essence, who has no 
known existence except in His works. 1 1 ·c• 
God, thus diffused throughout the whole, acts "impersonally'' through 
nature, that is by means of "laws'' and "provisions".120The impersonation 
of God in Christ expresses in personal form the various energies 
whereby God is manifested in nature, concentrating them in Christ; they 
are "condensed and exemplified in a real personal being.121 
There is some distortion in Newman's presentation of Abbott's 
~antheism". Abbott's initial assumption is not so much the divine 
immanence, as His transcendence. The apparently pantheistic language is 
used in contrast to anthropomorphic language, in order to combat the 
idea of God as a quasi-material being, inhabiting a place beyond the 
skies: 
The concept ion of childhood, -
that clings to us in maturer 
above the blue skies there 
concealed, where the deity sits 
delusive one. 1022 
and it is one 
years, - that 
is a heaven 
en throned, is a 
It is in this context that Abbott uses the apparently pantheistic 
language cited by Newman. 1 23 Its purpose is to express the sp ir itua 1 
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nature of God. - in this sense, only, is God everywhere diffused. 
However, Newman's suggestion that the perJ:>Q!! of Christ, in Abbott, 
is merely a concentrated and intense expression of God's self-
expression in nature calls attention to the way in which Abbott 
subsumes revelation under a modified form of 'physical' or natural 
theology, so that there is no longer any difference in practice between 
the natural and supernatural; the manifestations of the divine are in 
the nature of temporary theophanies - a 'Sabelliani.sm' more radical 
even than that linputed to hlin by Newman. Abbott arrives at this 
position froM the axiom that God is, in Himself, unknowable. He can only 
be known by human beings in "his doings". 124God can only make Himself 
known 
by acting himself out, as it were, in his 
works; and of course the nature of the 
manifestation which is made, will depend upon 
the nature of the works. 1 25 
Abbott's first stage in the development of this idea is conventional 
natural or physical theology, whereby in the manner of Paley, God's 
"doings" in the works of nature are to be discerned. One can only 
imagine the irritation of Newman,' 26who was no devotee of Paley, on 
reading Abbott's example of a "young lady of active mind", who "was 
advised by a friend to take a walk, and see how many proofs of divine 
contrivance she could find." 127Abbott dramatizes her meditations: on her 
walk she observes the divine contrivance of the ripe apple's stem, the 
vine, and the dew drop.128 
Abbott's next stage is to introduce the moral. The contemplation of 
the intricacy of creation has its limitations - it cannot affect the 
human heart. 1 29 Abbott is unhesitant that "mora 1 exh ib 1 t ions" can, 
however, be found in nature, especially in God's loving care for 
animals.130Abbott's nature is no nature "red in tooth and claw"131 : he 
-170-
pictures the animals prancing around in the forest enjoying themselves 
and providentially provided with all they need. The question of cold, 
starvation and predators is raised, but Abbott's response is a 
sent imen ta 1 camp lacency. 1 32 
The culmination of Abbott's adaptation of physical theology is 
Jesus Christ as the supreme manifestation of God's moral qualities, 
He brings out the purity and the spotlessness, 
and moral glory of the Divinity, through the 
workings of a human mind, called into existence 
for this purpose, and stationed in a most 
conspicuous attitude among men. 1 ''' 3 
The declaration of God's qualities in Christ is no different in kind 
from his qualities manifested in nature; 134 it is simply more !!J.O~ing. As 
with Erskine, it is the Atonement which most powerfully declares God's 
love and goodness. 1 36 
Abbott, then, presents God as communicating with man by a system 
of signs about Himself. These signs are modes of His manifestation of 
certain divine characteristics, but God is substantially unknown, except, 
as it were, piecemeal, in terms of some particular quality or other. 
However, all these qualities are centred and dramatised in the human 
person of Jesus. Newman hints at, but surprisingly plays down this 
aspect of Abbott's reductionism. He is, h,owever, provoked to indignation 
by Abbott's Christology which he sees as part of the popular "tendency 
to explain away Christ's divinity", beginning from the human, stressing 
first that "'Man is god"', while the "Catholic'" and '"orthodox'' tendency 
is to begin from the divine: ''"God is Man"'.136Therefore, to speak 
humanly of Jesus is a mark of heresy, as far as Newman is concerned: 
we must never speak, we have utterly no 
warrant to speak, of the person of the Eternal 
Word as thinking and feeling like a mere man, 
like a child or boy, as simply ignorant, 
imperfect and dependent on the creature, which 
is Mr.Abbott's way, 137 
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l\le'[,Jman's own °Apollinarian° tendency139here emerges as an issue in his 
discussion of Abbott. If he did, indeed, slip into Apollinarianism, this 
would be a remarkable turn, an extraordinary lapse, in view of the 
depth with which he had surveyed this very heresy only weeks before! 
Moreover, his Christological sermons during the preceding months 
between March and May, 1835, expound a classically orthodox position 
upon the unity of Christ. In, for example, The Humiliation of the 
Eternal SOn, he declares of Christ that 
He took into His own Infinite Essence man's 
nature itself in all its completeness, creating 
a soul and body, and, at the moment of 
creation, making them His own.' 3 "' 
Before the Incarnation, the Hard "had thought and acted as God", but 
now it "began to think and act as a man, with all man's faculties and 
imperfections, sin excepted. "Christ therefore experienced joy, grief, 
fear, anger, pain and ''heaviness" as fully as we do. 1400n the other 
hand, Newman is anxious to locate the identity of Christ in the person 
of the Divine Word. In Christ the Son of God Made Man, he presents 
Christ as "in nature perfect man" but not in the sense that we are: 
He was not, strictly speaking, in the English 
sense of the word, 9.. man ... He was man because 
he had our human nature wholly and perfectly, 
but His person is not human like ours, but 
divine. 1 41 
It would therefore be inappropriate to speak of Christ as "governed" by 
a "human intelligence". Christ can, at choice, act sometimes as God, and 
sometimes 110 through the flesh00 , He 00was not a man made God, but God 
made man."142Newman is here arguing for the anhypostatic humanity of 
Christ, by no means formal Apollinarianism in the patristic sense.143 In 
Bodily Suffering, although he sees the cry of 
anguish upon the cross as 8'recorded for our benefit", he nevertheless 
-172-
accepts that Christ did genuinely experience, if only for a moment, 
something approaching despair: 
For one instant a horrible dread overwhelmed 
Him, when He seemed to ask why God had 
foresaken Him ... the trial of sharp agony, 
hurrying the mind on to vague terrors and 
strange inexplicable thoughts144 
Christ's human experience of mental suffering is real enough, although 
the manner of its occurrence is 'inscrutable' since He was "all along 
supported by an inherent Divlnity."146 
Compared with such passages in the sermons, Newman's treatment of 
Abbott appears to verge upon a position which may, with greater 
accuracy, be described as Apolllnarian. However, even initially, one may 
observe that Newman's point here is subtle - an assertion, not so much 
about what the human Jesus felt, as about how we should §P-~ak of Him, 
in other words, the theological issue of the need for precise 
Chris to log ica 1 formulation. He attempts to criticise the phraseology of 
the popularist Abbott, with the measured prudence of the theologian. 
Unfortunately, much of Newman's analysis at this point is marked by 
a stridency which causes to slip the subtle, probing, analytical persona, 
possibly because he is concentrating more upon the authorial 
personality than was the case in his criticism of Erskine. In his 
treatment of Abbott, the gap which he has established between author 
and text is narrowed. However, this still does not amount, for all his 
irritation, to a personal attack upon Abbott, who is still presented as 
an unwitting heretic, although in the "if you will'O, only just: 
I have neither wish nor occasion to speak 
against him as an individual. For we have no 
concern with him. We know nothing of his 
opportunities of knowing better, nor how far 
what appears in his writings is a true index 
of his mind. We need only consider him as the 
organ, involuntary (if you wilD or unwitting, 
but still the organ, of the spirit of the 
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age•·v;. 
Newman will not 'reprobate' the man, but he ~:1111 criticize the "feelings" 
he expresses. This is, in fact, a re-introduction of the argument from 
ethos. Abbott's character is representative of a certain kind of piety 
engendering the text, which text, in turn, contains dangerous tendencies 
unforeseen by the author: 
Mr Abbott's theological system may be fitly 
followed up by some specimens of the temper 
and tone of his religious sentiments. In this 
way we shall be able to ascertain the 
character of mind which such speculations 
presuppose and foster. 147 
bfe may expect that Newman, in exposing Abbott's heretical ethos, will 
also disclose his own: the question of his 'Apollinarianismo will also 
revolve around his "temper" and "tone", as well as his formal 
profession. 
Abbott's fanciful description of Jesus as a human person is 
something of a period piece: the Romantic enthusiast for the beauties 
of nature, who, storing his imagination therefrom, fashioned an 
oratorical style of powerful and original metaphorical ilnpact. This was 
no rough and untutored peasant, but a civilized man, an elegant dresser 
and, indeed, something of an aesthete, an appreciator of good 
architecture. 148The public success of Jesus' teaching ministry commands 
Abbott's admiration: it was wonderful how He did it all, without the 
benefits of modern communications, the postal service and the 
press.149His courage before suffering and adversity reminds Abbott of 
Napoleon.160His recreations from public life are such as we might 
expect from such a sensitive and poetic figure: lone rambles in the 
moonlight, communing with God and nature. 151 
Newman is more than provoked by this picture of Jesus, and his 
-174-
analysis is punctuated by expostulations which stab at the humanistic 
assumptions underlying it: 
'There '.vas no press!' What notions does this 
imply concerning the nature, the strength, and 
the propagation of moral truth!·•s:o:: 
Newman sees Jesus as labouring under no "disadvantage" through his lack 
of access to modern communications, for He is, primarily, divine and 
therefore miraculously and inevitably, successful: 
Undet- no disadvantage, if he were God. 15''' 
Newman's attitude towards the history of post-revolutionary France, the 
impact of which was in conservative circles still being felt in England, 
contrasts sharply with Abbott's easy republicanism. The patriotic 
Englishman and Tory bristles: 
Who could have conceived that there was any 
possible category under which the image of our 
Lord could be associated with that of 
Napoleon?" 1 ''' 4 
He is also affronted by Abbott's picture of Jesus as Romantic communer 
with nature: 
Could the Creator- of nature 'stop to examine' 
and 'enjoy the grace and beauty' of His 01vn 
work?'' c-s 
Newman does not think so; it is, rather, 
evidence of an earthly and Socinian bias in his 
view of the Saviour of mankind.' 56 
Newman's acid ripostes to Abbott's gushing enthusiasm are effective 
in pointing to the drawbacks of his popular theology. A doubt, however, 
lingers regarding his own Christology: Jesus, being God, was under no 
human 'disadvantage'; His was no human struggle and He experienced none 
of the wonder of a human mind in the presence of nature. Newman 
opposes any comparison between Jesus and other human beings: 
The Son of God made flesh, though a man, is 
beyond comparison with other men; His person 
is not human; but to say 'most of all men' is 
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':o compare,' r:. 7 
Newman does not de~ that Jesus had a human psychology but cannot 
bring himself to show how His Saviour used it. He was, emotionally, if 
not formally, Apollinarian, if we are to judge by his accumulated 
reactions to Abbott's presentation of Jesus. 
To counteract this impression, however, there is also a finely 
drawn theological argument. Newman gives us more than outraged 
exclamation, and rhetorical enquiry: he also expounds post-Chalcedonian 
Christology, which, while taking account of Apollinarianism and 
Monophysitism, nevertheless locates the unity of Christ in the Person 
of the Divine Logos: 
His [Christ's] personality is in His Godhead, if 
I may express myself in theo log ica 1 language. 
He did not undo what he was before, He did not 
cease to be Infinite God, but He added to Him 
the substance of a man, and thus participated 
in human thoughts and feelings, yet without 
impa1r1ng CGod forbid) His divine perfection. 
The Incarnation was not 'a conversion of the 
Godhead into flesh, but a taking of the 
manhood into God. 168 
Newman, then, accepts Christ's full humanity - at any rate theoretically. 
He is not, however, interested in the reconstructed psychological 
experiences of a supposedly historical Jesus. Imbued with the Eastern 
Fathers, his eyes fixed upon a vision of the glorification and 
deification of humanity169 1 he stresses that the Word constitutes the 
unity of Christ's person. 
To this classical expression of orthodoxy, Newman juxtaposes 
another way of speaking, which has been formulated in the modern age 
because of the demand for apologetic against the background of 
spreading unbelief. This latter - which, of course, Abbott exemplifies -
is a dangerous habit to which everyone has become more or less 
addicted: 
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The truth is, we have got into a >vay of, what 
may be called, panegyrizing our Lord's conduct, 
from our familiarity lvith treat lses on External 
Evidence. 1 ''' 0 
Newman breaks down here a distinction between external evidencing, 
which has~ so far~ been right and proper, and Internal evidencing, a 
source of heresy. Here, he goes much further than his strictures upon 
presuppositions and arguments of unbelievers as moving dangerously 
close to infidelity: 
It has been the fashion of the day to speak as 
to unbelievers, and, there fore to level the 
sacred history to the rank of a human record, 
by way of argument. Hence, we have learned to 
view the Truth merely e~: terna i l y, that is, as 
an unbeliever would view itl 6 ' 
A slide from apologetic to infidelity may take place, he warns, when the 
sIan t upon revealed Christ ian i ty, necessitated by dialogue with 
unbelievers, becomes second nature, engendering "an habitual disrespect 
towards what we hold to be divine, and ought to treat as such."162And 
by "treat as such", he seems to mean, 'not to touch at all'. Revelation 
has become the privileged language of faith, an hermetic discourse. 
Newman announces here a theme to which he will return six years 
later in his criticism of the liberal Anglican theology of history, 
exemplified by Dean Milman,163 that is, the attempt to validate 
revelation by historical apologetic which takes us outside the circle of 
faith. The form of his argumentation is, however, different from that in 
Milman's View of Christianity <1841>. In Tract 73, he relates the 
externalising of apologetic specifically to Christology. Abbott's 
external approach reverses the relation between the divine and the 
human, upon which human glorification is based. Abbott 
exults in sinking the higher notion of Christ, 
and in making the flesh the hegemonic of a 
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Divine Essence. 1 '34 
Newman concentrates upon the way our picture of Christ's person 
becomes Q_ne. If the human is the uniting principle, then, like a 
"prophet or apostle'' we must see Cht-ist, and, in Christ, ourselves, as 
subduing his humanity to God's will by a moral act, and so pointing 
beyond the world to the unseen. Humanity is not glorified, and God 
remains a remote principle, in the manner of Deism.So, at any rate, 
seems Newman's argument. He goes further: such is the "triumph of 
Rationalism" in bringing revelation down, that it will go beyond 
humanitarianism, even presenting Jesus as "akin to those lower natures 
)) 
which have but an animal existence. So strong, however, is Newman's 
horror of "profane words" - "what 1 dare not draw out" - that his route 
to this bizarre cone Ius ion remains engulfed in obscurity. 1 66 
Newman may, then, be defended against the charge of formal 
Apollinarianism, in the patristic sense. His phraseology is the result of 
reaction against an opposed way of speaking - the low Christology of 
Abbott, a consequence of beginning_ from the human. Moreover, Newman's 
irritated rhetoric is balanced by the cooler, 'classical' statement of 
ancient and traditional Christological orthodoxy. On the other hand, just 
as Abbott's 'rationalism' is a conse~uence of his way of speaking -
which derives from his ethos, though is unintentional - may we not also 
declare that a form of 'Apollinarianism' is an unforeseen consequence of 
Newman's own way of speaking?166 It is his own principle that an 
heretical tendency may be undiscerned by the heretic himself. It 
therefore seems not inappropriate to apply a 'tu quoque• to Newman, 
touching his final remarks about Abbott. 
Several years after Tract 73, in 1843, Abbott and Newman had a 
surprisingly amicable meeting. 1 .. 7 Later still, in a Note to the Tract in 
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the Collected Edition, Newman recalled how Abbott "met my strictures 
with a Christian forebearance and generosity which I never can 
forget,'" 69 
I think he [Abbott] felt what really was the 
case, that I had no unkind feelings towards 
him, but spoke of his 1...rork simply in 
illustration of a widely-spread sentiment in 
religious c icc les 1 then as nm...r 1 ~...rh ich seemed to 
"'"" r!.<mcrarr11 '"' t.n crn<::;nP.l faith. 1 ''··.eo 
The generosity of his tribute to Abbott suggests that Newman suspected 
the persona he was affecting in Tract 73 had slightly slipped. 
Nevertheless, this later statement is a good account of Newman's 
rhetorical purpose in the Tract as a whole. 
Newman's striving for polemical restraint is all the more 
remarkable in the light of two characteristic prejudices of his class 
and party.17° First, there was his ambivalence towards the 'popular': 
although he saw the Tracts for the Times as themselves a popular 
appeal over the heads of the powers that be,171 nevertheless,popular 
revolutions and social upheavals were associated in his mind with the 
great apostasy which would take place before the apocalyptic arrival of 
Antichrist.172Secondly, Newman's attitude to America, occupied, it must 
be remembered, by republicans and secessionists, was often hostile.173He 
does identify the explaining away of Christ's divinity as a popular mode 
of speech but does not, on the whole, subject Abbott to the hostile 
rhetoric of which he was capable. 
Only at the very end of the Tract, does he issue a severe, blunt 
and dramatic condemnation, extending not only to Abbott but also to 
Erskine. As individuals, indeed, he will exonerate them from the 
harshness of his conclusion - "the good will be separated from the 
bad''.174He will not spare "the School, as such". To this he applies 
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that "ancient phrase" he borrowed, via Bull, from Eusebius,175and 
describes Sabellianism as a stage in a tragic, predestined journey: 
the School. .. \vill pass through Sabellianism. to 
that 'God-denying Apostasy', to use the ancient 
phrase, to which in the beginning of its career 
it professed to be especially opposed. 1 ?G 
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7. "Postcript": Newman a_nd Schleiermacher. 
Newman's analysis in Tract 73 was restricted to two outsiders to 
academic theology.1 Six months later, however, on February 2nd, 1836, he 
wrote a short but wide-ranging "Postscript" upon "the Sabellian 
tendencies of the day"2 ,in which he extends the discussion to 
continental and American theology, in particular to friedrich 
Schleiermacher, who had, by the early 1830's, published the works-" which 
were to establish his reputation. 
On the face of it, Schleiermacher's theological method opens him to 
the criticism that he is, in Newman's peculiar sense of the term, a 
'Sabellian'. The Christian Faith, first published in 1821-2, attempts to 
order the doctrines of Christian r·evelation in terms of a human feeling 
or state of consclousness,4 which is the universal basis of all 
religions, "the feeling of absolute dependency".5 Christianity is for 
Schleiermacher the most perfect form of religion, because it enables 
the God-consciousness6 latent in all human beings most effectively to 
be released from bondage This release, effected by a revelation in 
Christ which is certainly new and which cannot be exhausted by 
historical explanation,7 is what Schleiermacher calls redemption - and it 
is in terms of this that Christianity is systematically presented.8 
Most important in relation to Newman are, first, Schleiermacher's 
redefinition of the divinity of Christ in terms of human 
psychology,9 and, second, his criticism of the classical doctrine of the 
Trinity's insistence upon subsistent relations within the Deity, for not 
being "an immediate utterance concerning the Christian self-
consciousness ."1 0 Schle iermacher is t indeed t preoccupied almost 
exclusively with the 'economy' of salvation, 
we have no formula for the being of God in 
Himself as distinct from the being of God in 
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the world .. , 1 
The doctrine of the Trinity is presented as due for revision,12because 
it does not directly relate to human 'god-consciousness', and is 
relegated to the very end of his systematic theology. 
Schleiermacher's description of revelation also involves the social 
contextualization of religious statements:13 the feelings of a community 
determined by distinctive historical circumstances. The 'revealed' 
element consists in the originality of the fact that lies at the 
foundation of religious communions, and by 'originality' Schleiermacher 
means an act conditioning emotions which cannot itself be explained by 
the historical process which preceded it.14Such an approach to 
revelation is open to precisely Newman's objection that it is 
'Sa bell ian', because it concentrates exclusively upon revelation as 
phenomenon or- manifestation. Although the originality of revelation is 
discontinuous with [listorical causality, it is nevertheless fully 
assimilable in terms of a social psychology, which latter, indeed, 
exhausts its very meaning. 
Moreover, Schlelermacher's use of a priori categories -
philosophical, sociological and psychological - is open to Newman's 
critique of 'system'. It may be that, as S.W.Sykes points out, the "crude 
objection that Christianity is being evaluated in the light of some 
prior notions about religion" is disposed of by distinguishing 
methodologically the matter of revelation from the categories used to 
clarify and systematize it, by sayuig that such categories are only 
01over" Christianity in a "formal" sense. The doubt, however, remains that 
Schleiermacher's approach has far-reaching consequences "for the form 
of any subsequently articulated Christian doctrine of humanity."15To 
attempt to put this in to Newman's terms might be to say that, even if 
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Schleiermacher did not intend to sit in judgment upon revelation, his 
anthropocentric method would lead to a theology appearing to be 
dangerously close. A Newman might argue that Schleiermacher, like 
Erskine, has been 'led on'. 
How, exactly, Newman's concept of 'Sabellianism' may be applied to 
Schleiermacher can only partially be exp~nded. Newman did not read 
,.. 
German, although he toyed with the idea of learning it,16 , and therefore 
did not have access to Schleiermacher's principal works, which were 
untranslated.17Pusey's study of German theology,u''which he did read, 
with considerable bewilderment,19does not expound the principles of 
Schleiermacher's systematic theology, although it does convey admiration 
for him, and seems to have absorbed a not dissimilar experiential 
approach.20Perhaps Newman and Pusey discussed Schleiermacher together, 
but, if so, there is little evidence that Newman got to grips with the 
latter's theology of religious feeling. Must we, then, conclude, with Lee 
Yearley, that "Newman never really faced the more weighty Liberal 
alternative"=<= 1 of Schleiermacher'? 
It is not true to say, as Yearley does, that Newman "knew 
Schleiermacher ... only through a second-hand report on his Trinitarian 
ideas."22 ln fact, the document in Newman's hands was a weighty and 
detailed translation of, and commentary upon, Schleiermacher's treatise 
upon the Sabellian heresy. In the 1836 "Postscript", Newman refers to an 
"'American periodical" which has come into his hands since the writing 
of Tract 73. It contains "an account of Dr. Schleiermacher's view of the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity.'123This was The Biblical Repository and 
Quarterly Observer for April and July, 18::35, which contained a full 
translation, with notes, of Schleiermacher's "On the Discrepancy Between 
the Sabellian and the Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of 
the Trinity."24The trarflator was Moses Stuart, Professor of Andover 
A 
Seminary, who makes an extensive contribution to the discussion, both 
elucidating Schleiermacher's position, and making his own, somewhat 
different, view clear. The two articles amount to two hundred pages. 
Schleiermacher's treatise analyses in detail the evidence for a 
historical reconstruction of Sabellius's teaching. and piaces him ag·ainst 
the background of his precursors. Artemon. Praxeas, Noetus and Beryll. 
I·1oses Stuart had also translated a section of The Christian Faith 
concernrng tne aoctrrne or tne IrHHLy.--l\nnuus·n, ~Her·erun:!, I~ewmall !::> 
understanding of Schleiermacher's theology of feeling would have lacked 
depth, because he had not read the works which fully expounded it, it 
is untrue to say that he had "a second-hand report on his Trinitarian 
ideas."26The material at his disposal was first-hand, full and specific. 
Schleiermacher's account of Sabellianism is conditioned by an 
attitude towards the ancient Church, and towards heresy and orthodoxy, 
antipathetic to Newman's. He contrasts Sabellianism with the "Athanasian 
view", which he also confusingly refers to as the "Athanasian symbol" -
he does not mean the Athanasian Creed, but the theology promoted by 
Athanasius which triumphed at the councils of Nicea and Constantinople, 
and issued in the N iceneo-Constan tinopoli tan Creed.27Schleiermacher's 
declared aim is to correct this latter orthodox Trinitarian formulation, 
which has reacted too far "in opposition to Sabellianism."28The problem 
of the Trinity is presented as the need to steer a course between 
Judaistic monotheism on the one hand, and Hellenistic polytheism on the 
other; reaction against heresy on one side led to a closer 
approximation to the opposite error.29Sabellianism was a valuable 
expression of an essentially orthodox insight, which, because of the 
bitterness of controversy, was not allowed to.develop into full balance 
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and precision, to the cost of ancient orthodoxy080 
The positive value of Sabellianism for Schleiermacher is that it 
distinguishes between the Divine Monad or Godhead on the one hand, and 
all three persons of the Tr-inity on the other. Rejection of Sabellian 
theology prevented this distinction from being made clearly enough in 
orthodox Trinitarianism.The "oscillation" or instability in the orthodox 
doctrine31 derives from a fundamental mistake: to regard the persons of 
the Trinity as subsistent distinctions within the Deity introduces, in 
the terms 'Father' and 'Son', relations of dependency and inequality into 
the Deity .32 
Sabellius's Trinitarianism, thinks Schleiermacher, helps us out of 
this dilemma by distinguishin~ sharply between the Deus Revelatus and 
the Deus Absconditus. The Deus Absconditus, in His simplicity, lacks the 
inner instability of the orthodox presentation. The Deus f(evelatus, on 
the other hand, is manifested in three equal and mutually 
in terpene tra ted persons, whose distinctive character as 'Father •, 'Son • or 
'Holy Spirit' may be explained in terms of their impact upon us in the 
'Economy' of salvation. Sabellius is, therefore, not so much modalist, or 
crude monarchist, as were his predecessors, but an Economic Trinitarian: 
To Sabellius and his friends, no doubt, it 
seems very important to rna in ta in, that Ir in i ty 
was not essen t ia.l to Godhead as in .L!;_;:;e l f 
considered, but only in reference to created 
beings and on their account?8 
The persons of the Trinity are not temporary manifestations or 
theophanies. Sabellius's metaphor of sun and sunlight implies real and 
lasting distinctions: 
Sa be llius ... compares the c il-cu lat form of the 
sun as connected with its motion, its pm•er of 
giving light and of sending forth heat, with 
the distinctions in the Godhead; for these are 
not transitory phenomena, but active powers 
which continue as long as there are living 
beings on whom the sun can act and by whom It 
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may be noted.3 "' 
The distinctions of the Trinity are co-terminous t!ith the process 
whereby humanity is saved.35 
The implication of such a theology is that there is a Qevelopment 
of distinctions t!ithin the Godhead as a !result of His interaction with 
mankind, so that God is Father in His creation and preservation of the 
world, the Son in redemption, and the Spirit in the impartatiOn CJt 
divine gifts to men. Such an implication is gratefully accepted by 
Schleiermacher, who thought that 
every development of personality within the 
Godhead, even the second and third, must be 
regarded as in its nature creative.36 
The development of these distinctions does not, however, mean that it 
is not God man meets in revelation, but only an emanation of Him. It is 
rather that the One Godhead, in coming to man, forms a "union ... with 
something that is without tt••,37so that the external character of the 
divine is, in its turn, a manifestation of the internal nature of God, in 
three - and three only - ways: 
Sa bell ius ... admit ted only three rrpoac.ma 
because as a Christian he acknowledged only 
three ways in which God had specially revealed 
himself; and these three he separated 
definitely from each other ... The Son was not, in 
his v iew, the same as the Father, because he 
was united with something different from that 
with which the Father was united, and acted in 
a different sphere ... the rea 1 Godhead in the 
Father and in the Son was, in his view, one and 
the same.38 
Schleiermacher, then, rests happy with a Trinitarian theology which is 
agnostic about eternally subsistent distinctions within God: it is 
otiose to pry into the inner life of the Hidden God; rather, it is for 
man to receive God as God has come to him, and so be saved.39 
When one turns to Newman's use of Schlelermacher's treatise, one is 
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struck by the perfunctory quality of his remarks.40Schleiermacher has 
raised important historical questions about the nature of orthodoxy41 in 
relation to Sabellianism, which Newman makes no attempt to meet. 
l\1oreover, Newman makes no distinction between the theologies of Erskine 
and Abbott, and that of Schleiermacher and of Moses Stuart, 
The American publication above alluded to is a 
___ , ___ \.... .... 1.~ - •• .:....J .......... .--. .f-\-..-.4- +"h.-.. 
... ~ ·~···~··~. J ~. ·--· ·--
United States are bringing 
genius of Germans to bear 
same <as the writer must 
Christianity.'~::;: 
the learning and 
in favour of this 
call it) spurious 
In three short sentences, Newman identifies three underlying 
assumptions or tendencies which he holds are found, not only in Erskine 
and Abbott, but also in Schleiermacher and Stuart. They are, first, that 
the object of revelation "is to stir the affect ions and soothe the 
heart", secondly, that revelation "really contains nothing which is 
unintelligible to the intellect", and, thirdly, that "misbelievers, such 
as Unitarians,etc.,are made so, for the most part, by Creeds, which are 
impediments to the spread of the Gospel, as being stumbling-blocks to 
the reason and shackles and weights to the affections."43 
Only a caricature of Schleiermacher's thought could be made to 
harmonize with all three of these statements. As we have seen, his 
treatise on Sabellius does not provide an exposition of his theology of 
feeling, which is only to be found in untranslated works; rather it is 
an essay in the history of dogma. Moreover, although it is clear that 
Schleiermacher identifies revelation with the 'economy', he does not go 
so far as to say that it is totally intelligible to the intellect, nor 
does Newman provide us with any analysis to show that he implies it. 
Schleiermacher does, it is true, suggest that the difficulties of 
Unitarians are caused by creeds: it is part of his case that the 
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illadequacies of traditional Trinitarianism have caused such divisions. 
He does not regard Unitarians as "misbelievers": 
in point of fact their piety is by no means 
lacking in the specifically Christian stamp. 
this is the case often enough at the present 
moment not only in the Unitarian Societies of 
Eng land and America, but also among the 
scattered opponents of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity in our own country. That c ire urns tance 
to secure freedom for a thoroughgoing 
criticism of the doctrine in its older form, so 
as to prepare the way for, and introduce, a 
recons true t ion of it corresponding to the 
present condition of other related 
doctrines. 44 
It is here that Newman and Schleiermacher face one another most 
directly: for Schleiermacher, membershiP of Christianity is defined by a 
psychological canon - Christianity is a certain quality of religious 
feeling or "piety" - whereas for Newman acceptance of the creeds is an 
important part of any definition of what it means to be Christian. 
All this is not to say that Newman may not have identified a 
tendency in Erskine and Abbott - a tendency in Newman's own peculiar 
sense 'Sabellian' - which may not also be applied as a critique of 
Schleiermacher. The point is, rather, Newman's apparent unwillingness to 
provide a fuller and more precise critique, even on the basis of what 
was translated into English. This is all the more surprising in view of 
the full and sensitive treatment of Jacob Abbott, a comparatively minor 
figure. 
Perhaps, Newman's concern is not so much Schleiermacher as 
developments on the American religious scene. His use of quotation 
suggests this: all his references to the Biblical Repository articles 
are to the translator's, Moses Stuart's, contributions.46With regard to 
the "Sabellian tendencies of the day", Newman concludes, 
These extracts are perhaps sufficient to 
justify the apprehensions above expressed, as 
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fat· as the ~not·e religious part of Protestant 
America is concerned.4 c 
Newman adds that "Protestant France also would afford similar 
evidence"a.7 of the Sabelliful tendency. Germany, fot~ all its nlearning and 
genius"48 is, perhaps, seen by Newman as too far gone to elicit concern. 
Newman, however, substantially misunderstands Stuart's own position 
on the Trinity, as well as the North American context of Trinitarian 
debate. A full and careful reading of the Biblical Repository articles 
would have provided the information on the first point at least, but 
Newman's selective use of quotation presents a picture of Moses 
Stuart's theology which is the exact opposite of the truth. 
First, then, there is Stuart's own Trinitarian theology. There is no 
doubt that he is sympathetic to Schleiermacher's critical stance towards 
the ancient creeds. In his long Introduction, he shares Schleiermacher's 
view that the orthodox Doctrine of the Trinity lacks clarity and 
intelligibility.49He sees the construction of a more adequate view as 
possible, just as progress was possible from the crude idea of 
redemption as salvation from evil spirits.50Schleiermacher•s criticism of 
the Nicene formulation is accepted: that the idea of the Father as the 
principle of derivation of the other two persons, no matter how 
carefully distinguished from human generation, nevertheless involves 
dependence, so that inequality is introduced into the 
Trinity.51 Therefore Stuart speaks of the "imperfections of the Nicene 
Creed,"52 in terms of the idea of a "derived" or "dependent" God.53This 
has, as its logical consequence, "Arianism, or else what amounts to rea 1 
theoretical Tritheism."54The inadequacy of the doctrine of the Trinity 
is presented against the background of modern philosophy which has 
inculcated an understanding of personal existence, in terms of 
autonomous individualism, 
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But hmv shall we of the present day, educa b.od 
out of the c ire le of Emanation philosophy and 
Eclecticism, and taught from the ccadle to 
believe, and led by reflection in riper years 
to maintain, that self-existenc~ and 
independence are essential to a nature tr·u ly 
divine - how shall we, hm.,r can 1ve, force 
ourselves to believe, that a deriy~Q. God can be 
the only living and true God?'~··; 
It is on account of such arguments as these, that Stuart finds himself 
moved by Schleiermacher's 'economic' Sabellianism: in a passage cited by 
Newman, he remarks, 
Dr.S. [sic) asks with deep emotion, What more is 
demanded? What more is necessary? What more 
can further the interests of practical piety?66 
However, moved as he may be by Schleiermacher's theology, he is 
also critical of it, and advances a Trinitarianism of his own which 
could hardly be called Sabellian. Stuart's statement of his own position 
occurs in the "Additional Remarks by the Translator", in the second 
Biblical Repository article.57 He remains unconvinced, though impressed, 
by Sch le iermacher 's recommendation of Sa be 11 ius. The latter, it w i 11 be 
remembered, is presented as teaching that distinctions were ~Q_nstituted 
as a result of the economy of salvation, that, once constituted, they 
were eternal, but that they were a development as a result of that 
very economy. But Stuart will not go along with this - for him, there 
were always e terna 1 distinct ions with in the Godhead, 
Can a plain sensible, unsophisticated reader of 
the Bible feel, when he reads such 
declarations 1 that there was no distinct ion in 
the Godhead before the ere at ion of the world 1 
and therefore from eternity? I am unable to 
see how he can; any more than he can believe 
that the attributes of creatorship and lordship 
did not be long essen t ia.ll y to GOD, before the 
actual work of creation.68 
Stuart's own theology begins with subsistent distinctions within 
the Godhead, and is not Sabellian, 
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God must be in seipso t'-'ha t he has revealed 
l1 imse l f to be.'''"·" 
Therefore, the 'three persons' forming part of revealed language, must 
have a basis in the Deus Absconditus: the Trinity consists 
in something t'-'h ich be longs to the Movcxc; itself, 
and which laid the foundation for all the 
manifestations of the Father and Son and 
Spirit:=·<::> 
'What ~re constituted, however, as part of the 'Economy' are the !)ames 
themselves of these distinctions, so that, for example, the second 
person of the Trinity became "Son" in the Incarnation, although the 
Incarnation had a pre-existent, on to log ica 1 bas is ,6 1 
Moses Stuart, then, is seriously misrepresented by Newman, even on 
the basis of the information Newman had in front of him. Moreover, when 
Stuart is seen in his own American context, there are still stronger 
grounds for the view that he has been unfairly treated. In New England, 
Unitarianism had been growing since the eighteenth century. It took two 
forms: first, the 'Arians•, influenced by Samuel Clarke's Scripture 
Doctrine of the Trinity, who held that Christ was less than God but 
more than man; secondly, the 'Socinians' or 'humanitarians', who held 
that Jesus was no more than a man with a special divine mission.62The 
anti-Trinitarian movement was associated, in Congregationalist circles, 
with a libera 1 revolt against Calvinist orthodoxy. After bitter 
controversy over the appointment of two 'liberals' to Harvard 
professorships, in 1808, Andover, the seminary of which Stuart four 
years later became a professor, was formed as a breakaway movement to 
be the rallying-point for Trinitarian orthodoxy.63lt was Stuart who 
entered into controversy against the leader of the Unitarians, William 
Ellery Channing.64 ln 1819, Stuart prophesied that Unitarianism was a 
halfway house on the road to infidelityG6 - a view close to Newman's 
-191-
own. Stuart refers to his controversy with the Unitarians in the 
Biblical Repository article66 - and, surprisingly, Newman quotes this 
reference as his last in a series of quotations to prove the 'Sabellian' 
tendency In North American theology, 
'It may be proper for me to say, that the 
results of this re-examination of the Doctrine 
of the Trinity are, in their essential parts, 
the same which T snmP VPArs qinro ArlunrAtorl in 
my letters addressed to. the Rev. Dr .Channing.' &l 
But, as we have seen, Stuart's line could hardly be called 'Sabellian'. 
One can only assume that it was the word "re-examination" which 
attracted Newman's, at this point, undiscerning, hostility.Newman's 
failure to read Moses Stuart accurately cannot be explained by saying 
that he had perhaps omitted to read the Translator's final section 
where Stuart makes his own view clear, because Newman's final 
quotation, in reference to the Channing controversy, belongs to this 
very section. Therefore, his reading must have been careless, skimming 
through Stuart's pages to find quotations to fit a preconceived view 
formed during the analysis of Erskine and Abbott. 
Perhaps Stuart's enthusiasm, albeit critical, for a German 
theologian would have implicated him with what was, as far as Newman 
was concerned, a major source of heresy and unbelief. Hostility to 
German critical theological scholarship was apparent in Newman's pre-
Tractarian period: for example, his comment, made in 1832, upon 
Gesenius, then Professor of Theology at Halle,68 
We can see on the Con tin en t what mischief an 
unbelieving Hebraist <Gesenius) has done to the 
Old Testament.'3 ."' 
Moreover, earlier still, in 1829, when Newman was being consulted by 
Pusey about his controversy with H.J .Rose,70he would have come across 
Rose's thesis that, in German theology, rationalist unbelief had taken 
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over under the guise of Christianity.71 His impression of 
Schleiermacher's treatise would only have confirmed this attitude. By 
1841, after he had read Milman's footnote about Schleiermacher's silence 
on the resurrection,72Newman was referring as a matter of course to 
"'the sceptical and infidel writers of Germany."73By 184-5, "Germanism and 
infidelity" had become synonymous 7 4 
It was prejudice, then, which compounded Newman's linguistic 
limitation, prevented him from offering a worthy critique of 
Schleiermacher and even distorted his understanding of fellow 
theologians writing in America in his own language. It is a measure of 
the narrow parochialism of early nineteenth-century Oxford that it was 
no very damaging admission for Newman to reveal such lacunae in his 
theo log ica 1 understanding, in his "Postscript". 
The "Postcript" rounds off the process by which Newman came to 
discern a modern form of Sabellianism in his liberal contemporaries, in 
which an ex per ien t ia l or mor:-1 l theology of revelation underpins a 
mildly heterodox Trinitarianism <Sabellianism) concealing Unitarianism: 
it is the "Socinianism of Sabellianism". Having evolved this 'Sabellian' 
critique, Newman will return to it fitfully in subsequent years, 
although we have to wait until 184-1 before he again uses the idea of 
Sabellianism on a large scale, in his review of Milman's History of 
Christianity. 
The inception of the process leading to the evolution of this idea 
of 'Sabellianism' was, it will be remembered, the controversy 
surrounding Hampden about Oxford matriculation. Only a week after 
Newman had completed the "Postscript", he again returned to the subject 
of Hampden, when the controversy moved into a second phase. On 8th 
February, 1836,71:;1t became !mown that Hampden's name had been put 
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forward to the King for the Regius Professorship. There was Just time 
for a last improvised protest to avert Hampden's occupation of the 
Chair. Newman made his contribution: on the night of Wednesday, 10th 
February, he 
sat up all night at pamphlet against 
H[ampdenJ 7 6 · 
....-.'T '-- .I r_ -J... - 1 !- :.L""'~ .£',. • ..,..,_._..; ..... r-.. """"" rlr.."'""'"'r-+,....!3f.n 
Jli.C. LJ.J.U"-.J.UU C...J.'-'.I~W ll'-'Y.' 
........... ..._ .. , '\,& ......................... ._ ................. ~--~··· -- --
overwhelmingly, from Hampden's own works, that the professorial 
nominee's theology was indistinguishable from Socinianism - and to do 
so with the minimum of comment, so that the pamphlet might act as a 
reference-work, providing quotable ammunition at a moment's notice. He 
demands: 
Nm.;, supposing hearer-s ot his \..Jere to ta.ke up 
'" ith Soc in ian ism wou lci he oe ~arn~s t in 
reclaiming them or not?77 
Hampden's theology of revelation- as- facts could easily be made to 
fall into Newman's category of 'Sabellian'. Was not the controversy over 
the Regius Professorship a further opportunity for Newman to deploy 
this critique, especially since it was fr~esh in his mind from the 
"Postscript" written only a week or so earlier? Yet there is not a 
single reference in Elucidations to Sabellianism. 
One possible explanation may lie in the function of the pamphlet: 
Sabellianism as Newman uses it, is a complex, subtle, many-sided and, 
indeed, sometimes elusive concept. He may have judged it inappropriate 
for immediate need on this occasion: to drum up support by a clear and 
uncomplicated appeal to the lower clergy. It was not an occasion for 
theological subtlety. Still, this does not explain why, in the numerous 
letters Newman wrote about Hampden, he never once called him 
'Sabellian'. There is a deeper answer than the exigencies of a localized 
controversy. 
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The conflict between Newman and Hampden had been particularly 
acrimonious in its first stage concerning ma tr icu la t ion. Newman, for his 
part, had in 1834.-5 attempted to distinguish between his opponent's 
personality and his teaching. However, by January 1836, Hampden had 
assumed a shape more awesome than any ordinary heretic: it was no use 
any longer to "mince matters" - he was the "Forerunner of 
Antichrist"78 In a revealing letter, commenting upon the publication of 
the Elucidations in the British Critic, of March 1836, by which time 
Hampden was in situ as Regius Professor,79Newman provides some 
evidence about why he never called him a 'Sabellian' - he is far too 
bad. Newman tells his correspondent that he could not possibly "picture 
anything a quarter so bad as he really is."79He is ~orsg than a 
Socinian, and much worse than the other heretics of the day, 
There is no doctrine, ho•,;ever sacred, v;h ich he 
does not scoff at and in his ivlora l 
Philosophy he adopts the lowest and most 
grovelling utilitarianism as the oasis of 
Morals - he consider-s it as a sacred duty to 
live to this war ld .snd that r-eligion by 
itself injuriously absorbs the mind. ~ihately, 
whatever his etTors. ls open hear- ted, generous, 
and care less of money - 3lanco White is the 
same, though he has turned Socinian - Acnold 
is amiable and .,., inning - but this man, judg i£14 
by his writing_e,, is the most lucre-loving, 
earthly minded, unlovely per-son one ever set 
eyes on.'""=' 
The qualification, "judging by his writings", scarcely offsets the animus 
of this passage. While the British Critic reviewer of The Corner Stone 
had not hesitated to fling the charge of "utilitarian" at Abbott, Newman 
had forborne.131 However. he now brings it in to describe Hampden, 
though in a somewhat different sense. Hugh James Rose had, in January, 
1836, called his attention to Hampden's moral philosophy as "worse than 
the Bamptons".82Newman's interpretation of its consequences is applied 
directly to Hampden's "unlovely" personality: his acceptance, without 
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scruple, of the Chair, despite the outcry at Oxford, is the result of a 
worldliness borne of his utilitarian ethics. The sarcasm of "sacred 
duty" is stinging. It is therefore easy to see why Newman could not 
bring himself to introduce Sabellianisro into his discussion of Hampden, 
for he reserves this term, in his own peculiar use of it, to des.:xibe an 
unconscious tendency in thinkers, who, though erroneous, are accorded 
respect and sympathy. 
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8. Apollinarianism Revi?ited 
Newman returned to the subject of Apollinarianism in late June, 
1836, five months after Hampden's appointment to the Regius 
Professorship. Liberalism had triumphed at Oxford - at any rate in the 
matter of 'canonries a."ld stalls.' Meanwhile, Newman had been continuing 
his imaginative re-drawing of the authentic Christian ethos, in his 
Letters on the Church of the Fathers for the British Magazine, 
continued with interruptions from 1833 until 1837.1 The sixteenth Letter 
is entitled "Apollinaris.'02 
Letter XVI bears a close literary relation to Newman's long 
unpublished manuscript of 1835, Apollinaris' history, which he had 
originally declared was a bringing together of mater~al to be 
eventually re-cast, as the need arose.3 Letter XVI is one such re-
casting. Newman's awareness of the needs and limitations of a popular, 
rather than a learned, readership, against the background of a 
continuing struggle against theological liberalism,4 accounts for the 
nature of his very considerable redaction of the original paper. 
The character of Letter XVI is most readily defined by what is 
omitted from Apollinaris' history, his theory of the development of 
heresy, and the connected theological discussion of Apollinarian 
sectaries. His theories, though not the doctrinal details by which he 
arrived at them, found their way, as we have seen, into his discussion 
of Erskine and Abbott, under the different category of 'Sabellianism'. 
Letter XVI, however, aims at an altogether lighter and more 
straightforward contribution to Newman's anti-liberal strategy. 
Moreover, specifically doctrinal discussion of Apollinaris is 
severely attenuated. Newman wisely does not count upon a relish for the 
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intricacies of patristic scholarship on the part of the British Ma~tJ>~ii'\e.".s 
readers. He restricts himself, at the outset, to a precise, but brief 
few sentences, freshly written, which define the Apollinarian heresy. 
Apollinaris' purpose was, we are told, "to secure more completely the 
doctrine of the divinity of our Lord's person",5 in the face of Arianism. 
This seems harmless enough - and a theological definition of it makes 
it appear even more harmless: 
our Lord, though perfect man, as far as nature 
is concerned, is not a man in the sense in 
which any given individual of the species is 
such, his person or subsistence not being 
human, but divine. Apollinar is seemed to say no 
more than this, that our Lord had not that 
particular part of human nature in which 
personality seems to r·es ide viz., the 
rational part of the soul. Such is the 
seemingly trivial character of his doctrinal 
et-ror."·· 
Newman finds himself, as an upholder of orthodoxy, very close to the 
heretic, not surprisingly, ln view of his remarks upon Abbott. However, 
even this - the apparent 'triviality' of his error - will be used as a 
shaft against liberalism, when Newman draws the threads together at the 
conclusion of the article. 
Newman includes from Apollinaris' history the material which is 
most vivid and least erudite or speculative. The ornate and resonant 
opening sentences of this documenFappear, with only minm~ alterations, 
as the opening of Letter XVI. So does most of the narrative, historical 
material concerning Apollinaris' upbringing and education, his early 
apologetic work, his rise as an opponent of Arianism and ally of 
Athanasius, his slide into heresy unsuspected by the latter, the "open 
avowal", his condemnation and death.8 
Newman chooses material which not only tells a good, simple story, 
but also serves his polemical purpose. The accumulation of impressive 
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details about the learning and zeal of Apollinaris acts as the prologue 
to a tragedy. Even such a man as this, Newman warns, can fall. He also 
draws from his original fount details that are subtly disturbing, 
although he tactfully avoids underlining this too heavily: Apollinaris 
was highly-trained in rhetoric and letters, then moved into philosophy 
and 
began to distinguish h imse 1 f by his opposition 
to philosophical infidelity'"' 
His refutations of paganism were "on grounds of reason". 10 ln the light 
of his own reservations, in Tract 73, about apologetics of any kind -
'internal' or, in the end, even 'external' evidence - this is clearly 
in tended to sound sinister. 
The account of Apollinaris' orthodox phase at Athanasius' side and 
his degeneration, at first unnoticed, into heresy is lifted, with a few 
minor alterations, from Apollinaris' history. The detailed quotations 
concerning the Council of Alexandria, in 362, where the "first 
intima t lons" arose of the heresy later associated with Apo ll inar ian ism, 
are curtailed. Apollinaris is absolved from dissimulation at this stage 
of his development, when he was moving towards heresy without openly 
avowing it: 
I have no intention of accusing so considerable 
a man of that disingenuousness which is almost 
the characteristic of heresy.'' 
In fact, Athanasius was exercising a retarding influence over his mind. 
When the great man died it was natural that 
he should find himself able to breathe more 
freely, yet be unwilling to own it.' 2 
As with Newman's 'Sabellians' - Blanco White and Erskine - self-
deception takes place. Here, he indulges in some editing of the original 
fount: Apollinaris' history reads: 
While indulgi:1g the .:::Deculations of a 
se lfH i.lled and pcesu:np tuou:::. in i:·~ ll~c t, he still 
endeavoured to per-suade himself ~hat he '.-Jas 
not outs tepp ing the range wn len Scrip tuce 
prescribed and Athanasius had observed. 13 
This could almost be Blanco White: the rationalism, though the outcome 
of an unregenerate ethos, is tragically concealed from its exponent by 
delusion. In Letter XVI, he slants the phraseology in the direction of 
the con temporary debate initiated by Tractar ian ism: 
While indulging the speculations of a private 
judgment, he might s t i 11 endeavour to persuade 
h imse 1 f that he was not outs tepp ing the range 
which Scripture had prescribed, and the Church 
ca tho 1 ic witnessed. 1 " 
Apollinaris' dilemma is no longer portrayed as that of an individual 
character, sloughing off unwillingly the influence of a loved and 
revered spiritual father: he has come, in Newman's redaction, to stand 
for something, the typical Protestant liberal, for whom the exercise of 
"private judgment" - almost always an opprobrious term in Newman, 
virtually synonymous with 'heresy' - is the real, though still concealed, 
impetus. And "private judgment" is, in a classical expression of the 
Tractarian position, opposed to the witness of the "church catholic". 
This "outline of a melancholy history"1 s, drawn from Apollinaris' 
history, leads up to an entirely new piece of writing which brings the 
Letter to an end:16five paragraphs, the first two being closely-argued 
justification of the Trac tar ian posit ion on dogma, for which the 
biography of Apollinaris has served as an attractive introduction 
predisposing the reader towards a sense of the need for precise 
doctrinal distinctions. 
Newman beg ins by taking the 1 ine to which one has now become 
accustomed in his 'Sabellian' critique: the road to heresy is paved with 
good intentions. His a lready-es tab lished connect ion be tween Sa be 11 ian ism 
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and Apollinarianism 1..'1 the expression of this theme emerges starkly -
not only as a logical necessity, but an historical fact: 
It is a memm-able and very solemn fact that of 
the zealous opponents of Ar-ianism and friends 
of Athanasius, two of the principal fell into 
heresy,- Apo ll inar is in to the heresy above 
spoken of, and f.'iarce llus in to .3 sort of 
Sa be 11 ian ism. 1 ·/ 
Th~=> 11 1Pc:c:nn" nf t.h ic: nPPrl nnt: nnt. hP rlrnwn o11t.. Newman declares. - but 
he draws it out anyway: 
the 'straitness' of the true faith, and the 
difficulty of finding and keeping it, in the 
case of thinking and speculative minds.''~' 
Newman's procedure implicitly acknowledges the complexity of a modern 
apprehension of patristic orthodoxy: it has first to be found before it 
can be kept - it cannot be absorbed as part of the atmosphere, he 
seems to be suggesting, as in days of old; both finding and keeping are 
difficult in an age of intellectual self-consciousness. Newman is a 
subtle advocate: he invites identification with Apollinaris, who was 
both zealous and L~tellectuai and does not exclude hi~~elf from the 
danger. The reader, thus both flattered and warned, is then explicitly 
confronted: 
at this 
question 
doctrine, 
hopes of 
day a reader- may ... be tempted to 
the necessity of such exactness in 
in order to possess the title and 
a Christ ian.'"' 
The contemporary issue raised by Hampden, by latitudinarianism, by 
liberalism, of the necessity of dogma for salvation is announced. 
Newman will say "a few words", consisting of two tightly-packed 
paragraphs of argument, three of application to the history of 
Apollinarianism, and one of conclusion. 
Newman's argument is best summed up by a sentence in the final 
paragraph: 
-201-
while thet·e is no antecedent improbability in 
the not ion thA. t the Christ ia!1 fa l th is exact 
and definite, ot· what liber-alists call 
technical, there is, on the other· hand, a. great 
body of testimony fcom the earliest times to 
prove that so it is .2e 
His argument is twofold: first, a general argument from probability, 
and, second, from the testimony of the early Church. He is in defence of 
the "technical" and his f:Rr!>'Pt iq 11 Hhor .. Hctc" ~ ''" ;..,,."' -- .; .......... ,.......... ..:_, t- -- ----o-
Newman for the more usual "liberals".21 
First, Newman's argument in behalf of dogma attempts to destroy 
antecedent probability. His entirely typical rhetoric here - the appeal 
to eikos drawing on Butler - is to the "analogy of the other parts of 
religion" ,::;; 2 Dogma is argued to be at least not improbable by the 
analogy of similar "appointments" in the "whole system of 
religion.23Newman's meaning is, simply, that all religion operates by 
means of precise and definite actions or symbols, in order to 
communicate spiritual blessings, rather than at the level of generalized 
rationality: 
the a lit t :e the utterance 
few words, tl1e imposition of hands, and the 
like:.:' 4 
In the rea 1m of be lief, the precis ion, the part icu lar it y of dogmas is 
analogous to these "appointments", which are " as formal and technical 
as any creed can be represented to be".25His argument is, however, very 
considerably complicated by a play upon the Aristotelian mean of virtue, 
<"a point between indefinitely-extending extremes'126 ) and the !!l~ans of 
salvation. Now, a means by which grace is communicated is also a 
particular point. Newman equates particularity with 'technicality': 
In a toJord, such technicality is involved in the 
very idea of a means, which may even be 
defined to be a something appointed at God's 
inscrutable pleasure, as the necessary 
condition of something else27 
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The very possibility of mediation - of encounter between God and 
humanity - entailst at every level of religion, particularityt 
concreteness, individual points of meeting, the form of which, in the 
area of belief is the technicality and precision opposed by 
"liberalists". But Newman sees each particular point - the 'mean' or 
Culeans' - as arbitrarily or inscrutably imposed. On this occasion, His 
argument from probability and analogy has a markedly irrationalist 
tinge. Dogma is a means coming down upon us - we must obey it. One 
wonders what his readers would have made of all this : the density of 
the argumentation must have come as a shock, after Apollinaris' 
informative biography. 
Newman's second string - the testimony of the early Church - reads 
more straightforwardly. The issue, once antecedent probability has been 
disposed of, is whether the Christian faith 
involves the reception of certain definite 
truths conceived in certain definite forms of 
words?28 
To decide on this is, as Newman re-iterates, a matter of "fact",29which 
may be decided by "'catholic tradition".30His introduction of the latter 
is another appeal to elkos, for he treats "catholic tradition" as the 
accumulated evidence of the early Church's "unanimous•• state of belief: 
mu 1 tip lied, concordant testimonies to one and 
the same doctrine bring with them an 
overwhelming evidence of apostolic origin.31 
At the end of the article, Newman returns to Apollinaris, in order 
to make clear the application of his biography to his more general 
remarks. This is an interesting moment, for Newman has the task of 
relating the case of a particular heresy to his general statement about 
what orthodoxy is, rather than, as so often, using it to attack his 
opponents.Heresy is brought face-to-face with orthodoxy. How, then, will 
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he on this occasion make them define one another? 
Newman condemns Aoollinaris for failing to comply t11ith the 
"unanimous tradition of the churches", a convergence of testimony more 
certain than "that of witnesses to certain facts in a court of 
law".32This was, as a matter of history, the "plain" "ground" on which 
Apollinaris was condemned. Newman is not yet sceptical about the 
possibility of arriving at a decision about what the consensus patrum 
was,33 and Apollinaris is blithely excluded from a place in this 
consensus, for all his closeness to the orthodox position. Needless to 
say, Newman ignores the Apollinarian claim to be doing no more than 
articulating the ancient tradition of the Church,34 
Apollinaris is also uncomfortably integrated into Newman's argument 
on behalf of precise and "technical" dogma, advanced against the 
"liberalists". Apollinaris was hardly one of those who questioned the 
necessity of "exactness in doctrine" .35 Indeed, his thea logy was as exact 
and technical as that of any orthodox Father - as Newman knew 
perfectly well from his detailed 1835 researches into Apollinarianism. 
Where, then, does Apollinaris fit into Newman's antithesis between 
"technical" orthodoxy and liberalism? He was clearly not a liberal - yet 
he ~as a heretic. Newman's application of early Church history falls 
back upon the fine line between Apollinarianism and orthodoxy: the 
condemnation of Apollinaris is an indicator of the radical difference of 
ethos between liberals and early Christians to whom dogmatic 
intolerance of an exact and technical kind came quite naturally. 
Newman is, then, less successful in integrating his material on 
Apollinarianism into a defence of dogma, nor does he very satisfactorily 
define heresy's relation to orthodoxy. This is - as Part III will 
endeavom~ to show - hardly surprising in view of the unresolved 
-204--
tensions of the 'Via ;v!edia' ar·gument, which, ln any case, collapsed by 
the 1840's as far as Newman was concerned. If. however, the 
effectiveness of the XVIth Letter is considered in the context of the 
general strategy of the Letters on the Church of the Fathers, then 
Newman may be regarded as more successful. The Letters cumulatively 
present the ethos of early Christianity as radically different from the 
assumptions prevailing amongst early nineteenth-century liberals: 
Christianity was ascetic and dogmatic, rather than rational and 
latitudinarian, and its intolerance of even the slightest of errors, as 
in the case of Apollinaris, presents a challen~e to the age's 
understanding of its nature. 
Newman's returns to Apo 11 inar ian ism after this occasion were 
infrequent, until the resumption of his preoccupation with this heresy 
in 1839, which initiated the work on Monophysitism. It is possible, 
however, that he read a form of his Apollinarianism, which had been 
privately printed in 1835, to the Theological Society on Friday 3rd 
November, at Pusey's house.86This would have been an occasion when the 
detail of Newman's scholarship would have been relished: there was no 
need of simplification. On the other hand, his speculations upon the 
contemporary application of heresy would also have been welcome, for 
this was not only a learned society but a cell in which the Tractarians 
hammered out their ideology.37Newman also returned to Apollinadanism 
when he was compiling the book-version of The Church of the Fathers in 
1840, when he incorporated material from the British Critic Letters 
from 1833 onwards, and wrote some new material. He included a chapter 
on 'Apollinaris' - an only slightly edited vergion of Letter XVI.39 
The rich promise held out in the note prefacing Apolllnaris' 
history, that Newman's 1835 work was to act as a fount for a stream of 
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theological ,~hetcwic, is, at first sight, disappointing: the only work on 
Apollinarianism to find its way into public discourse was Letter )(III, 
which omits entirely Newman's theory of the development of heresy. In 
fact, it is under the category of 'Sabellian' that we find the 
speculations of his Apollinarian papers bearing fruit. The transfer of a 
theory about one heresy, to another, was, of course, easy enough, if one 
was working with Newman's assumption of one essence of heresy -
its hidden infidelity - of which particular heresies were only the 
outward and deceptive forms. It was Blanco White who brought 
Sabellianism into public debate. Newman, with his own speculations ready 
to hand, poured them into a ready-made mould. 
-206-
9 . Sa bell ian ism Rev is~j:_~d 
'Sabellianisrn~ and the related forms of the word, entered Newman's 
vocabulary as a shodhand way of t~efet~r ing to the an thropocen tr~ ic bas is 
of both evangelical Protestant piety and ecclesiastical liberalism. Soon 
after writing Tract 73, in October, 1835, he could write to Froude 
about what was now fixed in his mind as an established trend, the 
"Socinianislil of Sabellianism".1 ln September, 1837, writing to Lord 
Lifford, he recapitulates the line of the Tract, with regard to Abbott 
and his evangelical editors: 
Mr Jacob Abbott's ~oJOr!{S, \vhich Sabelliani::e to 
the very verge of Soc in ian ism have been edited 
by Mr Blunt, Mr Cunningham and Dr. Pye Smith .:L-
Newman, in this letter, associates Sabe ll ian ism entire 1 y with the 
"Evangelical System": Henry Blunt'-"and John William Cunningham ... were 
popularisers and popular preachers, like Abbott, but Pye Smith was, even 
in Newman's eyes, a respectable scholar, who, in J'r·act 73 is reproached 
for his recommendation of Abbott. 5 The "Evangelical System" tends, 
Newman argues, towards Socinianism, or some analogous form of 
infidelity: 
That sys tern has become r~a tiona list ic in 
Germany, Soc in ian in Geneva - Soc in ian among 
English Presbyterians and Ar ian among lr ish -
La t i tud inar ian in Holland it tends to 
Soc in ian ism among our own the Evangelical 
Party:=· 
He has a little trouble fitting Hampden in, who is "neither Socinian nor 
Evangelical," but he "speaks like both at once, and is received by 
both.'17 
The letter to Lord Lifford identifies Newman's use of Sabellianism 
as a component in a strategy directed against what he calls adherents 
of 'Protestantism' or "popular Protestantism".8 Three characteristics 
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recur~ in his description of Protestantism: its r~estriction of teaching 
authority to the Bible only, its vaunted right to - really an abuse of 
- "Private Judgment",S'and its stress upon psychological states in the 
believing subject as the guarantee of authentic faith. 10All three - in 
similar ways - are destructive of revealed Christianity as Newman 
understands it. Biblicism leads to indifferentism about propositional 
truth, a vague profession of allegiance to the Bible is enough. 11 Here, 
Newman reacts strongly against the Hanoverian latitudinarian 
Pro tes tan t ism which, after the English Revolution, has overlaid the 
Church of England,L2 Private Judgment, often a synonym for 'heresy', is 
claimed as a right: the individual may, according to his own conscience, 
interpret the Bible in his own way, uncorrected by external 
authority.'.-"'This, in practice, results in a multiplicity of mutually 
tolerated though contradictory views, concealing, Newman suspects, 
indifference and scepticism. Protestant piety, too, for all its 
emotionalism and zeal, approximates to infidelity, for it ~_gj.ns from 
the human. 1 ""Against all this, Newman opposes 'Catholicism': the external 
objective witness of the first five centuries to the fundamental 
faith. 1 s 
Newman had articulated, in classic form, his polemic against 
Protestantism in his Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church. 
Of the three parties constituting the Church of England ,"the 
Apostolical (or 'Catholic'], the Latitudinarian and the Puritan," Newman 
is clear that the latter two 
have been shown to be but modifications of 
Socinianism and Calvinism by their respective 
histories, whenever allowed to act freely.'"'· 
La t itud inar ian ism is as soc ia ted with the divinity flour ish lng be tween 
Charles II and George II, coming to its climax in Bishop Hoadly. Such 
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Protestantism did not seem so bad to Anglicans of former generations: 
it was a bulwarh against Romanism, and there was always the hope that 
it might eventually become more 'Catholic'.17However, the course of 
history revealed the true development of Protestantism to be quite 
otherwise: only in the nineteenth century, was its real essence, its 
tendency towards infidelity, revealed with "fearful clearness".u~orawing 
_ ..... u To--- 19 n.t,... .. .._.....,_ .,... __ ,..,_,..._ 
p ---··--~- ----~ --p 
Before Germany had become rationalistic, and 
Geneva Soc in ian, Roman ism might be cons ide red 
as the most dangerous corrupt ion of the 
gospel; and this might be a call upon members 
of our Church to waive their differences with 
foreign Pro tes tan t ism and D iss en t at home, as 
if in ·the presence of a common enemy. But at 
this day, when the connexion of foreign 
Pro tes tan t ism with in fide 11 ty is so evident, 
what claim has the former upon our 
sympathy?20 
Newman's theory of the development of heresy is thus ruthlessly and 
uncompromisingly applied to Protestantism. 
(a) Nicholas Wiseman and Roman Catholicism. 
Newman returned to the idea of 'Sabellianism' on two further 
occasions. The first is very surprising, in view of the overwhelming 
association of Sabellianism with Protestantism: he sees certain 
tendencies in Roman Catholicism - and especially in the theology of 
Nicholas Wiseman - as comparable with the method of Erskine and 
Chalmers! 
Newman attacked Rome for adding to, or 'corrupting' the faith, but 
was careful not to accuse Her of heresy, or of heresy's ultUmate 
development, infidelity, as he consistently does in the case of 
'Protestantism'.21 There is, however, a strand in Newman's critique of 
Roman Catholicism which draws upon the method by which he analysed 
Erskine: Rom,e is systematic in its presentation of revealed truth, and 
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Satan ever acts on a svstem~z 
Newman repeats the view of Tract 73 that revealed truths come to us as 
"detached portions of a complicated system".23 \!Je do not know how they 
hold together in the "whole Dispensation".24This is a version of Tract 
73's "vast system unrevealed".25 ln the Prophetical Office, Newman 
similarly dec lares the limitation of the human capacity to systematize, 
and the modesty and humility which behoves us; the "supernatural gift" 
of Christianity is 
a vast scheme running into width and breadth, 
encompassing us round about, not embraced by 
us. No one can see the form of a building but 
those \vho are e:-< terna l to it .. :~.. b 
To go beyond such limitations is to slide in to a "spirit of 
rat iona 1 ism": 
Rome • ..;ou ld classify and number all things. She 
\·lOU ld settle ever-y sort of ·~ ues t ion, as if 
resolved to detect and compass by human reason 
what runs out in to the next 1vor ld or is lost 
in th i.s .~" 7 
Roman is ts are "ever intruding" in to and "growing familiar" w 1 th 
"mysteries". They stretch out their hands to touch what should not be 
touched, as did irreverent Israelites who touched the Ark of God!28The 
pretension to a completeness of theological system - a scientific 
certainty - opens the way to pride, and constitutes the exponents of 
the system as judges of what is revealed. 
He who considers himself fully to understand a 
system, seems to have sway over it?9 
Theological systematizing arises from the Roman Catholic clerical 
system, at the apex of which is Papal Infallibility. Doctrines infallibly 
decided may, moreover, be subjected to a further rationalism: the 
organisation of doctrinal elements within the system, according to their 
relative importance. Newman admits that there are revealed both greater 
and lesser truths, but 
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it is on l? one thing to r~ce i ve them so far as 
Scri?ture declares them to be 20, quite another 
to decide about them for ourselves by the help 
of our own reasonings~0 
But it is "not wonderful" that Rome should do so: its system is "the 
work of its own hands"; the system it has "framed", it proceeds to 
judge.31 
As in Tract 73. Newmr~n hnlrk: th .. t .-- .. ,...h ~::'::::::-.::~:::~~;:: 
systematization works by reducing revelation to one intelligible 
principle extrinsic or alien to it. In the case of Roman Catholics, this 
principle is "present expediency" which is "the measure of its 
excellence and wisdom" .32Newman does not mean this to be quite as bad 
as it sounds: 
I do not say they are forced, but they a.re 
easily betl-ayed into doing· this-~'?. 
Like the internal evidencers, Roman Catholics have been 'led on'.34What 
Newman considers to be Roman Catholic "expediency" is not gross 
political intriguing or shady casuistry, but a tendency to want to 
consider the "experience of the cesults" of a doctr~lJ-;e: 
They ask what "::o the 'Jse •Jf -chis doctrine, 
what the a.ctua i harm of that erroc; as if the 
experience of results were necessary before 
condemning the one and sanctioning the 
other-.-:'' 5 
In this respect - in the utilitarian attitude towards doctrine <although 
Newman does not directly accuse them of this) - Roman Catholicism is 
comparable with "the religion popular among us at the present day", 
that is, Protestantism, which only admits "so much of the high doctrines 
of the Gospel .... as is seen and felt to tend to our moral 
improvement."36Newman introduces a quotation from Erskine's Internal 
Evidence and criticizes the assumption that "the understanding has a 
right to claim an insight into the meaning and drift of the matter of 
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Revelation".37He does not want revelation to be t.t_§gQ_ - he would 
preserve it inviolate from <.J.!1..Y. definable function - and the corollary 
of use is systematic intelligibility. 
Newman turns to Nicholas Wiseman's recent Moorfields Lenten 
lectures of 1836, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of 
the Catholic Church,38as an example of this rationalist tendency in 
Roman Catholicism. In reference to this work, Newman hopes to 
demonstrate that there is "agreement of temper and character"39between 
"popular Protestantism" and the "religion of Rome".40This surprising and 
regrettable41 identity of ethos produces an identical rationalism: 
this peculiarity in the religion of Rome, \·Ih ich 
it has in common with some other modern 
systems - its subjecting divine truth to the 
intellect, and pr·ofessing to take a complete 
survey and to make a map of it.~~ 
He finds Wiseman's apologetic for the Gospel draws upon the idea of it 
as a "system"; Wiseman declares himself ravished by the beauty of the 
intelligible order of revelation:"-3 The Lectures also recommend 
Christianity for their moral effect, its tendency lo promote social 
cohesion.44Wiseman and Erskine are so close, as far as Newman is 
concerned, that he can refer to them both in the same breath, "the 
Roman and the Scotch Divine."45 
In the Prophetical Office, Newman devotes to Wiseman about one 
page. Many could be written demonstrating the partiality and 
distortions of Newman's treatment on this occasion of the Moorfields 
Lectures. A few, however, must suffice to assess the hits and misses of 
the Parthian shafts directed at his great contemporary. He makes 
Wiseman into a sort of internal evidencer, who advocates Christian 
truth by pretending to expound it in terms of a systematic coherence 
assimilable by the intellect. In fact, Wiseman's concept of evidencing is 
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by no means this. On several occasions, he repudiates internal 
evidencing, on similar grounds to Newman, as a form of Protestant 
rationalism.46His own view of evidence is subtle: the fulness of 
revealed truth - identical, of course, for hi iseman with the dogmatic 
teaching of the Roman Church - is open to many different ways of being 
evidenced. "Systems of evidencing" will vary from age to age, for 
example, as historically-conditioned attitudes vary.47llliseman therefore, 
sees nothing alarming in the very new grounds for conversion to Roman 
Catholicism in Germany, via the aesthetics of Schlegel.48Even the new 
science of Political Economy might conceivably form the basis of a 
Christian apologetic!49The truth is one, but the proofs are many: 
Truth rna y be compared to a gem without a flat.J, 
which may 'oe viewed in differ-ent lights.5° 
Wiseman, therefore, cannot justly be accused of r_g_@cing revelation to 
one particular system. Revelation and its systematization are not 
identified. Rather, he establishes a duality: on the divine side, there 
is revelation, inexhaustible but not opaque- it is open to a 
multiplicity of systematic approaches, lending it an aesthetic5 ' appeal; 
on the human side, the possibility of multiform systematizations of 
revelation make possible an apologetic appropriate to culture ana 
historical evolution. Wiseman has a simple metaphor to explain the 
relation between truth and evidences: the one truth is like a key which 
opens a lock - the force of the discovery that the lock is opened 
effects convict1on.62 lt is, perhaps, necessary to extend Wiseman's 
metaphor here: the one truth is a pass-key, opening a variety of locks, 
and thereby validating itself in a variety of circumstances.63However, 
Wiseman does not suggest, nor is it necessary to his argument, that the 
human mind can fully_ understand what is revealed. 
On the other hand, there are t imes when Wiseman's own evidencing 
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operates at a much cruder level than his own declared methodology/"4 He 
sounds most as if he is subsuming Christianity to a kind of 
utilitarianism, when he compares the "practical success"55of 
Protestantism with that of Roman Catholicism in converting the heathen, 
so as to advance his conclusions as an evidence in behalf of his own 
Church's "rule of faith0' 56Wiseman has done his sums. He shows that the 
Bible-only fWindple of pure Protestantism has failed: the number of 
Bibles purchased and circulated to the heathen has produced a 
ludicrously small number of converts, considering the expense. The Bible 
Society has spent £2,121,640 in 30 years. During a comparable period, 
Roman Catholic missionaries have done much better in numbers of 
converts - and all for only £30,000!57There is undoubtedly here a 
considerable difference of ethos between the Roman prelate, exuding 
confidence and clarity, addressing his audience as a sound man of the 
world and ecclesiastical business executive, and the fastidious58 
Anglican, the asserter of mystery, tormented by the early modern slide 
into secularization and loss of God. 
Newman's passage about Wiseman in the Prophetical Office is an 
extreme example of the way in which the critique evolved in Tract 73 
can become a catch-all, the picking out of rationalistic tendencies 
becoming more and more arbitrary. In any case, Newman had it both ways 
over Wiseman. In his British Critic review of the Moorfields Lectures, 
in January, 1836, he used Wiseman's arguments against the "ultra-
Protestant10 party. Wiseman had argued that such Protestantism was 
rationalistic, because its "essential ground" was 
that each one is to be cons ide red res pons ib le 
to God for every particular doctrine which he 
professes.s·::• 
Therefore, each individual Protestant must be "internally convinced" 
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that the Bible is the l'iord of God, by the principle of "individual 
research, individual satisfaction.'060Newman declared himself "not 
displeased" with this exposure of ultra-Protestant rationalism. He 
manages, however, to agree with Rome while still making it sound 
sinister: 
Well, then, 
clear-sigh ted 
let us 
-
see \vhether these 
(:::::..-
themselves), these pure Pro tes tan ts and 
Scripturalists, will make a better and 
sat lsfac tory fight when they come in to 
contact with their foe, that crafty foe 
shelters its errors under the truths 
more 
r-igid 
more 
close 
which 
which 
such adversaries wantonly, unreluctantly 
surrender to it as its own :c-· 1 
Wiseman's 'tendencies' exemplify a broader trend in the Church of 
which he is the advocate. Back again on general ground, Newman pursues 
his attack with greater success. lt is a subtle blend of sympathy and 
censure. He argues that Roman Catholic clarity and system stem from the 
desire to control people: the rigour of its theology forecloses a full 
personal and individual response, the ventur~ of faith, by 
setting a limit to their necessary obedience, 
and absolving them from the duty or 
sacrificing their whole lives to God.sa 
The Roman Catholic system is "a minute, technical and peremptory 
thea logy". 'T echn ica lit y 163 - which Newman now f inds himself at tacking -
underpins Romanism's political spirit: 
She £Rome] has in view po 1 it ica l objects, viable 
fruits, temporal expediency, the power of 
influencing the heart, as the supreme aim and 
scope of her system.64 
Newman here also points to the popularist dimension of Roman 
Catholicism: like Evangelicalism, it wants to affect the heart. Yet he 
admits that the 'expediency' to which the Roman system adheres is borne 
of motives of which he thoroughly approves: 
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It is an effort to stem the tide of unbeliefcc 
The rationalism, then, lies below the surface of conscious deliberation: 
the purposes of the Roman clergy are, on the face of it, irreproachable. 
Roman Catholic ism takes revelation down from the shelf, where Newman 
would have it left untouched by human hand, and ruthlessly exp}Qlts it 
for the expansion and consolidation of its empire. Rome sees revelation 
as something visible, a mode capable of human absorption and use: 
They who are resolved that the Divine counsels 
and appo in tmen ts should be cognizable by the 
human intellect, are naturally tempted to 
assign some visible and intelligible object as 
the scope of the whole Dispensation:'·"'· 
It is Newman's 'Sabellians' all over again! 
With all the characteristics of Newman's 'Sabellian' heresiology in 
place, the expected does not happen: the terms 'Sabellian', 
'Sabellianism', and 'Sabellianize' do not make an appearance. Nor is there 
any suggestion of a slide from Romanism into Socinianism, despite the 
fact that Newman sometimes implied a resemblance between these two 
extreme limits of the tolerable. And after all, Blanco White had, in 
fact, started as a Roman Catholic and ended as a Unitarian.67Moreover, 
especially in the detested Daniel O'Connell, 'Romanism', democracy, 
republicanism, and the destruction of Anglican hegemony in Ireland 
coalesced.69Newman contents himself with pointing to Rome's rationalism 
without making explicit the implication to be drawn by a reader of 
Tract 73: that Rome was 'Sa bell ian'. 
The reasons for Newman's restraint here may only be conjectured. 
One possibility is that he had to find a form of rationalism coinciding 
with explicit evidence of Trinitarian modalism - as he could easily do 
with Erskine, Abbott and Schleiermacher - before he was prepared to 
bring in Sabellianism, and that Roman Catholic theology provided no such 
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evidence. However, in the case of Milman's History of Christianity, 
Newman was, as we shall see, capable of using the term 'Sabellian' while 
ignoring, or not even noticing there, any evidence of specifically 
Tr in i tar ian heterodoxy. A more like 1 y reason t then, is Newman's general 
unwillingness to describe Rome as heretical, or to convict Her of the 
hidden tendency towards infidelity which heresy conceals: Rome has 
corrupted or overlaid the "foundation" of the Christian faith,"' 9 , but 
still holds to it: it tends, therefore, not towards "infidelity" but to 
"superstition".70 
(b) Henry Hart Milman and the Liberal Anglican Idea of History 
It was not until five years after the "Postscript" to Tract 73, that 
Newman returned explicitly to the theme of 'Sabellianism', in his 1841 
review71 of H.H.Milman's History of Christianity, published in 1840. Here 
he declared to be disappointed his hope for a Church history to replace 
the impressive but in fide I Gibbon 7 2 In explaining his 
dissatisfaction,73Newman now applied his idea of 'Sabellianism', 
previously elaborated only in relation to the systematic dimension of 
theology, to historical method. 
Newman's use of terminology has undergone modification since he 
was examining Erskine: there the orthodox tendency was to accept, on 
external authority, the revelatum, while the heretical tendency was to 
decide whether or not something was revealed on the basis of its 
internal character. However, in his review of Milman's History, it is the 
word "external" which takes on Sabellian connottttions. This is not a 
total reversal of the position of Tract 73, for, as we have seen, there 
is a short passage in the treatment of Abbott where Newman's anxieties 
about the rationalism of evidencing are extended as far as the 
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external.74However, in M:llman•s T!Jew of Christianity whBlt is only a hint 
in Tract 73 is developed into a massive critique of libe~ral Anglican 
historiography. 
l'Hlman's decls.red aim is to present Christianity purely as an 
historian, th<llt is, dispassionately, eschewing polemics,75considering 
only the external facts. This Newman C<lllls ''the e:~tternal view he is 
taking of the subject""6 The heretical direction of such an "external 
view'', is, however, a characteristic of the independent life of l.'v'Hlman's 
text, rather than of the conscious purpose of the author. This 
distinction, which has been a feature also of Newman's treatment of 
Erskine and Abbott, is even more strongly stressed in the case of 
Milman. Milman "does not mean any harm"7 7 1t is, rather, his ''peculiar 
manner", and the facility with which he may be taken, not unnaturally, 
but still over-hastily, to be saying what he does not say,n•that 
worries Newman. He disclaims that he intends "to draw up for ourselves 
his doctrinal notion of Christianity."79He will not expound Milman's 
doctrine, but only "those momentous principles, which he has adopted 
indeed, but which are outside of him, and will not be his slaves.'ta0 The 
distinction between text and author could not be more sharply 
presented.81 A text takes on a life of its own: 
Principles have a life and power independent of 
their authors, and make their way in spite of 
them.82 
This apparently sophisticated hermeneutical procedure is in fact a 
debating tactic, allowing Newman great freedom in the interpretation of 
the text. He can thus apply his 'Sabellia.n' critique flexibly to the 
ultimate tendencies he discerns in that particular strand of the text 
which he selects. Such a procedure, it must be said, is a subjective 
one. 'Who, after all, can judge objectively of the ultimate direction of 
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forces operating in the text which are hidden even from. the author, not 
to mention the difficulty of establishing the effect of a text upon any 
mind other than one's own? Newman is, in any case, heavily reliant upon 
ironic raillery in order to bring the reader over to his view as he 
relentlessly contrasts Mibwan's liberal restatements of Gospel events 
~ith their starker odginals. The •persona• of Milman•s text, rather than 
f;lilman himself, one supposes, is being thus rhetoric/3\lly engaged,93 
He says respecting the incident in John XII., 
that what 'the unbelieving part of the 
multitude heard only as an accidental burst of 
thunder, to others ... seemed an audible, a 
distinct,- or, according to those who adhere to 
the strict letter, - the ' - (it avails not to 
delay, out with it!> - 'the articulate voice of 
an Angel.')'. Yes, the real articulate voice; how 
painful to our 'subtle and fastidious 
in te 11 igence. "34 
This is not, however, to suggest that Newman's strictures has no 
theological content, but rather that the skilful use of rhetoric might 
obscure the perception of the freedom with which he applies his 
critique. 
It is to Milman's "external" approach, and its consequences, that 
Newman applies the related heretical categories of 'Socinian' and 
'Sabellian•. He discerns heresy in the effect of Milman's style of 
presentation, 
For the fact is undeniable, little as Mr.Milman 
may be aware of it, that this external 
con temp la t ion of Christ ian i ty necessar 1 ly leads 
a man to write as a Socinian or Unitarian 
would write, whether he will or not.86 
But Socinianism. is also the inevitable result of Milman's "external" 
method. Some elements of Christianity, such as Christ's human Qature 
and crucifixion, are susceptible of "external" presentation in a history, 
but others, such as Christ•s Divinity and the Atonement, are not. 
Milman's history will inevitably "dwell on the latter•• and "slur over 
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the fo:rmer."~"=-His own methodology has hiln in thrall. Now, to deny 
Christ 0s Divinity and the Atonement, but to confess his humanity and 
crucifixion, is Socinianism.87f1toreover, ''1iloral improvement", which can be 
examined and presented .,externallyo', will, in Milman, predominate over 
the empirically unverifiable doctrine of the forgiveness of sins. 
Therefore, as with Ersldne and Abbott before hiln, revelation is reduced 
to a pa:rticular interpretation of the moral. 
consequently he will make the main message of 
_ the Gospel to relate mainly to moral 
improvement, not to forgiveness of sins.'38 
Inevitably for Newman, Milioan, because he is <Vspeaking mainly of 
what is externally seen'",89will be 'Sabellian•. He will present the 
persons of the Trinity as manifestations of characteristics of God, 
especially moral traits recognizable as such by human understanding, 
what is 'manifested' in Him, is not, cannot be, 
more than a certain attribute or attributes of 
the divinity, as, for instance, especially 
love :~•o 
Therefore Milman's method, because of what it cannot but omit, will 
bring him to 'Sabellianism•; he 
will be led to speak almost in a 'Sabe 11 ian' 
fashion, as if denying, because not stating, the 
specific indwelling which Scripture records and 
the Church teaches.31 
The relation between Socinianism and 'Sabellianism' is not clarified, 
as it is in Tract 73. The picture is further blurred by the introduction 
of Nestorianism. In commenting upon the Christology which Milman°s 
method •obliges• him to arJrive at, that is, Christ as "man with a 
presence of divinityo',92His person being "by this very theory nothing 
more than a man", Newman asserts, 
The ... doctrine is Sabellianism, Nestorianism and 
Soc in ian ism~·''3 
Bhat unites these diverse heresies for Newman is that by subjecting 
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Christianity to analysis in terms primarily of human phenomena 9 they 
initiate a slide in to a the ism, 
If we indulge them [such principles], 
Christianity will melt away in our hands like 
snow; we shall be unbelievers before we at all 
suspect that we are:=· 4 
Net:Jman's critique may be further clarified, if we examine his 
.&.'"-- J..JJ-- _,.. r:ro-L_,,~ c 
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reductionist systematization, t:Jhich emerges out of his analysis of 
Erskine. Milman's intention appears to oo the very reverse of the 
systematic, his purpose being "merely" to state "the facts of 
Christianity.'095But Newman is quick to point out that this approach is 
itself "a theory of the facts".96This is because the "principles" which 
are the "life" of the facts are omitted.97The supernatural, which 
underlies and sustains the facts, is artificially repressed by a 
principle of selectivity which amounts to an "external system'198 
distorting the "higher and invisible system" of revelation, the inner 
life of the supernatural which has its own mysterious coherence.99 
There are, however, exercises of the "external" approach to 
revelation, which fall short of such narrow systematization, and which 
are therefore legitimate. They are three. First is the apologetic 
approach whereby the thea log ian puts himself "in to the place of 
unbelievers and entering into their difficulties", taking an "external 
view of things", assists them to the truth. Surprisingly, Paley and his 
school receive a good word, 
Such is the case with Paley and other wr 1 ters 
on External Evidence. 1 00 
Secondly, there is the poetic effect of taking an external view, in 
order, by implied contrast, to stimulate a sense of even greater 
mystery, 
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a silent and soothing pleasure in viewing 
great things in the l1 t t leness and feebleness 
in which they appear to the world 1 from the 
secret fee 1 ing of their rea 1 power and majesty 1 
and an exulting anticipation of their ultimate 
and just triumph. 1 '-"' 1 
Thirdly, the "external" may act, according to the principle of reserve, 
as a 00Veil of mystery heightening our feeling of its 
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so"',103 is inadmissible as being "the state of mind which can ... look down 
upon a Divine Dispensat1on".104Newman here appears to contradict his 
much-stressed distinction between the heretical tendency of the text 
and the state of mind of the author, about which he has determined to 
say nothing: M i !man ••th inks", "imagines" and "considers". 1 05Th is is yet 
another point at which, in order to present Newman as consistent, one 
must think of him as presenting the persona established by the text 
rather than the author, 
This is what meets us on the very surface of 
his book. 10""' 
The critique of Milman is further elucidated by Newman's own 
account of the nature of revelation, to which 'Sabellianism' is opposed. 
He brings to his review of Milman the sacramental view107of creation, 
of revelation and of language itself, which was a characteristic feature 
of Tractarianism, providing a more elaborately articulated counter-view 
than the highly-condensed formulation, "a doctrine lying hid in 
language'•, of Tract 73. In Nillilants View of OJristianity, the mysterious 
nature of revelation is balanced by a greater emphasis upon the 
capacity of symbols to express the divine reality which they also hide. 
It is a phrase from the Catechism of the· Book of Common Prayer 
which Newman quotes to begin his exposition of revelation in 
sacramental terms, 
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The Christian history is 'an outward visible 
sign 0f inward spiritual grace. 110(3 
Milman's fault is to consider the outward sign in isolation from the 
00 thing signified00 , whereas the human, external aspect and the divine 
in terna 1 aspect must be taken together. 1 09 If 1:-H lman ho Ids up the idea 1 
of the sober historian, confin~ himself within the bounds of his 
sacrament. 1 1 0 
All that is seen, - the world, the Bible, the 
Church, the civil polity, and man himself, - are 
types, and, in their degree and place, 
representatives and organs of an unseen world, 
truer and higher than themselves. 1 ' 1 
The symbolism of the world is complex and varied: some symbols "bear 
their super-natural character upon their surface", while others are 
perplexing - they "run connter to the unseen system which they really 
subserve." In the Church, the same principle is present in sacraments 
and in the mystical interpretation of Scripture, where there is a 
00double sense", human and divine.1 12 
But does Newman's reaction against Milman's historical method move 
in such a strongly neo-Platonic direction as to present a docetic view 
of the world, so that he must be seen, not only as critical of one 
particular theory of history, but as out of sympathy with all historical 
enquiry? Such a view is taken by C.F.Harrold, 
His theory and practice of history, for 
example, is curiously 'Alexandrian' in that it 
neglects chronology, and objective consistency, 
leaving upon the reader the impression of 
vague, though splendid, scenes, as though 
history, like nature herself, were but a veil 
or a phantom across the face of the unchanging 
E tern a 1. 1 1 3 
Newman's heightened awareness of the invisible reality to which the 
visible things of this world point, 1 1 dand his solipsistic11 6 awareness of 
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the supernatural might contribute to the picture of him as a 
transcendental mystic. There are undoubtedly some passages in Milman's 
View of Christianity which give this impression: 
the visible world is the instrument, yet the 
veil, of the world invisible, - the veil, )'et 
still partially the symbol and index: so that 
all that exists or happens visibly conceals and 
yet suggests, and, above all, subserves, a 
,.... • .,..-. ..... ,.._ .-£' --·------ r- __ _L_ I l t I 
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itself. 1 1 "· 
However, that NeWlll.an had a more balanced position which avoids 
docetism is suggested by his argument against Milman's reduction of 
Christianity's essence to priiilitive moral simplicity, a procedure 
containing the assumption that 
nothing be longs to the Gaspe l but tvha t 
originated in it; and that whatever, professing 
to be long · to it, is found in anterior or 
collateral systems may be put out of it as a 
foreign element. 1 17 
Newman accepts as factually true the syncretistic nature of 
Christianity. It does contain Platonic, Magian and Babylonian elements, 
but this only confirms its fulness of truth and authority; it has 
gathered together and used the fragmentary divine revelations diffused 
throughout human his tory and culture. 1 18Th is argu.men t assumes that 
Christianity has a place in mankind's religious history and that it is 
open to historical investigation.119Newman may therefore be seen as 
Incarnationalist rather than Platonist, his vision of the symbolic 
deriving from the two natures of Christ, which, though distinct, are 
hypostatically united. As A.M.Allchiri has pointed out, a theological 
vision centred upon the Incarnation implies the transfiguration, but not 
the destruction of, the human, so that revelation may be harmonised 
with the aesthetic 1 20 It is this vis ion, encompassing but go irig beyond 
history, that Newman opposes to Milman's "theory of the facts". 
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This 11 theory of the facts10 is, as we have seen~ only 'Sabellian° in 
the subtlest of fashions. For all the sharpness of Newman's strictures 
upon the History, he is only prepared to say that Milman has been "led 
to speak almost in a Sabellian fashion". 121 It comes, therefore, as a 
surprise to find that he does not refer to a passage in the second 
volume in which Milman declares himself to be sympathetic to a modern 
forrm of Sabellianism. In discussing the teaching of Sabellius, Milman 
states, 
According to his system it was the same Deity, 
under different forms, who existed in the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. A more 
modest and unoff ending Sa be 11 ian ism might, 
perhaps, be imagined in accordance with modern 
philosophy. The manifestations of the same 
Deity, or rather of his attributes, through 
which alone the Godhead becomes comprehensible 
to the human mind, may have been thus 
successively made in condescension to our 
weakness of intellGct. It would be the same 
Deity, assuming, as it were, an objective form, 
so as to come with in the scope of the human 
mind; a real difference, as regards the 
conception of marr, perfect unity in its 
subjective existence. 1 :<: 2 
His sympathy with Sabellianism arises from his ideology of history. Like 
that of his fellow Liberal-Anglican historians, Milman's relativistic123 
presentation of history, in terms of cycles from childhood, through 
maturity to decay,124with its stress upon the alien quality of the 
mental worlds of the past,125 is balanced by belief in the application of 
a universal standard of morality, as an interpreted fixed 
point.126Therefore, Milman is provided with a means by which to 
evaluate the universal in relation to the party-torn world of the 
Fathers. It is the moral impression upon men, wrought by Christ's 
example, which, now dimly, now clearly, is to be discerned in the 
records of the Christian past. Christ is 
the Goodness of the Deity, which, associating 
itself with human form, assumes the character 
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of a r-epr-esentative of the human race; in 
whose person is exhibited a pure model of 
moral perfection, and whose triumph over evil 
is by the slow and gradual process of 
enlightening the mind and softening and 
purifying the heart.127 
~·1ilmnn's second volume, in which he shows such frank sympathy 
towards historic SabellianisM, applies the moral ideology of history of 
challenge the Tractarian view that Antiquity contained doctrinally 
normative interpretations of the revelation contained in Scripture. 
Again 0 surprisingly, Newman only very briefly interacts with this 
challenge, when he declares that Milman speaks true despite himself in 
characterizing the early Church as marked by "the principle of 
dogmatism11 , opposed to "ecclesiastical liberty".129Milman's words, lifted 
from the context of his argument, form part of a carefully worked out 
theory of heresy and orthodoxy. Milman sees the imposition of purely 
speculative tenets for acceptance by the faithful, through creeds, as 
oppressive.129Dogmatism has become divorced from love.130There are, in 
fact, two kinds of heresy. First, there is "heresy of opinion", which, 
being easy to identify and attack, was the target of too much attention 
to the patristic age. Second, there is the "darker and more baleful 
heresy of unchristian passions"; this was more difficult to detect, and 
being a matter of Christian behaviour, was much more difficult to 
eradicate.131 Antiquity concentrated upon weeding out the more easily 
identifiable doctrinal heresy, to the neglect of the moral variety. 
Christianity became distorted by the usurpation of the dogmatic 
<concerning "Falth")uf'o" the moral <concerning "religion").13~ 
As in the case of Schleiermacher, then, Newman appears unwilling to 
interact with specific historical challenges to his own concept of 
Antiquity. In Milman's case, this causes him to omit references 
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providing powerful confirmation of his own position about 'Sabellianism': 
Milman, admitting identification with historic Sabellianism, applies the 
idea of history as moral manifestation to orthodoxy and heresy. Even 
when Milman's ,.external" method is applied to the idea of mystery there 
is no response from Newman. Milfilan presents mystery as having a purely 
historical evolution.133Christian ceremonies excluded outsiders through 
fear of persecution,134but when Christianity became a state religion, 
the secrecy surrounding sacraments was retained, 1 35so that, after a 
certain point in the liturgy, outsiders were excluded. Eventually, under 
the influence of esoteric mystery-religions,136doctrine taught to 
catechumens also became associated with secrecy. Finally, after the 
Trinitarian disputes with heretics, there were even more powerful 
reasons to withdraw doctrine from the gaze of the profane.187Here, 
then, Milman's historical method exercises a reductionist pattern upon 
what Newman considered to be an unconditioned fact of the religious 
attitude of Christian Antiquity. Yet Newman presents us with no 
counter-arguments - indeed his review shows no awareness of the 
existence of this passage in Milman. 
Newman's interest, in fact, lies elsewhere. It is not Milman's 
presentation of the early Church which has attracted his attention, so 
much as that of the New Testament. Of the twenty-three full-length 
quotations from Milman, for example, only six are from Volumes II or III 
which deal with Christian Antiquity, while seventeen are from Volume I, 
which deals with the New Testament period. It is in relation to Milman's 
depiction of Jesus's life and teaching, especially, that Newman makes 
his strictures about the effect of the "external", 'Sabellian' method. 
Milman's presentBi1011 uf the life of Jesus would, at first sight, 
seem to present much less to provoke criticism, than his more 
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tendentious chapters in Church history. In the area of the New 
Testament, he could be shown to be constructive and conservative, 
striving to preserve historic Christianity against the "ultra 
rationalistic'~ life-of-Jesus school of such as D.F.Strauss, in 
Germany.138!'1ilman's historical approach has been formulated against 
Strauss's radical distinction between the abstract universal truths of 
Christianity and the supernatural events of the life of its Founder, 
which are open to historical scepticism, the view that 
'The supernatural birth of Christ, his miracles, 
his resurrect ion and ascension, rem a in eternal 
truths, however their reality as historical 
facts may be called in question'.'"''~, 
Milman attacks Strauss for according too great a latitude to the 
inventiveness of the early Christian communities in the picture we have 
of Jesus, 
The hypothesis of Dr. Strauss is, that the 
whole his tory of our Lord, as related in the 
gospels, is mythic, that is to say, a kind of 
imaginative amplification of certain vague and 
slender tract it ions, the germ of which is now 
impossible to trace. These myths are partly 
what he calls historical, partly philosophic, 
formed with the design of developing an ideal 
character of Jesus, and of harmonizing that 
charactet· with the Jewish notions of the 
Messiah. 1 40 
This thesis Milman attacks on four grounds: that Strauss has 
dogmatically assumed the question in dispute - i.e. that supernatural 
events are myths; that he ignores the fact that some of these 
supernatural events are essential to Christianity and must therefore 
have been the belief of earliest times, e.g.the resurrection; that the 
Biblical evidence shows that supernatural events were part of .the 
strata. of earliest belief; finally, that Strauss's handling of New 
Testament evidence is uncritical in failing to discern the early 
material in the Gospels contradictory to his thesis. 141 
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t.J:ilman~ therefore, is trying to pt~esent Christianity as historical 
rather than 'mythical', and his method springs from a desire to claim 
the New Testament as history. The purpose of his impartial stance is to 
recommend Christianity for belief, in a context where critical 
scepticism is calling it into doubt. He narrates as history a large 
supernatural element. No attempt is made to present the raising of 
Lazarus as anything but an historical fact;142he accepts the cursing of 
the fig tree as both parable and event;143Jesus's prophecy of the Fall 
of Jerusalem is not merely .. political sagacity", but supernatural 
lmowledge.144The healing of the High Priest's servant's ear is flatly 
and factually narrated, 
The man whose ear had been struck off, ~<Jas 
instantaneously healed.' 4 s 
Particularly important is Milman's strong assertion of the physical 
resurrection of Jesus, as the basis for the doctrine of the immortality 
of the soul,146a position made polemically in contradistinction to his 
understanding of Schleiermacher.' 47This contradicts Newman's 
argument that Milman favours the outward facts about Jesus which are 
human, as opposed to internal realities, which are divine: the 
resurrection is an outward fact for Milman, but it is also by its very 
nature supernatural. Confronted by this, Newman is forced, first, to 
respond that MiLman is nevertheless reductionist in reducing the 
supernatural to essential supernatural events, 
He thinks 1 t is a sign of an acute and 
practical intellect to pare down its 
supernatural facts as closely as possible, and 
to leave its principal miracles, the multiplying 
of bread, the raising of Lazarus, or the 
Resurrection, standing alone like the· pillars of 
Tadmor in the wilderness.' <~a 
But, as we have already seen, Milman allows a greater latitude to the 
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supernatural than this. Secondly, Newman suRgests that Milman is 
inconsistent with his own method, 
Mr.Milman of course insists, though >ve see not 
with what consistency, on the doctrine of the 
Resurrection as proper· to Christianity. 1 <Ls. 
The circularity of Newman's reasoning must be observed here: he is 
interpreting the tendency and effect of Milman's method in the light of 
MiLman~ text: it is hardly conclusive to suggest that a strong counter-
indication is inadmissible because inconsistent with what, after all~ is 
Newman's interpretation of these tendencies and effects. 
Newman's characterization of one of the most distinguished liberal 
Anglican historians as 'Sabellian' indicates his attitude to a school 
which was both near, and far, from Tractarianism. Like Newman, the 
Liberal Anglicans were opposed to the sceptical, static rationalism of 
the Enlightenment;' 50 like Newman they opposed the glib optimism of the 
'march of mind' mentality,151 and like Newman they saw that Christian 
civilization had come to a crisis.1528ut they offered a middle way, an 
accommodation with the apparently destructive inroads of the new 
historical sciences, which would provide a way forward without 
obscurantism,153 to avert the collapse of the ''house of authority".154 lt 
is precisely this middle way that 'Sabellianism' is made to symbolize in 
Newman: it obscures what he sees as the real crisis of the early modern 
period, the stark choice between God and atheism. To accept Milman's 
view is to take the first inadvertent step towards unbelief, to make 
a sort of irenicon or peace-offering, to 
reconcile the faith of eighteen centuries, and 
the infidelity of the nineteenth.' 6 "" 
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10. Conclusion: Heresy as Encodement 
NeWiilan was, by the mid-1830's, undertaking something more 
sophisticated than an imposition of his own preoccupations upon the 
patristic age~ moving beyond the satiric parallellism of Arians towards 
what, in his treatment of Apollinarianism and Sabellianism, may be 
described as the encodement of experience. 1 Searching for a pattern of 
universal significance beneath the surface features of his own 
situation, he found in the Fathers' presentation of the patterns of 
interaction between heresy and orthodoxy a code to bring out the 9iq~~Q 
significance of early nineteenth-century debates about doctrine, while 
distancing them from the localized polemic of England and Oxford. He 
took from the Fathers a sense of an inner logic by which all heresies 
either have developed, or will develop, into the 'God-denying apostasy' 
which is their concealed essence. This he brought to bear upon his 
England. An extraordinary fusion was the result: on the one hand, his 
treatment of ancient heresy is tinged with a very English 
preoccupation, the growth, challenge and toleration of heterodox 
Dissent; on the other, contemporary debates take place sub specie 
antiquitatis. 
Putting present experience into code: this does not seem, at first 
sight, a very happy way of describing Newman's efforts to illuminate 
the present by the past. Yet 'code' does catch the indirectness of his 
use of heresy as a description of the forms of liberal theological 
discourse. In fact, encodement is no esoteric procedure: it simply 
describes Newman's use of what is a very ordinary Christian activity,the 
tendency to see one's own experiences, sufferings and dilemmas, 
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parallelled in the Bible's stories, to journey with Abraham, to cross the 
Red Sea with Moses, with Peter to confess or to deny. the Christ ;2 to 
find in that ''Great Code"3 a censure or a condemnation, and, in the end, 
a key to the chaos of experience. Moreover, the patristic Church had, in 
typological exegesis, encouraged Christians so to encode their 
experience; this was to some extent retained in Calvinism.4 Newman's 
patristic study only reinforced it. The encodement upon which his 
treatment of heresy is based only extends the typological or figurative 
principle from exegesis of the Bible to interpretation of Christian 
history, ancient and modern, and makes the Doctrine of the Trinity the 
code by which the significance of all theological disputes may be 
understood. Accordingly, controversy in the 1830's about tests, 
doctrines and the nature of revelation is encoded by means of analogies 
between the underlying dynamic of the liberal approach to dogma and 
that of ancient Trinitarian heresy. 
Encodement brings the ancient uncomfortably close: aspects of 
Fathers and heresiarchs live again in contemporary figures and 
situations. Conversely, the uncomfortable present is glorified: the 
unlovely Hampden, the apostate Blanco, the pollution of the Regius 
Chair, the hostility of Heads of Houses, the accusations of bigotry -
all may be played out somewhere else as part of a grand and perennial 
drama. We have seen how the personal acridity of the Hampden 
controversy drove Newman, in Tract 73, towards a generalization of the 
issue of Socinianism at Oxford by projecting it into the texts of 
Scottish, American and German divines, remote from his acquaintance. 
This is already, by the very choice of Erskine, Abbott, Schleiermacher 
and Stuart, a form of encodement. The introduction of Sabellianism into 
this tract encodes an encodement, dulling present bitterness to 
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distance. while working with the utmost obliquity for a universal 
schema of intelligibility. 
It was not just other people, the pain of apostate friends, the 
abrasion of liberal enemies, which made the present uncomfortable for 
Newman: there was the problem of theology itself. He feared the appeal 
to human experience. He asserted a gulf between revealed and natural 
theology and would keep the former inviolate - yet, in his own 
apologetic, he constantly argues from human phenomena: conscience, 
probability, history, introspection. Newman's own 'phenomenalism' and 
'psychologism'/"may be seen as close to the 'Sabellianism' he criticizes. 
It may be argued that, in moving from heresy-hunting, to the 
construction of an a priori on behalf of revelation, Newman failed to 
avoid a kind of reductionism himself .6 
For all his strenuous efforts to the contrary, a sense that he, too, 
was close to what led to modern Sa be 11 ian ism may account for the 
subtlety, sympathy and poignancy of his analysis: 
t1ave \ve never- been tempted our-selves to ask, -
't.Jha t is the har-m of being, for- instance, a 
Sa be 11 ian? '7 
The use of heresy to encode his present situation therefore serves as 
an important function in his own self-definition as a theologian. The 
patristic presentation of heresy checks and balances the egotistical 
hypersensitivity to the intricacies of the mind's operations, which 
strikes such a 'modern' note, providing him with a means of distancing 
himself from the assumptions of the age of which he was a part. 
Yet the urge for personal self-definition cannot easily be 
separated from Newman's rhetorical impetus: both come together in his 
way of doing theology. He encodes the present, certainly, in order to 
categorize his experience, but rarely does he neglect, at the same time, 
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the public use of the code. Encodement of facets of the present in 
terms of Antiquity is also a rhetorical strategy. The rhetoric's power 
derives from the tradition of the normativeness, embedded in 
Anglicanism since the seventeenth century, of the first five centuries 
of Christianity.a In equating liberalism with heresy, Newman imposes a 
framework upon one ecclesiastical party of his time, in such a way as 
to dictate the conclusion, for the normative framework of the patristic 
age imposes its own implicit judgment of value. However, consensus 
patrum was the ideology of the Apostolicals - and, before then, the 
'Z"s , not of Anglican Evangelicals, nor of Dissenters. Newman is doing 
a little more than preaching to the converted, but his rhetoric has a 
limited appeal - to the waverers in the Anglican fold in a time of re-
alignment after the Reform Act. The deployment of 'heresy' precludes the 
universality to which his rhetoric aspires. 
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PART III 
RETREAT AND RE-ALIGNMENT: Monophysitism and the Collapse of the 'Via 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold 
<W.B.Yeats) 
1. Construction. 
(a) Tensions in the Classical Concept of Orthodoxy 
In the period leading to his conversion, Newman underwent a 
revolution in his understanding of the nature of orthodoxy. The 
Apologia <1864-) presents this revolution as the collapse and 
replacement of a paradigm. 1 Its account of 1839-1843 describes, in 
language full of violent and painful images, his anguish as his 
"stronghold" was demolished: the 1839 brush with Wiseman which 
"pulverized"2 the 'Via Media'f3then in 1841 the "three blows which broke 
me" - the Athanasius translation, Tract 90's condemnation, and the farce 
of the Jerusalem archbishopric, and finally his Anglican "death-bed".4 By 
December, 1841, the collapse was complete: the 'Via Media' had fallen to 
pieces "and a Theory, made expressly for the occasion, took its place."5 
In his autobiographical narrative of the 'Via Media's collapse 
<1839-43), Newman brings his analogical rhetoric of heresy <1831-41) to 
bear upon his Tractarian rhetoric of orthodoxy. The former corrodes 
and, finally, dissolves the latter, itself surviving and, indeed, 
flourishing in the Essay on Development <1845> and Difficulties of 
Anglicans <1850) as a means of encoding the very position to which he 
had formerly adhered. This analogical method was compulsive: he never 
abandoned it. 
The revolution in Newman's concept of orthodoxy suggest_s that, 
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beneath the confident surface of his Tractarian rhetoric, unresolved 
incon~ruities were lurking. This is not surprising if we regard him as 
having ~~erited a classical concept of orthodoxy which was already 
riddled with tensions, if: "static."6 lt is rooted in seventeenth-century 
anti-sectarian polemic, which saw the true faith as immutable. To 
concede development was to admit, with the sects, that Christianity had 
been corrupted7This position was shared by both Anglican theologians, 
such as Bull and 'Gallicans' such as Bossuet.9 They did not, of course, 
necessarily agree about particular doctrines - transubstantiation, 
images, the Blessed Virgin would have been contested - but they were 
arguing on identical assumptions about what orthodoxy and heresy were 
in general: orthodoxy had always been everywhere the same - heresy was 
novelty ."'*They also shared the assumption that early Christ ian i ty was 
normative, and that a study of it would vindicate their respective 
posit ions.' 0 • 
This view could find ample confirmation in the statements of early 
s. .... ~ ·H·e. 
Fathers, who, from the second century onwards, orthodox faith as 
A 
temporally prior to any heresy. To hold the latter is for St. Irenaeus, 
"setting aside the truth". 11 It is innovation, hence its variety and 
inconsistency, as contrasted with the one truth. He can appeal to a 
self-evident sensus communis: once the heresies have been given an 
exposition, no refutation will be necessary, for their novelty will be 
manifest to all.12Similarly, Tertullian in his De Praescrlptlone 
HaeretlcorUllJ: the true faith was given by Christ to the apostles; 
seeking ends when we have found it; we must thenceforth hold to it; 
heresy is a departure from the already-existing truth."3 
The idea of the temporal priority of orthodoxy may, however, be 
challenged, on historical grounds, as the view of an ecclesiastical 
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hierarchy which had, w lth considerable difficulty, been establishing 
itself from the second century onwards, and which only attained 
unquestioned hegemony in the fourth. Such a challenge is associated, in 
the twentieth century, with Walter Bauer, whose Orthodoxy and Heresy in 
Earliest Christianity (1934) actually reversed, on historico-critical 
grounds, the classical view of the chronological priority of 
orthodoxy.14This provoked an Anglican reply from H.E.W.Turner, who, while 
accepting that the "classical" view was, historically, untenable, 
nevertheless advocated "an interaction of fixed and flexible 
elements'"H>in early Christianity, placing among the "fixed" "the Creed 
and the Rule of Faith."016The Bauer-Turner debate is not so foreign to 
Newman's world as might at first appear: an analogous controversy had 
been proceeding smce the mid-seventeenth century, associated with the 
work of the great Jesuit patristic historian, Petavius.17 lt passed into 
eighteenth-century England, and Newman revived it in his arguments for 
a 'Via Media .18 lndeed, Turner is himself probably the last in a line of 
Anglican theologians who have attempted to reconcile the subversive 
implications of the variety and "fluidity"19witnessed by historical 
scholarship, with a fixity in the rule of faith. 
Newman was introduced to this problem by George Bull 's Defence of 
the Nlcene Faith (1685).20This he first read and used as a reference-
work, when he was writing Arians of the Fourth Century, in 1831.21 When 
he looks back upon his Anglican period, Newman invariably identifies 
Bull as the most important influence upon him.22Yet at the time of 
Arians' composition, he could refer to Bull, somewhat disparagingly as a 
"Doctrinist", rather than a historian.230ne can easily see why: 
voluminous and erudite, crammed with patristic influences, painstakingly 
taking the reader, century by century, Father by Father, through the 
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labyrinth of pre-Nicene Trinitarian debates, the DeFensio is 
disappointing as a model for the vivid and readable narrative to which 
Newman was then aspiring.24His retrospection is, nevertheless, not 
necessarily misleading, because he presents Bull as affording, not a 
narrative model, but a "principle" upon which an orthodoxy may be 
constructed: 
that Antiquity \vas the true exponent of the 
doctrines of Christianity and the basis of the 
Church of England ... 2 '" 
It was upon this principle that the 'Via Media' was constructed. When, 
in 1845, he took his leave of this "great theory, which is so specious 
to look upon, so difficult to prove, and so hopeless to work," he 
associated it with "Bp. Bull's theology" as "the only theology on which 
the English Church could stand .'126 
Bull mediated to Newman the most formidable extant scholarly 
challenge to the classical concept of orthodoxy, in his attempt to 
refute what he regarded as the denigration of the pre-Nicene Fathers 
by Petavius. The motivation for the latter's analysis is as obscure as 
his ultimate conclusions.:.:o:7 What made him the object of Bull's hostile 
attention was his presentation of variations of teaching amongst the 
pre-Nicenes, in an analysis which seemed to contradict the immutability 
of orthodoxy and to suggest ~a concept of evolution which until that 
moment had been almost to ta 11 y unknown." <Paul GaIt ier P 9 Part icu lar 1 y 
controversial was his argument that Arianism was no new invention, but 
that it came stra~ht out of earlier orthodox Fathers' subordination of 
the Son to the Father: · 
they thought He [the Son] had a beginning, as 
do creatures, that is that He was a distinct 
person by no means existing from all 
eternity."'s• 
In defending the pre-Nicene Fathers, Bull stolidly presents the 
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Church's under-standing of the revelatum as always having been the same: 
'orthodoxy' is fixed and immutable, no new ideas or developments being 
possible. When confronted with heresy, the Church always knew what this 
orthodoxy was - it had a clear idea of it - although it may, initially, 
have been stuck for the best way of putting it into words. This sharp 
distinction between, on the one hand, words or terms, and, on the other, 
things, ideas, or realities was all-pervasive in Bull30as the main means 
of reconciling the Fathers' variations with a fixed and static 
orthodoxy. The problem, for Bull, is manufactured by the heretics: 
really, there is no problem of knowledge for the Church when it gives 
expression to its orthodoxy. Armed with this rudimentary mode of 
explanation, Bull may argue for the temporal priority of orthodoxy over 
heresy which he has acquired from the Fathers themselves: the apostles 
handed down a pure, unmixed expression of the revelatum to the bishops 
succeeding them.31 Thus may heresy be demonstrated to be innovation by 
pointing to the previously existing condition of orthodoxy: 
But which of the Catholic doctors before his 
time taught this?32 
We must add - in substance, if not in words. 
Bull tries very hard at a specific level, to vindicate pre-Nicene 
doctrine. This raises, indirectly, the general issue, the relation of 
orthodoxy to heresy, which forces itself upon a scholar reluctant to 
treat of it. If orthodoxy is an expression of the revelatum which is 
Immutable and temporally prior to heresy, how may the origination of 
particular heresies be explained? Bull answers that any heresy may be 
demonstrated to derive from another, earlier, heresy.'"':aThis only puts 
off the problem: for, working on Bull's premisses, the temporal 
regression must come to a halt at a point later than the uncorrupted 
apostolic teaching. A further shift is necessary: heresy is perversion 
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of odhodm{yt heretics peeced.ing from right belief to a distor~ted foe.m 
of it.''"'lBut, as his distinction between words-and-thlngs has alr-eady 
conceded, it is not possible to point to a homogenous form of 
expression which may act as a prior norm against which the perversions 
of heresy may be identified: if the variations of the pre-Nicenes are 
diverse verbal expressions of the one orthodox faith, on what criterion 
are the similarly diverse expressions of heretics excluded as 
inauthentic expressions of the faith? Why, indeed, was it so difficult, 
when heresies arose, adequately to exclude them? Bull 0s explanation - it 
is not original - of why Arianism gained such wide acceptance within 
the Church is that many were deceived35by Arian language into believing 
it orthodox. This only highlights the difficulty of deciding which 
expressions of Christian revelation are authentic. Moreover, even Bull 
has, on a few occasions, to concede that, in a sense, orthodoxy had been 
on the move, as it underwent distortion in striving to re-express the 
true faith in contradistinction to heresy.::;:u:.The distinction between 
words-and-things is therefore ultimately of no avail to defend a static 
concept of orthodoxy - indeed the former calls attention to the 
untenability of the latter. 
Bull escapes into particulars; learning is his forte, not systematic 
analysis. Sometimes, however, even in specific cases, he has to admit 
that orthodoxy and heresy were not as different as he thought they 
were. Bull cracks upon a Christologlcal interpretation of the Old 
Testrunent which he found both in Tertullian and Justin: in the burning 
bush, it was the Son, not the Father or Spirit, who called to Moses, 
because only the Son, as His Incarnation shows, was materially 
circumscribable! Bull sounds a rare note of personal anguish and alarm: 
Who indeed, but must be utterly amazed at 
these surprlzing statements of the Fathers? 
Are we to suppose that these wr 1 ters were so 
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du 11 and in cons is tent as to suppose that the 
Son of God, whom they every where else declare 
to be very God of very God, t-Jas at any time 
circumscribed tv i thin the narrow bounds of one 
and that a small space, or that He was in His 
own actual natur-e visible? Far be it from us 
to think so of men so distinguished. By what 
clever expedient, then, you w i 11 say, can such 
words of their-s be set cight?87 
Bu 11 brings in his words- things a po loge tic, but it has worn very thin . 
.He iS whistling in the dark. Although "quite of the opinion" that the 
Fathers concerned stated a view "most true", he has to concede that 
they expressed themselves "somewhat harshly'', and "in a manner 
unsuitable and incorrect." It is all the heretics' fault, for their 
obstinacy drove the orthodox into ''unguarded expressions."38 
Newman, then, inherited from Bull much to be unthankful for. Yet 
the Defence of the Nicene Creed's significance in Anglican ideology was 
such that it could hardly fail to recommend itself to Newman. On one 
front, Bull was defining his position against the Roman Catholic 
assertion of a living papal magisterium, which appeared to claim the 
ability to expound Tradition without respecting the Fathers.390n the 
other', he was defending the dogmas of the Nicene Creed against 
burgeoning anti-Trinitarianism in England: the Socinian Christopher 
Sand's Nucleus Historiae Ecclesasticae used a Petavian style of analysis 
to demonstrate that the pre-Nicene Fathers' subordination of the Son to 
the Father brought them closer to Socinianism than post-Nicene 
orthodoxy.40This dual threat to Bull's conception of the fixed faith of 
Antiquity is similar to the two extremes of sectarian Protestantism and 
Roman corruptions against which Newman was in the 1830's attempting to 
define his 'Via Media'. Indeed, Newman identifies all popular 
Protestantism as virtually Socinian. 
The polemical dtscussion of arguments about the nature of 
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orthodoxy wa.s, by Newman's time, no longer restricted to disputations in 
Latin between the learned. Socinianisro had grown steadily in popularity, 
and the English Unitarians were pressing for a theological and social 
acceptance in accord with their influence.41 Moreover, the historical 
issue of variations in pre-Nicene doctrine had been popularized in 
Edward Gibbon's brilliantly sardonic account of the age of the early 
Fathers, which argued that Trinitarian orthodoxy was fundamentally 
incoherent.42Newman deplored, admired and used the Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire.43 1n justifying the Anglican Church's patristic 
authority, he could hardly fail, once again, to have the problem of 
variations forced upon him. 
(b) The Arians of the Fourth Century and the Problem of the Nature of 
Orthodoxy. 
Newman's estimation of Bull's influence in the Apologia, and the 
number of citations of the Defensio in Arians might lead one to 
anticipate a strong imprint of the static concept of orthodoxy in his 
first work on heresy. It is, indeed, true that Newman deploys the 
connected idea of the temporal priority of orthodoxy. In his section 
upon "Variations in the Anti-Nicene Theological Statements",44he 
discusses the historical fortunes of the Homoousion, arguing that it 
was first used in the orthodox sense - "a Being, real, living and 
tndividual"45 - to mean the revealed God of Scripture, distinct from 
and beyond Creation. It was applied to the Son as early as Justin 
Martyr, Newman argues, in order to express His identity with the Father 
and to protect His divinity: for Justin, -the Son is "inseparab"le from 
) 
the substance or being, ovara, of the Father."46Heresy perverted this 
established meaning by imposing the alien Gnostic usage, which denoted 
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the sharing in the essence of the Supreme Intelligence by aeons or 
spirits emanating from It. This is alien to what Newman regards as the 
basic principle of revelation - "the incommunicable character and 
individuality of the Divine Essence."47The Homoousion once tainted, the 
orthodox could not insist on it. Consequently, at the Council of Antioch, 
Paul of Samosata was able successfully to object to the term, when 
proposed as a test.48The orthodox had to give way and withdraw the 
term, lest 10Weak minds"49be perplexed. Having extorted this concession 
from "Catholics", heretics began a wholesale onslaught upon the 
established language of orthodoxy, with the result that 
they were gradually silencing the Church by a 
process which legitimate 1 y led to Pan the ism 
when the Alexandrians gave the alarm and nobly 
stood forward in defence of the faith.so 
Newman's narrative of the Homoousion, then, implies throughout a 
distinction between the fixed and prior condition, 'orthodoxy', the 
'thing' itself, and the words used to express it, the variety and 
fluctuating meanings of which explain the supposed 'variations' of the 
pre-Nicene age. However, Newman cannot, any more than Bull, adequately 
explain why, if a prior orthodox meaning had been so firmly attached to 
the term, it was so readily corrupted. 
Yet Newman's absorption of Bull was in Arians a more complex 
procedure than this, and he cannot really be said to have followed the 
DeFensio slavishly.51 Rather, he transformed both concepts and material 
from the DeFenslo, a.nc4 , while glancing at the infidel and 
Roman threats defended by Bull's 'staunch polemic', is altogether more 
subtle and ambivalent. At the outset of Newman's section upon 
"Variations", there occur·s a highly ambiguous passage wher-·e conflicting 
tendencies are being held in tension: on the one hand, there is 
allegiance to Bull, but, on the other, an understanding of ecclesiastical 
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dogma which is t·edolent of Romanticism, in its appeal to the affective 
and experiential. Newman only just comes down on the side of the 
priority of orthodoxy. His opening sentence shows the glimmerings of an 
idea of dog-matic evolution, competing with the 'classic' view: 
Thece •.vill, of coucse, be differences of 
opinion, in deciding how much of the 
eccles ias tical doc tr ine ... was derived from 
,_; u t:L L tl.fJU~ Lu lLLd 1 1 raa 11: 1on, ana now much was 
the result of intuitive spiritual perception in 
Scriptw·ally informed and deeply religious 
mindsY 2 
He concludes, in phraseology suggesting a degree of hesitation, that "it 
does not seem too much to affirm" that the lan~uage of ecclesiastical 
dogma may be found, or found to be implied, in the New Testament. He 
uses a form of the words-things distinction, arguing that the language 
of ecclesiastical orthodoxy expresses in a systematic form the truths 
unsystematically and imprecisely expressed in Scripture.53 
This brings him before the problem of the pre-Nicene Fathers. He 
sees them as distorted by the exigencies of a post-Nlcene orthodox 
perspective: they have to be accommodated to this later picture and -
while Newman does not deny that such accommodation is possible - it is 
clear that such a process involves loss and impoverishment. The warm 
and unselfconscious familiarity of the early Fathers with the object of 
their reverence had to be sacrificed in the interest of clarity: 
it is we in after times \vh.o s ys tema t ize the 
statements of the Fathers, which, as they occur 
in their works, are for the most part as 
natural and unpremeditated as those of the 
inspired volume i tse 1 f /"' 4 
Newman announces a tension, between the preciser Trinitarian language 
of the era of the ecumenical councils (''Creeds"), and the looser 
language of pre-Nicene Christianity, where words are organically 
integrated with the worshipping life of a community ("doxologies">: 
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We count the words of the Fathers, and measure 
the it- sentences; and so convert do:'o log ies in to 
creeds,!:''" 
This antithesis between "doxologies" and "creeds" introduces a note 
of complexity into the discussion absent in Bull, who defends orthodoxy 
on the assumption that its varying verbal expressions are rooted in 
one, clear, common idea which was present in the Fathers' minds. Newman, 
however, sees language as part of the life-form56of a community and 
interests himself in the political, social and psychological factors 
behind the evolution of dogma. His theory is that credal, propositional 
dogma was a secondary stage beginning in the fourth century. From this 
secondary condition, to which Newman sees himself as belonging, he 
looks back to an earlier, primary, stage with unconcealed nostalgia, the 
later stage being an attenuation of life. Here, in a sense, Newman 
accords with the Socinian historians' theory of 'corruption' - something, 
indeed, had gone wrong after Nicea! But he blames heretics for it: the 
lamentable constrictions of the secondary, credal stage were caused by 
the heresies which forced the Church into unwonted and unwelcome 
c lar it y;: of dogmatizing he dec lares, 
That we do so, that the Church has done so 
more or less from the Nicene Council 
downwards, is the fault of those who have 
obliged us, of those who, 'while men slept', 
have sowed tares among the wheat. ''=' 7 
Newman does not use the word 'orthodoxy' in this discussion. What, 
then, may be drawn out of this passage which applies to the problem of 
orthodoxy's relation to heresy? Two answers are possible. First, if by 
'orthodoxy• Newman means only the secondary stage of credal 
expressions, then he conceives orthodoxy, not as prior to heresy, but 
subsequent to it. Alternatively, he may be proposing as his concept of" 
odhodoxy something very complex, that it is a historically-layered 
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express ion of the reve la tUiiJ, the ear 1 ier stratum oper~a t ing according to 
different socia-l ingu is tic rules from the latter. Indeed, there is a 
resemblance to the position eventually adopted in the Essay on 
Development, in the dichotomy between the impact of the revelatum, 
itself a mysterious object, upon our experience, and the evolving ideas 
we farm of it. se If so, this passage contains some or ig ina l and pregnant 
suggest ions. 
Yet, Newman's very next paragraph falls back from this many-sided 
apprehension of what 'orthodoxy 0 might be, to a position unequivocally 
'Bullian'. He faces the fact that when the pre-Nicene Fathers - for the 
most part sunk in the doxological mentality - did make their occasional 
forays into precise dogmatic theology in "more intentional 
systematizing", then they appear closer to what was later seen as 
heresy, than to orthodoxy: their s ta temen ts are 
ambiguous, 
times an 
heresy.c··=" 
and in 
apparent 
consequence 
countenance 
afforded at 
to the Arian 
He defends them by the well-worn distinction between ideas,, clearly and 
commonly understood, and words, ambiguous and needing clarification: 
It often becomes necessary to settle the 
phraseology of divinity, in points, where the 
chief problem is, to select the clearest wot·ds 
to express not ions in which all agree; or to 
find the proposition which w i 11 best fit in 
w 1 th, and connect, a number of rev 1 ved 
doctrines .6 '-.., 
Eventually, the right idea becomes associated with a defined term, after 
a process of "scrutiny"': 
they are variously expressed 
process ... they are consigned 
formulas, at the end of it.61 
during the 
to arbitrary 
But even this goes beyond Bull: "arbitrary formulas" betrays awareness 
that something new comes into being even with a verbal development. 
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Scarcely a ripple of epistemological anxiety disturbs the even 
surface of Bull's Defensio: Newman's Arians is riddled with tensions, 
ultimately traceable to the pervasive antithesis between the credal and 
the doxological. This is particularly apparent in Newman's manner of 
describing how the delicate balance between the disciplina arcani and 
the economyG2 was upset by the disclosures of apostasy and the 
assertions of heresy, impelling the Church to publish creeds. According 
to Newman, the pre-Nicene Church jealously guarded its saving doctrines 
from all but the initiate who knew them in .an atmosphere of worship, 
mystery and secrecy. On the other hand, the Church also wanted to 
articulate some of its beliefs so that those outside could at least 
begin to understand them, by "adapting their sentiments and even their 
language as far as they could."63The economy provided flexibility of 
expression, while the dlscipllna arcani protected the revelatum from 
corruption. This balance is, perhaps, a version of Bull's words-and-
things, but modified radically: the economy is, indeed, words, but the 
thigg is not seen as just a clear body of ideas which may be expressed 
in one way or another, for the dlscipllna arcani is a pattern of 
believing activity, bound up with participation in the Christian 
mysteries or sacraments, in a corporate atmosphere of reverent feeling. 
Newman declares the dlsclpllna arcani to have conceptual content - he 
describes it as "doctrinesHG4 handed down from the apostles - but does 
not explain precisely what he means: he 1s probably thinking of the 
private, catechetical instruction to initiates, which was eventually 
taken over by the Church's public, credal doctrine: 
the secret tradition soon ceased to exist even 
in theory. It was au thor ita t1 ve 1 y divulged, and 
perpetuated according as the successive 
innovations of heretics called for its 
publication. In the Creeds of the early 
Councils, it may be considered as having come 
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to light and so ended."''''' 
He appet:u~s unwilling to open the disciplina arcanl to epistemological 
analysis: it is the numinous dawn of faith which heretics have caused 
to be replaced by the stark day of adulthood. 
All that is holy, all that is beautiful or Romantic, is broken down 
by heresy. In two intense metaphors, Newman conveys his nostalgic 
yearning for the Church's childhood, 'trailing clouds of glory.' First, a 
very English image of the love between friends and family is used to 
describe the reserve of the d!sciplina arcani: as in a profound 
relationship, the emotions are so strong as to preclude their 
expression in outward feeling, so in the piety of early Christians.66 
Secondly, he draws an analogy with literature: great works ar~e 
"composed freely" and only later "subjected to the rules of grammarians 
and critics.'t67 Heresy has driven the Christian to a lower level of 
existence, transforming him from poet to grammarian. 
On occasion, Newman strives to ease the tension between doxological 
and credal by positing the inevitability, given the human intellect's 
dynamic structure, of a natural movement from one to the other: 
As the mind is cultivated and expanded, it 
cannot refrain from the attempt to analyse the 
vis ion which influences the heart, and the 
Object in which vis ion centres; nor does it 
stop t i 11 it has, in some sort succeeded in 
expressing in words, what has a 11 a long been a 
principle both of its affections and of its 
abed ience .68 
The transition is not a little tinged with regret: it is unavoidable, 
and our choice is only to do it well or badly. We 'murder to dissect' 
and cannot help it. 
The ambivalence and hesitation of Newman's attitude to the problem 
of orthodoxy is epitomized in his description of the "systematic 
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doctdne of the Trii'lity."b9 The doctrinal expt~ess:ion of Tdnity is 
secondary to the rich but undefined immediacy of religious life; it is 
the shadow, projected for- the contemplation of 
the intellect, of the Object of Scriptut-ally-
informed piety 7° 
Doctrine t•tranquillize[s] the mind," giving it rest from perplexity, by 
limiting the scope of speculation7 1 But it is always "a representation, 
economical; necessarily imperfect", and expressed in a "foreign medium10 , 
that is, in the language of human experience, which imposes the "seen"' 
upon the "unseen"72 It involves "inconsistencies or mysteries." For a 
deeper, predominantly emotional satisfaction, the believer will always 
turn from doctrine to "the text of Scripture", which, "being addressed 
principally to the affections", is "of a religious not a philosophical 
character."73 In order, however, to counteract the impression of early 
orthodoxy as purely an emotional experience, later replaced by dogma, 
Newman introduces a cognitive element into his treatment of the pre-
Nicene period, in order to balance the affective. He therefore asserts 
that the "systematic doctrine of the Trinity" was "given to the Church 
by tradition" contemporaneously with Scripture7 4 With the epithet 
"systematic", Newman runs into contradiction, for, as has been shown, he 
elsewhere in Arians argues that the systematic only marked the later 
credal stage which developed from doxology. His attempt to get around 
this causes further confusion: he argues that the "systematic" doctrine 
was, in earlier centuries, "kept in the background", and only "brought 
forward", when "reason ... disproportionately developed" strove for mastery 
over "religion".n•Much hangs on the sense of "brought forward", but 
Newman does not help one to decide if the 'bringing forward'· is from 
implicit to explicit, or from private to public, or from ideas to words, 
or from impressions, via ideas, to words. 
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On the whole, the heretics are the systematicians. They 
i.'ltellectualize and demand explicitness, while orthodoxy is maintained -
notably by 00uneducated men" - practically and implicitly. It is to make 
this point that Newman undertakes a further subtle modification of 
Bull's words-and-things antithesis, when he declares that heresy ''puUsl 
upon us words for things."76The heretics are always mistaking 
arrangements of words, which have no existence 
except on paper, for habits which are 
rea 1 it ies 7 7 
Bull's antithesis is transformed: the 'things• to which the words refer 
are patterns of behaviour ("habits">, rather than ideas or objects, while 
Newman reserves for words an assessment verging upon the sceptical or 
nominalistic. For Newman, in Arians, then, the life is all, the 
speculative or analytical usually empty. 
Newman found himself, in his earliest work, being pulled in 
contrary directions. His heroes were Bull and the early Fathers. He 
wanted to be their disciple and to revive and defend the classical idea 
of orthodoxy, to assert the ancient and unchanging in a world in 
process of rapid dissolution, to re-create it imaginatively in the minds 
of his readers, just at the time when, in society, the 'old ways' were 
crumbling. On the other hand, Newman was the child of British 
empiricism, hypersensitive to epistemological issues, concerned with the 
psychology of impressions and ideas, agnostic about their object78 His 
presentation of heresy-orthodoxy therefore has a more sophisticated and 
modern air than that of Bull, who had not passed through the 
philosophical revolution of the eighteenth century. Moreover, Newman's 
empiricism is overlaid with Romanticism, a nostalgia for the 
primitive, and an exaltation of feeling over reason. This mixture of 
influences accounts for the haunting and ambivalent quality of Arians. 
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It must be admitted that his account of orthodoxy remains 
unsatisfactory, largely because of confusion about, or even 
unwillingness to expound, the relation between the revelatum, its 
assimilation by humanity, and its expression in doctrine. Nevertheless, 
he was beginning to grapple with problems of which the seventeenth 
century patrists had never dreamed. He comes to us as a modern. 
(c) The Problem of Definition: a Survey of the 'Via Media'. 
Newman's "Via Media' was the persuasive re-creation of an 
orthodoxy. The Church of England's situation after the Reform Bill 
precluded the unselfconscious mediation of its Catholic tradition to 
all. The first stage of Newman's rhetorical response to this suddenly 
unfamiliar situation was the popular appeal, in his depiction of the 
Milan of St. Ambrose, to the "irrefragable"7 g nature of the Christian 
Church's Apostolicity and Catholicity. But, of course, no such 
spontaneous recognition of the ancient heritage of Anglicanism 
necessarily sprang up in the generality of the English people. It was 
divided: the sensus communis had not so much to be sought for as to be 
constructed. Newman therefore had to re-invent 'Antiquity'. 
In his 'Via Media', Newman posited a form of Christianity in 
continuity with Antiquity but distinguishable, not only from the various 
forms of 'Protestantism' which - as he saw it - had broken with the 
past altogether, but also from Rome's additions to, and corruptions of, 
the authentic Christian tradition. His method may be described as 
rhetorical. From Joseph Butler, Newman acquired the idea of probability, 
a method of argumentation calling upon patterns of understanding drawn 
from practical everyday experience.80Bu tler's distinguished place in the 
history of philosophy should not, however, obscure the fact that he was 
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' an apologist, nor that pr-obability (or E'l.){o<;) has been, since classical 
times, par excellence the method of the rhetorician.81 Newman applies 
this method to history by an appeal to converging evidences, 
cumulatively constructing a picture of the faith and practice of the 
early Church. What,he asks, are the broad outlines, the essentials of 
the Christian faith, as illustrated by the age of the Fathers? 
Translations of the Fathers themselves - the Records of the Faith and, 
eventually, the Library of the Fathers82 - strengthened the broad 
outline of the nature of patristic Christianity. This approach to the 
historical appeals frankly to the ordinary person of sense, rather than 
to the intellectual whom Newman castigates, as requiring an unreal and 
abstractly theoretical certainty before assent. Moreover, the heritage 
of the past, Newman argues, could easily be grasped and epitomized in 
the Creeds,83known by heart since childhood and constantly recited in 
Church. 
It was always, however, a troubled vision. Newman could never 
entirely repress snags in the detail of his argument about how 
orthodoxy and heresy may be defined in relation to each other. 
Especially problematic was the need to define a position simultaneously 
anti-Roman and anti-Protestant. This raised complications inhibiting the 
freedom he had occasionally brought to his treatment of the problem in 
Arians. His own remarkable tendency to raise difficulties touching his 
own pas 1 tion explains the crisis at the end: a decade of tens ion and 
unease exploded in the move towards Rome. 
Newman's two tracts, of July and August, 1834-, launching his 'Via 
Media' of the Church of England as lying "be.tween the <so· called) 
Reformers, and the Romanists"94 , or between "Protestantism" and 
"Popery'996 1mmediately suggests an insecurity underlying the grandiose 
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pr~ogramme of a nsecond Reformation"86 to re-Catholicise the Church. 
The discussion inevitably moves, via the problem of the status of 
Reformation articles, to the nature of the unchanging apostolic faith 
with which such articles are contrasted. When heresy comes up, a 
fearful tangle ensues. 
The problem of the relation of development to fixity is raised in 
the dialogue in Tract 38 between Clericus, an ardent 'aposto ,lical' and 
Laicus, a dubious but sympathetic enquirer. The former declares that 
Age after age, fresh battles have. been fought 
with heresy, fresh monuments of truth set 
up/"7 
This is not what it seems: Clericus is not arguing evolution of dogma. 
The ''fresh monuments" are, however, in some sense, "additions" made to 
the Apostolic Faith. Such are the 39 Articles, the other continental 
Protestant articles, and, for that matter, ''Tridentine articles" ( which 
differ from the Anglican only in being "unsound".88 ). All these articles 
were framed "against certain errors of a certain period of the 
Church."89They do not constitute a coherent statement of the Christian 
faith in its wholeness ("a body of divinity").90and are therefore to be 
distinguished from "rule of Faith", the 'Apostolic' faith, "whole Gospel 
of Christ" or "whole counsel of God", which may be identified by its 
priority to the Reformation, and by the fact that "Romanists and 
Reformers" alike agreed upon it.91 
Tract 41, continues the conversation. Here, Clerlcus further 
defines the prior, unchanging Apostolic Faith as saving. He explains 
additions as being of two kinds: either 'Romish' corruptions or 
reforming protests, the latter of which aimed to return the Apostolic 
or 
Faith to its original purity. Laicus attempts a summary, the 
'apostolical' position: 
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that, as time goes on, fr-esh and fr-esh acticles 
of faith are necessary to secur-e the Chucch 's 
purity, according to the rise of successive 
heresies and errors. These articles wer-e all 
hidden, as it were, in the Church's bosom fr-om 
the fir-st and brought in to form according to 
the occas ion."~'2 
The Roman Catholic Newman, in a note to the Collected Edition, declared 
this account - which Clericus accepts93 - to be an early admission of 
the pr inc ip le of doctrinal development ... as true 
and necessary for the Christian Church.94 
But Newman is reading the earlier by the later. In fact, Laicus confuses 
the issue considerably by failing to distinguish between essential 
'articles of faith', such as "the Nicene explanation against Arius," and 
local, disciplinary 'articles of religion', such as "the EnRlish articles 
against Popery.'195Yet Clericus, the Tractarian mouthpiece, fails to 
disabuse him, and himself seems unaware of the distinction. Further to 
confuse the matter, Laicus in another summary, equally readily accepted 
by Clericus86 defines "the doctrines of the Catholic Church" as what 
He ar'e clearly bound to believe, and all of us 
do believe, as essential, doctrines \.Jh ich 
never the less are not contained in r.he 
Articles:-'>7 
The essential "doctrines", then, are not articles. But is the Nicene 
definition a 'doctrine' or an 'article'? The drift seems to be that, 
insofar as it is a verbal expression, then it is an 'article', and so !lOt 
essential. 
This ambiguity about articles was to haunt Newman's presentation 
of orthodoxy in the 1830's. It was a difficulty which others had 
already encountered in the discussion of fundamental articles, in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.98 It was forced upon Newman when, 
he was pulled into a debate initiated by his friend Henjamin Harrison 
with the Abbe Jager.99The systematic clarity required to defend 
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Anglican claims aga~t the often uncomfortably acute enquiries of the 
tenacious Abbe was uncongenial to Newman and the translation into 
French inevitably diminished the effectiveness of his style. The result 
is a "rather confusing" 1 00 argument. But there is a structural 
incoherence too, pointing to a basic uncertainty about the definitions 
of heresy and orthodoxy. Newman's other Tractarian writings more 
skilfully conceal it~ but the Jager correspondence exposes the cracks~ 
before, as it were, the cosmetics were applied. 
The terms of the initial discussion between Jager and Harrison had 
been complicated enough: they both accepted Tradition in some sense but 
disagreed about how it was to be found, and about how Vincent of 
Lerins• Comm.oni torium 1 01 - the quad ubique, quod semper, quod ab 
omnibus1 02 - was to be applied. For Harrison, the Vincent ian Canon is 
an invitation to make a judgment about what Tradition is, on the 
evidence. 1 03Jager, on the other hand, argued that, since no one can read 
all the Fathers and ma.ke scholarly judgments on them, the Common.«"torium 
upholds ecclesiastical authority and recommends obedience: Vincent 
meant that, when new heresies arose, if they had not been condemned by 
the Church, then one could have recourse to the quod ubique, quod 
semper, quod ab omnibus as a rule of thumb by which to guage Tradition 
- but if the Church had defined, then obedience was all that was 
required. 1 04Jager, then, asserted the role of the magfsterlwn in 
defining10&what had always been, while Harrison upheld historical 
judgment against Roman authoritarianism. Moreover, they differed not 
only about the nature of Tradition, but also about its relation to 
Scripture. For Harrison, the latter was the sole authority, Tradition 
being a guide to its authentic interpretation. Jager, however, saw both 
Scripture and Tradition as sources of revelation.106 
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Newman further complicated the terms of the debate by introducing 
for the first time, the subject of fundamental articles, hitherto 
unfamiliar to Jager.107Newman's exposition is marked by a grotesquely 
elaborate precision, which only serves to magnify the confusion about 
how heresy is to be placed. He defines fundamentals as 
"doctrines ... necessary for Church Communion", identical with "the articles 
of the Creed."1 oe.They are "ultimately11 grounded in Scripture, though we 
may receive them "immediately19 from Tradition.109There are other 
traditionary doctrines, not based on Scripture, which are only points of 
discipline, not terms of communion and not fundamental. Newman, then, 
distinguishes between two kinds of Tradition. There is, first, and most 
important, "the authority of tradition based on Scripture in fundamental 
points" which is "imperative".110There is also secondly, and much less 
important, Tradition "in matters of doctrine not fundamental and of 
discipline," which it is only "pious"1 11 to believe. The latter, which 
Newman, unhappily, calls "pure Tradition" 1 12 is what Rome wrongly 
imposes as fundamental. In contrast, Newman sees as fundamental a 
static deposit, "ever one and the same, admitting of no addition and 
imperishable."113 lt is "the ground of communion'' - but it precedes the 
Church and is hidden, as it were, in Scripture. Only one strictly limited 
form of Church Tradition, Apostolic Tradition, is capable of finding it, 
and expressing it in what Newman calls the "fundamental creed.'0114 
Newman does not clarify its relation to the various Creeds which came 
into existence in the Early Church - the Nicene, Athanasian and 
Apostles'. Is the "fundamental creed" an expression, in articles, of the 
deposit? Does this imply a form of doctrinal development? Indeed, does 
the "fundamental creed" consist of verbal propositions at all? Obviously 
the answers to such questions will dictate where heresy is to be placed 
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in relation to fundamental orthodoxy. 
Aware of these difficulties, Newman makes a distinction between the 
"fundamental creed'' and its development by various communities into 
"Articles of religion" which are not fundamental and have a disciplinary 
usefulness. These ''voluntary developments" are, indeed, "additions", but 
the essentials of the faith are prior to them, remaining static and 
unchanging.116However, Newman has not settled whether the "fundamental 
creed", too, consists of articles. ~hen he comes to give examples of 
l>lArticles of religion" this problem intensifies. As "Articles of 
religion", which are not fundamental, he lists infant baptism, the double 
procession of the Holy Spirit, and the Homoousion of Nicea.116His 
explanation of the function of "articles of religion" in relation to 
"fundamental creed" makes it obvious that he considers such dogmatic 
definitions as the Homoousfon to be equivalent to Anglican articles, 
rather than articles of faith: 
The object of these additions is either to 
secure the fundamentals, as was effected at 
Nicea by the Homoousion, or to fortify the 
Church itself, as our article denying the 
jurisdiction of the Roman See in Eng land. 1 1 7 
But 1f the Homoousfon isn't fundamental, then the Arian heresy was not 
a denial of the fundamental faith. In what, then, does heresy consist? 
Newman's answer hardly supports his characteristically strong sense 
of the perniciousness of heresy: he sees the "voluntary developments" 
of the fundamental creed which were made in the first five centuries 
as having ''great weight to all Christians in every age" because agreed 
by an undivided Church. Thus the first four Ecumenical Councils act as 
"the rule of orthodoxy against heresy".118 His explanation has odd 
consequences: heresy is not a direct denial of the fundamental creed, 
but, even more surprising, Newman will not impose the dogmatic 
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definitions of Ecumenical Councils "as terms of communion."119 lt is, 
however, improbable that he intended to present heresy as only a local 
or disciplinary infringement, for this would contradict the stress he 
lays elsewhere upon the danger posed by heresy to the survival of 
Christianity, and his vigorous defence of the ecclesiastical 
ana thenuA. 1 20 Indeed, Newman is trapped: to concede a development of 
dogmatic definition as fundamental, essential or 'of faith', would be to 
throw in the towel to Tridentine Rome, but to cling to a static concept 
of the fundamental faith makes the Church's response to heresy 
incomprehensible. Why all the fuss, if essentials are not at stake? 
Jager shrewdly and ruthlessly pressed this weak point in Newman's 
argument: the issue of fundamental error. If Roman errors are 
fundamental, then a branch of the church has failed - and the branch 
theory falls. 121 But if Rome's errors are not fundamental, why has the 
Church of England broken with it? Newman's failure to clarify the 
relation between terms such as 'fundamental error', 'heresy', 'addition' 
and 'corruption' is understandable: he needs Rome to justify a form of 
Catholicity against Protestantism, which he is always happy to call 
heretical. On the other hand, Rome has to be, in some sense wrong, 
though not radically enough to lend weight to the ultra-Protestant 
claim that, by 1600, the Christian faith had been corrupted. Moreover, 
Jager identifies Newman's difficulty over the content of the 
tJfundamental creed", which would seem not to include Original Sin or 
Baptismal Regeneration. Newman was, of course, vigorously advocating 
such doctrines, in his polemic against Protestantism - it is hard to 
imagine that he did not regard them as essential. But he did not need 
to with Rome - here was agreement. Newman's expression of the 
essential content of the Christian faith has a shifting - and, indeed, 
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an almost shifty - quality, as his articulation varies with the 
polemical context. Jager's blunt demand for him to spell out what the 
fundamentals are is therefore a pertinent one. 
Newman's second letter, however, continues the wire-drawn 
distinctions of his first, bringing his difficulty over heresy to 
preternatural clarity. He distinguishes between fundamentals, "necessary 
for Church Communion", and doctrines ''necessary to profess in order to 
be saved" ,1 22so that he can justify, by means of the latter, submission 
to ecclesiastical doctrines which are not fundamental. It is, of course, 
difficult to imagine how a doctrine can be 'saving' without also being 
fundamental. Newman uses this dubious distinction to prove that heresy 
is a bad thing even though it does not directly threaten the 
fundamentals. He defines a heretic as a public teacher ("doctor"), 
promulgating what is contrary to the "teaching of the Church".123By 
this latter phrase, he does not mean the fundamentals, but their 
developments. This is clear from his distinction between heretic and 
private individual: both may hold the same opinion but the latter 
should not be excommunicated provided he keeps quiet. 1 "' 4 ln both cases 
the doubt or error concerns "certain developments of doctrine", not 
fundamentals. 125The heretic is excommunicated, not because he denies 
fundamentals, but because he teaches developments at variance with the 
Church.126He is, in fact, cast out from the Church without ever 
violating the "terms of communion". This is how Newman would keep 
~ocinians, Pelagians and others~ out of the Church, even though the 
truths they deny may not necessarily be found in the Apostles' 
Creed.127lt is a real difficulty that, to protect his flank against Rome, 
Newman has to make heresy a non-fundamental error. He is driven to 
locate the culpability as disruption in the public sphere, reverting to 
-259-
the line pursued in defence of ancien regime which identifies as 
"tes ts11 both anc lent dogmas and modern articles: 
The laity of the upper classes have a great 
power in the Church of Eng land: I mean the 
Privy Council, the law officers, the membet-s of 
Parliament etc. Just as the Council of Nicea 
imposed its be lief on the Clergy, so we impose 
our articles on certain laymen, namely on the 
members of the universities. 1 :;;::e 
The second letter re-iterates that the Homoousion of Nicea is only 
an article of religion, not an article of faith. Newman averts the 
consequence - that even Arianism was a non-fundamental error, by the 
words-things distinction. St.Athanasius, he argues, did not 
excommunicate those semi-Arians who baulked at the word, provided they 
believed the same thing as himself. 1 290n this bas is, Newman 
distinguishes between the "general doctrine"1 :3°of Nicea and the 
Homoousion which was used to express it. As ~ord, the argument seems 
to run, the Homoousion is non-fundamental, but if the thing it denotes 
be meant, then it is a fundamental. It therefore may, or may not, be 
heresy to deny it. 
Finally, Newman articulated for the first time in this letter a 
distinction which was to become celebrated when he re-used it in his 
Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church, that between 
"Apostolic Tradition" and "Prophetical Tradition". Here the tension 
between stasis and fixity attains its clearest expression: while 
gApostolic Tradition" is immutable, fundamental, hands down articles of 
faith and is virtually synonymous with the Apostles' Creed, ''Prophetic 
Tradition" is the development of the Apostolic into a vast system of 
interpretation "permeating the body of the Church like an atmosphere", 
out of which non-fundamental "articles of religion" arise.131 However, 
"to develop is not to create"182 - not for the Newman of 1834 - and 
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her·esy cannot stimulate the ''fundamental faith" into a new 
understanding of itself. Heresy is opposed, not to the Apostolic, but to 
the Prophetical Tradition. Since this latter is non-fundamental and 
contains within itself truths "entitled to very different degrees of 
cred it'0, 1 33Newmnn 's recommendation of it as a standard for orthodoxy 
can only be tentative: 
This is that body of teaching 
to every ind i v idua 1 according 
and which ... must be received 
affection, and not be said to 
be not necessary to submit 
proof. 1 "'' 4 
which is offered 
to his capacity 
with trust and 
err, although it 
to it without 
This is hardly a clinching dissuasive against heresy, and even suggests, 
in its mention of the need of "proof", a means by which the heretic may 
legitimate his dissent. 
The argument with Rome about the Rule of Faith continued on the 
soil of England where a formidable antagonist, the urbane and plausible 
Nicholas Wiseman had disembarked, to deliver, at St. Mary's Moorfields, 
an engaging set of Lenten public lectures in defence of Romanism 
< 1836). 1 35Newman had, in the previous year, in the Brame Chapel, been 
drawing upon his exchange with Jager to justify the 'Via Media'. 136 The 
presence of Wiseman so preoccupied him from March 1836 onwards that 
he could list as one of the events of that "cardinal time" when a ''new 
scene gradually opened"137his "writing against the Church of Rome.'1136 
His new association with the British Crltlc139produced two articles 
pursuing the argument over the Rule of Faith: in July, Apostolical 
1+1 
Traditlon,140and in September, his review of Wiseman's Lectures. Finally, 
in late 1836, he worked over the ground again and brought his position 
to classic expression in Lectures on the Prophetical Office.' 42 In all 
these works, Newman matched the suavity of Wiseman with a polished and 
attractive style very different from the turgidity of his letters to 
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Jager. Yet the inconsistencies disclosed there with regard to heresy 
may still be discerned beneath the surface sheen. 
Apostolical Tradition, written in the wake of the Hampden 
controversy, 1 43argues the latitudinarian, and ultimately infidel, 
consequences of the Protestant principle of Private Judgment and sole 
reliance on Scripture. He places "Apostolic Tradition", the assertion of 
1 r m ny and lncarna t ion, in direct opposition to the line of virtual 
Socini;ism running from Locke to Hampden.144 ln contrast to his argument 
A 
with the Abbe Jager, he suppresses distinctions between immutable, 
fundamental creed and articles, articles of religion and those of faith, 
or apostolic and prophetic tradition. He wants to bring the full weight 
of the Ecumenical Councils to bear upon such as Hampden: it would 
weaken his position to suggest that ancient definitions, such as the 
Homoousion were neither fundamental nor terms of communion. He only 
needed to argue in this latter way when resisting developments of 
the fundamental creed in controversy with Rome. The shift from Catholic 
France to Protestant England provoked a jarring shift of strategy. 
The review of Wiseman's Moorfields Lectures, written three months 
later,145presents a somewhat different argument for the Rule of Faith, 
in its placing of heresy and orthodoxy. Significantly, of course, the 
rhetorical context has changed: Newman is still arguing on behalf of 
Tradition as an authoritative interpretation of Scripture, but, this 
time, has to protect himself against the Roman understanding of 
Tradition as in itself a source of revelation, in addition to 
Scripture.146 
Newman has tidied up his terminology, possibly in response to 
criticism.147''Fundamentals", and "fundamental faith" give way to terms 
more immediately communicative - "necessary" or "essential".148 
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Moreover~ he has dropped the dis tinct ion be tween 'essen t ia 1' and 
'saving'. While, then, Rome defines "points of faith ~on.Q Scripture" 
and adds to what Tradition draws out of Scripture, the "points 
necessary to be believed in order to sa 1 vat ion", 1 49 Anglican ism holds to 
"what is agreeable to Scripture doctrine, and gathered thence by the 
'Catholic Fathers and ancient Bishops.'"150His definition of necessary or 
essential doctrine brings in the branch-theory to validate Anglicanism; 
the introduction of "fundamental doctrines" is carefully glossed with 
the word ''essen t ia 1". 1 51 
Fundamentals - now popularised into the distinction between saving 
essentials, and non-essentials - play a vital role in Newman's anti-
Roman defence.152The static quality which has been a consistent feature 
of his characterisation of the fundamental faith may, moreover, be 
clearly seen, in his response to Wiseman, as a consequence of the need 
to hold Church authority and fundamental doctrine as far apart as 
possible, in order to avert the Romanist inference 
that the Church may create articles of 
necessar-y belief; that what was not necessary 
to be believed in order to salvation before her 
decision, becomes so afterwards.158 
Newman argues the faith to precede the Church, which merely guards 
what has been immutably given to it: 
Both parties consider 'the faith' to be 
necessary to salvation but we say that the 
faith is prior to the Church; they, the Church 
is prior to the faith. 1 54 
This distinction presents the problem for the placing of heresy 
which has a !ready been observed: heresy, arising later than the depos 1 t, 
cannot contradict the essentials of Christianity. There is something 
wrong with heresy, but Newman is not sure what it is. In attacking 
Wiseman's position of an infallible defining Church, he brings in 
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;;heresy and schism.11 to demonstrate that the Church is by no means as 
perfect as his opponent has suggested; they are 
spots and wrinkles in the Church during the 
time of their growth, and an enfeebling of her 
lvhen they were cast out. 1 S(':> 
This is perhaps sufficient to refute l:Jiseman's argument that the Roman 
Church had always maintained doctrinal purity. It is not, however, 
sufficient to explain why heresy was ever so vehemently condemned, if, 
despite it, there was always, unimpaired, "perfect maintenance of 
fundamental doctrine." 1 56 
Four months after Newman's initial response to l:Jiseman, he reworked 
much of his anti-Roman material into Lectures on the Prophetical Office 
of the Church, written in November, 1836.157An immediate assymetry 
arises in Newman's treatment of the two extremes to which the 'Via 
Media' is equally opposed. The two distinct polemical strategies, 
against Rome and against popular Protestantism, necessitate two 
different methods of placing heresy. That against Protestanism ~tenq~ 
the de f in i tion of heresy to cover rat ion a l ism and cryp to- infidelity. 
That against Rome restricts it to denial of the fundamentals, and 
castigates Her for unwarrantably extending her criterion of heresy to 
her additions to the fundamentals: 
We are at peace with Rome as regards the 
essentials of faith; but she tolerates us as 
1 itt le as she tolerates any sect or heresy. 1 ~"" 
Moreover, while Protestant error is heresy, the Roman is not, for Rome 
'"holds the foundation or is the truth overlaid with corruptions," 1 59and 
lacks the tell-tale mark of heresy, the tendency to unbelief.160 lt is, 
of course, indispensable to the argument on behalf of the Catholicity 
of his own communion that there be certain irrefragable fundamentals, 
shared by Anglican, Roman and Eastern Orthodox Churches. In the 
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division between belief and unbelief, he would have Rome on hi~ side, 
but Protestantism against him. 
Newman's attempt to construct a pattern of orthodoxy, while 
resisting the Roman claim that additions or corruptions are really 
developments, results in additional problems of definition. He presents 
orthodoxy as a fixed deposit, which the Church has no authority to 
alter, and joins Bull against Petavius, who 
consents that the Catholic doctrine of the Holy 
Trinity should so far rest on the mere 
declat~ation of the Church, that before it was 
formally defined, there was no heresy in 
rejecting it, provided he can thereby gain for 
Rome the freedom of making decrees unfettered 
by the recorded judgments of Antiquity. H'"' 
Newman defines the fixity by reference to the fundamentals: the 
"essentials" do not change, only the "superstructure" develops. He 
'rl 
enforces this distiction throughout the Lectures with a battery of 
,.. 
antitheses, drawn mainly from the Jager controversy, between essentials 
and non-essentials,162articles of faith and articles of religion,163 
terms of communion and disciplinary precepts,164 'saving' faith and local, 
or particular traditions,165and the basic outline of the Apostles' Creed 
and its developments in the technical definitions in the Nicene or 
Athanasian.166The antithesis is, however, blurred by the introduction of 
quinquesaecularism,1 67 for even the Prophetical Tradition of the first 
five centuries of the undivided Church has an authority going beyond 
mere articles of religion, and approximating to what is of faith. As in 
1834-, Nef:nllan proposes the Vincentian canon as a means of identifying 
the Catholic essentials, so as to distinguish them from the articles of 
religion of particular national Churches. Newman seems to mean by 
'orthodoxy' the deposit of apostolic tradition expressed in articles of 
faith. One might expect that he defines heresy as the denial of this, 
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but he by no means adopts such a consistent definition. 
His uncertainty about the exact content of the fundamentals and 
their relation to Antiquity is so persistent as to imply a chronic 
inability to declare what orthodoxy is. In the following passage, from 
his first Lecture, Newman epitomises "the relation which Romanism bears 
to Catholic Truth", as confirmed by a comparison of "the doctrinal 
articles of our own and of the Roman faith": 
In both systems the same Creeds are 
acknowledged. Besides other points in common, 
we both hold, that certain doctrines are 
necessary to be believed for salvation; we both 
believe in the doctrines of the Trinity, 
Incarnation and Atonement; in or ig ina 1 sin; in 
the necessity of regenet·a t ion; in the 
supernatural grace of the Sacraments; in the 
Apostolical succession; in the obligation of 
faith and obedience, and in the eternity of 
future pun ish men t. 1 ""'"' 
Newman's drift is familiar: Rome,though corrupt, holds to the 
fundamentals - it is "substantial truth corrupted.11169His allusion to 
"Catholic Truth" suggests that he is itemizing here what he thinks 
fundamental orthodoxy is. But it is a highly ambiguous passage. It is 
not clear, for example, if he identifies "the same Creeds" with "certain 
doctrines ... necessary to be believed for salvation", or even whether he 
means that Anglicanism and Romanism agree about the latter. Moreover, 
Newman's list of doctrines cannot all be identified with the 'essentials' 
or fundamentals, or the articles of the Creeds - sacramental grace and 
Apostolic succession are particular difficulties - but it is not certain, 
anyway, if he intends them to be. He is, in fact, appealing "to the 
common opinion of the world."170But this sits uneasily with the 
distinctions about fundamentals which he has also imported directly 
from the Jager debate. Common sense, indeed, could only with difficulty 
be described as a characteristic of this more theoretical strand of the 
Lectures. e sentence such as, 
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Scripture is the foundation of the Creed, but 
belief in Scripture is not the foundation of 
belief in the Creed, 171 
is hardly an appeal to '0comrnon opinion". About generalities, Newman is 
precise but arcane. Yet when he comes to specify the content of 
orthodoxy, he attempts to evade, with bluff practicality, the tighter 
distinctions he has elsewhere established. 
Nowhere is this difficulty about the nature of orthodoxy more 
apparent than in the treatment in the Lectures on the Prophetical 
OfFice, which have inherited all the unresolved conundra of the Jager 
controversy, about whether heresy is to be placed in opposition to 
articles of faith, or articles of religion. Newman's oscillation on this 
point emerges starkly. On the one hand, he can declare heresy to be a 
denial of the essentials, the fundamental faith: 
The Creed commonly so called, not in its mere 
letter, but in its living sense, is this Faith, 
'the engrafted word, which is able to save our 
souls;' to deny or resist which, is no lawful 
use of Private Judgment, but heresy or 
seep tic ism. We find it declared, .. by the Church 
in the beginning; we find it actually 
maintained by all its branches even in this day 
of division." 72 
On the other hand he can declare that the Church may rightly exclude 
those who oppose its teaching even as it goes beyond the essentials:173 
Let this maxim be laid down concerning all 
that the Church Ca tho lie holds, to the full 
extent of her Prophetical Trad 1 t ion, viz. that 
her members must either believe or s llen t ly 
acquiesce in the whole of tt. 1 74 
Tht.s 1s how Newman meets "the difficulty of drawing the line between 
essentials and non-essentials'0: 176 the Church demands an uncritical 
assent even for teachings that are, confessedly, non-fundamental. She 
will tolerate those who keep quiet, but may legitimately crush 
persistent critics, that is, the ''hopelessly contumacious.'0176 
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Yet Newman has to confront the fact that, in the face of evolving 
theological terminology, it was not always easy to decide who was being 
contumacious. A day arrived when the Homoousion became a test of 
orthodoxy, when it had not been so before: were all those who refused 
to accept it heretics? Although Newman would have all who failed in 
acquiescence, obedience and passivity in their demeanour towards the 
Church - all troublemakers, in a word - to be heretics, yet he shrinks 
from the idea that the Church defines the essential Faith, in reaction 
to heresy, by adding fresh articles - for to admit this would be to 
play into the hands of Rome. He dare not therefore place defined 
dogmatic articles, such as the Homoousion, in direct opposition to 
heresy, lest a defining authority be conceded: the "Rule of Faith11 is, 
for Newman, 
'sole, unalterable, unreformable;' not a hint 
being given us of the Church's power over it. 
To guard and to transmit it, not to remodel it, 
is her sole duty. 177 
Newman explains the relation between new articles, such as the 
Homoousion, and the static, fundamental faith, by borrowing Bull's 
defence of the Nicene dogma based upon the distinction between words 
and things. The Homoousion, Newman argues, was an explanation of what 
was already known unambiguously;1781 it was 
merely in explanation of a great article of 
faith, held from the first, but then needing, 
from circumstances, a more accurate 
wording. 1 79 
Dogmatic articles, then, are the clearer articulation of what had 
always been understood by the Church, necessitated by agitation on the 
part of heretics for a re-definition ("a- new- sense"P 90of the' Creed. The 
Church learns nothing new about its understan .ding of the deposit, in 
its encounter with heresy. It is the heretics who desire development of 
-268-
doctcine; 1t is in sticking out fm~ this that their contWll.acy consists. 
Newman argues that the Homoousion was not a development in this sense: 
rather, its function was "to fix and perpetuate"191 the unalterable 
meaning that had always been held by the Church. Nevertheless, there 
were some "who repudiated the Homoousion with an unaccountable 
violence'' who yet were not really heretical, because they held to an 
orthodox meaning, and only choked at the word. Newman cites with 
approval St. Athanasius's toleration of such "semi-Arians" as these, 
admitting them to communion .1 82 
To keep the essential Creed static by recourse to the re-
description, as "explanation", of dogmatic definitions which appear as 
additions to the creed is a desparate shift. It does not cover many 
dogmas which Newman thought it heresy to deny. In a passage recounting 
what he thinks St. Athanasius would have said had he met Pelagius, for 
example, Original Sin is made an explanation of "forgiveness of sins" in 
the Nicene Creed. This stretches "explanation" as far as development. As 
the Roman Catholic Newman remarked many years later, in one of the 
numerous glosses upon this text: 
Surely this is giving up the point in dispute. 
Or ig ina l Sin is as much external to the Creed 
as the Imrnacu late Concept ion. 1 """ 
Newman's attack upon this aspect of his earlier self is rejoined in 
his commentary upon a passage in Lecture X where the Homoousion is 
expounded as a verbal explanation of an eternally immutable reality.' 94 
The Tractarian Newman argues that the "article of the Homoousiorf' is 
GOtrue but not necessary'11 85and characterizes it very much as an article 
of religion - disciplinary, not fundamental and imposed on pa.in of 
anathema only upon clergy and theologians. The placing of heresy is 
crucial: 
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the mass of Christians [were) left as they 
<.vere before, neither pledged as if teacher-s, 
nor expelled as if heretics. 1 '"""· 
On "heretics", the later Newman demurs: 
This is not quite the point. It was not a 
difficulty of doctrine at Nicea, but of a word; 
the doctrine was both true and necessary, and 
the mass of Christians were so zealous for it 
as not to need to be pledged. 1 ''' 7 
Here, he sees the ''word10 as vital to the Nicene faith. He is, 
accordingly, in his account of those "parties" who 'refused the word', 
much harder on the Semi-Arians than in the .text of the Lectures on the 
Prophetical OFfice - he now sees them as "pious but subtle-minded and 
perverse.'11 138Perhaps, over the abyss of years, Newman is glancing 
critically at his earlier self. 
The Lectures, then, fail to surmount the problems of defining ~ 
orthodoxy which Newman had encountered in the Jager controversy. This 
is not surprising - in the interim, he has become less reflective and 
even more obsessive, feverishly hacking out a clearing in which to 
stand. The obstinate presence of heresy refuses to fit his scheme, and 
he, with equal obstinacy, refuses to modify his scheme to place it. In 
the end, his frankest reaction to heresy is exasperation: 
If, after all, persons arose, as they would 
arise, disputing against the fundamentals, or 
separating on min or points, let them go their 
way: 'they went out from us, because they were 
not of us'. They would commonly be 'men of 
corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the 
fai th. 11 89 
Unwilling to decide if heresy be a fundamental or a non-fundamental 
error, Newman falls back upon his earliest, and most obvious, 
characterization of it as personal inauthenticity <"corrupt", · 
"reprobate"). yet in his approximation of heresy to schism, he reveals 
how much public eccles ias tical order is on his mind: the heretic is 
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essentially a trouble-maker. That the dissident is - here almost by 
definition - reprobate is a maxim more extreme than any adopted even 
at the apogee of his defence of ancien regime. His succeeding sentences 
betray a flicker of unease, as he faces the possibility ("extraordinary 
cases") that "better men" may be heretics, but he would still have them 
"!'"'t rmt of the Church for their error's sake, and for their 
contumacy.'0190This is a problem for God to sort out, providing '0 in His 
own inscrutable way for anomalies which His revealed system did not 
meet."1 91 In practice, Newman invokes the authority of the Church. He 
will not call this "infallibility", but rather "the confidence and 
obedience of her members". 1 92Th is benign phrase, however, introduces a 
procedure which emerges, only a few lines later, as something 
altogether more brutal: "the proud and self-willed disputant" will be 
"dis carded without the perplexed inquirer suffering",' 93once 
ecclesiastical power is exercised. In the end, then, Newman hoped that 
all dissidents would either go away of their own accord to start a 
sect, or that the Church would be able to throw them out. It is 
unlikely that he was expressing such hopes with any conviction: 
experience would already have adequately disappointed him. 
Newman was more effective when he avoided exposing his weaknesses 
by drawing out all the implications of his position. It is, perhaps, for 
this reason that his Preface to the translation, made by R.W.Church, of 
the Cathecheses of Cyrll of Jerusalem,194written a year later than the 
Lectures, has not even today lost its power to convince.' 95Many of the 
features which have been prominent in Newman's treatment of 'Antiquity' 
so far - necessary doctrine or fundamentals·, consensus patrum, 
Scripture and Tradition, and, of course, heresy - reappear. The placing 
of heresy in the argumentative pattern is, however, markedly different 
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rr-om what has gone before, for, after all, this time Newman is arguing 
the writings of a Father, who was, in some sense, heretical, to be, in 
some sense, nonnative. It was a confident performance, at the high point 
of Newman's Tractarianism, just before he began to falter. 196 It belongs 
to the most ambitious of all Tractarian enterprises, the Oxford Library 
of the Fathers,' 97 1n which Newman and his allies launched into 
translation, passionately believing that the ancient past could be shown 
to be on their side - as much a rhetorical as a scholarly effort, in 
its desire to bring over the English people by imbuing them with a 
particular vision of the meaning of Antiquity. The Oxford Library at 
least began with pretensions to impartial autonomous scholarship, in 
that interpretative notes accompanying the text were deliberately 
eschewed. 1 98Bu t even in its second publication, Newman's Pre Face to the 
plain text directs the reader's attention towards what is significant 
for the contemporary debate about 'the religion of the day'. 
Newman argues that "necessary" or "apostolic" doctrine is contained 
in Scripture but that the broad testimony of the early centuries of 
Antiquity is Scripture's interpreter. If we are to understand Scripture 
aright, therefore, we must betake ourselves to the Fathers.199Yet the 
Father whom Newman here introduces belonged to that school of opinion 
called 'Semi-Arian', which, disliking the Homoousion, occupied an uneasy 
middle ground, "disinclined both to the friends of Athanasius and to the 
Ar ians". 200 
The first task of the Preface is to explain this paradox: how an 
apparent heretic may be a witness for orthodoxy, against 'the religion 
of the day'. Newman uses a familiar strategy - the 'words-things' 
distinction - but it is more carefully integrated into his argument, and 
avoids the air of desparate special pleading, so evident in his 
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specifically anti-Roman apologetic. A mild-mannered "lover of peace", he 
was imposed upon by ~Qrds, the subtle argumentation of the Arian 
Acacius, without, however, being, in any respect, "an Arian or an 
Arianizer" himself.2 c"Cyril's orthodoxy, then, goes deeper than mere 
technicalities; "doctrine" is not words: 
Here is a \·JT iter, separ~a ted by whatever cause 
from what, speaking historically, may be call-::d 
the Athanasian school, susp1c1ous of its 
adherents, and suspected by them; yet he, when 
he comes to explain himself, expresses 
precisely the same doctrine as that of 
Athanasius or Gregory, while he merely abstains 
from the part leu lar theo log ica 1 term in which 
the latter Fathers agreably to the Nicene 
Council conveyed it.202 
How Cyril's doctrine could be "precisely the same" as Athanasius's, 
without using identical terms tormented Newman four years later.203 For 
the moment, his appeal is, once again, to a kind of common sense: it is 
possible to be technically and even theologically wronR, yet still in 
touch with the authentic voice of Christian tradition: of such as 
these,204 Newman declared, 
Their judgment, which was erroneou·.:>, 
own; the lr faith was not the irs 
shared with them by the whole 
world205 
·..;as their' 
only, but 
C:r1r ist ian 
Newman's principle here announced is not without r'elevance to his 
stance towards his own contemporary audience: the essential faith of 
Antiquity is a broad outline, witnessed by the unanimous convergeance 
of Fathers. It does not require a trained theologian to discern it. Just, 
then, as Cyril could fail on a technicality, while being essentially 
orthodox, so may a modern man of sense discern the mind of the 
primitive Church. Newman intends the Library of the Fathers to take 
patristic writings out of the realm of scholarship and into the arena 
of popular debate. 
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Newman can capitalize upon the experience of every zealous 
Christian who attempts to argue with another Christian who does not 
agree with him: invoking Scripture texts never seems quite to clinch it. 
As in the 1830's - so in the fourth century; but the latter age, by 
relying upon Tradition in the first instance, had at least a means of 
finding, hidden in Scripture, the texts to answer their difficulties: 
The Ar ian and other heresies obliged them [the 
Fathers] to appeal to Scripture in behalf of a 
certain cardinal doctrine \vhich they held by 
uninterrupted tradition; and thus they have 
been the means of pointing out to us 
particular texts in which are contained the 
great truths which were assai led .206 
Newman bypasses the question of the heretics' relation to the 
"uninterrupted tradition" - he implies they stand outside it, and are 
out of touch with the sensus communis, yet they provoke those with in 
to find it. Finding the grounds of truth in Scripture, as "elicited" by 
controversy, is ,then, a mysterious, but not a specialized task, - it 
comes within the ambit of a communal, if not an everyday experience. In 
a transition of feathery lightness from Antiquity to Reformation, 
Newman introduces "our Divines", and in an audacious feat of 
legerdemain re-presents the English Reformation, and all its tomes, as a 
sort of patristic revival: 
our Divines at and since the Reformation have 
betaken themselves to the extant documents of 
the early Church, in order to determine thereby 
what the system of Primitive Christianity was; 
and so to elicit from Scripture more completely 
and accurately that revealed truth, which 
though revealed there is not on its surface, 
but needs to be deduced and developed from 
i t,207 
But Newman cannot conceal an uneasy sense that such divines•" reflection 
upon revelation had a remote and theoretical quality - his very 
phraseology <"betaken themselves to the extant documents", "system"> 
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suggests that the ''Divines" are hardly eliciting from the "uninterrupted 
tradition" of the patristic age: they are trying to find out what it 
was, or even to re-create it; they seem as much outsiders as the 
Arians. 
Newman's attempt to construct, out of his patristic reading and the 
controversies of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century divinity, a 
rhetoric of orthodoxy with a common appeal to the person of ordinary 
intelligence is unconvincing - and failed ultimately to convince even 
Newman himself. He appeals to the obviousness of how it was in the 
f1t~t five centuries but never quite extricates himself from the 
theoretical difficulties lurking at the corners and margins of his 
discourse. Having committed himself to a view of both history and 
Tradition which presupposed consensus on the part of sensible people, 
he confronted the fact of heresy presenting an obstinately irreducible 
disagreement about the nature and significance of both, a fact he was 
forced to marginalize. But, in the end, he was both too honest and too 
perceptive not to be tortured by these difficulties. In his 85th Tract, 
Holy Scripture in Its Relation to the Catholic Cree<F08 <1838), he 
argues, along lines now familiar, that Tradition as manifested 
especially in the first five centuries, points to the truths hidden in 
Scripture. But he is no longer confident, too aware of difficulty for 
his own happiness: 
Doubt and difficulty, as regards evidence, 
seems our lot; the simple question is, What is 
our duty under it? Difficulty is our lot, as 
far as we take it on ourse 1 ves to inquire; the 
multitude are not able to inquire and so 
escape the tria 1; but when men inquire, this 
trial at once comes upon them.2·0 ~' 
Ironically, it was in the same Tract that Newman had declared -
already, perhaps, more in hope than certainty - that 
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What is !'igh t and l'llha t is happy canna t in the 
long run and on a large seale be disjoined. To 
folloH after a truth can never be a subject of 
regret; free inquiry does lead a man to regret 
the days of his childlike faith; ther-efore it is 
not following after truth.21 0 
Indulging in that syllogistic manner absorbed from Whately, Newman 
exposes his characteristic duality with regard to theological 
reflection: on the one hand, he is a critical thinkPr. nn nrlP!"'t "'""'" ,.t 
the sorties of scepticism, on the other, he refuses, by an act of will, 
to embrace .. the kind of seeking which begins in doubt".211 
It is this duality which explains why the years 1839-1845 saw, 
unavoidably, both collapse, and, equally inevitably, reconstruction and 
reaffirmation. The collapse of the 'Via Media' did not happen just 
because events turned against him, but also because he found his 
pas it ion inadequate to an ever-increasing, erosive, inner critic ism: the 
experimentum crucis to which he refers in the Apologia was the pain of 
a religious being who, though he flinched from it, could not shut out 
the implications of his own intellectuality. Yet he would not allow 
himself the full scope of autonomous choice - the hair-esis - of 
following wherever criticism might lead - he feared the despair of 
scepticism: he yearned for authority and wholeness: 
we may seek some heresy or sect: true, we may; 
but are they more sure? are they not a par-t, 
while the Church is whole? Why is the part 
true, if the whole is not?212 
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~- Collapse. 
(a) Monophys it ism <1839-40) 
Newman had used analogy between past and present as polemic, 
subjecting his opponents to a hostile interrogation in which the 
pattern of the past laid bare their crypto-infidelity. When he came to 
portray his own period of doubt and self-questioning from 1839 to 
1843, he presented the analogical and critical structure of his own 
rhetoric as turning back upon himself, as he found his own position the 
subject of an inner inquest, in the same style of interrogation to 
which he had subjected his opponents. In his 1839 study of 
Monophysitism, the analogy turned: 
i>1y stronghold was Antiquity: now here, in the 
middle of the fifth century, found, as it 
seemed to me Christendom of the sixteenth and 
nineteenth reflected. I saw my face in that 
mirror, and I was a Monophysite. The Church of 
the 'Via r-~ed ia I was in the pas it ion 0 f the 
Oriental Communion, Rome was where she now is; 
and the Protestants were the Eutychians. 1 
And, quoting from Difficulties of Anglicans: 
It was difficult to make out how the 
Eutychians or Monophysites were heretics, 
unless Prates tan ts and Anglicans were heretics 
also; d iff icu l t to find arguments against the 
Tridentine fathers which did not tell against 
the Fathers of Cha lee don; difficult to condemn 
the Popes of the sixteenth century without 
condemning the Popes of the f1fth.2 
Newman's doubts are here depicted as taking on a rhetorical structure -
"'difficult to find arguments" ; he is always thinking of how to 
persuade, how to justify, imagining an audience. Indeed, he perceived, in 
1850, his 1840's experience of the bankruptGy of the 'Via Media' as a 
bankruptcy of rhetoric: 
What was the use of continuing the controversy 
or defending my position, if, after all, I was 
forging arguments for Ar ius or Eu tyches and 
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turning devil's advocate against the much-
enduring Athanasius and the majestic Leo?3 
These sources of Newman°s picture of 1839-4.3 - his fiercest anti-
Anglican polemic written in his Roman Catholic honeymoon period <1850)4 
and his own eloquent self-vindication against Kingsley 0864)5 - might 
lead one to suspect that the exigencies of later rhetorical strategies 
to be the internalization of the rhetorical might, equally~ be a later 
rhetoricization of past experience. Newman's later accounts need 
therefore to be considered in relation to the evidence of the time. 
Newman remembered Spring 1839 as his Anglican apogee: 
I had supreme confidence in my controversial 
status'"· 
By Summer, things were starting to go wrong. The underlying unease 
about whether or not the 'Via Media' really was so straightforward and 
sensible, hints of which are observable even in 1838,7 has become 
explicit: he now finds the debate between Roman and Anglican divines 
about Church and Catholicity to be "a tangled and manifold 
controversy ... not easy to sum up and settle.'19 Then came Monophysitism, 
studied between June 13th and August 30th, 1839, when 
for the first time a doubt came upon me of the 
tenableness of Anglicanism.:o• 
Newman's reminiscence is very precise: Monophysitism was the very first 
thing to worry him, before ~iseman's Donatist comparison, and long 
before the ''three blows" that broke him of the summer of 1841. He 
presents the inception of the 'Via Media"s collapse as an inner 
revolution, born of reflection, rather than as a consequence of public 
events. The Apologia's presentation is only to be expected: the purpose 
of Newman's narrative is to counter Kingsley's thesis that Roman 
Catholics are invariably shifty,H'by the powerful evocation of himself 
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as a conscientious man inwardly moved - to his great cost - by the 
inconvenient voice of truth. 
On the other hand, Newman's description of how Monophysitism 
worked upon him does not suggest that an immediate conversion from the 
rhetorical to the systematic or reflective took place, that he had at 
last brought heresy and orthodoxy into a relation conceding that the 
necessary faith must develop. Rather, the manner of Monophysitism's 
working is in touch with the public world of rhetoric of 1833-1838, the 
analogical use of heresy. According to the Apologia, Monophysitism did 
not disturb him because he thought he was, in his Christological 
doctrine, a l'lfonophysite. hlhat he presents as unnerving him, as he 
looked into the "mirror" of Antiquity,1 1 arises from a flash of 
imagination, a sickening intuition: he places his own 'Via Media' 
position in an analogical relation to the spectrum of ancient 
theological opinion, and finds in his own espousal of moderation, and of 
a conservative view of Tradition resisting development, the very 
qualities of the Monophysites, who, giving up the extremes of Eutyches, 
harked back to Cyril and Athanasius, but resisted the present voice of 
the Church in the Chalcedonian definition. As Martin Svaglic rightly 
comments: 
It is not the doctrines themselves 1-1h ich are 
significant for Newman's point here, but rather 
the mode in which a solution was reached.' ~' 
Newman's own dating of this inner experience at 1839 is, however, 
open to a number of difficulties. The rhetorical purpose of the 
Apologia has already been remarked. But what particularly provokes 
suspicion is that Newman does not support this splendid piece of self-
dramatization by any corroboration of letters or memoranda of the time 
- something he always does in the Apologia when he can - by drawing 
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upon what was by 1864- a large personal archive. He gives a lengthy 
quotation from Difficulties of Anglicans, "the account which I gave in 
1850, of my reasonings and feelings in 1839.'" 3 This work is, of course, 
dedicated to the public demolition of the cause he once espoused. It is 
Lfl this much later context that his remlniscence first appears as 
a key to the different parties and personages 
!.lhn hr~u<=> ficrnrori 1""\n tho r,.th.--lir 1-h.-, 
~ 
Protestant side at and since the era of the 
Reformation.14 
DiFficulties is, in turn, drawing upon the rhetoric of the Essay on 
Development <1845), which uses the analogy of the f/lonophysites to 
undermine the 'Via Media' 11 s i .n order to advocate the extreme of the 
Roman Catholic position as, in the light of Church history, the 
authentic inheritor of Antiquity. What Newman does no_! draw upon to 
substantiate his reminiscences are the papers on Monophysitism which he 
actually wrote in 1839, even though he had carefully kept them, along 
with his notes. This is not surprising, for they present a very 
different picture of Monophysitism from that which he put forward in 
1845, 1850 or 1864, and which only his Roman Catholic writings project 
back to the Long Vacation of 1339. 
Newman compiled three papers on Monophysitism in 1839, none of 
which ever appeared in published form. The manuscript entitled The 
Monophysite Heresy, dated August 23rd, 1839,16 is the longest paper 
Newman ever wrote which has remained unpublished. Rwming to eighty-
three pages, a meticulous and detailed examination of the patristic 
evidence about Eutychianism, and the relation of this extreme position 
to Monophysitism, it also contains an important strain of generalization 
about the nature of heresy. Then there is, secondly, a privately-printed 
paper, fourteen pages long, which Newman describes as "an abstract ... 
with Notes and References" of the long manuscript.17 Its style of 
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pt~esentation is comparable with that of the printed paper, 
Apollinarianism, based on the 1835 manuscript. Lastly, there is, another 
untitled, manuscript,19 of only eleven pages, dated 1839, which ends 
abruptly.It is possibly part of something Newman read, or intended to 
read, to the Theological Society. Its character is somewhat different 
from The fllonophysite Heresy, and contains material peculiarly its own. 
In none of these papers do we find the method of placing heresy which 
the Apologia describes as originating In 1839. 
It is, however, possible, In the light of Newman's autobiography, 
retrospectively to discern In the 1839 papers the stirrings of a 
profound unease, which only some years subsequently developed into a 
method of describing heresy, a ghostly, but nevertheless genuine, 
memory which he later expressed in the forms of his distinctively Roman 
Catholic rhetoric. The sense that Newman might have been, as early as 
1839, beginning unhappily to find points of correspondence between 
himself and the Monophysites emerges most clearly in the opening pages 
of The Monophysite Heresy. Here, he considers Monophysitism as the 
result of a zealously orthodox reaction against the Arian tendency: 
It may be obser·ved that, as Syria was the 
especial seat of Arianism, so Egypt which had 
res is ted it, was the seat of Monophys it ism, the 
counter er-ror which succeeded it. 1 ._,, 
That a defence of Christ's divinity - and such a defender was Newman 
himself - could ultimately result in one of the Church's greatest 
heresies was, no doubt, a disturbing thought. Newmanas topology hints at 
a frightening sense of closeness here: if Syria was the seat of 
rationalism and humanitarianiasm, then did its antithesis, "Egypt" - he 
cannot quite bring himself to write "Alexandria" - the home of Clement, 
Athanasius and Cyril, eventually spawn the most perduring and divisive 
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heresy in the history of the early Church? Newman implies a certain 
sympathy with the Monophysite ethos: 
As the Monophysite heresy is contrary to 
Arianism in doctrine, so, as might be expected, 
is it in its ethical character. It was far 
more subtle, specious and attractive to pious 
minds.20 
l:Jh ile the Ar ians were "able partizans and intriguers; men of the world", 
unscrupulous and "clear" <or - as he first wrote - "clever"> 
04disputants", the Monophysites are unworldy, unskilled in polemic <or 
'seem' so), motivated, in their refusal of the 5vo tprxTnc;, by reverence 
for the Son of God: 
they did not dare to use such a word as human 
nature of Him who had a divine nature.2 ' 
Or such, at any rate, was the zeal and reverence they professed: 
Newman's passages of sympathy with Monophysitism are usually 
accompanied by disclaimers ("seemed", "specious", and, most notably, 
''They had at first sight not little to say for themselves").22 
Nevertheless, an ominous, though dim, recognition of the face in the 
mirror has been registered. 
Moreover, in Newman's meticulously fair distinction between 
Eutychianism and Monophysitism, there emerges a quite new sense of the 
danger of a moderate position - of a 'Via Media' - in dogmatic 
controversies. Eutyches maintained two tenets, Newman argues, in his 
extreme emphasis upon the divine nature: that is, both that ·~hrist was 
of only one nature after the incarnation, and that he was not of our 
substance". tfuen pushed, he persisted in the former, for which he had 
Cyril's authority, but "wavered" in the latter.23Now the "Semi-
Eutychians" - after some vacillation, Newman concludes they actually 
existed24 - embraced the proposition from Cyril, but condemned what 
Eutyches "wavered" about.26Newman identifies Monophysitism as this 
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moderate 10Se!Iti-Eutychian'' position, holding Christ to be human, but 
denying He had a human nature, after the Incarnation. Christ's humanity 
was present, but not as nature: 
They held that the D 1 vine Nature of the Word 
had the addition of what viewed by itself was 
a human nature, but viewed in the Word thereby 
ceased to be a separate nature, but formed one 
nature with his Divine.:;;""· 
In this they held to Cyril's horror of Nestorianism - of introducing two 
distinct but irreducible principles of unity into Christ - and their 
determination was reinforced by their understanding of 'nature' ((l>ootc;> 
as synonymous with 'person' <vtroa'l'autc;J.27NeWiilan, then, was confronted 
with a moderate position eschewing both Eutychianism proper arid 
Chalcedonian orthodoxy, which maintained itself by the highly self-
conscious and theoretical adoption of fine distinctions. He may have 
seen a parallel between this and his own 'Via Media' but, if so, he did 
not remark on it, still less use it to 'place' the 'Via Media' as he did 
in 1845, 1850 or 1864. 
Finally, Monophysitism presented a disquieting challenge to the 
view of heresy as innovation, which Newman so often expressed between 
1833 and 1839. The Monophysites, far from being innovators, were 
traditionalist and conservative, resisting the apparently new ovo q~vunc; 
of Chalcedon with the JHa q~vutc; of their father, Cyril: 
They claimed but the use of what was already 
received, what had already been determined 
against heresy. They wished to add nothing, 
they said, they were con ten ted w 1 th what had 
been <they found> already provided for them.2 e 
But, again, although we may imagine that this may have disturbed 
Newman, he makes very little of it. Indeed, Newman describes Severus, 
"head of the Monophysite school", as distorting earlier tradition, in the 
interests of party spirit 029 much as Bull accused Sandius and Petavius. 
-283-
Of his predecessors, Severus taught, as Newman puts it, 19 that the 
Fathers economized91 in speaking of two natures 9 or that the earlier 
evidence for Chalcedonian orthodoxy may be dismissed on critical 
grounds: 
He at temp ted to prove some of their writings 
spurious, accounted for others on the plea of 
the Arian controversy which led to the fathers 
c;nPAkina- nf tha h.tn n"'htroc fnr thn .-oln-. ,-,+ 
& ..... --
at·gument and maintained that a form of speech 
which might be innocent before the Nestor ian 
controversy was highly dangerous since it."'' 0 
Thus to take a Monophysite to task ilnplies no intolerable unease with a 
view of Tradition which witnesses to an unchanging orthodoxy. The 
definition of Chalcedon is only made problematic, on Newman's argument, 
by the exigencies of heretical self-legitimation. 
If, then, there is at times a vague unease, there occurs, in The 
Monophysite Heresy, none of the stark and terrifying self-recognition, 
as Newman tells it in 1850 - and, again, in 1864. Nowhere is the 
rhetorical method of the mirror - placing modern theological parties 
against the spectrum of early Church opinion - deployed, or applied to 
Monophysitism, in the long 1839 manuscript. The explicit argument of 
this paper is quite otherwise: its method of describing and 
schematizing the heresy is, in fact, a revival of the heresiology of the 
1835 Apollinarianism papers. In the Long Vacation of 1839, he did not 
cook up a new method of treating Antiquity: he merely warmed up an old 
one. 
Wewman sees his Monophysitism papers as containing a story he left 
off when treating of Apollinarianism: indeed he opens The Monophysite 
Heresy by declaring the date of the enquiry to commence with 
Apollinaris in 361 A.D. and to end with the Vlth General Council, 
A.D.681.31 Apollinarianism he considers to be an early form of 
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Monophysitism. The same methods of analysis are deployed in 1839 as in 
1835: an apparently high Christology conceals an infidel tendency 0 which 
is revealed in its developments, as elicited either by logical inference 
or by the course of history: 
Though the Monophysite heresy is the 
contradictory of Arianism, yet strange to say, 
it comes round, when reasoned out, to somewhat 
,£..1........ ...... ...... ,.....,,,... ,~ ... ""..;.....,,.,. ,...,4_ ... 'h.l"'\ ..,.. __ <:ll .. 
-------, -------u ---r w· 
doctrines of Christ's Divinity, which it seems 
to be defending, equally with the vicious who 
impugned it. ~'2 
Although the detail of the process by which Monophysitism 'comes round' 
to infidelity differs from Apollinarianism, the underlying principle 
which accounts for the development is, in 1835 and 1839 alike1 made out 
to be rationalism. Thus he declares in 1839 0 that, for all their 
antipathy of ethos and language, Monophysitism shares with Arianism 
an allowance of abstract reasoning, in other 
words, that is, maintenance of intellectually 
conceived first principles in a matter which 
was purely of faith.3 '"' 
Later in the paper, Newman admits that it "may seem unfair to press 
upon the party who held it the conclusions which we draw from it as if 
such conclusions were <are> but our own."34Especially so - he frankly 
acknowledges it - since the ''Form of words may in certain cases be an 
accident and the character of mind represented be the real d[irelction 
for a derltain principle.1036He is aware of the force of such an 
objection, Jn the light of the Monophysite ethos of "especial. .. reverence 
and devotion".36He 'presses upon' them nevertheless because of his 
strong sense of the uncontrollable power of speculative reason, once 
let loose: whatever a moderate heretic may have meant to say, wherever 
he fixes his own sticking point, - 'thus far and no further,' - the 
"form of words" he has created takes on a life of its own, developing, 
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by laws of icon necessity, to the very edge - thus Newman's scholarship 
purposes to show - of atheism: 
consider-ing what a wakeful, operative, 
persevering pr inc ip le our reason is, how the 
mind is ever anticipating know ledge by means 
of it, ever darting forward to conclusions 
spontaneously, hot-J instinctive and strong and 
certain it is that, after all the differences of 
private judgment, yet on the long run and 
11lt.imr>h:=>l1T All m.:>n tl"f'm tho e<Omo :-'rom;e.-<"<"' 
arrive at the same conclusions.37 
Newman's handling of his patristic sources is dominated by this 
distinction, between the intentional features of a heretic's discourse, 
which lie on the surface but are of deceptive appearance, and the real, 
unintended, "conclusions" which may be drawn out of tendencies hidden, 
or embedded, in the language. The bulk of The Monophysite Heresy is 
dedicated to showing that the sources bear out this theory. His 
demonstration of the logic of heresy aims to show how Monophysitism 
tends ultilnately towards its very opposite, the denial of the Divinity 
of Christ which it appears so vehemently to be upholding. This is 
because 
Opinions apparently very opposite, or rather 
those which are apparently most so, agree in 
the major pz'em iss or principle on which they 
rest, and differ in the min or. Hence they are 
much more connected than at first might be 
supposed.::=""' 
Newman's manner of expressing this idea shows that, if he has sloughed 
off the Noetics' theological liberalism, he has retained their 
predilection for the syllogism. He even regards the Fathers as having 
divined instinctively what he will elicit logically: 
the Fathers often condemnn the most opposite 
heresies at once.'3 "-' 
First, Newman considers Eutychianism, out of which the more 
moderate Monophysitism or "Semi-Arianism'' eventually arose. He finds 
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that Eu tyches was "running in to the heresy he most hated, 
Nestorianism."40Drawing upon the critiques of Eutyches " as maintaining 
the impiety of Nestorius".41 Newman elicits the implicit Nestorianism of 
the Eutychian understanding of 'nature' <qHJuu;> and its relation to 
person (VJrou1:auu;>. Eutyches was unable to see how a nature could exist 
wi.thout oersonhood. This is the identical oreruiss adooted bv Nestorius. 
so that 
while here was an agreement in fundamen ta 1 
pr inc ip le at once, there would moreover be no 
great difficulty in their actually passing over 
from their own party to the opposite.42 
Newman's analysis immediately proceeds to elicit further, more 
radical and damaging consequences. He sees two possibilities: first, 
that the humanity of Christ is absorbed into the Divinity so as to be 
of one substance with it, and, in this case, 
nothing is left of Christ but the original 
Divine Nature; or 1 in other words 1 ther-e is no 
incarnation at all;4 '"' 
Secondly, that ''Christ was perfectus homo, though not consubstantial 
with us."44Eutyches, who wanted to hold to the Incarnation, drew back 
from the first but embraced the second. The orthodox (''Catholics"), 
however, "insisted" that even this second position entailed a 
consequence: "a change of the Godhead into flesh, or at least into some 
third new nature."45The Eutychians, themselves, "resisted this 
conclusion, .,maintaining their own language that the Word was '"changed 
into flesh without change'".46Pressed as to how this could be, 
they answered that 
explain the manner 
mystery."" 7 
they were not bound 
how, that it was 
to 
a 
Newman's self-inconsistency here, in the way his analysis tries to push 
the Eutychians out of "mystery" into rational explicitness, 1s difficult 
to palliate, when his own defence of Trinity and Incarnation so often 
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takes a similar refuge."-9 
As The Monophysite Heresy proceeds, we find Newman pushing the 
heresy further and further outside the circle of authentic Christianity, 
into the realm of infidelity. In a passage where he discusses what he 
sees as the crux of the controversy, he most forthrightly dismisses 
Eutychian pretensions to "mystery", by coining the startling phrase, 
"the mystery of unbelief in the Eutychian party'', which he finds to 
have been ''working out, by degrees and in diverse manners, through its 
various sects and champions, even when they seemed furthest from such 
a result.''49Here, Newman deploys the idea, familiar from the 1835 
Apollinarianism papers, of a heresy developing historically from a high 
Christology, via its sects, to the real unbelief underlying it. The 
"unbelief" of which Newman argues Eutychians were guilty was that they 
could not accept the human life and death of the Logos. Their strategy 
for evading this was ultimately destructive of the Incarnation - as 
much, and for the same reasons as Nestorianism: 
What the Nestor ians had avoided by separating 
the man from the God, Eu tych ian ism had evaded 
by denying the reality of the manhood.E' 0 
The remoter deductions, however, of Eutychians' "stumbling" at 
Christ•s humanity brings them to consequences they would never have 
even imagined. In the end, Newman sees them as implicit Socinians! These 
remarkable and radical conclusions occur at the very end of the long 
section on 'VEutychianism Proper~'~. They are what he has been working up 
to all along. Newman considers the Eutychian inability to accept the 
human nature of Christ as an implicit denial of his sufferings and 
death as man.5 'This entails, ultimately, denial of "the Atonement made 
for the sins of the world, the great revealed purpose of the whole 
Economy".52But they do not fall into this at once: there is a mediate 
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consequence - if Christ had one divine nature, then God suffered. They 
could hardly rest long in this "Theopaschism"; in the end it was too 
"shocking" and "repulsive" .53Beyond this halfway house lies an 
unavoidable alternative: 
either ... a denial of Christ's sufferings or of 
His Divinity.s 4 
The route to the first conclusion lies through a retreat from 
Theopaschism, to a Gnostic-Docetic position, that the sufferings of 
Christ were only apparent. Thus, 
A den ia 1 of the A toneroen t was the necessary 
consequence.55 
Finally, Newman brings Eutychianism round to a denial of what the 
heresy was so strenuous in upholding, the Divinity of Christ. Here, 
Newman's argument is highly scholastic: by denying a human nature in 
Christ, the Eutychians had to locate His priesthood, and therefore his 
suffering, in His divine nature. Christ, then, was "not man and yet 
passible", a supernatural being distinguishable from God by the fact 
that he suffered.56Thus Eutychianism and, by implication, Monophysitism, 
make Christ inferior to the Father and approximate to Arianism: 
the Monophys i te doctrine, denying the proper 
humanity of Christ, made him Mediator and High 
Priest according to His Divine Nature, which 
was notoriously a Platonic & Semi-Arian tenet, 
and favoured the idea of His inferiority to the 
Father as God.57 
Although Newman ruthlessly reduces the heresy to a form of virtual 
Socinianism, he initially admits a degree of ambiguity about the 
heretic: ethos is held in tension with logical consequence. He ends his 
section on ''Eutychianism Proper" with a meditation upon "the view" 
which "ecclesiastical history" gives of "the personal character of 
heretics", a view than which "perhaps there is nothing ... more awful."'58 
The 'awfulness' consists, not as one might expect, in the baseness of 
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heretics; but in the tragic contrast between the frequent excellence of 
their characters and the gravity of their error: 
mean there is so much about them good, 
interesting, at least exciting our com pass ion. 
The case of Eutyches is more to the point here 
perhaps than other-s, for the clear- and awful 
condemnation with which his doctrine is 
mentioned in 'Every spir-it that confesseth not 
that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not 
of r.nrl. ;mrl thic: 
Antichrist •.s·.~· 
Newman's evident sympathy for Eutyches makes him steel himself 
To say that perhaps Eutyches did not hold this 
doctrine really, is scarcely in point. We can 
but judge from appearances. He seems to hold 
it and he seems a harmless innocent man - one 
appearance is likely to be as wrong as the 
other:=·o 
The ambiguity of the situation thwarts Newman's natural tendency to 
argue from ethos to truth or error ("We know of course that evil is 
joined with evil - not evil with goodq161 >.But he pulls back ultimately 
from the paradox - good ethos: false doctrine - and re-states what the 
'awfulness' consists of: 
it is awful that our view of things is so 
untrustworthy; and that good and evil are so 
mixed together that we must not <dare not> 
rely on our judgment ."' 2 
Thus is ambiguity too much to bear, and he resolves it in 
characteristic manner, scepticism anaesthetizing the judgment, that 
authority may be unquestioningly embraced: 
we ... must act in all things singly from what 
God's word commands.63 
mten Newman moves to the Monophysites or "Semi-Eutychians", we may 
suppose that his sympathy is even greater. This does not, however, 
exempt them from having similar consequences drawn out from their 
teaching: Monophysites, too, are infidels by inference. As the 
Monophysite position is both more subtle and moderate than the 
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Eutychian, so is the logical procedure by which Newman elicits his 
conclusion more finely-drawn and elaborate. In seven pages of close 
analysis at the end of the paper,64he essays a demonstration of how 
Monophysitism may be logically brought round both to Arianism, (denial 
of Christ's Divinity) and to docetism (denial of his humanity>, so that 
this most 'orthodox• of heresies entails a total destruction of the 
Incarnation. 
The analysis commences from a refutation of the "philosophical 
grounds~ upon which Monophysites' Christology was based, the denial 
that a nature may exist without an hypostasis or person, which led 
inevitably to their inability to see that the unity of Christ could be 
affirmed without maintaining only one nature.65Although it is true that 
"every nature, if it really exists & is not a mere word expressive of a 
generalization of the mind, must exist in an individual," it is not true 
that a nature must always have an hypostasis of its own, for a nature 
may exist as individualized in another hypostasis. Here Newman is 
arguing along the lines of the orthodox Fathers he was reading: 
the Catholics distinguished between hypostasis 
and enhypostaton, individual & individualized 
or in individuality. They allowed that no 
physis ·or ousia could exist except at least 
individualized, but they denied that it need be 
an individual, since it might belong to an 
ind iv idua 1."'·6 
Thus the ~ord "had taken to Him a manhood, but so that it became 
attached to his individuality as a part of Him."67There was, therefore, 
one person of the Word, but two natures, the human nature being in 
itself impersonal but taking on personal lndividuali ty from the Divine. 
Newman's analysis of the Monophysite position, in contrast to which 
he has so carefully drawn the orthodox stance, proceeds by way of 
inference, 
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A oar-tic ioa t ion 
l l 
in the pr~ inc i p le involved a 
part ic ipa t ion in its consequences."':':'' 
The Monophysite equation of person with nature leads, Newman argues, 
logically to Sabellianism, if the one divine nature is considered, or to 
tritheism, if the three persons in God are held to.69Next, Newman sees 
the Monophys i te formula p. ta q>IJ(J"tf; uvvfk-'coc;, ('one nature of the union') 
divine and human "went to make up one nature", then the "result, thus 
gained" must be seen as ''more perfect than the parts of which it is 
composed.'070 lt follows - this is the "drift of it .. - that the Eternal 
Word went on to perfection by the Incarnation"71 - which derogates the 
Word's eternal perfection. Finally, Newman would have the Monophysites 
to destroy the humanity of Christ also. Indeed, he regards the pta q>VUtf; 
as totally destructive of the Incarnation: 
Then again as this tenet of the mia ph,vsis 
derogated from our Lord's Godhead, it could not 
but impair the doctrine of His manhood ... In 
order that God might certainly be r-eceived as 
man, and man held to be God, it seemed to 
teach that Christ came short of being God in 
that He was man, and of man in that He was 
God. 7 '2 
The Monophysites, then, are subjected to all the severest censures of 
the ''Eutychians Proper". Both, in fact, are brought round to a virtual 
Arianism. 
Although Newman's line on heresy remains, despite the Apologia, 
overwhelmingly in continuity with that of the mid-1830's,73 the subtle 
linguistic distinctions of the Monophysite-Eutychian controversy - so 
confusing that even the clear-headed Leo at first hesitated to condemn 
Eutyches - have brought out a sharper awareness than before of the 
cruciality of dogmatic language <word§., as opposed to things>, and of 
its capacity for creative development. The Monophysite Heresy contains 
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an eloquent passage on the dynaiD1c mannet~ in which the Chur·ch uses 
human language, and even the teriDs of pagan philosophy, to formulate 
its doctrines, transforming such words in the very process of their 
appropriation: 
the Church forms its own language, it remodels 
the tongues of earth, it creates as soc ia t ions. 
No theology could be formed without allowing 
L\....-. rt... .. --L.. J..'L.~- •• \.....! -L. ,:_ -'---1 
philosophy assumes in 
province74 
its own particular 
At this point, Newman creates for himself an alarming objection: a 
tu quoque is possible, for as the Church has framed a language - in 
this case that of Chalcedonian orthodoxy - so has Eutychianism. They 
are both equally contestable: 
Was the language used by Christian theologians 
in the doctrine of the Incarnation open to 
obJections near~ ly so 
brought against their 
of the Eternal Sonship 
plausible as must be 
[ Eu tych ians 'J exposit ion 
of the Word?7 .s 
But having seemed to concede - albeit "for argument's sake"76 - a 
legitimate pluralism in ancient Christological formulations, he will not 
pursue its implications for the placing of heresy. Rather, he deploys 
political and psychological description to demonstrate the Eutychians' 
personal inauthenticity. They are, firstly, found guilty of a schismatic 
mentality: even if valid, their objections to Chalcedonian orthodoxy 
were "a poor ground for causing a schism in the Church."77They held 
out, moreover, because of "some real peculiarity of temper, which was 
likely to go, and in the event did go, much further.'1713If the Eutychians' 
conscious intention was to defend a particular theology, the very 
pertinacity with which they maintained it argued the covert operation 
of sinister forces, deeper and more powerful than any dialectic: 
Their real objection lay, not against the word 
nature, but against the humiliation which the 
assumption of that nature implied; and whether 
consciously or not, they objected to the word 
na tuce, in ordet' 
shock which the 
their feelings73 
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to mask the 
humiliation 
fat'Ce of 
itself gave 
the 
to 
Thus they "stumble" at the very Incarnation i tse If. The moment has 
passed - and Newman is back on familiar ground, having psychologized, 
characterized, rhetoricized heresy for all he is worth, as he swerves 
tram a systematic and reflective examination of the confrontation of 
Monophysite with Chalcedonian language. 
Newman's second piece of work on Monophysitism80 is different in 
character from The Monophysite Heresy: it is less logical and 
analytical, with an intet'est in the psychological and political origins 
of heresy. However, it no more bears out Newman's later descriptions of 
1839 than the longer manuscript. Nowhere is Monophysitism compared 
with the 'Via Media'. There are, indeed, fewer hints of unease in this 
paper than in the other. Newman holds the heresy disdainfully at arm's 
length, and minimizes the difficulty of the evolution of orthodox 
language. Concerning the dispute over the natures in Christ, he demands, 
Who could have supposed that any difficulty 
could arise on so plain a point; or, if a 
difficulty, more than a difficulty of words?81 
Newman's theme is the rise of heresy, a subject he admits is "very 
obscure and can seldom be investigated without theorizing."82His 
opening aetiological flourish imitates the pronouncement of so many 
ancient writers: the origin of heresy is the Devil, that father of 
lies.83But Newman's own first theory is a speculative, psychological one: 
heresy originates in the labyrinth of "subtle minds", of those who, 
having obscured what was originally quite clear, fall into a '5tate of 
chronic perplexity: 
They cannot view the subject in the plain 
straightforward way they did at first.'" 4 
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Comu10n-sense meEU! ing is lost in a pro 1 if era t ion of "strained" or 
"unnatural'' senses. Unaware of the disorder" of their "critical powers", 
they 
persist, at a time when they should fall back 
upon authority, to decide, under so great a 
disadvantage, by their private judgment,85 
and so become committed to a heresy, which once embarked upon, 
"deviates further and further from the way of Truth.'ce6 
This description has much in common with the writings of the 
1830's, and especially Tract 73, where heresy is closely associated with 
the abuse of private judgment. There is a fresh nuance here, however: 
whereas, in 1835, heresy is seen as as the result of a rationalistic 
simplification, a 'reduction to system' of the boundless mystery of the 
revelatum, here, in 1839, it obfuscates the essentially plain and simple 
truth. Yet the view is itself in touch with a marked feature of 
Newman's earlier Tractarian rhetoric - the appeal to common-sense. His 
1839 theorizing also implicitly draws upon the static concept of 
orthodoxy which has prevailed since 1832, for he supposes that a pure 
and simple truth preceded a corrupting intellectualism. 
The rise of Monophysitism is also explained by reference to an 
elaborate historical theory, which traces the origin of the heresy back 
to fourth-century Apollinarian factions. Newman's explanation of how 
this can be, in view of the ninety-year gap between Apollinaris and 
Eutyches, is ingenious. He dates the rise of Eutychianism from 4-28, 
when the rump of the Apollinarian secession applied for re-admission to 
the Great Church. They were received 
without a real abandonment of their heretical 
opinions, the circumstances of the times 
favoring [sic] such an oversight. No wonder 
that in consequence the controversy had to 
come over again ,07 
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The '1circumstances" were favourable because of the react ion against 
Nestor ian ism: 
the necessary resistance to it would both 
clothe and foster the opposite error?8 
Nestorius tended to push into Monophysitism those whom "he did not 
pey-suade". As a y-esult of Nestorianism, there was an "existing or rather 
pre-existing disposition of the Church tmmrnc; Mnnnnhu<=dHcm " c-.n -1-h~l-
its "outbreak00 was "inevitable'0 , once Nestorius was overthrown.890nce 
the heresy broke out, the form of Apollinarianism, from which 
Eutychianism, and then Monophysitism grew, was a more tenacious and 
subtle one, which had the advantage of being able to invoke Cyril's 
language (one nature or hypostasis) on its side: 
It had learned to state its errors more 
guacded 1 y, and to defend them more speciously; 
and it claimed the especial sanction of that 
portion of the Church, which, undet' Cyril of 
Alexandria as leader, had fought with its own 
adherents against the Nestorians.30 
This theory is a projection into the ancient past of a contemporary 
preoccupation which had been with Newman since the late i820's - the 
urgent and almost obsessive desire, in the wake of an ancien regime's 
collapse, to shore up the established Church's visible order and 
Wel.S 
coherence, as it fragmented into parties, and challenged by Dissent. 
" 
Just as, in the 1830's, it was proposed that tests, statutes and 
anathemas be waived so as to admit alien elements, so in the early 
400's, a Church alarmed by Nestorianism was too liberal in its re-
admission, on insufficiently stringent terms, of Apollinarians, whose 
residual heresy was the seed of a later, indissoluable dispute. Indeed, 
Newman's choice of phraseology shows that the underlying mofivation 
dictating his characterization of Monophysitism in 1839 is not new: it 
still belongs to the overall strategy, commencing in 1832, of which the 
-296-
'Via Media' was a part. 
There is nothing new either in his understanding of dogmatic 
definition in the face of heresy. Newman, while admitting the extreme 
subtlety of the distinctions between Chalcedonian, Eutychian and 
Monophysite, betrays less anxiety about the complex issue of dogmatic 
languagg, than is the case in his longer paper, The Monophysite Heresy. 
Indeed, the final pages rely31 rather heavily upon the words-things 
distinction he so often makes in the Tractarian period to get himself 
out of difficulty. Here, it is 
not a difficulty of argument as to the 
doctrine itself and its importance but as to 
the measures to be taken, or the test adopted 
for defending the doctrine.~-'2 
The Church's "difficulty" was not that it did not know what the true 
doctrine was, and had always been, but only which word to choose to 
express it, in such a way as to safeguard it: 
Leo alone and his section of the Church was 
clearsighted enough to see where the danger 
lay and how to obviate it .c'' 3 
Newman remains committed, in Summer 1839, to the static concept of 
orthodoxy to which he had adhered since the late 1820's. 
An examination of the unpublished material on Monophysitism 
suggests several possible conclusions about the importance of Summer, 
1839, as the first point in the collapse of the 'Via Media'. The first 
possibility has already been raised: that Newman rhetoricized his 
earlier self, so that 1839 might serve a place in his Roman Catholic 
polemic, that is that, what was, at most, a seminal unease was 
massively expanded, and expressed from a later perspective as the 'face 
in the mirror'. Such a conclusion has the advantage of taking fully into 
account the rhetorical nature both of the Apologia's account and of the 
passage in DiFficulties of Anglicans which it cites. It is to suggest 
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that so dominant was the rhetorical in Newman's mentality that the very 
act of remembering was also a rhetorical procedure, and that his 
understanding of himself was caught up in the elaborate structure of 
self-justification, which his prominent public position could almost be 
said to necessitate. It is to move towards a view of early nineteenth-
rPntllrv thP.nln~rical reflection. and even of individual religious self-
understanding as socially or politically pre-constructed; particular 
responses to change would therefore be inescapably rhetorical, if 
private reflection and public discourse could no longer be confidently 
separated. 
Such a view, however, leaves no room for a more conventional, and 
on the face of it, common-sense, view that individuals have private 
access to their own experiences, which they, and they alone, can 
remember. If this be accepted, then Newman's Roman Catholic 
reminiscences about August, 1839, are uncri ticizable: one would have to 
conclude that he did indeed so early recognize himself as 'Monophysite' 
in the special sense recounted in Difficulties of Anglicans, even though 
there is very little trace of any such experience in the writings of 
1839 on that heresy - we must, as it were, take his word for it! To do 
this entails seeing Newman omitting from his writings any reference to 
a major anxiety destructive of his whole 'Via Media' position. This 
would have been either a massive act of suppression, or again, a 
rhetorical necessity, for, although the Monophysitism manuscripts were 
never published, it does not follow that they were private, or secret, 
reflections. Indeed all the evidence, indicates that they were intended 
to form a part of his public discourse: they are shot through with the 
rhetorical procedures deploying heresy, that are entirely characteristic 
of all his other Tractarian writings. To include the parallel between 
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Monophysites and Tractarians in his 1839 writings would have been to 
turn his guns on his own friends, allies and disciples, and on the 
position which he still publicly stood for. He was not yet ready to do 
that. 
There is, however, another, more probable interpretation, mediating 
between these two extreme solutions. It may be argued that Newman did, 
in fact, form an analogy between the 'Via Media' and Monophysitism in 
1839 - but not until about a month after he had completed his studies 
of it, when, in September, 1839, he read Nicholas Wiseman's Dublin 
Review article on the "Anglican Claim".94This acted as a catalyst in the 
format ion of the image which fixed what had been, a man th earlier, a 
vague unease. The idea of the Monophysite "face in the mirror" arose 
out of the turmoil provoked by Wiseman's adept public challenge, rather 
than the scholarly researches of his closet some weeks before. But it 
remained a private ghost. Newman did not deploy it rhetorically until 
the desperate rearguard action of 1839-41 had conclusively failed. Such 
an interpretation is implied by the Apologia's narration of the initial 
alarming effect upon Newman of Wiseman's challenge, but unlike the 
immediately preceding account of the Long Vacation, this reminiscence is 
borne out by corroborative evidence from the period in question. 
In the Apologia, Newman tells us that he was unmoved by Wiseman's 
comparison between Anglicanism and Donatism, but that it helped him to 
see that Monophysitism was a disturbingly apt analogy: 
It [Donat ism] was a case of A 1 tar against 
Altar, of two occupants of the same See, as 
that between the Non-jurors in England and the 
Established Chur-ch; not the case of one Church 
against another, as of Rome against the 
Orienta 1 Monophys i tes ... 'Securus jud ica t orb is 
terrarum ' ... were words which went beyond the 
occasion of the Donat is ts: they app 1 ied to that 
of the Monophys 1 tes.-c••.o. 
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This description of Monophysitism resembles that of the Essay on 
Development raising the problem of national secessions against which, 
as he later argued, papal supremacy developed. However, the 'application' 
of Monophysitism does not have any doctrinal dimension, as one might 
expect when the attention is shifted from schism to heresy. Newman's 
'placing' of the heresy is entirely f.10 lit ica 1: Monophys it ism's schismatic 
quality is uppermost in his thinking, not its distinctive theology. In 
this, he follows Wiseman, whose application of Donatism is applied 
especially to the break with Rome in the reign of Henry VIII. 
The "stomachachelt96 which Newman contracted on this occasion was 
perhaps caused by the fact that, for the first time, he had received a 
dose of his own medicine: Wiseman is no less inventive in the 
ana log ica 1 rhetoric which he app 1 ies to 'Via Media' Anglican ism, than 
Newman himself on the subject of liberalism and ultra-Protestantism. 
Wiseman is often wickedly particular and unsettling: Anglican and 
Donatist schisms were occasioned, he tells us, by the pique of two 
powerful women, Ann Boleyn and Lucilla, respectively;97both involved 
the theft of Church propedy - het'e he brings together the dissolution 
of the monasteries and the issue of lost Church plate in Donatist 
Africa;98both Donatists and Tractarians insisted on being called 
'Catholics';99Donatists justified themselves, like Anglicans, by supposing 
the corruption, at a particular instant of time, of the universal 
Church.100Wiseman even finds Donatists to possess a Branch Theory of 
their Catholicity, and to have had a "High Church party."101 These are 
debating points. But Wiseman's placing of Donatism argues a way of 
discerning the judgment of Antiquity which brutally cuts through the 
elaborate distinctions of Tractarian argument: 
by the Father's, who combated [sic] the 
Donat is ts, the quest ion was essen tia ll y 
considered one of fact rather than of right; 
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that is to say, the very circumstance of one 
porUcui.'~r Church being out of the ag8regation 
of other Churches, constituted these judges 
over the other, and left no room for 
questioning the justice of the condemnation.''":: 
Wiseman has invoked common sense, just as Newman, in his use of 
Antiquity. But whose common-sense interpretation was to be chosen? 
Newman's correspondence at the tlme indicates strongly that he felt 
the pull of Wiseman's, and had begun to doubt his own. Here, for the 
first time, a month after he wrote on Monophysitism himself, appear the 
first expressions of anxiety about the thre~t the case of that heresy 
presents to his own position. Donatism and Monophysitism equa_l!y haunt 
him. Monophysitism has only become a threat after he has read Wiseman. 
Thus, writing about Wiseman's "Anglican Claims" in late September, 1839, 
to Frederick Rogers, Newman declared 
we have sprung a leak ... It is no laughing 
matter.' 0 ~' 
At about this time, according to a reminiscence of Henry Wilberforce, 
Newman, in a walk in the woods with his friend, confided a doubt if 
Rome might not, after all, be right: 
the t1vo examples ~oJh ich had inspired the daub t 
the position of St. Leo in the !Ylonophysite 
controversy, and the pr inc ip le securus jud ica t 
orbis terrarum in that of the Donatists.' 04 
The Monophysite analogy here is a secret anguish, confided to a friend, 
rather than a rhetorical strategy - provoked not by his own studies of 
the heresy, but by hliseman's article. 
Newman's unreadiness publicly to make the Monophysite-'Via Media' 
parallel is confirmed by his response to Wiseman in his British Critic 
article of January, 1840, a vigorous re~assertion of Tractarian 
ecclesiological prtnciples' 05which suppresses the inner anxiety. In a 
reminiscence of November, 1843 - by which time, of course, the 
-301-
rhetorical usefulness of the Monophysite analogy to his new position 
had become apparent - Newman told J.B.Mozley of the destructive effect 
of Wiseman's challenge, and the way he tried, in, 1839, to write his way 
out of it: 
Last summer four years <1839> it came strongly 
upon me, from reading first the iVlonophysite 
controversy, and then turning to the Donat is t, 
that we were external to the Catholic Church. I 
have never got over this. I did not, however, 
yield to it at a 11, but wrote an article in the 
'British Critic' on the Catholicity of the 
English Church, which had the effect of 
quieting me for two years. Since this time two 
years the feeling has gradually 
strengthened. 1 oE. 
This remarkable piece of introspection postulates two rhetorics, two 
patterns of argument proceeding coterminously: the one, centred on 
Monophysitism, is submerged, an erosive inner inquest, Newman's own 
rhetoric turned upon himself; the other is both a public argument to 
justify the continuing viability of Tractarianism, ~me!_ an attempt, only 
partially successful, to quieten the working of the inner counter-
pattern of argument, one which he only embraced unreservedly after 
184-3. 
Newman's treatment of heresy in The Catholicity of the Anglican 
Church <184-0>, shows this rearguard action going on. Passing from the 
,.para lle 1" be tween Donat ism and Ang 1 ican ism, to that of Monophys it ism, 
he dismisses the latter with an argument which, in earlier years, he 
has used many times: 
The Monophys i tes got possess ion of whole 
districts, and might seem, if any men, 
identified with the local Churches in those 
districts. Yet they are named from Eutyches, 
from Severus, from Jacob, ft~om Gaianus and 
from Theodosius. 1 07 
The particularism of Monophysitism is revealed, Newman argues, either 
in being .,formed upon a certain doctrine" (the pta rprxna), or begun "in 
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a certain leader'0 .1C""'But of Anglicanism, he can declace, with apparent 
confidence, 
We have none such. 109 
Yet it is notable that, albeit fleetingly, Newman raises the "might 
seem" of the Monophysites - after all, Wiseman had not. He does not 
succeed entirely, then, in repressing the idea in his public discourse. 
It slips out, even when it is not necessary for an engagement with 
Biseman. 
How far Newman's public discourse was from the position he 
eventually adopted in the Essay on Development regarding heresy is 
evinced by two passages on doctrinal development, where he dismisses 
what, after 1843, became his own distinctive position: 
that the Church held in the first age what she 
holds now; only that heresy, by raising 
quest ions, has led to her throwing her faith 
in to dogmatic shape, and has served to 
precipitate truths which befor-e were held in 
solution. 1 10 
But he invites us to imagine the Apostles as "implicit Tridentines", 1 11 
or behaving in a way even remotely to suggest that they believed in 
Purgatory or the intercession of Our Lady. 1 1 2 The Roman is t concept of 
developing articles of faith is "all very well in the abstract," but 
becomes absurd in concreto: he demands of the Romanist, 
Did he m- did he not hold that St.Peter could 
give indulgences to shorten the prospective 
suffet·ings of the Corinthians in purgatot-y? 1 18 
This would, of course, not be a conclusive objection to the Newman of 
the Essay on Development. But even in 1840, the appeal to what is or is 
not imaginable seems strained, almost desperate: 
we canna t imagine an Apes t le saying and doing 
what Romanists say and do; can they imagine it 
themselves?' , -"· 
This is hardly the point. In any case, Newman's own sense of what is 
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imaginable - "We can imagine them administering extreme unction or 
\-Jearing copes" 1 1 s - calls attention to the arbitrariness of this 
criterion. 
Contemporary with the parallel of Monophysitism, between 1839 and 
1842, Newman began a project which also played an early part in 
inducing the "Via Media'"s collapse, that is the translation of Fleury's 
Ecclesiastical History: 
that simple representation of the 
centuries had a good deal to do 
unsettling me in my Anglicanism.·' 1 '"' 
early 
with 
Newman notes the irony of this. Hugh James Rose, that pillar of High 
Anglicanism, had urged him to translate it.117Moreover, though a Roman 
Catholic, Fleury was "of the Gallican school,'0116so that his line reduced 
the points of antipathy between his position and that of Anglicanism. 
In his 1864 memory of Fleury's effect, Newman uses a word -
comparatively new to the language - which declares he found in Fleury's 
history more than congenial support for his party's position: 
' it presented a photo~raph of ecclesiastical 
his tory.' '~ 
He is alluding to his Advertisement of June 4, 1842, where he declared 
Fleury's work is a minute and exact narrative 
of the course •J f eccles ia tical events as they 
occurred. 1 20 
In a manner markedly different from the self-consciously sophisticated 
approach to historiographical method of the Essay on Development, the 
Newman of only three or four years earlier could recommend Fleury in 
preference to Mosheim, Milner or Neander, as an unbiased historian, who 
self-effacingly told it as it was: 
one who does not prom in en t 1 y put 
characteristics of his Church, 
contents h imse 1 f with setting 
reader facts, opinions, characters 
w 1 thou t comment of his own.' 21 
forward the 
but mainly 
before the 
and wr 1 t ings 
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The metaphot' of a "photograph00 is, indeed, different from that of 
"mirror": in the former there is less of a sense of disturbimg self-
recognition. But both invoke Antiquity as an immediate and disturbing 
visual image, the impression of ~hich is difficult to remove. 
Ne~man commenced the translation-project in July, 1839.122 lt was a 
concerted venture, various disciples revising an eighteenth-century 
English translation,123 while Newman composed most of the notes,124 
many of which were very extensive. He sa~ it as fitting well with his 
shift of interest towards the fourth and fifth centuries:125 the dates 
chosen, 381-4-56 A.D., coincided with his incipient study of Theodoret, 
Cyril, Nestorius, Leo, and, of course, Monophysitism.126The work on 
Fleury commenced just as he began to take an interest in the material 
which he incorporated in his Monophysitism papers. On July 12th, in a 
letter announcing the inception of the Fleury translation, he declares 
that he has 
got up the history of the Eutychian 
controversy, got hold of the opmwns of 
Eutyches ... have got up St. Leo's works ... now that 
I am in the Monophys i te controversy, I think I 
shall read through it, and then back to the 
Nestor ian.' 27 
The translation and notes proceeeded between 1839 and 1842, when the 
first volume, 381-400 A.D. was published, with the Advertisement and 
the long Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles, which served as an 
introduction to the work, the completion of which, by the end of July, 
184-2, exhausted him. 1 2a 
There would have been sufficient material in Fleury to disturb the 
'Via Media', if one were to assume that Newman was already familiar 
with the material for translation at the inception of the project in 
1839. Particularly in the matter of the third volume <429-456), he 
would have found heretics such as Nestorius and Eutyches to be 
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conservatives, defending themselves by reference to Nicea, to which they 
would have no addition; they appealed to past Fathers; they held to the 
faith as it had been delivered to them. 129No doubt this was disturbing, 
in view of the manner in which, as we have seen, Newman presented 'Via 
riled ia' Ca tho lie i ty as static, resisting the additions or corrupt ions of 
Roman Ca tho 1 ic ism. 
However, the notes to Fleury make no reference whatever to this 
Monophysite parallel. In any case, Volume I, which was being compiled 
between 1839 and 1842 dealt with the period before Monophysitism arose 
<381-400 A.D.), so that there would have been no occasion to comment 
upon this heresy. Nor is there any reference to the "face in the mirror" 
in Volumes II and III, compiled between 1843 and 1844. Even at this 
point, Newman eschews any rhe tor ica 1 strategy centred on Mono ph ys it ism, 
reserving it for the later public justification of his conversion, in the 
Essay on Development, 1 30 and even here there are only gent le hints. On 
the whole, he remained loyal to his allies right to the last moment, in 
such joint, public projects as the Fleury translation. 
~ 
Newman felt the los~ "a distinctive plea for~ Anglicanism," unless he 
"would be a Monophys i te .'41 $l He fe 1 t his pas it ion open to what he 
imaginative 1 y anticipated as a devastating coun ter-rhe tor ic. His 
understanding of Monophysitism is therefore dominated by the demand 
for self-justification in terms of a distinctively West European 
argument about which of the several conflicting polities is the 'True 
Church'. His contribution was the capacity to frame imaginative 
analogies, which worked well, until they were turned upon himself. This 
affected, as we have seen, the theoretical structure which he applied to 
the examination of his sources. It also affected his perspective upon 
the living communities - the Monophysite churches in the Near East -
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inhedtors of the anti-Chalcedonian tradition. The personal and 
artificial character of his preoccupation with Monophysitism emerges 
nowhere more clearly than in his remarks a little later during the 
controversy over the Jerusalem Bishopric: 
It seems we are in the way to f ca tern ise \..J i th 
Protestants of all sorts - Monophysites, half-
converted Jews and even Dcuses. 132 
Newman described the Druses as ''Socinian-Mohammedan". 1 33To speak of 
Monophysites in the same breath as them argues a man putting together 
a picture of Antiquity from his Oriel study: a nineteenth-century 
Englishman's view of Palestinian religion. But, then, it is hardly 
Palestine that really interests him. 
(b) Semi-Arianism <1841) 
1841 was the year Newman broke. He had published Tract 90: this 
and the connected writings were his last attempt to argue for the 
Catholicity of the Church of England. 1 :=. 4 The almost universal 
condemnation of the ecclesiastical authorities followed, in the 
succeeding months.136 ln July, the project for a Protestant Bishopric in 
Jerusalem further shook his confidence in the Church of England: he saw 
it as a fatal compromise with heresy, whether Western or Oriental.13G 
By the end of the year, he was finished: he was on his "Anglican death-
bed~ and 
A death-bed has scarcely a history. 1 ~ 7 
In the midst of these events, Newman went back to Arianism. The 
Apologia tells us that, despite the Tract 90 affair, he was able to 
withdraw to L1ttlemore, "without any harrass or anxiety on my mind." 139 
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Heads of Houses had criticized, but the bishops had not yet come out 
against him. Neverthelessp there is a close link between Tract 90 and 
his translation of the works of Athanasius.13"Newman told his Bishop in 
April, 1842, that the adverse criticism surrounding Tract 90 made him 
withdraw from public controversy to scholarship.140 lt was yet another 
Oxford summer, and Newman was again reaching down his lexicons and 
thesauri. As the Apologia tells it, there then occurred another decisive 
imaginative reversal, in which heresy was 'placed' in such a way as to 
shatter the "Via Media •: 
I had got but a little way in my wm-k, when my 
trouble returned on me. The ghost had come a 
second time. In the Ar-ian History, I found the 
very same phenomenon, in a far bolder shape, 
which I had found in the Monophysite.'"'' 
This comes to him as a 'providence' - he 'has not sought it out', and 
finds it "wonderful10 • He declares that he was "reading and writing in my 
own line of study" - and, here, we may doubt him! - "far from the 
controversies of the day." He was never that "far" - as his placing of 
heresy shows only too clearly: 
I saw clearly, that in the his tory of Arianism, 
the pure Ar ians wet·e the Pro tes tan ts, the 
semi-Arians were the Anglicans, and that Rome 
now was what it was then. The truth lay not 
with the Via Nedia, but with what was called 
'the extreme party'.-142 
The sympathy which his earlier Tractarian writings evinced for a 
portion, at any rate, of the semi-Arians has now, by this account, 
evaporated. Moreover, Rome has now become the party of unchanging 
fixity - but it is a fixity of overall disposition, an uncompromising 
rigour and precision, rather than adherence to a static orthodoxy. This 
presentation of heresy and orthodoxy, in terms of various forms of 
moderation and rigour, is found in the Essay on Development, but Newman 
declares it to originate in a flash of insight which took place ag he 
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was translating and annotating St. Athanasius, in 184.1. 
There is, however, no sign of any such understanding of Semi-
Arianism in the numerous and often extensive annotations to the 
translated text of Athanasius' works. Newman frequently expounds the 
static concept of orthodoxy, 
setting forth in writing what has ever been 
held orally or implici te !y m tne Lnur·cn. · -~-· 
The fixed faith was only expounded more clearly - and more technically 
- when heresy challenged, but there had never been any doubt about the 
thing itself. Difficulties might, however, arise over the terms: some 
might stumble at the orthodox terminology, though they held to an 
orthodox meaning. Such were the Semi-Arians, in Newman's mid-Tractarian 
portrayal of them. In the Athanasius footnotes, there is no reversal. 
Newman re-iterates the words-things distinct ion: 
it should be obser~ved how careful the fathers 
of the day were not to mix up the question of 
doctrine, which rested on Catholic tradition 
~.<lith that of a cet~tain term wl1ich rested on 
Catholic in june t ion. 1 44 
The mention of semi-Arianism is, moreover, anything but hostile: he 
distinguishes two elements in the moderate ''Eusebian court party": 
the more religious or semi-Arian which tended 
to Catholicism, and ultimately coalesced with 
it, and the other the proper Arian or Anomaean 
which was essen t ia ll y here t ica 1. 1 4 s 
St Hilary receives praise for his discernment of this distinction: 
Hilary, wishing to commend the hopeful semi-
Arians to the Gallic Church, makes excuses for 
them of the necessity of explanations of the 
Nicene formulary. 146 
Athanasius too "does justice to the sem1-Arians,"147but is not as well-
informed as Hilary.149There is, certainly, no sense that the "truth 
lay ... with what was called 'the extreme party'."149Newm.an has not yet 
abandoned the Vincentian canon of the Rule of Faith, in which the very 
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idea of convergent testimonies is sympathetic to moderation. 1 50 
The Apologia's narration cannot, then, be taken straightforwardly 
as a picture of heresy's role in the collapse of the 'Via Media'. As 
with Monophysitism in 1839, so with Arianism in 184-1. We must suppose 
an anguished tension between Newman's private experience and his public 
position. This would have been especially the case with the Library of 
the Fathers translation; here he was committed to a party-venture, and 
it is not surprising that he excluded any doubts from the annotation to 
the text. His pretensions to pure scholarship were here at their 
highest, and the scholarly footnote was not, in any case, the ideal 
vehicle in which to write himself into a problem such as the semi-
Arian/Anglican parallel. Moreover, as in the Apologia's account of 1839, 
the pages on Semi-Arianism may be considered as also heightening and 
dramatizing experience in conformity with his later distinctively Roman 
Catholic rhetoric. 
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3. Rhetoric Refurbished (1843-1845) 
(a) The Essay on Development: Anglican or Roman? 
The rhetorical 'placing' of Anglicanism against the spectrum of 
theological parties in Antiquity may, or may not, as we have seen, be 
traceable back to 1839. What is certain is that this strategy first 
appears in Newman's public discourse only in the Essay on Development, 
composed between the beginning of 1845 and October of the same year. 1 
But is the Essay on Development an 'Anglican' writing? J.J.Byrne's 
article on ''The Notion of Doctrinal Development in the Anglican Writings 
of J.H.Newman" includes the Essay in his survey, and defines "Anglican 
writings" as "all that Newman wrote in the years 1825-1845".2 
Technically, Newman was an Anglican while he was composing the E:.ssay, 
in the semi-monastic seclusion of Littlemore. The work was 
substantially complete, when Dominic Barberi received him3 on 8th 
October, 1845: 
As I advanced, my difficulties so cleared away 
that I ceased to speak of "the F~oma.n 
Catholics", and boldly called them Catholics. 
Before I got to the end, I resolved to be 
received, and the book remains in the state in 
which it was then, unfinished." 
Newman's 1864 account suggests that he was working through a residual 
Anglicanism, and that, as the work progressed, he wrote himself into a 
decision. 
However, the character of the Essay as an ''hypothesis to account 
for a difficulty,"6 that is, an attempt to remove historical difficulties 
as obstacles to a full assent to Roman dogma, hardly confirms Newman's 
own suggestion of its exploratory character. Indeed, the die had been 
cast some tUne before. By Autumn 1843, Newman could declare that the 
Roman Catholic Church was the Church of the Apostles and that the 
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Anglican Chun~h was in schism:=In Septembet~ of this year, he resigned. 
his curacy at St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford7 and lay down gingerly upon 
his Anglican death-bed. At the height of his composition of the Essay, 
in the summer of 1845,8 upon the occasion of the visit of a theological 
student from Oscott, he was 
attired in grey trouser's ... cone lus i ve evidence 
tnat ne no longer regaraea n1mse1r as a 
clergyman'" 
The student, on the look-out for a "sign", reported that "the end was 
near."10ln a sense, then, the author of the Essay was a Roman Catholic . 
On the other hand, the Essay belongs to the world of distinctively 
Anglican ecclesiological debate, presented by Newman's 'Via Media' 
writings, and addresses itself specifically to the Anglican claim to a 
form of patristic "Catholicity". Pure Protestantism is, by contrast, 
summarily dismissed: 
\.Jhat ever' be historical Christianity, it is not 
Pr-o tes tan t ism. If ever- ther-e wet'e a safe tt-u th. 
it is this.' ' 
The Essay completes the story of the 'Via Media"s collapse and t'e-
integrates in to a new model the elements of the ear 1 ier, now redundant, 
paradigm. Newman is still speaking as an exponent of the Fathers but 
his method of presentation of the early Church has shifted to 
accommodate his new plea. But he is still speaking as an Anglican to 
Ang 1 icans - as the hew i ldermen t provoked by his Essay in Roman c ire les 
demonstra tes. 1 2 
As may be expected, Newman need no longer resist some of the 
systematic implications concerning the nature of orthodoxy to which his 
'static' presentation was so vulnerable. He can allow a dialogue between 
orthodoxy and heresy and admit that the latter provokes real 
development of understanding on the part of the Church. Yet it would be 
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a mistake to see Newman as presenting a flialecticaJ. relation between 
heresy and orthodoxy - in the truly Hegelian sense, where all 
oppositions conceal a relation, and where a higher reconciliation, a 
synthesis, is possible. This limitation emerges most clearly when the 
continuing deployment of heresy as analogy - Monophysites, Nestorians 
and Semi-Arians - is considered for underpinning the method by which 
the 'Via Media' is cruelly placed against Antiquity and found wanting: 
it is the assumption that heresy and orthodoxy arise from radically 
different underlying principles, whatever their surface resemblance may 
be. Newman will allow development to arise from a 'warfare of ideas', 
but, equally, will not tolerate pluralism: the way of truth is not only 
narrow but s~. Accordingly, there co-exist somewhat uncomfortably 
in the Essay two ways of presenting heresy: first, that heresy provokes 
developments in orthodoxy, and contributes to the evolution of 
Christianity's language about itself; but, second, that it is a form of 
personal inauthenticity, an existential failing, so that, working from 
the assumption that heresy is alien in ethos to Christianity, it is 
possible to inauthenticate the 'Via Media' by the deployment of analogy. 
The former belongs to his philosophical discussion of the manner in 
which ideas develop, the latter to the literary dimension of the Essay: 
vivid portraiture of the fourth- and fifth-century heretics, and deft 
glances at the present. The question of the s·elation of these two 
strands presents an acute problem of interpretation, and points to the 
weaknesses of the Essay"s improvised and highly partial character. 
The idea of doctrinal development did not, of course, appear for 
the first time in the Essay but in an Anglican sermon, the XVth 
University Sermon, preached several months before the moment in 1843 
when he recorded that he privately began to feel that the Roman was 
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the Church. There are, indeed, some indications that the doctrine of 
development was present much earlier in Newman's thought in an either 
mchoate or repressed form. The Essay on Development <1844-5) must 
therefore be seen against this background <1839-1844), if its peculiar 
character, particularly in the treatment of heresy, is to be appreciated. 
U>J The ldea of Development and Heresy <1839-1844) 
Newman had, of course, always allowed that doctrinal terminology 
may develop, but when he was defending the 'Via Media', presented such 
development as verbal explanations of what had always been explicitly 
present in the mind of the Christ ian community as an idea. However, the 
idea of development breaks from the picture of believers having a clear 
and constant inward mental representation of the content of the 
Christian faith. From now on, the 'idea' of Christianity is tacit, 
mysteriously alive, and, in the process of coming- to- be through 
his tory, sharpening and particularizing an or ig ina ll y vague 
consciousness: 
The inward idea, the impr-ess Lon of that truth, 
might be made on the mind and exist in it 
without the per·son becoming conscious of the 
fact. t3 
It eventually became possible for Newman to use suD~ an approach to 
dogma, to explain why a Church professing teachings St. Paul would 
hardly have recognised or even understood was still nevertheless 
faithful to the deposit handed down by the Apostles. It was also 
possible for Newman to show how it was inevitable that orthodox 
terminology should have affinit les with heretical discourse, and that 
there would even be a period, before the latent 'Idea' had been drawn 
into explicitness, when heretic and orthodox expressions could hardly be 
distinguished. 
-314--
Characteristically, Newman asserted that he had always, all along, 
believed in this idea of development. In a letter to Mrs. Froude, 
written from Littlemore on July 14-th, 184-4, he declared: 
From the time I ~JI-o te 
fr-om 1836, I have had 
could not bring it 
theory, which at last 
University Sermon.14 
the Ar ians, or at least 
in my thoughts, though I 
aut, that argument or 
appeared in my closing 
This passage shows how much the idea had become an idee fixe by 1844. 
He uses an idea of development about himself to show that he had 
always believed the idea of development! The problem of the relation of 
change and continuity was not only pressing in the realm of Church 
history - it presented him also with acute difficulties in the 
understanding of his own identity, which the obsessive concern to 
demonstrate consistency discloses. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that Newman's Anglican 
rhetoric was always fighting off something very like the doctrine of 
development of the Essay. The gap which he announced in Arians between 
doxological and credal, for example, closely resembles the 1843 
University Sermon's distinction between the tacit, indwelling of the 
'idea' in the Christian community, and its propositional expression.15 
Moreover, Newman had been exercising a doctrine of the development of 
heresy in the mid-1830's,H;and this deployed a method of analysis going 
far beyond merely verbal development. When he came to apply it to 
orthodoxy, he would have already been well-practised in the art of 
discerning development where others saw only difference and 
discontinuity. Indeed the link between his work on heresy of the 1830's 
and the doctrine of development was in his mind when he was composing 
the Essay, for in his 1844 Copybook on Development, under 'In loco 
haereticorum' is found: 
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Sa bell ian ism becomes Soc in ian ism 
atheism.' 7 
down to 
The idea of doctrinal development, even if traceable back to the 
~ia Media' period did not necessarily always present a threat to 
Newman's Anglican position. For example, in 1840, he could use it, in 
renewed correspondence with his brother, Francis, to justify "the 
Anglican principle," that is, "'quod semper, quod ubique."''"'Here Newman 
argues that the sparse evidence concerning the nature of historic 
Christianity in the early centuries may be interpreted in the light of 
the fourth and f!fth, and shown to form an organic identity with what 
came later. The idea of development is introduced to argue for the 
variations, while identity of "temper and principles" is invoked - as 
later in the Essay - as the underpinning of the whole revealed system. 
By 'development', here, Newman means more than explanation in words, 
as he so often does when discussing Bull and Petavius: 
Its [the Church's] doctrines and course of 
conduct have developed from external and 
in tema l causes; where by development I mean 
the more accurate statement and the varied 
application of ideas from the act ion of the 
reason upon them according to new 
circumstances.' ·a 
From what immediately follows, it is clear that Newman is thinking 
along the lines of the XVth University Sermon <181!.3), rather than 
repeating Bull's idea that the Church merely explains what it already 
explicitly knows: 
All systems which have life, have a 
development, yet do not cease to have an 
identity though they develop e.g. Locke and 
Luther have done far more than they themselves 
saw_.:::o 
~hat is latent or tacit is drawn into explicitness through the conflicts 
of history. Newman's examples are significant: Locke and Luther are 
important figures in his heresiology, unconscious originators of 
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infidelity and heresy respectively. Again, the detail contributes to the 
impression that Newman's rhetoric of the development of heresy of the 
1830's eased him into the idea of the development of orthodoxy. 
Completely lacking from this letter, however, is any sense that 
development of doctrine is a threat to Anglicanism. Even by 1843, when 
Newman's Anglican nerve had almost snapped, it is by no means certain 
that he saw development of doctrine as incompatible with Anglicanism. 
He was, for example, still overseeing the translation of Fleury, 
originally part of the programme of translations to be published to 
bolster the 'Via Media' position. In a note to the text of the third 
volume, he accommodates the rise and prevalence of heresy to a scheme 
of divine providence: some of its "best ends" are 
to promote humility - to try our faith - to 
rouse the carelesss to an attentive study, and 
tr,e religious to a more earnest realization of 
the Christ ian verities - and to subserve the 
evoiution of these verities in a dogmatic 
form.::c: 1 
This note can with some certainty be dated at 1843, for it refers to a 
Ql 
work published in that year, the German edition of Mohler's Einh. i in 
,., 
der Kirche. Newman, of course, did not read German and it is unlikely 
that he was familiar with this book's argument even when it later 
appeared in French translation.22Nevertheless, he was using the book as 
a handbook of references regarding development of doctrine: 
the interesting passages collected by Mohler 
[sicl Einhat in der Kirche.23 
Yet he does not understand dogmatic development to be in conflict 
with the static concept of orthodoxy of the 'Via Media'. Still, in the 
edition of Fleury, references to Mohler co-exist with the by now well-
worn distinction between 'words and things.' Newman's account here of 
Leo's Tome could belong to any works of the mid-1830's on the Rule of 
Faith: 
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The letter~ was received, not as a final, 
judicial decision, but as evidence that was to 
be weighed, and scr·u tin ized, and accepted on 1 y 
if found to agree with that which was from the 
beginning. And this is precisely \vha t \ve meet 
lvith in every part of the history of Christian 
doctrine; it is not new truth that is 
discovered, but old truth that receives a new 
expression adapted to the present exigency? 4 
That Newman means by "new expression" only a verbal expression or 
explanation of a truth generally agreed is clear from a note a few 
pages earlier on the same subject, Eutychianism: 
The truth is, that in the contest with diverse 
forms of error the words became more fixed and 
definite in their application. 'Had Eu tyches 
never appeared,' says Leon tius to the 
Acepha Ius, 'you and I had perchance been using 
the same terms in common.;:;:.s 
It is, perhaps, unfair to require systematic consistency between the 
footnotes of a work in which he was collaborating with others. Nor 
would this project - part of a distinctively Ang-lican apologetic 
programme - have been an appropriate place to raise anxieties about 
the relation of dogmatic development to eccles io logy, even supposing 
that Newman felt them. 
In the XVth University Sermon, however, Newman reached his highest 
point so far of systematic clarity concerning the relation between 
dogma and revelation, and between orthodoxy and heresy. In this sermon, 
the epistemological sophistication is such as to make his own previous 
formulations in terms of words-and-things seem naive. Immediately, in 
dis cussing Mary's "pondering", he breaks with his own earlier static 
model: the mark of an authentic faith is not "acquiescing" in what is 
given, but in unfolding it by reflection.26 
His presentation of the cognitional status of dogmatic orthodoxy is 
remarkable for its employment of the epistemology of eighteenth-century 
British philosophy, and, particularly, of the terminology of David 
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H ume .27Newman presents revelation as a vivid inward "impress ion", which 
is only gradually conceptualized and then expressed: 
what was at 
Imagination has 
the Reason .2 "' 
first an 
become a 
impt-ess ion 
system or 
on the 
creed in 
In the latter, development of dogma consists: in the former consists its 
identity with the deposit of faith. The inner conceptualization of the 
initial vivid impression is described in very Humean terms, as an 
"idea", that is "an image of what is real".29 On the other hand, Newman 
also uses "idea" to mean the 'impression' of revelation in all its 
inexhaustible richness, to which dogmatic propositions are contrasted as 
but partial and feeble attempts to express the original: 
Pact icu lac propos it ions, then, ~..rh ich ace used 
to express portions of the great idea 
vouchsafed to us, can never really be confused 
with the idea itself, which all such 
propositions taken together can but reach, and 
cannot exceed7° 
The body of dogmatic orthodoxy consists, then, of shots from various 
an~les at a mysterious entity that can never be exhausted by 
conceptualization: thus, he can describe the doctrines of the 
Incarnation and Trinity as 
not a philosophy, but an individual idea in its 
separate aspects. 3 ' 
Significantly, Newman identifies "knowledge" in the Christian sense of 
knowledge of God in Christ, not with concepts, but with an inner 
~'~impression" of an "intimate kind," which is "faint and doubtful in some 
minds, and distinct in others.'032By contrast, the dogmas which develop 
to explicitness by the action of Reason are accorded a more provisional 
status; they are 
the truth as 
conditions of 
imposes ."'"3 
far as they go, and undet- the 
thought which human feebleness 
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At several L111portan t po L."1 ts in his argument, Newman touches on 
heresy, although it is given much less attention than in the Essay on 
Development. He can now accord heresy a role in the formation of "any 
Catholic dogma'034 - in contrast with the lines taken in the 1830's 
concerning the fundamentals, without, however, conceding a genuine 
dialectical relation between heresy and orthodoxy, for he can still 
place heresy outside the circle of authentic Christian discourse: it is 
the wickedness which provides the irritation stimulating the exuberant 
forms of developing doctrine.86 ln two ways, Newman adapts his manner of 
describing heresy, to fit his new and sophisticated treatment of 
orthodoxy. Firstly, heresy is castigated not so much because it 
innovates, as because it fails to throw up what is new: 
its dogmas are unfruitful; it has no theology; 
so far forth as it is hecesy, it has none.3 '-'· 
Heresy is sterile - "it developes [sicl into dissolution", and grudges 
orthodoxy its fecund life: 
Her-esy denies to the Chur-ch \.Jha t is v1an tin::; in 
itself .''' 7 
Secondly, heresy is not marked by intellectual sophistication, a common 
feature of Newman's earlier presentations; rather, it is 
epistemologically naive, embracing "this or that proposition of the 
Creed" and taking this propos it ion logically further, but failing to 
discern the complex underlying non-propositional reality which can be 
approached in a linear, conceptual manner,only at the risk of losing it 
a 1 together .38 
The sermon's systematic clarity regarding the nature of dogma is 
not, however, accompanied with any apparent .anxiety about the validity 
of Anglicanism. Indeed, Newman can distinguish between the discussion 
of doctrinal development, and questions of church authority, and can 
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postpone a consideration of the latter without anguish m~ sense of 
threat: 
Nor am I here in any way concerned with the 
question, who is the legitimate framer and 
judge of these dogmatic inferences under the 
Gospel, or if there be any. \IJhether- the Church 
is infallible, or~ the individual, or the first 
ages, or none of these, is not the point here, 
but the theory of developments itself .::o··o, 
In this sermon, then, Newman was still - though perhaps only just -
speaking as an Anglican. He was not trying to persuade his audience 
that historical objections to Romanlsm are surmountable. There is no 
hint that Anglicanism is challenged at all by the idea of development 
of doctrine. Indeed, the Sermon concludes with the earnest injunct ion to 
submit the reason to the teaching of God's "Holy Jerusalem, His 
Church."40A listener at St. Mary's on this occasion would have no reason 
to assume that he did not mean the 'Church Catholic' in the Tractarian 
sense. 
Newman reminisces that privately he was drifting ever Romewards 
but it was not a drift promoted by the ?~ternatic definition of 
orthodoxy of the 18~3 Sermon. He was, rather, haunted by an imaginative 
parallel between heresy and Anglicanism - his "ghost" of 1841, his face 
in the mirror of 1839. The "principle of development" acted as 
a sort of test, \.Jh ich the Ang 1 ican could not 
exhibit, that moder·n Rome was in truth ancient 
Antioch, Ale:<andria and Constantir;10ple, just as 
a mathematical curve has its own law and 
express ion.41 
But this disturbing application did not strike hint, according to the 
Apologia, until after the composition and delivery of the 1843 Sermon. 
The relationship between the idea of development and the treatment 
of heresy between 1839 and 1844 is in marked contrast to the Essay on 
Development. In the latter, heresy plays a prominent part in his 
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che tonca l strategy, while in the for·mer it occupies no such impor~tan t 
role. The reason for this contrast was a change in rhetorical purpose: 
in the Essay, Newman finally changed sides: the construction of a 
positive case on behalf of Romanism had to be accompanied by the 
destruction of the case for 'Via Media' Anglicanism and, as in 1832, 
Newman could reach for heresy as a devastating offensive weapon. 
(c) The Es-sav on Development <1844-1845) 
In the Essay, Newman stood once again in the forum of debate. 
After a brief period of collapse and vacuum, he reconstructed himself 
as rhetor. Although he abandoned the rhetoric of orthodoxy of the 
1830's, he retained that appeal to eikos upon which it was based: 
the gaps ... which occur in the s true ture of the 
or ig ina l creed of the Church make it probable 
that those developments, which grow out of the 
truths which lie around them, were intended to 
complete i t.42 
he is still, as Professor Lash describes him, "fundamentally 
jurisprudential...a pleader."43 
However, Newman's rhetoric is necessarily more complex than that of 
the 'Via Media', because of the revolution in his concept of how 
Antiquity may be appropriated and deployed. He has moved away from the 
idea of a normative Christian past as a static entity which may, at any 
rate in its broad outlines, be brought to bear upon the uncertainties 
and ambivalences of the present, in order to codify it and prescribe 
for it. To find in Rome the answers to uncertainty and the resolution 
of ambiguity positively required a form of historical scepticism. Newman 
has, then, shifted from a strategy prescribing for a coutested present 
by reference to an unproblematic past -
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~he pr-esent. is a te~t and the past 
- to such complicated formulations as the Essay's 
The event alone still future. which Hill bring 
its [a past event's) completion, will also bring 
its interpretation. 4 ''-· 
Newman's appeal to the 'idea' of Christianity is therefore a complex 
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it is, as Professor Lash describes it, 
at one and the same time, an historical, 
descriptive claim, a heuristic recommendation 
(creating expectation that things would turn 
out this way), and a complex prescriptive 
argument. 4 c 
Newman's 'demonstration' is not there fore theoretical: it is, rather, 
"coaxing the reader to 'see' the <ambiguous) evidence in the way in 
which he himself has come to see it."47 lt is a bid for his Anglo-
Catholic reader's assent to a view of the past which simultaneously 
demands also a life-decision. But the context of such decision is now 
the contestedness of all historical interpretation. In order, then, to 
bring his audience over, Newman brings to explicitness the complexity 
of historical interpretation and argues that any interpreter will 
inevitably use his preapprehensions in re-creating the 'text' of history. 
He attempts to break down an obvious 'prejudice' - which he himself 
shared in the 1830's - that Roman dogmas are corruptions, while feeding 
the imagination with the idea that the Roman claim to Antiquity is not 
really, after all, so improbable. 
It is primarily as part of such a rhetorical strategy, rather than 
of a theoretical or systematic analysis,_ that descriptions of. heresy are 
deployed in the Essay. Central to this strategy is his use of 
Monophysitism. He proceeds subtly, avoiding the brutal equation of 'Via 
Media' Anglicanism with Monophysitism, which Difficulties of Anglicans 
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deploys five year's later. Nevertheless, his description of Monophysitism 
is organised to signal such a parallel to the patristically-minded 
Anglican alert for analogies. Personally "unexceptional", Eutyches took 
his stand on Tradition - on the Fathers, on the previously-canonized 
Councils of Nicea and Constantinople. He could invoke Athanasius 
When the Catholic doctrine was put befor·e him, 
h(""\ .,..,, ..... r,.-,~r-nt1 •la-f- AthAn:=lcine: ha 1'-,:::l.Rri• Vflll f"rill 
find nothing of the kind there'. 4 "' 
Nor could the Vincentian canon be easily applied to him : 
it is plain ... that there could be no 
against him, as the word is now 
unders toad. 4 '·"' 
consensus 
commonly 
Eutyches seemed to have the very things on his side that an exponent 
of the 'Via Media' might invoke in behalf of Anglicanism against Rome: 
~luch might be said on the plausibility of the 
defence, which Eutyches might have made for 
his doctrine from the history and documents of 
the chut-ch befor-e his time . 5 '~' 
Most poignantly, Eutyches will have no additio11; he will adhere 
obediently to what has been handed down. Newman can describe 
Eutychianism as "a heresy, appealing to the fathers, to the Creed, and 
above all to Scripture ... by a general Council, professing to be 
Ecumenical."51 This is almost an epitome of his own position between 
1833 and 184-0! 
By equating doctrinal conservatism with Eutychianism, Newman is 
undermining 'Via Media' patrism while at the same time invoking the 
normative authority of the patristic age: the suggestion that 
conservatism was analogous to the Eutychian position would, of course, 
only unsettle a reader who was himself unquestioningly ~~lpc~g of the 
'0 
irreformable rightness of the Chalcedonlan settlement. To make his 
analogy work, however, Newman is compelled to adjust his earlier 
descriptions of patristic orthodoxy. Most strikingly he stresses the 
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innovatory character of Ephesus, the Ecumenical Council which preceded 
the Eutychian controversy: 
It is remarkable that the Council of 
Ephesus, ... had itse 1 f sane t ioned the 8~o-roxoc; 
an addition, greater perhaps than any before or 
since, to the lettet' of the primitive faith:52 
Thus Eutyches in invoking Ephesus is involved in a contradiction, for 
Newman can now even bring himself to describe the Council as making an 
.,addition" to the Creeds. 
On the other hand, Newman cleaves more strongly than ever to his 
conception - stretching back to the 1820's - of orthodoxy as obedience. 
But in order to be able to schematize Monophysitism as the contrary of 
this, he has to redefine obedience. While in his 'Via Media' phase, 
orthodoxy was obedience to a given which was distinct from the Church, 
and to which the Church must conform itself, in the Essay orthodoxy and 
Church are organically identified. It follows that Newman is now 
thinking of the Church as a particular communion, or even party, 
following Wiseman's 'argument from schism • against Ang lo-Ca tho lie ism. 
This influence is apparent in Newman's description of the moderate 
Eutychians, or Monophysites, who seceded from those who upheld the 
Cha lcedon ian settlement: 
their refusal to obey the voice of the Church 
was an omen of error in their faith, and its 
secret heterodoxy is proved by their 
connection, in spite of themselves, with the 
extreme or ultra party whom they so vehemently 
disowned. s::o> 
This is the closest Newman has come so far to the expression of 
that parallel between Anglicans and Monophysites which the Apologia and 
Difficulties of Anglicans alleged to have been influential upon him 
since 1839. The analogy is carefully integrated into his argument: if 
-325-
development of doctrine is to be embraced, then it becomes essential to 
be a member of that one ecclesiastical party - the true Church - in 
which dwells the genius of authentic evolution, as opposed to those 
whose tendency is towards corruption and dissolution. But it is possible 
to be tragically unaware of the inauthenticity of one's own party and, 
by the logic of heresy's development, to be always tending 
unconsciously towards a more radical error.54 Newman would have us 
seek a sign, a mark provided by Providence - an "omen of error"55 to 
point the way, and, in this imaginative appeal, can advocate the claim 
of that most imperious of communions, the Roman. The fate of the 
Monophysites is one such sign. 
If Newman's sect ion on ''The Monophys i tes" in the Essay is compared 
either with the passage in Difficulties of Anglicans which the Apologia 
cites, or with many of the passages in Arians, then it seems markedly 
Jess rhetorical, in the sense that analogies with the contemporary 
scene are not explicit. The section ends mutedly,56 before the highly 
rhetorical conclusion, with its elaborate final twenty-four line 
period,57on behalf of the Roman claim. There is, however, another way of 
considering the 'Monophysite' section: that it is not less rhetorical, 
but, rather, more skilful in its use of rhetoric, and that, consequently, 
it is less obvious that it is rhetoric at all. Newman is both more 
sophisticated than the man of 1832, but also less strident, and even 
crude, than the frank polemicist of Difficulties of Anglicans. In the 
Essay, he is content to unsettle, to undermine, before the magnificent 
peroration of the fifth chapter bursts like a flood upon the reader. 
The section on Nestorianism is more explicitly satirical in its 
deployment of analogy, than that on Monophysitism. lt shares some of 
the malicious sense of fun of Arlans, as Newman slips in suggestions 
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that the Syrian school of theology out of which Nestorianism emerged 
bears a passing resemblance to Protestantism: he seems to be striking 
both at continental Protestantism, and the inheritors of the Hanoverian 
brand of Anglicanism. Thus Syrian Eucharistic theology was Zwinglian, 
As it tended to the separation of the Divine 
Person of Christ fr-om His manhood, so did it 
tend to explain away His Divine Presence in the 
Sacramental elements.5 '"' 
Moreover, the Nestorians introduced married clergy. Newman glances at 
Luther - Barsumas "is even said by a l\!estorian writer to have married 
a nun."590ne l\!estorian Catholicos even used the device of extending 
marriage to monks, "that is, to destroy the monastic order.'160The 
Nestorian world was a hotbed of error, on account of is loose structure 
of ecclesiastical authority: theologians were, not, as in Alexandria, 
directly answerable to one patriarch, and inhabited a "private" world of 
their own "schools", insulated from episcopal control. The result was 
divers i t'l in religious opinion and incaution in 
the e:-:oress ion of i t.6 1 
Here, perhaps, is a dart at the latitudinarian Anglicanism of Hampden 
or \IJha tel y • A 11 this is, indeed - unless one is the target - very 
entertaining. It is most probably designed to appeal to those who 
already have a Catholic regard for the Real Presence and for clerical 
and monastic celibacy, and even to suggest that papalism contrasts 
favourably with Anglican episcopal inertia on matters of faith. It is, 
however, only loosely integrated into Newman's central argument on 
behalf of the development of doctrine. 
Most of the section on Nestorianism is devoted to demonstrating an 
association between the exegetical principles of the Syrian School and 
Nestorian Christological heresy. Newman's introductory phrases, however, 
show that he is also re-descrtbing the contemporary: 
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it devoted itself to the litecal and crit~cal 
interpretation of Scripture.''··:, 
In case the point should be missed, Newman immediately afterwards 
alludes to "the connection of heterodoxy and biblical criqcism in that 
age."63The introduction of such anachronisms into the description of 
Nestor ian ism is, indeed, ca leu la ted. It is an oblique at tack upon the 
methodology of Liberal Anglicanism, whose application of an historico-
critical method to the New Testament Newman had already denounced in 
his 1841 critique of Milman. He had, in fact, not only called Milman 
'Sabellian', but also declared him 'Nestorian'. In his analysis of 
Theodore of Mopsuestia's exegetical principles, he finds the origins of 
the Nestorian failure to acknowledge the unity of the divine and human 
in Jesus Christ: by interpreting the Old Testament literally and 
historically - excluding allegory - Theodore was opposing the idea of 
the interpenetration of divine and human,64keeping the two aspects 
strictly distinct; his critical principle eventually emerged explicitly in 
the later Christological heresy. 
This attack upon historical criticism is more carefully integrated 
into Newman's argument from development than his more incidental 
sallies, for he relates it to his defence of the "Mystical 
Interpretation of Scripture'166which he identifies as one of the constant 
underlying principles of authentic Christianity. The "Mystical 
Interpretation" is presented as acknowledging that the meaning of the 
inspired text of Scripture is constantly unfolding into the future, 
transcending the historical context in its richness and finding its 
culmination in Christ. It is an essentially developmental att~tude. 
Newman can then imply, by contrast, that the historico-critical method 
is static, fixing the text's meaning in its original context. It is, 
moreover, a clever way of casting doubt upon one of the most dangerous 
-328-
threats to the Roman Catholic claim to Antiquity, the patient 
stratifications of the historian. Imagination, Newman arg-ues, is a 
necessary accompaniment of scholarship if historical data are to be 
united in one vision. In suggesting a modern parallel with Nestorian 
exegesis, he invites doubt and self-questioning in order to make room 
for his own hypothesis. 
In characterizing as inauthentic a static mentality, Newman was 
inverting his Tractarian position on the nature of orthodoxy. In the 
Essay, this reversal has two related manifestations: a general 
philosophical stance, regarding revelation and epistemology, and a 
return to a specific issue, the Bull-Petavius debate on the pre-Nicene 
Fathers. The accommodation of these intertwined issues to his case is 
one of Newman's trickiest tasks, for, in attempting to persuade his 
patristically-minded former allies, he runs the risk of appearing a 
nominalist in his view of theological knowledge, and, in the acceptance 
of Petavius' analysis, a denigrator of the Fathers. 
Newman's epistemological analysis66of the relation between 
revelation and developed dogma follows the lines he laid down in the 
184-3 Sermon, that is, an application of eighteenth-century British 
philosophy to the problem. In his somewhat ambiguous handling of 'idea', 
however, he may be seen as moving towards a Kantian apprehension of 
the mind's active role in the construction of knowledge - without, of 
course, necessarily having read, or even read about, the German 
philosopher. Thus "idea" in the Essay means both a judgment about 
experience and the objective reality itself. Not surprisingly, Newman 
arrives at a dualism between revelation~in-itself, objectively 
considered, and revelation as gradually assimilated and apprehended by 
human minds: 
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Ideas are not ordinarily brought home to the 
mind, except through the medium of a variety 
of aspects; like bodily substances, which are 
not seen except under the clothing of their 
proper-ties and influences, and can be walked 
round and surveyed on opposite sides and in 
different perspectives and in contrary 
lights."'·· 7 
The rich, but occult, substratum of revelation then, is formed into a 
mAnifnlrl. P.volving bodv of knowled~e - orthodox doctrine. 
Newman's manner of overcoming the dual ism between revelation as 
Qbiect and its gradual assimilation and articulation in the form of 
doctrine in the Church is both reminiscent of, and markedly different 
from, Hegel's attempt to surmount Kant's epistemological dualism. 
Although there is no more evidence to suppose that Newman had read 
Hegel, than he had Kant, the comparison is useful in placing the 
philosophical dimension of his argument, in order to show how its shape 
is tailored by his rhe tor ica l needs. 
Like Hegel, Newman argues the constructive role of conflict, in the 
coming-to-be of knowledge. This Newman applies to the Church's 
developing understanding of the revelatum, employing a dialectic of a 
kind - pointing to the "warfare of ideas"68by which development takes 
place, by which the 'idea' comes to be; it is 
e 1 ic i ted by trial, and s trugg 1es in to 
perfection. Nor does it escape the collision of 
opinion even in its earlier years; nor does it 
rem a in truer to i tse 1 f and more one and the 
same though protected from vicissitude and 
change:=·"' 
However, while in Hegel subject and object, Geist and world, mutually 
modify - or participate in - one another as the very process of 
coming-to-be, in Newman, revelation, objectively considered, remains 
unchanged, though rich and mysterious: it does not come to be in the 
warfare of ideas and is "protected" from the "vicissitude and change" 
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to which doctrine is open. 
This pulling-back from a 'dialectical' understanding of subject and 
object emerges clearly when, towards the end of the book, Newman 
introduces the theme of heresy as a constructive element in the 
"warfare of ideas" by which orthodoxy develops. He pursues this line at 
t1:1o points: in the passage on "The Formation of Theological Science", in 
Chapter Vl,70and on "Developments Growing out of the Question of our 
Lord's Divinity," in Chapter VIII.71 In the latter, ArianisM, Nestorianism 
and Monophysitism are reviewed touching their part in stimulating 
dogmatic development. These passages are separated by several hundred 
pages from Newman's opening epistemological discussion, "On the 
Development of Ideas", where his ambiguous handling of 'idea' might make 
him sometimes sound Hegelian. The later treatment, however, makes clear 
that even if heresy and orthodoxy are in a dialectical relation, there 
is an immutable tertium quid beyond both. 
In Chapter VI, Newman shows how Apollinarianism and Monophysitism 
enabled the Church to define the distinction between the divine and 
human natures in Christ72 Arianism, on the other hand, helped the Church 
to develop its cult of the saints by provoking the distinction between 
a created mediating being and the unique, divine, mediation of Christ.73 
Indeed, it made possible Marian devotion by forcing the Church to 
distinguish between latria and hyperdulia. Nestorianism assisted 
further clarification of the mediating role of Our Lady7 4 Thus Newman 
attributes the systematic clarity of later Catholic Theology to the 
beneficial irritation presented by heresy: 
Such was the state of sentiment on the subject 
of St.Mary, which the Arian, Nestorian and 
Monophysite heresies found in the Church; and 
on which the doctrinal decisions consequent 
upon them impressed a form and consistency 
which has been handed on in the Church to this 
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day7 5 
The antithesis here between "state of sentiment"- a vivid unarticulated 
body of experience - and "form and consistency" is entirely 
characteristic of Newman's handling of the relation between the initial 
impress ion made by revelation and developed dogma. But in making "state 
of sentiment .. prior both to the challenge of heresy and to developed 
dogma, he keeps in touch with his Tractarian position. However, he 
departs from it in declaring that this prior "state of sentiment" is 
modified by ''doctrinal decisions10 , by having. a 0'form" impressed upon it: 
the "impression" has - to follow Hume's terminology - become an "idea". 
Such HWilean epistemology pervades the Essay: a 'something', fixed, 
unchanging but rich and mysteriously open makes a vivid subjective 
'impression' upon a colillilunity. The impression is clarified into distinct 
ideas, after a passage of conflict in which word?., in search of a 
mooring jostle in confusion and uncertainty. But the dialectic only 
takes place at the level of the subjective and communal assimilation of 
the revelatum, which latter is itself unaffected. Unlike the Hegelian 
dialectic, where everything is moving, Newman supposes a fixity over 
all above the conflict of heresy and orthodoxy. In positing this duality 
between fixity and change, he reaches out to his Anglican friends -
and, indeed, to his former self. 
The static concept of orthodoxy in fact recurs in a modified form 
as a component in Newman's idea of doctrinal development, as he locates 
the fixity of Christianity in certain underlying principles,76 rather than 
in an immutable content of ideas. However, when he comes to his 
description of the nature of developed orthodoxy, he represents it in 
complex fashion as a balance between two principles naturally 
antagonistic: the "dogmatic element," which guards an immutable deposit, 
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and the ''eclectic element"77which, infinitely adaptive, would 
accommodate all human philosophy. The former is exemplified in 
Tertullian, the latter represented by the Alexandrian Fathers, 
particularly Clement. But fixity on its own is no longer a note of 
authenticity: he clearly repudiates Tertullian's position as the sole 
criterion, by a juggling of dates whereby he can relegate that Father's 
conservatism to the period of his schism: 
it is chiefly in Tertullian's Montanistlc works 
that his strong s ta tern en ts occur on the 
unalterableness of the Creed."7 8 
The authentic 'idea' of Christianity, on the other hand, is a balance of 
fixity and flexibiliity: 
Thus Christianity grew in its proportions, 
gaining aliment and medicine from a 11 that 
came near, yet preserving 1 ts or ig ina 1 type, 
from its percept ion and 1 ts love of what had 
been revealed once for all and was no private 
imagination. 7 "" 
It follows that heresy can no longer be simply condemned as 
innovation. Its innovative tendency is, rather, a creative force, 
anticipating and initiating the future direction of orthodoxy: 
Nay, the doctrine of her-etical bodies are 
indices and anticipations of the mind of the 
Church. As the first step in settling a point 
of doctrine is to raise and debate it, so 
heresies in every age may be taken as the 
measure of the existing state of thought in 
the Church and of the movement of her 
theology; they deter-mine in what way the 
current is moving, and the rate at which 1 t 
flows.80 
This reverses Newman's Tractarian position, where heresy is always 
represented as being preceded by orthodox truth. Nevertheless, he finds 
a way to inauthenticate heresy. His method of doing so revea'ls his 
desire to keep fixity as a component of his developmental idea: heresy 
is schematized according to a failure in terms of ''Continuity of 
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Principle". Having pushed back the ifillllutability of Christianity beyond 
doctrinal content to a fixed set of principles, Newman can demonstrate 
heresy's failure to comply with these. Thus, in Chapter VII, he lists 
heresies against the fixed principle which they contradict: Arianism and 
Nestorianism opposing the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, 
Gnostics, Eunomians and Manichees the principle of faith, the sects the 
"dogmatic principle", those who separated from the Church the 
sacramental principle. Like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, 
Newman simultaneously condemns as heretical Tertullian's anti-
developmental conservatism, while retaining the ancient categorization 
of heresy as innovation. 
Newman's attempt to reconcile change with fixity by means of the 
idea of development is partly the result of his characteristic craving 
for consistency in the face of the revolution in his interpretation of 
Antiquity - but it is also tact before his Anglo-Catholic audience. On 
occasion the argumentative structure whereby opposites are held 
together shows signs of strain. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
his return to the issue between Bull and Petavius over the teaching of 
the pre-Nicene Fathers. It has been argued that Newman simply dropped 
Bull and went over to Petavius81 once he was on his way to Rome, since 
pre-Nicene 'variations' were confirmation of his hypothesis of doctrinal 
development. In his section on "Developments growing out of the 
Questions of Our Lord's Divinity,IJS2 he does indeed appear to take the 
Petavian line. almost taking it for granted: 
No one who has looked ever so 1 itt le in to the 
theological works of the ancient church, but is 
aware that the language of ·the. Ante-Nicene 
Fathers, on the subject of Our Lord's Divinity, 
may be far more easily accommodated to the 
Arian hypothesis than the language of the 
post-N icene.'"'::;' 
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But it is by no means clear that Newman here intends to abandon 
his former position: he mentions Bull's defence of the An te-N icenes 
against Sandius without disapproval: 
had not the fact been as I have stated it, 
neither Sand ius would have at tacked the Post-
Nicene Fathers, nor would Bull have had to 
defend the An te-N icene .84 
with Old Testament texts concerning theophanies which they spoke of "as 
if they were appearances of the Son." It took Augustine to make 
explicit that these theophanies concerned "simply angels through whom 
the Omnipresent Son manifested Himself." In the light of this 
development, the true meaning of the pre-Nicenes is shown to be free 
from Arianizing: this idea of angels is 
the on 1 y in terpre tat ion which could be out on 
the Ante-nicene statements, as soon as reason 
began to examine what they meant?5 
This contrived defence of the ante-Nicenes shows Newman clrrtging to 
the idea of a 'defence' of the early Fathers, and accommodatint~ it 
somewhat awkwardly with his developmental hypothesis. 
In a passage much earlier in the Essay, Newman has already 
adverted directly to the Bull-Petavius controversy: 
the quest ion raised by various learned men in 
the seventeenth and following century, 
concerning the views of the early Fathers on 
the subject of Our Lord's Divinity.eE. 
Here it is even clearer that Newman by no means regards himself as 
having abandoned Bull. On the contrary, he argues that Bull had all 
along been deploying the very method he himself adopts in the Essay: in 
reading the earlier Fathers in the light of post-Nicene theoiogy and 
creeds, Bull was using the idea of development of doctrine as a working 
hypothesis, to account for a "difficulty": 
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the oos it ion 1.vh ich Bull rna in ta ins seems to ~e 
nothing beyond this, that the N icene Creed is a 
natural_kgy for interpreting the body of Ante-
nicene theology. His very aim is to exolain 
difficulties; now the notion of difficulties and 
their explanation imp 1 ies a rule to which they 
ar·e appat·en t except ions, and in accordance 1-1 i til 
which they are to be explained. Nay, the title 
of his 1'-'0rk, which is a Defence of the Cr·eeQ__g_f. 
Nicea, shows that he is not seeking d 
conclusion, but imposing a view.07 
This is indeed a fantastic descr i p t ion of Bull 's methodology. The 
attempt to transmute Bull 's ponderous form in to something fleeter shows 
how desperate he is to avoid givUrrg the impression of a total reversal 
of his earlier "Via Media' approach, in which the Defence of the Nicene 
Faith had been a mainstay of the Tractarian position. 
The Essay, then, registers a complex re-adjustment of the enquiry 
which had since the 1830's obsessed Newman concerning the nature of 
Christianity's doc tr ina l content and its relation to the ancient past. 
Heresy and orthodoxy are described in very different terms from the 
'Via Media' presentation. It is tempting to conclude that he has arrived 
at a greater systematic clarity about the nature of orthodoxy and the 
relation of heresy to it, which avoids the difficulties of the 'Via 
Media', tempting to conclude that liberation from the constraints of 
anti-Romanism freed him to speculate upon the problem more flexibly 
and imaginatively. 
However, it is equally possible to view the increased complexity in 
Wewman's position as part of a reorganization of the elements of his 
rhetoric. It is not so much a new understanding of heresy and orthodoxy 
that emerges, as the sophisticated re-statement of well-worn adages: in 
its contradiction of 'Continuity of Principle', heresy is in itself both 
innovative and worthless. For all Newman's evocation of heresy's 
creative participation in the process of dogmatic evolution, he 
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continues to share the patristic frisson of abhorrence at the company 
of heretics,88and can brutally consign the losing party to the dustbin 
of history: 
In Christianity, opinion, \vhile a raw material, 
is called philosophy or scholasticism: \vhen a 
rejected refuse, it is called her-esy ."'s-' 
Equally, his re-presentation of orthodoxy as development defends the 
Roman faith as unchanged from the beginning. 
The Essay continues to fascinate because of the irreducible 
heterogeneity which an attempt to interpret it provokes. Its many-sided 
analysis of the history of dogma is compellingly attractive to the 
modern sceptic in search of the elusive essence of Christianity. Yet its 
underlying dependence on a few very ancient assumptions - that heresy 
is bad and orthodoxy goodt that the apostles have handed down the 
faith, that there is a True Church, the inheritor of the primitive one -
warms the heart of the conservative, unnerved by modern questions. 
There is something for everyone in the Essay. not the least aspect of 
Newman's genius is his ability to find a way of drawing all sorts and 
conditions of men into the way of Rome. 
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And w·ha t you thought you came for 
Is only a shell, a husk of meaning 
From which the purpose breaks only r,,hen it is fulfilled 
If at a 11. Either you had no purpose 
Or the purpose is beyond the end vou figured 
And is altered in fu 1 f ilmen t. There are other places 
I<lhich also are the r.;orld's end, some at the sea jat.;s, 
• I - J. - - -
VJ 1.../VC:::l a UL.l~ I~ 10/lt..:., .tit o..J Uf_.-''-1 "' -~ '-• 
But this is the nearest, in place and time, 
Now and in Eng land. 
<T.S.Eliot, Little Gidding.> 
Newman's Anglican writings on heresy dramatize the tens ions of that 
anxiety about the past so characteristic of Christian reflection. 1 Such 
anxiety is almost a note of classical orthodoxy, which developed the 
notions of revelation's finality against the background of Gnostic and 
Montanist challenges: all its norms point to the past - apostolicity, 
canonicity, tradition and the rule of faith. At the same time, and 
despite considerable modification during the New Testament period, 
eschatology continued its hold: the future - as death and afterlife, or 
as salvation-in-history, or as predestination and providence -
obsessively preoccupied the Christian imagination. The present became a 
barely isolable point on the way to the future by way of the past. 
The past and the future appear to rule over the brief span of time 
which a Christian might ca 11 his own age. But they are as much servants 
as masters, for they serve to categorize the chaotic and fleeting 
images of the present. Just as an apocalyptic re-description of the 
present,2 by which the present age is judged against a vision .of the 
ultimate future, serves well the needs of present polemic, so, too, the 
re-description of the present by reference to a normative past, the Age 
of the Fathers. The heresies of the early Church, however, surviving in 
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the records <albeit in a truncated or distorted form), inconveniently 
contest the retrospective authority of patristic orthodoxy. Yet they 
may be, admittedly with some difficulty, accommodated to a scheme: the 
heretics were innovators, or pseudo-intellectuals, introducers of an 
alien sophistical logic, or men tragically clutching the part for the 
whole, or victims, or even embodiments, of Satan. Such systematizations, 
have their uses to the ages which inherit them, for they can be re-
deployed, by an orthodox rhetoric, to describe almost any negative 
elements it confronts. By a relentless sucking in of all otherness, such 
a rhetoric colonizes the ancient past: whatever resists appropriation -
heresy's plea for the irreducibility of difference - is ruthlessly 
enslaved and turned upon the present. Such re-descriptions spawn upon 
the occasion of a sudden, sickening jolt into self-consciousness, at a 
point of social, ecclesiastical or intellectual history, when the 
normative past, as once constructed, is no longer tacitly, 
unproblematically accepted. Heresiology revives as part of a mechanism 
for survival and preservation of identity, by which an orthodoxy 
struggles to marginalize the chaotic forces striking at its very heart. 
Claude Welch has placed the Tractarian Newman amongst those 
movements in post-Enlightenment Europe which were pursuing "Strategies 
of Restoration and Conservation.'13 The peculiarly febrile fretfulness of 
Newman's conservative strategies, even when compared with the 
Tepristinators' Welch describes, arises from the confluence of 
influences upon him during his Anglican period. Converted in youth to 
an intensely patriotic and conservative form of Calvinism, he adopted 
apocalypticism as a response to social a.rid po"litical change; indeed, he 
never subsequently lost that Calvinist sense of the Satanic significance 
of contemporary events. Converted in early manhood to High Church 
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Toryism. he suppressed his apocalypticism: underground, it dictated the 
course of his narration of Antiquity, merging gratefully with patristic 
typology. Converted in middle age to Rome, he found himself again 
confronting a last anxiety about the past. All these conversions were 
played out against the background of the growth in Europe of historico-
critical studies. Its uncomfortable significance eventually dawned upon 
Newman: remarkably, there was no "refusal to accept the historical 
question"4 - for all the strain it put him under, he would yet take 
even this in. 
However, Newman's acceptance of the existence of the historical 
question co-existed with both pre-critical and anti-critical stances. 
His first essay in theologico-historical scholm·ship, his Arians, was 
reliant upon seventeenth- and eighteenth-century handbooks, and was cut 
off from the new research taking place in Germany. Although he wanted 
to depart from the archaic methods of the "Doctrinists"5 , it was mainly 
the fact that he constructed a narrative, rather than a critical, 
approach to Christian Antiquity that distinguished him from them; the 
narrative itself, moreover, is primarily a 'tract for the times'.6 His 
arguments about antiquity in his 'Via Media' phase show the same 
ambivalence, reflecting as they do a sense of distance from the ancient 
past. While constantly advocating a 'Church of the Fathers', he assumes, 
nonetheless, that it cannot be straightforwardly found anywhere: it is 
not to be directly equated with the Church of England; he polemically 
used the Fathers to demonstrate Rome's unpatristic corruptions; he 
never seriously considered the Eastern Orthodox Churches; he was 
certain that Protestantism was not the Christianity of the Fathers. But 
this sense of the gap between past and present is articulated in the 
terms of an archaic debate, stemming from the seventeenth century, 
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between post-Reformation divines arguing that their own communion was 
the True Church. The Essay on Development is, to be sure, much more 
sophisticated about the problem of sources - but this sophistication is 
subordinated to Newman's confessional argument for the newly-found 
True Church he was about to embrace. 
Newman's occupation of this no-man 's-land somewhere be tween the 
critical and the pre-critical conferred an exquisite ambivalence upon 
his treatment of heresy. His enquiries are surrounded with the 
apparatus of erudition. Never a facile construer, he pored earnestly 
over the original texts, making his own translations of examples for 
quotation. But he never escaped what had by his time become the old-
fashioned methods of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: just as 
he always wrote with a goose-quill, so did he rely upon the folios of a 
byegone age.7 lf he strikes a modern note, when contrasted with the old 
handbooks, then it is because, like Gibbon, he was capable of 
constructing a narrative, dramatizing situations and drawing characters: 
it is this literary gift which marks him off from seven teen th-cen tury 
patrism. Moreover, for all his attention to the original texts, Newman 
was often so influenced by the pt~essure of present occasion as to cut 
across the data in a quite anhistorical manner, to find fantastic 
resemblances between heresies separated by centuries. 
Newman's ambivalence towards the past, as he strove to play the 
dual role of urbane and scholarly modern, and ancient Father redivivus, 
shows up in all the heresies of which he treated. Part I has shown how 
Arianism was historicized and given a chronological narrative, but also 
rhetoricized against the political background ·or 1831. One little 
incident in the final recension of Arians vividly epitomizes the 
extraordinary amalgam of the primitive and the urbane in Newman's 
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attitude to scholarship at this time. It concerns the death of At-·ius. If 
glee were an emotion applicable to St.Athanasius, then his narrative of 
the death of his enemy may be described as only with difficulty 
suppressing it: at the very moment of the heretic's triumphant return 
to Alexandria, as he solemnly processed through the streets, supported 
by ecclesiastical allies and the imperial cohorts, he was suddenly 
afflicted, and, rushing to a nearby latrine, perished therein by an 
outrushing of his bowels. Athanasius presents his enemy's death as a 
providential act of God, vindicating the orthodox position. He does not 
shrink from drawing a comparison between Arius's evisceral demise and 
the fate of Judas.'"' Newman found his textbooks divided in their 
assessment of Athanasius' account: while Mosheim notes simply that 
Arius died "in a very dismal manner,'09Milner paraphrases the source 
with colourful relish. 10 
Newman did not quite know what to do. Eagerness to include the 
event vied with misgivings about its effect. He consulted Hugh James 
Rose about whether he should keep it in: 
If ... you think it will not strike, pray strike it 
out.'' 
Rose was non-committal. Eventually Newman included a paragraph 
recounting Arius' death. His account casts a refined and delicate veil 
over the horror of the privy: 
the stroke of death suddenly overtook him, and 
he expired before his danger was dlscovered. 12 
Yet he does not forebear to draw out a ~oral: a "thoughtful mind" 
cannot help seeing it as an "interposition" of Providence, to show that 
God "is not indifferent to human conduct.1113 Still, he is uneasy: he 
pulls back from stating quite starkly that God struck down Arius to 
punish him and to demonstrate His disapproval of heresy, . 
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wrapping himself in fold upon fold of qualification.14 Newman had 
already defended Divine 'interpositions' in his early Essay on Miracles 
<1826). 15 His application in Arians of the principle he had defended, 
however, typifies the anxiety and ambivalence with which he was 
appropriating an ancient perspective. He is acutely aware of the 
incongruity of adopting the attitudes of a fourth-century Egyptian 
patriarch: yet polite, urbane, charitable and critical though he is, he 
yearns for some of Athanasius' toughness. 
The same ambivalence marks his treatment of Apollinarianism and 
Sabellianism four years later. Although the reading of the texts is 
exhaustive and detailed, Newman moves in a consciously anhistorical 
manner: he supports a theory of the secret correspondence and basic 
unity of heresies of widely differing provenance and theological 
context. It is a sophisticated re-statement of the patristic adage that 
all heresies are one because they were all spawned by that one Father 
of Lies, the Devil. Newman's attempt historically to demonstrate an 
ontological structure beneath heretical discourse . ts an early modern 
form of this patristic view. 
Again, in his treatment of Monophysitism, the evidence of grinding 
study is enormous: there is little doubt that Newman was trying to find 
out exactly what were the teachings of all the various forms of this 
heresy. Yet, ultimately, the significance which he drew out from all his 
labours is quite unrelated to the historical content of Monophysite 
theology. Rather, he discerned a purely imaginative parallel with the 
'Via Media' - the 'face in the mirror'. Similarly, the outcome of his 
examination of Semi-Arianism is, quite literally, fantastic - the "ghost" 
which had come to him a second time! 
The element which has most irritated commentators assessing Newman 
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from the point of view of historico-critical scholarship has been the 
rhetoric he adapted from the Fathers. This derives, perhaps, from the 
negative view of rhetoric which has always been a mark of its 
history.16 A.M.Fairbairn, for example, unequivocally denounced Newman's 
rhetoricization of history: 
Modern criticism, as regards both principles 
......... -l _.....,._\-.'"'.-1,_ rM ........ u'"-.r"\1 "'""H,...-...- ~ ..... ~1""\rl f-n m~C""'fo~.,.... nr 
---- ----~-·---, --·- .. ···-···-
even, objectively, to conceive. The scientific 
treatment of history is too alien to his spirit 
to be comprehended by him. His one 
considerable historical work (i.e. Arians) is 
but an overgrown po lem ica l pam ph let a 
treatise on the con travers ies of his own times 
disguised as his tory. 1 7 
Fairbairn's criticisms are, of course, the fruit of his own assumptions: 
that modern criticism is 'objective', that history is 'scientific'. 
Professor Rowan Williams• recent account of Newman's treatment of 
Arianism is less unambiguously dismissive: 
At precisely those points at which his 
historical analysis seems eccentric, superficial 
and prejudiced, New:nan shows his skills as a 
controversialist. Even more than in the fourth 
century i tse 1 f, 'Arianism' is being created by 
abstract ion from \vha t is :10 t. and the 
importance of Newman's work is in its classical 
exemplification of this technique at least as 
much as in its con tr ibu t ion to serious 
scholarship <and probably more).'<'' 
But his antithesis between "controversialist" and "serious scholarship" 
suggests that Newman has not rendered up to him anything that can be 
called knowledge. 
Yet it is precisely for his rhetoric of knowledge that recent 
commentators have been most strenuous in c la 1m ing for Newman 
originality and continuing significance. Gerard Verbeke has illustrated 
the importance of Aristotle's rhetoric as part of the Aristotelian 
background to Newman's idea of informal reasoning and the illative 
sense, in the Grammar of Assent,19 while Susan Funderburgh Jarratt has 
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suggested that Newman's rhetoric of knowledge is comparable with that 
of the ancient Sophists.20 The latter study pursues an analogy between 
the Sophistic assertion of "the primacy and diversity of human 
knowledge construction'0 , which made the discovery of truth a matter of 
personal persuasion, and the Victorian "sense of the difficulty of 
establishing an authority for knowledge ... and a consequent awareness of 
the increased importance of language in the shaping of knowledge, given 
such a situation."21 The Protagoran Sophists, Dr. Jarratt argues, bridged 
the gap between reality and perception by appeal to probability: when 
in the Apologia, Newman dealt with the historical difficulties touching 
the Roman Church, he, too, asserted, by means of his narrative, a 
"sophistic nomot1'22 • 
Such affirmative assessments of Newman as rhetorician appear, at 
first, to contradict the plain fact that he saw the heretics as the 
rhetoricians: indeed, he variously presents heresy as both Aristotelian 
and Sophistic.23 His condemnation of heresy as rhetoric suggests that 
he did not share the idea of rhetoric as epistemically creative, at any 
rate, not in his Anglican period. Must we not, moreover, see him as 
something of a hypocrite - denouncing heretics for their use of 
rhetoric,24 while wielding it as his own most powerful weapon'? In his 
embattled position in the 1830's, especially, it would not, perhaps, have 
been wise to admit using in one's own defence the skill of making the 
weaker argument appear the stronger! 
Characteristically, Newman was too perceptive not to anticipate 
these criticisms. When revising Arians, in the late 1830's, for a second 
edition, he admits that it is not only heresy that is rhetorical, but 
orthodoxy, too. Next to that part of the text of the first edition which 
read 
he adds, 
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The skill of At'ius in the art of disputation is 
well known .::c''·" 
But many of the Fathers were from the 
Sophists, Cyprian, Augustine, Greg. Naz. Basil, 
etc:.::.:;. 
More remarkable still is a pencilled annotation in which he suggests to 
• I • I I ("> t t - I A T l _ _ 
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above a passage about the theological 'economies' of the Alexandrian 
School: 
Throw Disc. Arc. Allegory & Economy together in 
one calling it the pr inc ip le of importing truth 
gradually and considerately wh. goes under 
different names etc. 
Or qu. begin with remarks on the AddrPss 
<wisdom of serpent> necessary for preaching 
gospel, give vat'ious instances of this rhetoric 
from Scripture, e.g. fr-om St. Paul - then branch 
ou t. 2 7 
Newman never did "branch out": the rev is ion of Ar ians was never 
completed, nor did he ever expand these hints into his own 
comprehensive theory of theological rhetoric. 
For all its gnomic quality, however, the annotation contains all the 
elements of such a theory: it expresses an assumption characteristic of 
his thought, the inexhaustable mysteriousness of the revelatum which 
drives the mediating theologian to a series of shifts, as he struggles 
to adapt it to the capacity of his audience. However, he goes further 
than this, extending the application of the concept of rhetoric beyond 
the transmission of the faith in the early Church - to Scripture 
itself. In a manner which startlingly anticipates early twentieth-
century German Form-Criticism, he identifies a rhetorical act - that of 
preaching28 - as crucial to the formation of the New Testament 
documents. 
All attempts to claim Newman's rhetoric as enduringly significant 
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have ignored the Anglican period. If by the Grammar of Assent, he had 
arrived at a rhetoric of knowledge. it was the final stage in a long 
journey which began with the specific public occasions of the Anglican 
period. The years 1825-1831 are crucial here. It was then that he 
acquired, in his collaboration with Richard Whately ,29 the detailed 
knowledge of the almost defuncP0 art of Aristotelian rhetoric. Whately's 
Elements of Rhetoric <1828> was the last of its kind.31 Newman's one-
time mentor, following Aristotle, distinguished sharply between 
philosophy ("inferring">, "the ascertainment of the truth by 
investigation", and rhetoric, <"proving"), "the establishment of [a truthl 
to the satisfaction of another." 32 Whately accepts that the arguments 
used in inferring will differ from those used in proving, even in 
respect of the same truth. He nevertheless warns of the danger of 
confounding the distinction between investigation and persuasion, when 
"those engaged in Philosophical and Theological inquiries" act as 
"Advocate" as part of "the process of forming___their own_q_P-ini0!!§.".33 
This is, of course, exactly what Newman did in his treatment of heresy: 
his rhetoric became a form of investigation, and it led him where he 
did not expect to go. Finally, these years provided him with the 
occasion, which, if initially a defence of Establishment, soon developed 
into a journey of discovery. 
Newman's Anglican rhetoric was more than polemic: it became, 
progressively, a more and more sophisticated essay in hermeneutics. It 
began from the disturbance of a previously uninterrupted and 
unproblematic communion with the past, and moved into a phase of 
creative, if tormented, anxiety. It rejected, quite deliberately, one mode 
of surmounting the gap which had opened up, the one soon to become 
dominant, that is, the idea of historical scholarship as impartial or 
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presuppositionless.34 It asserted the personal in the task of re-
appropriating the past. Not surprisingly, the general similarities 
between Newman and the contemporary hermeneuticist, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, are remarkable, for all their differences of milieu?"=· 
Particularly striking is Gadamer's assessment of the kinship between 
rhetoric and hermeneutics:36 both are concerned with distance. The 
mterpretative gap between past and present is, for Gadamer, analogous 
to that between rhetor and audience. Moreover, he sees in rhetoric the 
same appeal to. the humane and personal which, in his own hermeneutic, 
he is recommending in opposition to an obJectivist methodology. The 
latter is the hermeneutic epitomized by Schleiermacher, the "art of 
avoiding misunderstanding", a procedure in which errors of 
mterpretation engendered by geographical distance, time and language, 
may be reversed by historical research, the personal perspective of the 
mterpreter being 'extinguished'.37 For Gadamer, on the other hand, the 
'horizon' of the interpreter should not be extinguished, even supposing 
this were possible, for "every misunderstanding presupposes a deep 
common accord." 38 The interpreter is alienated from, yet also, tacitly 
in communion with, the past, and the initial tension between the two 
'horizons' of text and object of interpretation, is the starting-point 
for a creative fusion.39 Rhetoric not only bears witness to the problem 
of distance but also to the possibility of synthesis: 
Rhetoric from oldest tradition has been the 
only advocate of a claim to truth that defends 
the probable, the eikos <verisimile), and that 
which is convincing to the ordinary person, 
against the claim of science to accept as true 
only what can be demonstrated and tested.40 
It would be tempting, in the 1 igh t of this, to claim Newman as a 
'post-cdtical' or 'post-modern' thinker for an age just beginning to 
pass beyond the assumptions of post-Enlightenment autonomy of 
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judgment.41 A fairer assessment would be that, while Newman 
increasingly recognized the value of historical method,42 nevertheless, 
1n his Anglican period, this co-ex is ted both with pre-cr it lea 1 stances 
and with something approaching a criticism of the assumptions 
underlying the early manifestations of historico-critical method.43 If 
he only partly entered into the critical movement himself, this was not 
purely from pre-critical inertia. An instinct held him back, a scepticism 
about the critical assumptions of his contemporaries. It is this which 
brings him remarkably close to what may be termed a 'post-modern' 
perspective, one which places a high value on the role of the 
interpreter's preapprehensions and the tacit assumptions of his cultural 
tradition. 
Such an interpretation gives Newman's three rhetorics of heresy, 
for all their surface contradictions, a fundamental, strategic coherence. 
It is the sensus communis that he seeks either to elicit, or even to 
create. His rhetoric of Arianism moved from initial defence of status 
quo to ask broader questions about the Church's roots in an almost lost 
Antiquity. It initiated a programme of imaginative re-creation. His 
rhetoric of Sabellianism and Apollinarianism attacked a wide variety of 
opposing assumptions, L"lcluding those of liberal Anglican scholarship, 
in order to break the ground for the reception of his 'Via Media'. His 
rhetoric of Monophysitism provided an existential way of apprehending 
.s 
the ultimate precariouness of the 'Via Media', and of supporting the 
"' 
sophisticated argument of the idea of development. 
The question of the continuing significance of Newman's rhetoric of 
heresy today is a problematic one, for it is involved with the present 
and future absorption of 'Newman' as an artefact of the past. Just as 
he himself once strove to re-appropriate patristic discourse, so today 
-34-9-
the problem of Newman-interpretation inevitably encounters the use of 
him as a modern 'Father•. His rhetoric has the potential always to be 
re-rhetoricized. This process can take place in surprisingly divergent 
contexts: his very ambivalence provides something for all, while his 
empiricist epistemological framework makes him feel modern, even at the 
points he was repudiating modernity most vigorously. He has been 
claimed as an ''early modern", a Roman Catholic Schleiermacher.44 In the 
wake of Vatican II, and the collapse of Roman Catholic neo-scholastic 
orthodoxy, he may be looked to as the paradigm of a new, contemporary 
way of doing theology.46 Appropriation of Newman is equally possible on 
behalf of conservative and traditionalist stances.46 
The centenary of Newman•s death approaches with rumours of still 
another 'canonization', as his cause progresses in the Vatican. It would 
be a triumph for liberal and traditionalist alike. Newman encapsulated 
patristic attitudes in a form which resembled modernity. On the whole, 
his heresiology favours the traditionalists. Already, as the flank of 
'critical' scholarship becomes more and more exposed to pos t-cr it ica 1 
approaches, Newman's texts contain the potential for an intellectual 
repristination of traditionalism. 
The very disparity between these attempts to re-appropriate Newman 
suggests the protean quality of the texts themselves. Newman glimpsed 
himself in the past, as in a mirror. He strove to gather the fragments 
of that past, to make just such another looking-glass for his own age. 
Contemporary appropriations of Newman show him as himself having 
become a mirror. The texts beckon but in the end render up above all 
the reflected image of the investigator, who is startled to behold 
there the inescapable outline of his own obsessions. 
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Tillotson school, C.R.Cragg, From Puritanism to the Agg_gf Reason, 
<Cambridge: C.U.P., 1950> p.61. Newman's understanding of the term is 
defined in the Prophetical Office as the ''notion that one creed is as 
good as another,'0 Via Media, I, p.29. Since Newman sees dogmatism as of 
the essence of Christianity, latitudinarianism is a denial that there 
are any essentials at all, ibid., p.215. Newman devoted a section of 
Tract 85, Holy Scripture in Its Relation to the Catholic Creed, <1838>, 
to latitudinarianism, see Discussions & Arguments, pp.126-41. He uses 
the term as a synonym for heresy, e.g: ~eretical and latitudinarian 
attem.rs to disparage the orthodoxy of the Ante-Nlcene centuries," Via 
Media, p.61. Latitudinarians were, in Newman's eyes, crypto-Socinians; 
this was a charge going back to the 17th century, and one which 
latitudinarians themselves were always anxious to deny, see Cragg, 
pp.76-7. 
<23> Letters & Diaries, II, p.130. 
<24) Loc.cit. 
<25) Ibid., p.l32. 
(26) Ibid., p.130. 
<27) Loc.clt. 
(28) Loc.cit. 
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(29) Letters & Diaries, II, p.130. 
(30) See J .H.Walgrave, O.P., N"ewman the Theologian. The N"ature of 
Belief and Doctrine as Exemplified in his Life and Works, trans., 
A.\1 .Littledale~ <London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1960) pp.149-50: 'moral sense' 
is a judgment about what is good or bad; 'sense of obligation' is the 
raw, primordial impulse, which has a quality of feeling that one is 
being affected elttrinsically - it leads to God. 'Moral sense' without 
'sense of obligation' is mere aestheticism, the first stage of transition 
from the theocentric to the anthropocentric, p.158. 
<31> Letters & Diaries, II, pp.130-1. 
(32) _Ibid., p.131. 
<33) Loc.cit. 
<34> See Piers Brendan, Hurrell Froude and the Oxford Movement) 
<London: Paul Elek, 1974> pp.4-3-4, Keble, reacting against the 
intellectualism of the 'Noetics' <according to Isaac Williams) put ethos 
above intellect. See also Georgina Battiscombe, John Keble. A Study in 
Limitations, <London: Constable, 1963) pp.54-5, influenced by Butler's 
Analogy, Keble deprecated purely intellectual satisfaction in theological 
matters, regarding religion as something to be lived. 
(35) Autobiographical Writings, Journals, Bk. I, October, 1819, p.162: 
"As a man's faith, so is his practice." 
(36) The connection between truth or error, and a corresponding ethos 
is so marked a feature of Newman's thought that it has been widely 
observed. Since Newman saw the acquisition of truth as personal and 
eJ\:jstential, and inseparable from the exercise of virtue and the life of 
holiness, he inevitably tended to see error as the result of a faulty 
ethos. See Gunter B iemer, Newman on Tradition, <London: Burns & Oates, 
1966) p.116; Boekrad, The Personal Conquest of Truth in J.H.Newman, 
<Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1955) pp.134-5, 250-1: Sean O'Faolin, 
Newman's Way~ <London: Longmans, 1952> p.211: Thomas J. Norris, Newman 
and His Theological Method, <Leiden: E.J .Brill, 1977) pp.101, 110, 161, 
175-6; Brilioth, The Anglican Revival. Studies in the Oxford Movement, 
<London: Longmans. 1933>, points out that this is a characteristic of 
the whole Oxford Movement; hlalgrave, pp.148,162, points to the 
distinction of •types• of character - the orthodoxly religious and the 
rationalist, and, p.163, shows that Newman links the rationalist type 
""ith heresy: '"The religious man becomes ..... the bearer of orthodoxy, the 
rationalist becomes heretical,"" see also p.166. 
(37) Brian W. Martin, John Keble, Priest, Professor and Poet, <London: 
Croom Helm, 1976): he associated, in a doggerel rhyme, the colour of 
conservatism, blue, with heaven and truth, pp.35-6; he staunchly 
defended the political status quo, pp.39ff. See also Battiscombe, p.55: 
Keble admired George Herbert•s '"Country Parson". 
<38) "Occasional Thoughts for 1827", in Remains of the Late Rev. 
Richard Hurrell Froude, (ed. J.H.Newman> Part I, Vol I. <London: 
Rivingtons,1838) p.115. 
(39) Loc.clt. 
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(4.0) Froude, Remains, p.116. 
<41) Loc.cit. 
(42) The subject of the relation between ethos and belief had been 
variously discussed by those in Newman's circle. In 1828, in a 
correspondence with Blanco tlhite, Newman challenged Blanco "to give me 
some account of the connection of speculative error with bad ethos-
e.g. in what is a consistent SociniaJn worse than an orthodo:K believer? I 
think him to be worse, but I wish my mind clear on the subject," see 
uavtd 1\lewsorne, •rrhe Evangelical Sources of Newman's Power," in ed. 
Coulson & Allchin, Rediscovery of Newmoo. <London: SPCK, 1967> p.25. 
Since Froude's treatment of the subject precedes this discussion, it is 
very likely that Newman's preoccupation with the ethos of heresy was 
sparked off by him. 
(43> Remains, p.116. 
<44> Ibid., pp.116-7. 
{45) Letters & Diaries, II, p.80. This was in early July, 1828. 
(46) NeWlilan was reading the epistles of St Ignatius of Antioch on 
3rd & 4th July, 1828. 
<47) Most strongly in the epistle to the Smyrneans, which Newman 
read on 4th July,l828: ''Let no one do anything that pertains to the 
Church apart from the bishop ... Wherever the bishop shall appear, there 
is the Catholic Church. It is not permitted to baptise or hold a love-
feast independently of the bishop. But whatever he approves that is 
also well-pleasing to God," ed., & trans., Henry Bettenson, The !iarly 
Christian Fathers~ <Oxford: O.U.P., 1976> p.49. 
(48) No.15 of Parochial & Plain Sermons, I. 
<49> Ibid., p.191. 
(50) Loc. cit. 
<51> Ibid., p.197. 
<52> Ibid., p.201. 
<53> Ibid., p.197. 
(54) Loc.clt. 
(55) Loc.clt. 
(56) Ibid., No.6, preached on 4th June, 1829. 
<57> Ibid., p.211. 
<58) Loc.cit. 
<59) Ibid., p.212. 
(60) Parochial & Plain Sermons. III, preached on 29th November, 1829. 
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<61) Proverbs, 4. 24-7. 
<62> Parochial & Plain Sermons, III, p.150. 
<63) Ibid., p.192. 
<64> Loc.cit. 
<65) Ibid., p.193. The texts sre I Cor. 11.19 and Tit. 3.10. 
(66) Romans 16.17. 
(67) Parochial & Plain Sermons, III, p.193, 
<68> Ibid., p.l92. 
<69) Ibid., p.199. 
<70> Ibid., p.202. 
<71> Ibid., p.205. 
<72) University Sermons, p.21. 
<73) Jbid., p.29. 
<74> Ibid., p.30. 
<75> Ibid., p.28. 
<76) Newman's correspondence with Charles lasted from March to 
September, 1825. Five years later, Charles attempted a resumption, which 
Newman declined. Charles objected on a priori grounds to future 
punishment, miracle and historical reliability of evangelists, and 
presented Judaism and Christianity as the products of causes purely 
human, Letters & Diaries, I, pp.213-5, 219, 224-8, 240, 253-5, 258; II, 
pp.266-81, 258. Charles was, then, a typical example of the mentality 
which, in Newman's view, stood in judgment upon authority. Newman's 
response to Charles relied upon the external evidence for the authority 
of dogma and Bible, I, p.224. 
<77) Parochial & Plain Sermons, I, No.17, preached on 24th October, 
1830. 
(78) Ibid., p.222. 
(79) Ibid., p.219. 
(80) Ibid., p.218. 
(81) Ibid., p.219. 
(82) Ibid., p.221. 
(83) Loc.cit. 
(84) Ibid., p.223. 
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(85) Parochial & Plain Ser~mons. I, p.224. 
(86> Loc.cit. 
<87> Ibi~, p.226. 
(88) Loc.ctt. 
<89) Ibid., No.18, preached on 14th November, 1830. 
{~U) lbid., p.22!:L 
(91> Ibid., p.235. 
<92) Ibid., pp.237-8. 
(93) Louis Bouyer, Newman. His Life and Spirituality, trans. J.Lewis 
May. <London: Burns & Oates> 1958, p.184-: Newman consistently denounced 
"bourgeois liberalism" and came close to "a wholesale condemnation of 
modern man and all his works." 
(94-) University Sermons, p.48. 
(95) Parochial and Plain Sermons. II, No.16. "Religious Cowardice." 
April 25, 1831, p.181. 
<96) Parochial & Plain Sermons,!, No022, "Witnesses of the 
Resurrection," April 24, 1831, p.291. 
(97) Loc.cit. 
(98) Letters & Diaries, III, p.l03. Arians was rejected by the editors 
of the Theological Library on October 23, 1832. 
(99) Letters & Diaries, II, p.323. 
000) For example, ibid., pp.338, 34-5. 358-9, 371. 
(101) Ibid., pp.352-3. 
(102) Ibid .• p.371. 
<103) Loc.cit. 
<104-) Apologia <Svaglic), pp.35-6. 
(105) Letters & Diaries, II, p.371. 
(106) Letters & Diaries, III, p.54. 
<107> It was not only tests, but also dogmatic language in the public 
liturgy that liberals wanted to remove. Thomas Arnold, for example, 
objected to the damnatory clauses in the Athanasian Creed, see 
V.F.Storr, The Development of Eng!!?h Theology in the Nineteenth Century 
1800-1860, <London: Longmans, 1913) p.llO. 
<108) Letters & Diaries, II, p.321. 
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009) The analogical, and therefore rhetorical, presentation of the 
patristic age has been touched on by H.Bremond, The Mystery of Newman, 
trans., H.C.Corrance, <London: Williams & Norgate) p.108, and by 
Walgrave,Newmfi!!, pp.38-9: Walgrave points out that, in studying the 
Fathers, Newman "found these ideas, principles and standpoints analogous 
to those of the disputants of his own day." Walgrave sees the analogy 
as working by "continuity of ethos'. Oddly, C.S.Dessain, John Henry 
Newman, <London: Nelson, 1966) declares that because Newman was 
unconditioned by any dominant school or by reaction agall1st specific 
heresies, he was able to evolve, almost in vacuo, "a classical, a truly 
t.atnollc l..atnollcism, p.44. !::iuch a view is wide of the mark, if applied 
to the Anglican writings, where the polemical context is of vital 
importance in determininB the nature of Newman's heresiology. 
<110) Ar ians, p .4-06. 
0 11) Ibid., p.309. 
<112) Ibid., p.394-. 
013) Ibid., p.246, 
<114-) Ibid., p.287. 
<115) Ibid., p.264-. 
<116) Ibid., p.266. 
<117) Ibid., p.373. 
<118) .l_bid., p.372 . 
<119) The earliest occurrences of "liberals" and "liberalism" in 
Newman's vocabulary come in letters of the early 1830's, when the 
Church-State crisis was clearly on his mind. Writing to Simeon Lloyd 
Pope on August 15th, 1830, he gives the pressing need to support the 
Established Church against Dissent as the reason for ceding from the 
Bible Society: "The tendency of the age . is liberalism .. .No religion will 
stand if deprived of its forms." Newman declares his allegiance to the 
Church of England as "a system of Church government ... actually 
established by the Apostles," Letters & Diaries, II, pp.264--5. By the 
time he was engaged on Arians, he could declare, to J.W.Bowden, that the 
Nhigs "are liberals and in saying this, I conceive I am saying almost as 
bad of them as can be said of any man," ibid., p.317 <13th March, 1831>. 
Wewman's first use of the term in the text of Arians was more general 
- it was a form of 'Neology• or "'false illumination", Arians p.109. For a 
discussion of this, see below, n.152. 
<120) Arians, p.26. 
<121> Ibid., p.31 
<122) Ibid., p.32. 
<123) Ibid., p.29. 
<124) Ibid., p.52. 
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<125) Ibid., p.28. 
<126) Ibid., p.31. 
<127) Ibid., p.31. 
<128> Ibid,_, p.32. 
029) Ibid., p.33. 
\1 ,jU J 1010., p.,j,j. 
(131) Ibid., p.34. 
<132) Ibid., pp.34-5. 
(133) Ibid., p.114. 
034) Ibid., p.116. 
(135) Ibid., p.115. 
(136) Loc.cit. ''The trinitarian hypothesis of the Eclectics was not 
perplexed by any portion of that difficulty of statement which in the 
true doctrine, results from the very incomprehensibility of its subject." 
<137> Ibid., p.106. 
<138) Rough Notes Preparatory to Arians Birmingham Oratory Archive 
Archive, A.12 .11. This definition occurs on a single sheet of paper 
containing notes on Ammon ius Sac cas, whom Newman considers an 
"apostate", rather than a heretic. It is clear that he is thinking of the 
contemporary analogy "parallel of neologism." Neologism is particularly 
dangerous because not easily identifiable by its language as heretical: 
<>its artifice is to keep within the letter." 
<139> Hugh James Rose, The State of the Protestant Religion !!!. 
Germany, In a Discourse preached before the University of Cambridge, 
<Cambridge: Deighton & Sons; London: Rivingtons & ~hittaker, 1825), 
<140) E.B.Pusey, An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the 
Rationalist Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany, 
«.ondon: Rivingtons, 1828). 
<141> For the course of the controversy, see H.P.Liddon, pp.5lff. Rose's 
book was unanimously regarded as being misinformed, pp.151, 154. 
(142> Newman recorded its appearance, in his Diary of 1828, but 
confessed to his sister, Harriet, that he found it "very difficult" and 
had made little of it. ~riting to Samuel Rickards, he criticised the 
style of the book, see Letters & Diaries, pp.74, 98. 
<143) Liddon, p.164. 
<144> Ibid., pp.173-4. 
<145) Letters & Diaries, II, Diary for June 8, 1829 and July 31, 1829, 
pp.l47, 155. See also Liddon, pp.164-7. 
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<146) Pusey, p.48,176. 
<14.7) Newman refers to the influence of Rose upon him in Apologia 
<Svaglic>, pp.44-7, and alludes to his book on German theology. 
<148) Rose, <Part D, p.3. 
<149) Ibid., p.65. 
<150) Ibid., p.lO; see also p.103. 
<151> Arians, p.109. 
052> Liberalism became an all-embracing concept in the Tractarian 
period. The breadth of the concept is indicated by the appendix to the 
Apologia <Svaglic>, pp.254-262, where Newman lists eighteen 
characteristics of liberalism. At the outset of this, he gives a concise 
definition, "the Anti-dogmatic Principle" - although this is to "tell us 
very little about it", ibid., p.255. In his J;Jiglietto Speech, <1879) he 
summarised his life's work as the battle against liberalism in religion 
and defined ·it in a way virtually synonymous with latitudinarianism, 
"Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth 
in religion, but that one creed is as good as another," quoted in Ward, 
II, p.460. 
<153) flrians, p.22. 
<154) Loc.cit. 
<155) Ibid., pp.366. 
<156) Ibid., p.270. 
(157) Ibid., pp.329-30. 
<158) Ibid., p.372. 
<159) Ibid., pp.308. 
(160) Ibid., p.391. 
<161> Ar fans, p .308. 
<162) Ibid., p.307. 
(163) Ibid., p.304-5. 
<164) Ibid., p.304. 
<165) Ibid., p.305. 
<166) Ibid., p.307. 
<167> Ibid., p.8. Rowan Williams, Arius. Heresy and Tradition. <London: 
D.L.T., 1987) p.3, declares that "Newman rightly claimed a degree of 
originality for his interpretation of the roots of Arianism' .. in locating 
the heresy's origin in Antiochene exegesis, rather than Neoplatonism. 
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(168) Williams, p.9. 
<169) Ibid., p.ll. 
<170) Ibid., p.18. 
(171) Ibid., p.113. 
(172) See Essay on Development, pp.305-6, his discussion of the origins 
of Nestorianism. 
<173) Williams, p.4; by contrast with the Syrian Church, "The 
Alexandrian Church is held up ... as the very exemplar of traditional and 
revealed religion." 
<174) Charles Frederick Harrold, 00John Henry Newman and the 
Alexandrian Platonists,'0 Modern Philology, 37, <1940), p.282. 
<175) Ibid., p.287. 
<176) For 'figuration', see Hans Frei, Ihe Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 
<New Haven & London: Yale U.P., 1974> p.2. 
<177) The edition referred to throughout will be: Joseph Milner, The 
History of the Church of Christ Previous to the Reformatio~ [in 6 
vols.l, Vols. I & II, <London: Religious Tract Society, undated). It was 
originally published in York, 1794-1809, being completed after his death 
by his brother Isaac. 
<178) See "Milman's View of Christianity,o• Essays Critical & Hi?torical, 
II, p.186: "Gibbon is almost our sole authority for as subjects near the 
heart of a Christian as any can well be." 
<179) J .D.Walsh, "Joseph Milner's Evangelical Church History," Journal of 
Ecclesiatical History, X, <1959), p.186. On the other hand, Harrold, 
pp.284-5, n.26, is more positive about the continuing influence of 
Milner upon Newman. 
080) For republicated patterns, see Walsh, pp.l79, 185. Newman did 
acknowledge the influence upon him, when composing his first Essay on 
Miracles, of Milner's theory of history: .. that upon the visible Church 
came down from above, at certain intervals, large and temporary 
Effusions of divine grace,'' Apologia <Svaglic), p.32. 
<181> Yngve Brllioth, p.35. 
<182> Quoted in Walsh, p.l77. 
<183> Ibid., p.l76. 
<184) Milner , I, p.142. 
(185) Ibid., I, p.139. 
<186) Ibid., I, pp;207-10, 224 and 326-7, where Ortgen is blamed for 
or ig ina t ing Arianism. 
(187> lbid.,I, p.185. He is treating of the heretic Theodotus. 
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088) Milner ,I, p.201. See also pp.383-4.. 
<189) Ibid.,!, p.201. 
<190) Compare Newman's account of Ammon ius Saccas' accomoda t ion of 
ChristiEmity to his eclecticism or "Neologism" <Arians, pp.104-6), with 
Milner's description of this philosopher·'s corruption of the true 
doctrine of Justification by platonic philosophy. Milner, I, pp.l88-9. 
091) Milner,!, p.384. Similarly Julian the Apostate is compared with 
Hume, see Walsh, p.179. 
<192) Walsh, p.179. 
<193) Milner, I, p.183. 
(194) Loc. cit. 
<195) "If then this zeal for good works be the EFFECT of HIS 
redemption, how is it possible that a person who disbelieves the 
important doctrines essentially concerned in that redemption should 
have any zeal for good works." Ibid._, I, p.379. 
<196) Ibid., II, p.59,67 
<197> Ibid., II, p.60, precisely as Newman does in Arians! 
<198> Ibid., I, p.380. 
(199) _Ibid., I, p.379. Milner asserts that many passages testify to 
Origen's orthodoxy of belief. His "ambiguities" may be explained by "his 
well-known, curious and adventurous spirit of enquiry, in subjects on 
which he never meant to be positive." 
§3. Newman's Tractarian Rhetoric, 1833-1837: The AnalogJ- Continued. 
<1) See Norman, p.106. 
<2) For example, on Roman Catholic Emancipation, see Part I, §2, n.17. 
<3> Arians, p.406. 
<4> Apologia <Svaglic), p.43. 
(5) Verses on Various Occasions, p.18l. 
(6) Ibid., p.145. 
(7) lbid., p.102. 
(8) Ibid., p.89. 
(9) The Letters have a long and complex textual history behind them 
before their appearance in the Collected Works, Historical Sketches, I & 
II. They were extensively reworked for the first edn. of The Church of 
the Fathers, in 1840, and also in 1857, for the new edn. of this work, 
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when some of the material was diverted to form Pri~t~ve C~ristianity. 
Numerous rephrasings, conflations, deletions and additions took place 
between 1833 and 1872/3, so that quotations in Historical Sketches, I & 
II are not a reliable guide for what Newman wrote in the original 
Letters. The original articles have been referred to at all times in the 
body of the text, but, for convenience, accompanying references to the 
collected works have been given, where applicable. 
(10) Letter I, British Magazine, Vol. IV, Oct. 1, 1833 (London: 
Rivingtons) p.421, Historical Sketches, I, p.339 
<11> Loc.ci t. 
<12 ) Loc .cit . 
<13) Letter I, British Magazine, IV, p.422. Historical Sketches, I, 
p.341. 
<14) Letter I, Br. Mag., p.424, Historical Sketches, I, p.346. 
<15) Letter I, Br.Mag., IV, p.423, Historical Sketche~, I, p.342 
<altered). 
(16) Letter I, Br. Ma~, IV, p.425, Historical Sketches, I, p.347. 
<17> Letter I, Br. Ma~, IV, p.425, Historical Sketches, p.347. 
<18) Discussions & Arguments, p.41. 
<19) Tract 15, p.ll. 
(20> j...oc.cit. 
(21) Newman continues, "And as evident is its growing importance at 
this era in our history, when Democracy is let loose upon us. Either the 
Church is to be the providential instrument of re-adjusting Society, or 
none at all is vouchsafed to us. The Church alone is able to do, what 
lt has often done before, - to wrestle with lawless minds, and bring 
them under. The Church alone can encourage and confirm the better 
feelings of our peasantry, conciliate the middle classes, and check the 
rabble of the towns." Via Media, II, p.84. 
<22) Ibid., pp.89. 
<23> Ibid., pp.89-90. 
<24> Ibid., p.59. 
<25) For a full account of the young Newman's apocalypticism, and its 
political dimension, see Sheridan W. Gilley,"Newman and Prophecy, 
Evangelical and Catholic, ~ Journal of the United Reformed Church 
History Society, Vol. 3, no.5, <March, 1985), pp.160-88. 
(26) This connection has been observed by Dessain, Newman, p.ix and 
more vividly by William Barry, p.54: ''Savanorola condemned the Pagan 
Renaissance; Newman the French Revolution." 
<2 7) Dis cuss ions & Arguments, p .51 . 
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(28) Discussions & Arguments, p.57. 
<29) Newman adds, " ... a coincidence between actual events and prophecy 
sufficient to show us that the apparent contradiction in the latter may 
be easily reconciled!, though beforehand we may not see how." Ibid., p.68. 
(30) Ibid., p.58. 
(31) Ibid., p.59. 
(32) Loc.cit. 
(33) Ibid., p.59. 
(34.) Essays Critical & Historical, I, p.139. 
(35) Ibid., p.140. 
<3 6) " ... accordingly, what we, in our English thea logy, should ca 11 the 
lawless and proud lusts of corrupt nature, he abmost sanctifies as the 
instinctive aspirations of the heart after its unknown good. Such were 
the cravings of Eve after the forbidden fruit; some such vision of a 
summum bonum, unpossessed but attainable, did the tempter suggest to 
her. But the promise, "Ye shall be as gods', seems in M. de la Mennais' 
system to be a sufficient justification of rebellion." Ibid., pp.l57-8. 
<37) Ibid., p.158. 
<38> Ibid., p.l60. 
§4. Conclusions: Rhetoric and Politics. 
(1) Apologia <Svaglic>, p.45. 
(2) Ibid., p.62. 
(3) J.C.D.Clarke, English Society 1688-1832, Ideology, Social Structure 
and political practice during the ancien regime, <Cambridge: C.U.P., 1985> 
pp.3-38 which surveys historiography. 
<4> Ibid., p.l. 
<5> Ibid., p.96. 
<6> Ibid., pp.272ff. 
(7) Clarke thinks Locke never really caught on, pp.46ff. His "chief 
impact" relates rather to heresy: it was "not to import contractarianism 
into politics, but Arianism into religion." 
<8> Ibid., pp.378, 272-3. 
<9> Ibid., pp.89, 320ff. 
<10> Ibid., p.277. 
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<11> Clarke , p .2 19. 
<12) Heterodoxy was growing in the 1760's, p.320, and in the 1800's 
merged with atheism, p.330. "Socinianism was often only a resting place 
on the road to unbelief ... As 'rational Christianity' degenerated from 
religion to ethics, it set the scene for the triumph of utilitarianism 
from the 1820's," ibid., p.345. 
<13) Even Edward Irving opposed the repeal of tests, ibid., p.350. 
u ... , ,.,~ :::.01 ut::u ~ i c:u .. -. 1 ur· 1.ue soc 1a 1 n IS tor Ian ot eighteenth century 
England is that Christian belief is initially almost universal, a belief 
calling attention to the his tory of a chosen nat ion conceived as a 
family .. ,"ibid., p.87. 
<15) Ibid., p.350. 
<16) Tracts, Vol. I, no.2, p.2. 
<17> Norman, pp.73-5: it was possible, Norman argues, to make a 
distinction between non-party-political defence of the Establishment 
before 1832, and specific party involvement. Indeed, Toryism was not 
necessarily sen as party-political <p.84). After Reform, this distinction 
was made more difficult to maintain <pp.92-3). 
<18) Letters & Diaries, IV, p.24. 
<19) Ibid., p.26. 
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PART II: ATTACK: Sabellianism and Apollinarianism - a critique of 
liberal ism. 
§1. Transition to a ne'f;J heresiology: the mid-1830's. 
(1) Sabellianism was held to deny the personal distinctions of the 
Trinity. It arose out of the 'monarchist• movement, centred in Rome in 
~iu:: l..J.u::;mg uectmes ot -.;ne second century. Two heresies arose, which, 
though essentially d 1 ff eren t, both at tacked the persons of the Trinity, 
in the interests of the divine monarchia, or unity. See J.N.D.Kelly, Early 
Christian Doctrine, 5th Revised Edition, O..ondon: Adam & Charles Black, 
1977) p.115; J .F.Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of 
Christian Doctrine, 9th Edn., <London: Methuen & Co., 1951) p.97. One 
group somP.times called "rationalist .. or "dynamic"' Monarchians, or 
Adoptionists <Harnack>, saw Christ as a mere man, whose 'divinity ' 
consisted of power from God devolving upon him. The names of Theodotus 
"the Shoemaker", Artemon - and, later, in the third century, Paul of 
Samosata, are associated with this group. A second group, however, 
remained convinced of the divinity of Christ, and tried to reconcile 
this with the monarchy by seeing the persons as ~odes of the one God's 
various activities. With this group are associated the names of Praxeas, 
Noetus and Sabellius, the latter being the most sophisticated exponent 
of medalist theology. See Kelly, pp.119-23, Bethune-Baker, p.97. The rise 
of Sabellianism, or modalism, took place against the background of a 
similar orthodox thea logy - 'Economic Trinitarian ism', which explained 
the distinction of Persons by reference to God's acts towards humanity, 
in the economy, or plan, of salvation. In the Apologists, Irenaeus, 
Tertullian and Hippolytus, the originally Stoic distinction, employed by 
Philo, between the logos endiathetos <the rational, unexpressed thought 
in the mind) and the logos prophorikos, <the thought 'put forth' and 
expressed in a word), became the dominant Western Trinitarian formula, 
Kelly, pp.10-11; 101-108. However. the orthodox Fathers did not teach 
that the persons only came into existence with the economy of 
salvation: they taught eternally subsistent distinctions within the 
Godhead. It was on this point that Sabellianism appears to have 
departed from orthodoxy: the persons are treated entirely in 'economic' 
terms; there are no subsistent distinctions. This account of 
Sabellianism, of course, describes what the heresy was regarded as 
being, from the point of view of a victorious orthodoxy. In fact, 
Sabellius' writings are not extant and the earliest accounts of his 
teaching date from the fourth century, Bethune-Baker, p.l05. Newman's 
own reading of the sources will be considered in detail, during the 
course of Part II. He encountered, in Schleiermacher, one attempt to 
rehabilitate Sabellianism, on both historico-critical and systematic 
grounds: see § 7. 
The two alternative directions - modalism or adoptionism - in 
which Monarchism moved were more than historical coincidence for 
Newman, and suggested a deeper link between Sabellians and the 
'Adoptionists• who so resembled modern Socinians. The rise of 
Sabellianism out of a theology of salvation - the explanation of 
Persons by reference to their impact upon humanity - will also not be 
without significance in Newman's analysis. 
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<2> Apollinaris became Bishop of Laodicea, in Syria, in 361. 
Apollinaris' heresy is usually defined as a denial that Christ had a 
h~man soul, i.e. that Christ did not have a normal human psychology, and 
human intelligence. The Divine Logos replaced Christ's human soul, in 
Apollinaris' conception: Christ was "spirit united with flesh". 
Apollinaris may have been a trichotomist, believing that human nature 
consists of body, animating spirit <psyche> and intelligence <nous>, the 
Logos taking over the latter two. Or he may have been a dichotomist, 
believing that human nature was body and soul, the Logos, in Christ's 
case, talking the parrt of the soul. See Kelly, pp.292-3. The first date of 
the appearance of this heresy may have been 362, at the Council of 
l\lt:!xanar1a. Jnnanasms• account of this Council, Tomus ad Antiochenos, 
refers to a heresy that believed that Christ had a body without a soul, 
i.e. "without sense or in te 11 igence", ed. J .Stevenson, Creeds, Counc Us and 
Controversies, <London: S.P.C.K., 1978> p.55; see also p.56, n.7. In the 
second half of the fourth century, after the death of Athanasius, 
Apollinarianism was condemned. It exercised the Cappadocian Fathers, 
especially Gregory Nazianzen. Material in English on Apollinarianism may 
be found in Bethune-Baker, Chapter XIV, pp.239-54-; G.L.Prestige, Fa_thers 
and Heretics, <London: S.P.C.K., 1958) Lecture V, pp.94--119; Charles Raven, 
Apollinarianism. An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church. 
<Cambridge: C.U.P., 1923). 
In Newman's investigations into Apollinarianism, he dealt with 
original sources, and arrived at his own, very precise, conclusions 
about what Apollinarianism was. See § 5. 
(3) Brilioth, p.223, where he designates Apollinarianism as a 
characteristic of Tractarian Christology generally. For a full discussion 
of Newman's alleged 'Apollinarianism' see 6 (b) below. 
<4> ed. J.Stevenson, A N~w Eusebius, <London: S.P.C.K., 1978) p.340. 
According to Socrates' History, Arius accused his bishop, Alexander of 
Alexandria, of "introducing the doctrine of Sabellius the Libyan". 
(5) Late 17th-century deniers of Trinitarian orthodoxy had, in fact, 
made the connection themselves by claiming the Arian, or adoptionist, 
strand in early Church history as a legitimation of their postion. See 
Earl Morse Wilbur, A History of Unitarianism, <Camb. Mass.: Harvard U.P., 
1947>, p. 512. 
(6) "The great doctrines which the Socinian denies are Our Lord's 
divinity and atonement." Essays Critical & Historical, p.202. 
<7> In Arians, Chap. 1, § V, ''Sabellianism", Newman offers some 
hesitant speculations about the possibility of a "'declension" from a 
C3more orthodox"" form of modalism <Christ is God>, to something 
approaching Socinianism ("the Ebionite, or modern Socinian heresy", 
p.123). 
(8) That is "historical development", according to the Essay on 
Development, p.109, "when a fact, which at first is very imperfectly 
apprehended except by a few, at length grows into its due shape and 
complete proportions, and spreads through a community, and attains 
general reception by the accumulation, agitation and concurrence of 
testimony". Newman later gives, as an •instance in illustration', the 
later growth in Church history of papalism. This was originally 
unperceived as part of the revelatum: it was latent, ••sleeJ1ing". 
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Awareness of the papacy's role only came in when inter-church 
difficulties arose after the cessation of persecution, so that there was 
an opportunity for a universal jurisdiction to operate, see pp.207ff. 
hlhen the papal supremacy was finally realized, it was not regarded as 
something new, but what had been always there, though unperceived. 
Therefore, historical change has made clear the true nature of what was 
originally revealed about the Church. Similarly, in the 1830's, Newman 
argues that historical development can reveal the true, but initially 
unperceived, nature of a heresy. 
(9) That is, what the Essay calls "logical development". This occurs 
when a strict development may be drawn out from established premisses. 
There is nothing new in the logical conclusion, which is really only 
revealing more fully the character of the premisses, see p.108. Of 
course, such a logical development may be new in the sense of coming 
as a surprise, but it is not new in the sense of being in continuity 
with premisses. Newman•s heresiology in the 1830's constantly applies 
this technique to heresy. He is unwilling, however, at this stage to 
apply it to fundamental orthodoxy. 
(10) Rarely does Newman use the word "atheism": "infidelity" is his 
usual term. This means disbelief in the revealed doctrines of 
Christianity. Infidelity and atheism are, nevertheless, very close - for, 
once revelation is set aside, the door is opened to unqualified 
disbelief. Newman's vocabulary is often backward-looking, to the Deist 
and Socinian challenges of the eighteenth century. Hence, the prominence 
of 'Socinian' and 'infidel' in his vocabulary. On the other hand, he can 
refer, looking forward, to the increasing secularization of his own age, 
e.g. "Milman's View of Christianity", p.219. Here, be it noted, he uses 
the term "infidelity" rather than 'atheism'. 
<11) For example, passim in De Decretis Nic. Symb., esp., ch.4-
<P.G.XXV,429B>, Ch.5 <P.G.:XXV,4-31C), ch.15 "a:aEf3at>V'tE<;" <PG XXV, 419), 
P .G.XXV ,4-19>, Ch.16,"cxaEf3Eta:", <P .G.:XXV ,419), Ch.30 <P .G.XXV ,4-710>, ch.32 
<P .G.XXV ,476>. 
Other important phrases include: 
D the idea of Arianism as .. ty6EO'tl)<;", 'godlessness', 'atheism', 
"'tcx 'tl'j<; 1cx6EO'rl)<; Ent/{Etp'lJUX't0!10 , 'the syllogisms of godlessness'. P.G.XXV, 
7818, Hist.Arianum, Ch.75. 
ii)Athanasius concludes that Artus's manner of death proved that 
' ) 
"a:aE6E<; '[0 xntO"'tOJICX]{CX]{OV EpyotO"'tl)ptov 'tc.>V ApEtOJ!CXVtXc.>V" -
'the workshop, hostile to Christ, of the Arian maniacs is impious', 
P.G.XXV, 689A, Epist. ad Serapion De Morte Arii, Ch.4-. 
In an 1871 note to Arians, Newman notes the connection between 
C3aaE6Eta"" and heresy, and "'EuaEfJEta'" <'piety• or 'godliness•) and 
orthodoxy, Arians (1833>. p.286, n.5. 
<12> In an important passage, Athanasius declares the Arians to be 
guilty of apostasy [apostasiaJ: " ... but ye, 0 modern Jews and disciples 
of Caiaphas, how many Fathers can you assign your phrases? Not one of 
the understanding and the wise; for all abhor you, but the devil alone; 
none but he is your father in this apostasy, who in the beginning sowed 
you with the seed of irreligion," Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers of the Christian Church, 2nd Series, '11ol.IV, Select Works and 
Letters of St. Athanasius, trans., J.H.Newman, <Michigan: Eerdmans, 1980) 
pp.168-9. This translation dates from 1841-2. The original Greek bears 
out the point clearly, 
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., ( ) ) ' "~ae~~at ~tva~ apa ~~v p~~a~ov u~~v exe~e fiesat rra~epa~; aAAq ouoeva ~~v 
~povt~~V ~at U00~V av EtHOt~E. HOV~E6 yap U~au anocr~pE~OV~at ~A~V ~OVOU 
~ou ota~oXou. ~ovou yap u~tv ou~ou ~rycr ~otau~~~ anou~auta~ na~~p 
ye:yovEV 0 J(O:~a U)V ap](T}V UJJ.l.V EHtUHEtpa~ U)V aue:j3e:tav." 
Migne, Patrologia Graeca, 1857, Vol. XXV, col.465D, St. Athanas ius, !)_~ 
Decretis Nicaenae Synodi 27. 
§2. The Inception of Patristic Research: the Edition of Dionysius of 
Alexandria 
<1) Letters & Diaries, IV, p.202, To Henry Wilberforce, lOth March, 
1834. 
<2> Bethune-Baker, pp.113-118, Ch.VIII, "The Correspondence Between 
the Dionysii"; Kelly, pp.l33-6; ed.Stevenson, pp.268-71, documents 
nos.235, 236. 
(3) In the Libyan Pentapolis, see Kelly, p.l33. Dionysius, Bishop of 
Rome, in his contribution to the controversy, alludes to an exaggerated 
and erroneous reaction to "Sabellius' opinions", ed. Stevenson, p.268. 
(4) Kelly, p.133,indeed, sees Dionysius of Alexandria as the "best-
known exponent of Origen's subordinationist strain." 
(5) See Kelly, p.134; Bethune-Baker, pp.ll6-7. 
<6> Although without directly naming or accusing him. The Pope's 
phraseology is courteously vague, "I am told that some among you .. ," ed. 
Stevenson, p.268. 
(7) For a translation, see Newman's own of the De Sententia Dionysii, 
most readily available in ed. Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
vol.IV, St Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, Oxford & N.Y., 1892, 
pp.181-2. See also Stevenson, pp.269-70 for discussion of the nuances 
of the analogies by the two Dionysii. 
<8> l:Jard, II, p.576, To Canon Jenkins, Feb.27th, 1877. 
<9> Letters & Diaries, IV, p.320, To John l:Jilliam Bowden, Aug.lOth, 
1834. 
<10> Loc.cit. Newman therefore tells Bowden "not to trouble himself" 
about Mohler's book on St.Athanasius. 
<11> Letters & Diaries, III, p.43. 
<12> Ibid., p.65. 
<13> Ibid., pp.l04-5. 
<14> Letters & Diaries, IV, p.311, n.l. 
<15> Newman began work on lOth March, 1834, Letters & Diaries_, IV, 
p202, and ended on 30th August, 1835, Letters & Diaries, V. There are 
references to the work in progress throughout this period:-Letters & 
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Diaries, IV, pp.253, 274, 280, 283, 291, 293, 311, 320, 360, V: 97, 104, 
107, 118, 120, 122, 132. 
(16) Letters & Diaries, IV, pp.283 ,293, V ,97. 
(17) Ibid., pp.293, 310-11, in July ,1834. 
(18> Letters & Diaries, IV, p.31l. 
(19) Ibid., p.320. 
\I!.VJ 1010.., p.,jbU. 
(21) Letters & Diaries, V, p.l04. 
(22) Ibid., p.118. 
(23) Letters & Diaries, v. p.122. 
(24) Ibid., p.132. 
(25) Loc.cit. 
(26) Birmingham Oratory Archive, B.2.8. 
(27) i.e. Sextus. 
<28> Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, Penguin Edn., p.289 <7.1.6.)) '"The 
doctrine now being propagated at Ptolemsis in Pentapolis is an impious 
one, characterised by shocking blasphemy against Almighty God, Father 
of our Lord Jesus Christ; utter disbelief in His only-begotten Son, the 
word made man; and indifference to the Holy Ghost ... 
<29> Birmingham Oratory Archive, 8.2.8. 
<30) Loc.cit. 
§3 The Hampden Controversy 
(1 > Letters & Diaries, IV, p.323, August 20th, 1834. 
(2) Trevor, pp.173-7, gives a vivid account of the atmosphere and 
personalities involved in this first stage of the controversy over 
Hampden, centring on matriculation for Dissenters. 
(3) Letters & Diaries, IV, p.371, 28th November, 1834. 
(4) Letters & Diaries, V, pp.50-1, 23rd March, 1835. 
<5> Ibid., p.65, 3rd May, 1835. 
<6> See Trevor, pp.174, 176: "Hampden, in spite of holding that 
differing opinions did not matter, invariably assumed that people who 
attacked his mm did so from mere malice." 
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(]) That is, Newman! See, Letters & Diaries, V, pp.73-4. Wilberforce 
refused. Hampden then applied to Newman, who passed on the letter to 
H.ltHlberforce, without responding directly to Hampden. l:Jilberforce, 
presumably acting under Newman's instructions, wrote to Hampden that 
·~r Wilberforce is not aware of any right on the part of the Principal 
to require the names of his correspondents." 22nd May,1835. 
(8) Letters & Diaries, V, p.74, letter of Hampden to Newman, May 
22nd, 1835. 
(9) Ibid., p.83, Hampden to Newman. 23rd June, 1835. In the Collection 
of Pamphlets there was that of ~ilberforce, Foundations of the Faith 
Assailed. This still rankled with Hampden, "You have been among 'the 
crafty firsts who have sent their silly seconds' to fight their mean 
and cowardly battles by their trumpery publications: you have worked 
the machine, but hid yourself behind it." 
<10) Letters & Diaries, V, p.90, June 23rd, 1835. 
<11> The sentence in Hampden•s letter of June 23rd, 1835, was "~ould 
you have dared to act in such a way, had you not taken the advantage 
of the sacred profession?" Letters & Diaries, V, p.83. For Froude's 
interpretation, see below, n.12. 
<12) Newman wrote to J.l:J.Bowden, on July 7th, 1835, perhaps not 
without amusement, that Hampden "affirms that I should have been afraid 
so to have acted except under shelter of my 'sacred profession', which 
means, as Froude says, that he, to prove himself a Christian, would have 
fought a duel with me, but for my being in orders. This is ingenious." 
See, Letters & Diaries, V, p.93. 
<13) Hampden's imputations were 'altogether disallowed' and 'gravely' 
protested against, Letters & Diaries, V, pp.83-4. 
<14) See Trevor, pp.183-190, "The Persecution of Hampden". Arnold's 
famous attack upon the Tractarians, as "Oxford Malignants", appeared in 
April, 1836, in the Edinburgh Review, and was part of the second phase 
of the controversy, about the Regius Professorship. 
<15) See §7. 
<16> In view of his protest in late November, 1834, to Hampden, who 
had sent him a copy of his pamphlet, Observations on Religious Dissent, 
see n.<3> above. However, Newman !mew of Hampden's position from late 
August,1834. See his letter to Rose, n.<l> above. 
<17) Oxford: J.H.Parker & London: Rivingtons, 1833. This work was 
delivered as the Bampton Lectures in the previous year, 1832, and will 
be hereafter referred to as Hampden, Bampton Lectures. 
<18> Diary for 31st March, 1835, Letters and Diaries, V, p.53. The 
controversy had been proceeding since late 1834, see nn. (1) and (3) 
above. 
<19) Elucidations of Dr.Hampden's Theological Statements consisted 
largely of quotations from Hampden's Bampton Lectures and Observations 
on Religious Dissent, in order to demonstrate Hampden's virtual 
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Socinianism, under nine sections: doctrinal truths, Trinity, Incarnation, 
Atonement, Sacraments, or ig ina l sin, the sou 1, morals, positive 
statements. When the prospect of Hampden's appointment to the Regius 
Professorship had got out, Newman was in a position to compile his 
Elucidations very quickly - he wrote the pamphlet overnight, having had 
dinner in his rooms, Diary for l:Jednesday, lOth February, 1836, Letters & 
Diaries, V, p.231. 
(20) R.D.Hampden, Observations on Religious Dissent, <Oxford: 
J.H.Parker, & London: Rivingtons, 1834-) p.14-. 
(21) Ibid..!., pp.ll-12. 
<22) Loc.cit. 
<23) Ibid., p.12. 
(24) Loc.cit. 
<25) Ibid., p.13. "All such inferences [i.e. moral ones] fall properly 
within the province of man. They are enlargements and elevations of 
those natural outlines of duty with which God has furnished us in the 
sentiments of our own hearts, and our experience of the conduct of men 
in the world." 
(26) Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p.92. 
<27> Ibid., p.l3. 
<28) i.e. in the derogatory sense of indifference to religious truth. 
Hampden distinguishes a better sense of the word - one who is eager 
"to conciliate dissentients, further than his allegiance to his own 
church is conceived to admit," Observations, p.29. 
<29) Ibid., p.36. 
<30) The sociological unity of any particular denomination is not, for 
Hampden, the one true Church of Christ, Observations, p.33, "The real 
unity of the Church is, after all, an invisible one. It is the communion 
of saints; the union of Christians with the Holy Spirit himself." The 
doctrines of particular denominations will therefore inevitably be 
relative rather than absolute. 
<31> Hampden. Observations, p.25. 
<32) Ibid., pp.22-3. The best kind of dogma is self-effacing, ''The 
perfection of such expression is when it neutralises itself - when it 
meets the unavoidable necessity of the case in such a way as to 
maintain the sole proper authority of Scripture, without arrogating to 
itself the character of real divine truth." 
(33) Ibid., pp.23-4, " ... the social instinct of human nature puts a 
barrier to this indefinite extension of the liberty of reason. Hence the 
existence of separate communions; an alternative. which accommodates 
itself to the necessary, irreconcilable differences of theological 
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op1n1on, whilst it linposes a reasonable check on the anti-social 
tendency of private speculation and judgment." 
(34) Hampden, Observations, p.27. 
<35) Elucidations, pp.5-6. 
(36) Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p.278. 
(37) @ologia <Longmans), p.169. 
(38> Although Hampden is very careful to distinguish himself from the 
early Tractarians. This is probably the meaning of his deprecation of 
the 'party sense' of the word: he is glancing at something like Newman's 
use of rationalism ens a polemic on behalf of High Church opinions, "This 
term, having been lately appropriated to a particular class of 
theological opinions, may require the explanation, that it is here used 
in the general sense corresponding with its etymology," !3ampton 
Lectures, p.37, n. (b). 
(39) Ibid., p.37. 
<40) Ibid., p.54. 
(41) Ibid., pp.376-7. Hampden quotes Gregory Nazianzen to exemplify 
the Fathers' dislike of logic,p.57. Hampden's picture of the Church 
unwillingly being forced by heresy to use logic to defend itself is 
identical to Newman's in Arians, ch.II, section 3, pp.168-9. See also 
Parochial and Plain Sermons, II, p.28, Sermon III, ''The Incarnation". This 
is not necessarily to suggest mutual influence here: Newman shows no 
awareness of the Bampton Lectures when writing Arlans, nor does 
Hampden allude to Arians in his Bampton Lectures. It may, perhaps, be 
suggested that they both belong to the same 'Romantic' antipathy to the 
logical and merely propositional. 
(42> Hampden uses a metaphor from Ancient History, Bampton Lectures, 
V, pp .60-61 , "'The whole [Spartan] institution was for war abroad; whilst 
he was strictly prohibited from displaying the skill which he had 
acquired, in any occasion of domestic grievance. The natural consequence 
was, that, as the Spartan was restless within his own territory, so the 
Christian logician was ever impatient to exert his disciplined acuteness 
within the pale of the Church itself." 
<43) Hampden, Bampton Lectures, v. p.77. 
<44) Loc.cit., 01Wlen a theology of that a priori character was 
established, it nullified the use of Scripture as a record of the divine 
dealings with the successive generations of mankind. The voice of God 
was no longer heard as it spoke 'in sundry times' and 'in divers 
manners' to holy men of old; but simply as uttering the hallowed 
symbols of an oracular wisdom." 
(45> Ibid., p.88. 
(46> Loc.clt. 
(47) For this phrase of Hampden's, see Bampton Lectures, -p.278. 
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<48) firians, pp.185-6. 
<49) Hampden, Bampton_Lecturg2_, p.l49. 
(50) 
_lgjd., p.88. 
(51) Jbid., p.91. 
(52) Ibid., p.89. 
(53) Ibid., pp.l12-3. 
(54) Ibid., pp.l14-5. 
(55) Ibid., pp.ll7-8. 
(56) Loc.cit. 
<57) Ibid., pp.ll8-9, 
(58) Ibid., p.127c 
<59) Ibid., p.l48. 
(60) Loc.cit, 
(61) Loc.cit. 
<62) !..oc.cit. 
§4 Blanco White 
<1> Blanco White had left his position with Whately and gone to 
Liverpool, to become Unitarian in January, 1835, Letters & Diaries, V, 
p.51, n.l. However, Newman only heard about it on 20th March, when 
Charles Litchfield Swainson, Fellow of St.John's College, Oxford, called 
on him and told him the news, Letters & Diaries, V, p.48, Diary for 20th 
March, 1835. Blanco had no reason to tell Newman: they were no longer 
close f r lends - Blanco had drifted off in to Wha te 1 y 's c ire le, see nn. <2) 
& <3>, below. 
<2> Newman says that ties of friendship had been severed between 
them, after the publication of Arlans in 1832, Letters & Diaries, IV, 
p.103, n.2, since the work expressed sentiments which would have been 
t:lsimple misery" to Blanco. 
(3) Whose clientela was an opposing camp to that of Newman's by the 
mid-1830's, see nn. <52>, <55>, below. 
<4> See Martin Murphy, "Blanco White's Evidence", Recusant Histors_, 
vo 1.17, no .3, <May ,1985 >, p .263. 25 years later, Newman paid tribute to 
the now dead Blanco's personal qualities and testified his affection for 
him, Present Position of Catholics in England, Lecture IV, §3, pp.l4-2-3. 
t. .. -zyp! 
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(5) The British Critic, Quarterly Theological Review & Ecclesiastical 
~ecord, XX, <July,1836), Art.VIII, "The Brothers Controversy, being a 
genuine correspondence between a clergyman of the Church of England 
and a layman of Unitarian opinions", p.l67. Newman's review of this book 
adverted to the Socinianism of Hampden and Blanco White. Newman had a 
horror of Socinianism and shrank from it, as St.John from Cerinthus, "I 
would not sit down to table with a !mown Socinian." Letters & Diaries, 
IV, p.316, To Henry l-Jilberforce, Aug.,3, 1834. 
(6) A copy of this letter does not exist, although a note about it 
bv Newman does, Letters & Diaries, IV, p.103. Blanco White noted in his 
diary for March 23, 1835, that he had received a letter from Newman 
which was ''nothing but a groan, a sigh from beginning to end,'' ed. John 
Hamilton Thom, The Life of the Rev Joseph Blanco White, 3 vols. <London: 
John Chapman, 1845) Vol.II. p.117. Blanco's rather cynical comment here 
upon Newman's anguish contrasts with his dignified reply to his former 
friend's letter. 
<7) Letters & Diaries, V, p.4-9, 23rd March, 1835. 
(8) _Ibid., p.123. Writing to his sister, Jemima, on August 9,1835, 
Newman describes Blanco White's by then irrevocable decision as "like a 
madness", it "seems like insanity". 
(9) Murphy, "Blanco White's Evidence", p.269, Letters & Diaries, V, 
p.50. 
00) Letters & Diaries, V, p.56, To Henry \Hlberforce, 5th April, 1835. 
(11) Blanco White was generally, but without evidence, held to be 
behind Hampden's Bampton Lectures, because of his knowledge of 
scholasticism: Murphy, p.268, Liddon, I, p.271. 
02) !-.etters & Diaries, IV, p.169. J.F.Christie, writing to Newman on 5 
Jan.,1834-, comments upon the Second Travels: it is ''nominally at least 
by Blanco White, not the Archbishop. Of course it would contain the 
notions of the latter, though developed by another hand." Whately was 
right to think that he would be blamed for Blanco White's defection, 
Murphy, pp.267-8. Moreover, Newman associated Blanco and Whately as 
belonging to a "certain school", Letters & Diaries, V, p.51. 
<13> O'Fa.olin, pp.236-7, is. however, surely wrong to suggest that 
Newman himself belonged to this web. and that Blanco's view of the 
defectibility of language derives from Newman's Arians. In the latter 
Newman balances the defective language of the economy by the concept 
of mystery, in which the economy is rooted. All liberals, however, 
including Blanco. attacked 'mystery'. 
<14-) Murphy, pp.269-70, even suggests that Newman's reading, in 184-5, 
of Blanco White's posthumous journals pushed him over the edge to Rome, 
because in them he saw the terrible consequences of rationalism. 
<15) Letters & Diaries. V, To J.W.Bowden, 3 August, 1835, "I have just 
seen Bl.White's most miserable book - there are some instructive 
confessions in it." 
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(16) There are four almost verbally identical references to this idea 
in Newman's letters, between 3 August, 1835, and 9 August, 1835: 
Letter~_& Diaries, V, pp.114,115,116,120. Newman's expression is an 
almost exact quotation from Blanco White, Observations on Heresy and 
Ortodoxy, (London, 1835) Preface, p.viii, "Sabellianism is only 
Unitarian ism disguised in words." 
(17) Letters & Diaries, V, p.116, To R.H.Froude, 9th August, 1835. 
<18) Blanco White, Observations, p.vi 
09> ]bid., p.x. 
<20) Ibid., p.vi 
<21) e.g. Parochial and Plain Sermons, II, pp.167-8, "Self 
Contemplation", written in January or February, 1835, where 
la t i tud inar ian indifferent ism to dogmatic truth is iden t if led with 
Sible-Protestantism. There are hints here that Newman sees the latter 
as 'Sabellian' also, because it leads one "to consider that inspiration 
speaks merely of divine operations, not of Persons." <p.167) 
<2 2) Blanco White, Observations, p. vi. 
<23) Ibid., p.viii 
<24> Tract 73, in Essays Critical and Historical, I, pp.78-9. 
<25) Blanco White, Observations, p.viii. 
(26) Both Froude and then Newman attacked this extreme nominalistic 
view of language in articles in the British Critic, in 1836:- R.H.Froude, 
The British Critic, XIX <1836), pp.211-19. Froude opposed to this view 
an argument combining history and probability: it is a fact of history 
that the early Church was able, for instance at Nicea, to agree an 
interpretation of Scripture, even though bishops came from many 
different parts of the world; this is an indication that traditions from 
the Apostles' time had been faithfully preserved, pp.221-3. 
Newman, The British Critic, XX (July, 1836), pointed out that Blanco 
White, a Socinian, was arguing like an Anglican latitudinarian, p.174. 
Blanco's view of language is seen by Newman as "boldly advancing a 
step", p.l76, upon those who deny any authoritative tradition of 
Scripture interpretation, by questioning "the possibility of the 
~revelation itself", and initiating a slide "into Pantheism, or some more 
avowed form of atheistical speculation", pp.179-80. 
(2.7) B lance White, Observations, Letter 1, p.5. 
<28) Loc.cit. 
<29) Loc.cit. 
(30) Loc.cit. 
(31) Ibid., p.11. 
(32) Loc.cit. 
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(33) Blanco White, Observations~ Letter 1, p.16. 
{34) Ibid., p.27. 
<35) Ibid., pp.27-9. 
(36) Letters & Diaries, IV, p.316, To Henry Wilberforce, Aug.3rd, 1834-. 
(37) Letters & Diaries, V, pp.120-1, To Elizabeth Newman, 9th August, 
1835. 
(38> Ibid., p.121. 
<39> Parochial & Plain Sermons, III, no.12. 
<40) Newman's patristic studies may be assumed to be in the 
background, between October, 1834 and August, 1835, although he did not 
begin to study Apollinarianism in depth, until six months after this 
sermon was preached. This may explain why his doctrinal line in this 
sermon is not entirely clear, and why he speaks, somewhat vaguely, of 
'N icene theology • when making Chris to logical points. 
{41> Parochial & Plain Sermons, III, p.169. 
(42) Loc.cit. 
<43) Ibid., p.170. 
<44> Ibid., p.171. 
(45) For the bearing of Hinds' "notions about Inspiration", i.e. his 
internal evidencing, and the link in Newman's mind between this and 
Sabellianism, see §6 <a> on Erskine. 
<46> Letters & Diaries, V, p.51, 23rd March, 1835. 
(47) 'Nestorianism' may be defined as the heresy which denies the 
union effected by the Word in Christ, so that there appear to be _!;wo 
co-existent persons or hypostases in Christ, a divine and a human. 
<48> Hinds was Whately's domestic chaplain. They were also friends 
from schooldays and as undergraduates, W.Tuckwell, Pre-Tractarian 
Oxford. A Reminiscence of the Or ie 1 "Noe tics', O..ondon, Smith, Elder & 
Co., 1909) pp.54,129. 
<49) For a detailed consideration of this incident, see Part 1 of the 
thesis. 
(50> See Part 1 - Newman's Memorandum, written about the whole 
affair at the time. 
(51> See E.Jane Whately, Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, 
p.60. The charge originated from a passage in the Appendix to his t.Qgk 
<1826>, dealing with 'Person', in which Whately declared that, in the 
case of the Trinity, Person meant not an individual but a 'character'. 
This would bring him very close to modalism, see Life, p.61, Tuckwell, 
Pre-Tractarian Oxford, p.72. Ironically, it was this very work, the Logic, 
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with which the young Newman had assisted his one-time mentor, f\pQ.lOgjf!, 
p.488, n.on 23.16. 
(52) Letters & Diaries, II, p.367. The call never came. Newman later 
attributed this fact to their divergence, perceived by Whately, not by 
himself: "He knew me better than I knew myself". 
(53) Ibid., pp.360, 369, 372. 
<54) Ibid., p.363, in !)iary, Thursday, 29th September, 1831. 
\::>::>J the divergence of Newman and Whately was more gradual than is 
stated in the ~ where it is declared that the "formal break" 
came over Catholic Emancipation in 1829, Apologia, p.26, the occasion of 
Whately's humorous revenge for Newman's anti-Emancipation stance, in 
which he invited him to dinner and placed him among a group of port-
drinking 'two-bottle orthodox'. Newman dates his departure from 
Whately's clientelBJ at this date, ibid., p.27. However, as we have seen, 
nn. 53 + 54 above, even by 1831, they were friendly and Whately was 
happy to offer him promotion. But it was not until November, 1834, that 
Newman made clear his differences of principle over the Church-State 
issue. In the preceding month, a ripple of indignation on Whately's part 
reached Newman from Dublin, because of rumours that Newman had 
absented himself from Holy Communion when Whately visited Oriel. 
Newman denied this, but began to make clear his disagreement with 
Whately's public stance over the Irish Church, see Letters & Diaries, IV, 
pp.356-9. By March, 1835, Newman could lump together Whately with 
Arnold, Hampden and Blanco White. They were all liberals and all 
Sabellian, Letters & Diaries, V, p.51. 
§5 Apollinarianism 
(1) References to his edn. end on 12th November, 1834, !,etters & 
Diaries, IV, p.360, and do not begin again until Thursday, 16th July, 
1835, Letters & Diaries, V, p.97. 
(2) Newman worked on Dionysius throughout July and August, 1835, 
Letters & Diaries, pp.97, 104, 107, 118, 120, 122, and came to a halt on 
30th, p.l32. He first read Blanco White's Observations on Heresy and 
Orthodoxy on lOth August, 1835, Letters & Diaries, V, p.123 and was 
still referring to it at the end of the month, ibid., p.134. 
<3> Letters & Diaries, V, To R.H.Froude, 9th August, 1835. 
(4) Ibid., p.122, To Jemima Newman, 9th August, 1835. 
(5) Ibid., p.132, To Frederick Rogers, 30th August, 1835. 
(6) Ibid., p.l14, To John William Bowden, 3rd August, 1835. 
(7) Ibid., p.115, To Hugh James Rose, 6th August, 1835. 
(8) Ibid., p.118, To R.H.Froude, 9th August, 1835. 
(9) Ibid., p.119. 
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(10) Letters & Diaries, V, p.120. 
(11) Loc.cit. 
<12) Loc.cit. 
<13) Birmingham Ora tory Archive, B .2 .8 <C). 
<14) Ibid., p.l. 
<15) Loc.cit. 
<16> Loc.cit. 
<1 7) Loc .cit. 
08) Loc.cit. 
<19) Ibid., p.2. 
<20) Loc.cit. A variant reads "they" for "he". 
<21) Ibid., p.3. This moves Apollinarianism close towards the 
Patripassian form of Sabellianism. 
<22) Loc.cit. 
<23) Loc.cit. 
<2 4) In the Birmingham Ora tory Archive, B .3 .5 . 
<25) Apollinaris' history, p.1. 
(26) It is in the Birmingham Oratory Archive. 
<27) E.g. in the version which appears in Tracts Theological and 
Ecclesiastical, Newman introduces a new phrase which succinctly 
epitomises his 1835 view of the hidden relation between apparently 
divergent heresies - "underground communications", see Tracts 
Theological and Ecclesiastical, p.305. This phrase does not appear in 
the 1835 MSS. 
(28) Apolllnaris' history, p.l. 
(29) Ibid., pp.l-4. 
(30) Ibid., p.5. 
{31) Ibid., p.6. 
{32) Ibid., p.7. 
{33) Loc.ci t. 
{34) Ibid., pp.8-12. 
(35) Ibid., pp.12-14. 
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(36) Apollinaris' History, pp.16-19. 
(37) Apollinaris' history was partly used in the British Magg_;;-:_ine 
Letter on the Church of the Fathers, July 1836, no.XVI. In 1840, Newman 
omitted some chapters of the 1st edn., including "Apollinaris". This 
shortened, revised edn. is the one appearing in Historical Sketches, II, 
<1873>. Newman further edited the omitted chapters and brought them 
together in !iistorical Sketches> I <1872), under a new title, "Primitive 
Christ ian i ty". The Apo ll inar is article appears in "What Says the His tory 
of Apollinaris", Chap. 3. 
~..JU/ 1.e. 11.pUHIDarlS' OlStory, pp.lfi-19. 
(39) Ibid., p.16. 
(40) See Part I, passim. 
(41) Apollinaris' history, p.16. 
<42) It was a common argument, for example, on the part of the Roman 
Catholicism of Louis XIV, the school of Bossuet. See O.Chadwick's account 
of Bossuet•s Variations of Protestantism, From Bossuet to Newman. The 
Idea of Doctrinal Development, Cambridge: C.U.P., 1957, p.9. 
(43) 1\,gollinaris' history, p.17. 
(44) lbid., p.l8. 
<45) Loc.cit. 
<46) Loc.cit. 
<47) Loc.cit. For "detestable", Newman wrote, as a variant, above the 
line, "extravagant". 
<48> Ibid., p.19. 
(49> Apollinarianism is a privately printed paper, dated August 22nd, 
1835, for which the MS does not exist. It bears a close relation to the 
draft, The Defection of Apollinaris, B.2.B<C>, in its structure. Newman 
wrote the notes up and published them, with emendations in Tracts 
Theological and Ecclesiastical, pp.301-27, ''The Heresy of Apollinaris". 
<50> Newman's method of presentation now shows the influence of 
Roman Catholic theology, subscribing to the 'two-source• view of 
revelation. Referring to the logical consequences of Apollinarianism, he 
declares, Wfhis is what comes of Reasoning in the province of theology, 
unless in the first place we inquire our way by Scripture and 
tradition, and then proceed to reason under the information thence 
afforded us," 
Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, p.309. 
(5 1) Apo 11 inar ian ism, p .2 , see Tracts Thea logical and Eccles ias t ica 1, 
pp.303-5. 
(52> Loc.cit_,_ 
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<~3) Anollinar·ianism, p.1. Newman declares his independence of the 
textbooks, particularly those tinged with French Enlightenment 
rationalism: "J.Basuage and Bayle's Dictionary are intolerable, and most 
unfair, selecting from Apollinaris' opinions just what they choose." 
This implies that Newman was ploughing deliberately through the 
sources himself and compBlring his findings with the textbooks. 
<54-) Ibid, n. to p.2. This appears, in substance, in Tracts Ttteologlcal 
and Ecclesiastical, n. on §2, pp.303-4. 
<55) Ibid., p.2. 
(56) Ibid., p .2 . <This p8lssage does not appear in Tracts Thea log ica 1 
and Eccles ias t ica 1.) 
(57) Arians of the Fourth Century, p.304. Newman is referring to the 
Semi-Arians <see Part 1 ). 
(58) Apollin~rianism, p.2. 
(59) !,.oc.c it. 
<60) Jbid"'' p.3. 
(61) 1!> id.' p.3. 
(62) !,oc.ci.h 
(63) Ibid., pp.6-7. 
<64-) Ibid., p.7. 
(65) Loc.cit. 
(66) Loc.ci t. 
{67) Loc.cit. 
{68) Loc.cit. 
{69) Loc.cit. 
(70) Ibid., p.8. 
(71) Loc.cit. 
(72) Ibid., p.9. 
(73) Loc.cit. 
{74.) Ibid., p.ll. 
(75) Loc.ci t. 
{76) Loc.cit. 
(77) Loc.cit. 
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(78) Apollinarianism, p.12, n.2. Those belonging to this party were 
called "synus ias ts". 
<79) i.e. according to nous. 
(80) Apollinarianism, pp.5, see also p.ll. 
(81) Ibid., p.12. 
(82) Loc.cit. 
(83) Loc.cit. 
(84) Loc.ci t. 
(85) Loc.cit. 
(86) Loc.cit 
(87) Loc.cit. 
(88> Newman's phrase is "others, nay Apollinaris himself", 
Apollinarianism, p.12. 
(89) Loc.cit. 
(90) Ibid., p.13 
(91) Loc.cit. p.l3 
(92) Ibid., p.12, n. 
(93) Ibid., facing p.l2. 
(94.) Tertullian's argument may be found in the Adversus Praxean, §27, 
translated in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, ed. Roberts and Donaldson, 
vol.XV, The Writings of Tertullian, Vol. II, pp.395-99. 
(95) Ibid., p.397. 
(96) Apollinarianism, p.13 <marginal note). By "Paul", he means Paul of 
Samosata. 
<97> Loc.cit. 
§6 Tract 73. On the Introduction of Rationalist Principles into Revealed 
Rellglon. 
(1) On the Introduction of Rationallst Principles into Revealed 
Religion, Essays Critical & Historical, I,"Mr.Erskine's 'Internal 
Evidence' .. , §§2-5, pp.49-71, cited hereafter as Tract 73. 
<2> Thomas Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the Truth 
of Revealed Rellgion, lOth Edn. <Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1878> 
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(3) See HF.Henderson, Et-skine of Linlathen, Edinburgh & London: 
Oliphant, Anderson & FerrtJ~~':)p.31. F.D.Maurice acknowledged the book as 
a major influence upon him, ibid., p.l32. 
<4> Erskine's approach to evidencing is fully presented in Steve 
Gowler, ''No Second-hand Religion: Thomas Erskine's Critique of Religious 
Authorities," Church History <American Society of Church History>, 54, 
<June,1985), pp.204-14. 
(5) Gowler, p.202. 
(6) Ibid., o.207. 
<7> Ibid., p.202. 
(8) Thomas Chalmers, The Evidence and Authority of the Christian 
Religion. 6th edn., <Edinburgh, 1818> cited by Gowler, p.207. 
<9> Gowler, p.207. 
<10) See especially University Sermons, No. 11, "Influence of Natural 
and Revealed Religion Respectively", (1830), p. 18, "it is obvious that 
Conscience is the essential principle and sanction of Religion in the 
mind. Conscience implies a relation between the soul and a something 
exterior, and that, moreover superior to itself; a relation to an 
excellence which it does not possess, and to a tribunal over which it 
has no power." For a full discussion of Newman's approach to the proof, 
see A.J. Boekrad and H.Tristram, The Argument from Conscience to the 
Existence of God, Q.ouvain, 1961 >. 
(11) For example, University Sermon, No. IV, "Usurpations of Reason", 
p.70, where Newman refers to "such works on Natural Theology as treat 
of the marks of design in the creation, which are beautiful , and 
interesting to the believer in a God; but, when men have not already 
recognized God's voice within them, ineffective, and this moreover 
possibly from some unsoundness in the intellectual basis of the 
argument." In this sermon, Newman contrasts this with the inner 
testimony of conscience, see also p.66. 
<12) For example, in his correspondence with his profligate and 
infidel brother, Charles, Newman asserted the external evidence of 
historical testimony against Charles' a priori objectives which he calls 
"internal", see Letters & Diaries, I, p.24. The correspondence lasted 
between 3rd March & 26th Sept., 1825, see Letters & Diaries, I, pp. 213-
5, 219, 224-8, 253-5, 258. 
<13) Newman criticized, as early as Arians, lltthe practice of 
stimulating the affections, such as gratitude or remorse, by means of 
the doctrine of the Atonement, in order to the conversion of the 
hearers," pp.47-8. Here he considers Natural Religion as the proper 
means of effecting conversion! The preaching_ of Atonement offended 
against Reserve; Newman's movement away from Evangelicalism is 
associated with his dislike of the aspect of popular preaching, see 
Selby, pp.1-43. 
<14.) This work is unpublished, remaining in MS form at the Birmingham 
Oratory Archive. 
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(15) Critical Remarks upon Dr.Chalmers' Theology, p.1. 
<16) Loc.cj_i, The list which follows of the "various ways" is 
characterised by the all-embracing elusiveness with which Newman 
describes rationalism in Tract 73. 
<1 7) Ibid., p .2. 
< 18) Loc .ci t . 
<19) Loc.cit. 
<20) Ibid .. o.3 .. 
<21> " ... in no case do I make the gaspe l doctrine as such the 
instrument of a change from disobedience to obedience", ibid., p.4-. 
<22> Ibid., p.6. 
<23) Ibid., pp.3-4-. 
<24-) Loc.cit. 
<25) ]bid., p.3. 
(26) "Baptism is our time for declaring that pardon and grace are 
fully vouchsafed to us - and baptism is the first act in the 
Christian's life - nay we place baptism at the beginning of his actual 
existence - we administer it in infancy." Ibid., p.4. 
<27> Ibid., p.11. 
<28) Letters and Diaries, V, p.51. 
(29) Rev. Samuel Hinds, An Enquiry into the Proofs, Nature apd Extent 
of Inspiration and into the Authority of Scripture. <London: B.Fellowes, 
+ Oxford: J.Parker, 1831) 
(30) See Part I: §1. 
(31) Hinds, Inquiry, p.39. 
(32) Ibid., p.9. 
(33) Ibid., p.28. 
(34-) Loc.cit. 
(35) Ibid., p.28. 
(36) Ibid., p.31. 
<37) Ibid., p.4-3. 
(38) Ibict_, p.4-5. 
-387-
{39) Hinds advocates internal evidencing on behalf of the miraculous 
basis to a writing which ensures its inspiration. The possibility of 
this approach is let in by his very broad defiition of "miraculous": 
"something, either in the subject-matter, or in the manner of writing, 
which surpasses the powers of men generally, or of the particular 
author - some departure, in short, from the usual course of man's moral 
and intellectual agency, which can only be referred to divine wisdom." 
Hinds, p.48. Here Hinds allows human judgment to exercise itself about 
revelation, in that it can decide what is "miraculous" - by the latter, 
he seems to mean no more than 'unusua 1'. 
<40) Ibid., p.50. 
<41> Ibid., p.51. 
(42> Hinds, p.66, especially so, Hinds argues, since the New Testament 
writers were unlearned. 
(43) Ibid., p.69. 
(44) Ibid., p.92. 
<45) Ibid., p.93. 
(46) Loc.cit. 
(47) Ibid., pp.175ff. 
(48) Yearley, p.6, considers Newman in terms of the insights gained 
from the use of 'typology', i.e. the consideration of religious types, 
the prophet, the priest, the ascetic, and so on, or of categories cutting 
across various traditions, such as mysticism reform, etc.,pp.ix-xi. The 
purpose of the 'typological' approach is to "organize their raw 
perception of phenomena into intelligible forms". 
(49) According to Yearley, ''Newman's mind seems naturally to work 
typologically," and the older generation of comparativists especially 
the line that runs from Otto to van de Leeuw and Wach" were "closer to 
Newman's intellectual world" and "often provide a more helpful 
perspective on him than do some more recent comparativists." Ibid., 
pp.151-2 (footnote). 
<50) Yearley categorizes Newman's meaning of 'liberalism' according to 
six characteristics. They are:- (i) Human Nature as Good. (iD Private 
Judgment as Obligatory. (iii> Deity as a Principle Through Examination 
of Evidence. <lv> Revelation as a Manifestation not a Mystery. <v> 
Useful Goods as Primary. <vD Education as Salvatory. Ibid., pp.94-124. 
(51) 11Any attempt to reform Christianity by means of Liberal ideas 
can only create a halfway house on the road to the rejection of all 
religion. The only two real possibilities are religion and nonreligion." 
Ibid., p.96. 
<52) Ibid., p.110. 
(53) See Newman's paper "The defection of Apollinaris", §5, n.18. 
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<54) Tract 73, pp.43-4. 
(55) Ibid., p.40. 
<56> J b id., p .41. It is the event of divine disc lo~re which produces 
mystery, "What was hidden altogether before Christ came, could not be a 
mystery; it became a mystery, then for the first time, by being 
disclosed at His coming." 
(57) Ibid~, pp.H-2. 
(58) Tract 73 . o.41. Newman returned to this theme in 1838, in Tract 
85, "Holy Scripture in its Relation to the Catholic Creed", Discussions 
and Argum~n.ts. Here, "utter latitudinarians", virtual Socinians and Roman 
Catholics have in common a desire for false surface clarity and "will 
not submit to the notion of the doctrines of the Gospel being hidden 
under the text of Scripture from the chance reader." <p.126-7> This was 
the original fault of the Jewish opponents of Jesus: "the Saducees had 
a clear, simple Mosaic creed - they rejected all additions to what was 
on the surface of the Mosaic writings, and thus they rejected what 
really was in the mind of Moses, though not on his lips." <p.247) 
<59> Ir?ct 73, p.34. 
<60) Yearley, p.94, defines the essence of liberalism as a belief that 
"people have a fundamentally unhindered capacity to fulfil themselves; 
they have the ability to know the good and to realise it through proper 
action." 
<62> As will be shewn below, Newman was attacking a particular !ind 
of system. One need not conclude that he would be hostile to all 
systematic theology, because in some sense revelation is itself 
systematic. As S.W.Sykes remarks, "A door, one might say, is left 
slightly ajar for the further development of the idea of system, 
inherent indeed in revelation, but in part at least mysterious ('a vast 
system unrevealed'), The Identity of Christianity 1 <London: S.P.C.K, 1984) 
p.105. It is a very narrow chink: the system of revelation is 
"unrevea led", 
(63) Tract 73, p.42. 
(64) Ibid., pp.52-3. 
(65) Ibid., p.47. 
(66) Loc.clt. 
(67) Ibid., pp.33-4. 
(68) Tract 73, p.47. In a letter to Henry Wilberforce, 11 August, 
1836, Newman criticised Erskine's rationalist approach to the Atonement, 
that it is a ''manifestation to our reason of God's justice." Newman uses 
his own brand of rational scepticism to show that the Atonement is not 
rationally explicable, "for how God's justice <according to any sense we 
attach to the word> could be satisfied by one suffering for another, is 
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past my conception - it seems in the abstract contradictory to the 
first notions of mere justice ... " Therefore the Atonement is a mystery 
addressed to our faith, Letter:~ & Diaries, V, pp.336-7. 
{69) "To this, as if to the point of sight in a picture, all the 
portions of the Gospel system are directed and made to converge; as if 
this doctrine were so fully unders toad, that it might fear less l y be 
used to regulate, adjust, correct, complete, everything else." Tract 73, 
p.47. 
,, 1; 1D1a., pp.oz-.:L 
(72) ]bid., p.32. 
<73) Loc.cit. 
<74-) Ibid., p.56. 
<75) Loc.cit. p.56. 
<76) Ibid., p.55. 
<77) On the other hand, the popular element is not as strong as in 
the )...etters on the Church of the Fathers, written for the British 
Critic;_. 
(78) Although it had been brought to public prominence by Blanco 
White's Observations on Heresy and Orthodoxy. 
<79> Trac_t 73, p.56. 
<80) lbid., 57. 
<81 ) Lac .cit. 
(82) Loc.cit. 
(83) For example, the notorious accusation of 'malignancy' by Thomas 
Arnold in ''The Oxford Malignants and Dr. Hampden", The Edinburgh 
RevL ew or Critical Journal, LXIII, <1836>, pp.225-39. 
{84) Jacob Abbott, 1803-1879, author of Rollo at Work, Rollo at Play, 
Rollo in Europe, studied at Andover Theological Seminary, taught natural 
science and mathematics at Amherst College, 1824-9, and founded Mount 
Vernon School for Young Ladies in Boston. A Congregationalist minister, 
his Young Christian was very popular. The Corner Stone was written as 
a sequel to this. See Encyclopaedia Britannica. 11th edn. <Cambridge: 
C.U.P., 1910) Vol.l, p.26. 
<85) John Pye Smith, 1774--1851, Congregationalist minister and 
theological lecturer at Homerton College. He had published the ~criptur~ 
Testimony to the Messiah, 2 vols. <London, 1818-21> <See DNB). Newman, 
Tract 73, p.93, describes him as "one of the most learned, orthodox and 
moderate of the Dissenters of the day," but reproves him for his 
preface to The Corner Stone, because "expressly specifying the 
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Unitarians, he requires us to adopt Mr. Abbott's language in order to 
reconcile them to us." 
(86) Jacob Abbott, The Corner Stone, or a Familiar Illustration of the 
Principles of Christian Truth, with a Preface by John Pye Smith, D.D., 
<London: Seely & Burnside,1834). This edition is the one used by 
Newman.Two other editions also appeared in England in 1834: 
D ed. Rev.P.Phillip <London: T.Hard & Co., 1834). 
iD abridged Henry Blunt <London, 1834). 
(87) Abbott, "Preface••, p.vii, ''Not a page had I read of any other 
production of the author." 
(88> The British Critic, Quarterly Th~ical Review and 
Ecclesiastical Record, XIX {1836). 
(89) Abbott, pp.16,19. 
<90) Ibid., pp.2-3. 
<91 > Ibid., pp.337-363. 
<92) Tract 73, p.83, "In the following passage he applies Mr.Erskine's 
doctrine ... "etc., and on p.72, Newman refers to Abbott's "treatment of the 
theory, in which Mr.Erskine's principle seems to issue ... " 
<93) Ibid., p.76. 
<94) ]bid., p.74-, ''But Mr.Erskine certainly has not taught this 
explicitly." 
(95) Ibid., p.73, 
<96> "My father, who had been the pastor of one flock for more than 
sixty years, once said to me that that book had done more than any 
single book of his time to give character to the new phase of theology 
in New England, which began about 1820, and in which Dr.N.W.Taylor, 
Dr.L.Beecher, Dr. Moses Stuart, and many others, were prominently 
concerned." William Hanna, Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, 4-th 
edn. (Edinburgh, David Douglas, 1884-) pp.26-7. See also Henderson, p.31, 
but note Steve Gowler's caveat, see above n.13. 
{97) In 1821,1822 and 1824-, Encyclopaedia Britannica, p.26. 
(98 > See the §7 on Sch le iermacher be low: it will be shown that Newman 
had a poor understanding of the context and intentions of 
Schleiermacher's translator, Moses Stuart. 
(99) Tract 73, p.85, "Mr.Abbott, with the liberalism to which his 
predecessor leads ... •• 
<100) Yearley, p.94: 'liberalism' is seen by Newman as a "type of 
religion", without being an identifiable group of theologians, "A type 
points to certain definable attributes that distinguish one phenomenon 
from others, but it does not imply the existence of a functioning 
entity that exactly corresponds to the type ... Liberal religion is not, 
however, an abstract type like natural religion. Newman does refer to 
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specific schools, movements, or men, as personifications of Liberal 
religion. Nevertheless, the general idea of typological characterization 
holds." 
<101> Tract 73, p.91. 
<102) ]bid., p.72. 
<103) Jbid., p.74-. 
<104) Ibid., p.73. Newman admits that the difference between Erskine 
and Abbott is "not very distinct or observable at first sight." 
<105) Ibid., p.85. 
(1 06) Loc .cit, 
<107> Loc.cit., p.85. 
<108) Newman uses 'Socinian' to refer to the historical heresy whose 
roots are in the 17th century and 'Unitarian • to refer to the 
denomination of his own day holding these tenets. Abbott is not, of 
course, a Unitarian, but his teaching is virtually Socinian and 
therefore almost indistinguishable from Unitarian teaching. 
<109) Tract 73, p.74. 
<11 0) " ... to say that man is God ... leads us to consider Him [Chris tJ a 
man primarily and personally, with some vast and unknown dignity 
superadded, and that acquired of course after his coming into existence 
as man." Loc.cit. 
011) Ibid., p.76. 
012) Loc.cit. 
<113) Loc.cit. 
(114) Ibid., p.72. 
<115) Ibid., p.76. 
(116) Ibid., p.79. See §4 on Blanco White. 
(117) Ibid., p.79. 
<118) Ibid.,,.J>.78: Abbott's doctrine "to speak plainly savours 
unpleasantly~antheism. It treats the Almighty, not as the great God, 
but as some vast physical and psychological phenomenon." 
<119) Ibid., p.81. 
020) Loc.cit. 
<121) Loc.ci t. 
<122> Abbott, p.10. 
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<123) Tract 73, pp.76-7, cites Abbott, pp.6-14, which are concerned to 
banish the idea of God as a "visible deity on a throne", rather than to 
identify Him with nature. 
<124) Abbott, p.12. 
<125) Ibid., p.l2. 
<126) If Newman ~as irritated, he did not show it. 
<127) Abbott, p.17. 
<128) Ibid._, pp.17-19. 
<129) Ibid., p.23, .. They are striking exhibitions it is true but they 
are exhibitions of cold intellect only, after all," whereas with "moral 
exhibitions•u, "our hearts are touched.'0 
<130> Ibid., pp.23-5. 
<131) Tennyson, In Memoriam, section LV, stanza 4, 
"Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw 
With ravine, shriek'd against his-n creed." 
11-i.e., man's. 
<132) In the robin's nest, the chickens are defenceless, "But they are 
safe and happy." Though vulnerable to cold, they are protected from it 
by God's contrivance of the climate, so that "no nipping frost, and no 
storm of snow can possibly come to desolate their little dwelling." 
Predators need not be feared because "God has so regulated the 
instincts and properties of the milL ions of living things around them, 
that they shall be exposed to none." Abbott, pp.24-25. 
<133> .Lbid., p.15. 
<13 4) Ibid., p .15 : the Incarnation is ''GOD MAN IF EST IN THE FLESH; the 
visible moral image of an all-pervading moral deity, himself for ever 
invisible." 
<135) Abbott's explanation of the Atonement is comparable with 
Erskine's, in that it has an exemplary character. However, Abbott. 
stresses the social effect of the Atonement, which operates by 
producing "the right moral impression" upon the human community: God's 
mercy is declared without undermining justice, because Christ's 
suffering expresses God"s disapproval of wickedness; Abbott, pp.68-
74,129ff. 
<136) Tract 73, p.75. 
<137) Ibid., p.87. 
<138) 184. Brilioth, p.223, remarks that an ·Apollinarian tendency was a 
general feature both of Newman and Pusey: although they did maintain 
the sufferings of Christ's human nature, " ... on the other hand it seems 
as if zeal for maintaining the complete Divinity in Newman and Pusey, 
as well as in Apollinaris of Laodicea and his school, at times got the 
upper hand, that the human nature becomes little more than a veil and 
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an actor's mask, as if they had not fully succeeded in maintaining their 
balance on the rfl7or-edge of the orthodox doctrine of the two natures." 
See also ~etters & Diaries , XI, p.135, To Henry Wilberforce, 10 March, 
1846, where Newman declares that the idea that Jesus "grew in virtue" 
as "untrue and wrong", "heresy", and "very startling, except we say it 
in the sense of his manifesting and having the exercise of virtues." 
More recently, Roderick Strange in his study , Newman and the 
Gospel of Christ, <Oxford: O.U.P., 1983) adverts to his high Christology 
but declares, "For Newmnn there could be no more total affirmation of 
the. reality of Christ's manhood than to equate it with his Godhead," 
p.56. He is concerned to defend Newman from all appearance of 
rlnrPtic;m. "the imnortance Newman attached to Christ's manhood lays to 
rest the occasional accusation of docetism to which a casual reading of 
his work has sometimes given rise," p.94. It is doubtful if his 
treatment of Abbott lays any such doubts to rest. If Newman was not 
docetic, he verges on the Apollinarian. 
<139) Parochial & Plain Sermons, III, no.12, (8th March, 1835), p.164. 
<140> Ibid., p.166. 
<141) Parochial & Plain Sermons, VI, no.5 <April 26th, 1836), p.62. 
<142) Loc.ci t. 
<143) Newman does not explicitly deny that Christ had a human psyche. 
<144) Parochial & Plain Sermons, III, p.150. The passage is in fact 
full of ambiguities, e.g. the following lines suggest that Newman is 
uncomfortable with Christ's psychological suffering, even though he 
acknowledges its reality: "Perhaps it was intended to set before us an 
example of a special trial to which human nature is subject, whatever 
was the real and inscrutable manner of it in Him, who was all along 
supported by an inherent divinity." 
On the other hand, his strong sense of the unity of Christ forced 
him to accept the suffering of the Divine: "WhP.n He spoke, it was 
literally God speaking; when he suffered, it was God suffering", 
Parochial & Plain Sermons, VI, p.72, "The Incarnate Son a Sufferer and 
Sacrifice", no .6, April 1 , 1836. However, Newman also had problems with a 
fully human Jesus until much later, Letters & Diaries, XI, p.135. 
<145) See n.147 above. 
<146) Tract 73, p.91. 
(147) Ibid., p.86. 
<148) Newman quotes this, loc.cit. See Abbott, pp.50-1. 
<149) Tract 73, p.88 quoting Abbott, pp.53-4. 
(150) Ibid., p.89 quoting Abbott, p.59-60. 
<151) Ibid., p.88 quoting Abbott, pp.54-5 
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<153) Tract 73, p.88 
<154> Ibid., p.89. 
<155> Ibid., p.90. 
<156) Loc.cit. 
<157) Ibid., p.87. 
<158) Ibid., pp.86-7. 
<159) C.S.Dessain, "Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition", pg~nside 
Review, 94 0976), pp.83-98. 
<160) Tract 73, p.87. 
<161 > Ibid., p.87-8. 
062) Ibid., p.88. 
063) See §9: Returns to Sabellianism. 
<164) Tract 73, p.89. 
<165) Loc.cit. 
<166) Strange, p.75, refers to Newman's language denying a growth of 
virtue and knowledge in Christ, and, p.88, to the absence in Him of 
human emotional frailty. Strange's attempt to defend Newman's 
Chris to logy is, according 1 y, hard to account for. 
<167) Tract 73,Essays Critical and Historical, p.lOO, "Note to Essay II". 
<168) Loc.ci t. 
<169) J_.oc.cit. 
<170) A review of The Corner Stone in The British Critic, XIX, <1836>, 
attacked Abbott's work as the fruit of the "republican school of 
politics" and pours contempt upon its popular form of expression, p.l90. 
The unidentified reviewer would have been a Tractarian sympathizer, for 
it was in 1836 that the magazine became a Tractarian organ, see Esthar 
Rhoads Houghton, "The British Critic and the Oxford Movement", Studies 
in Bibliography, <Papers of the Bibliographical Society of the University 
of Virginia), XVI, (1963>, p.119. The reviewer detects in Abbott's 
presentation of Atonement the underlying assumptions of utilitarianism, 
that justice is a matter of expediency, ibid, p.197. Newman's treatment 
is milder: he draws no such conclusions. 
(171> For example, in "Primitive Christianity", Historical S~g_tches I, 
pp.339-41: there must be an appeal by the Church to the people, in the 
light of attacks by the government upon the Church, although Newman 
views such an appeal "with great repugnance", p.341. 
<172) This idea was very strongly expressed a few years after Tract 
73, in "'The Patristical Idea of Antichrist", Discussions & Arg_!!ments, 
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pp.56-70, where the increasing secularization of society in political 
liberalism is regarded as approaching apostasy. French Revolutionary 
Jacobinism was ritualized apostasy and contemporary approaches to 
atheism are a "shadow of the final apostasy which scared the world 
some forty or fifty years ago." p.70. See Part I, §3. 
<173) Newman'g eggay on nTI1e Anglo-Amedcan Chm-·ch"; written in 1839, 
shows alarm at the proliferation of bizarre heresies of the American 
backwoods, where Baptists, Quakers and Shakers held sway, "In reading 
such accounts how are we thrown back into the times of early Church 
His tory, and find ourselves among the Valent in ians, Marc ion i tes, 
Cataphrygians, Ebionites, Manichees, and all other prodigies to which 
the presence of the true Church gives rise, as the sun breeds 
reptiles ... " J;;ss~s Critical & Historical, I, p.327. In the same work, 
Newman attacks the American bourgeoisie, by contrast with the old 
landowners, for the heretical self-dependence which their acquired 
wealth has given them; they are thus a breeding ground for Unitarianism 
- the religion of the complacent middle-classes, pp.348-9. The danger is 
concealed Socinianism, taking root in the American episcopal Church, 
" ... we think one special enemy to which the American Church, as well as 
our own, at present lies open is the influence of a refined and covert 
Socinianism", p.347. 
See also Newman's treatment of Moses Stuart, in the Schleiermacher 
section below, and the anonymous British Critic article on Abbott. 
<174) Tract 73, p.95. 
075) Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith, Vol. II, Book 3, Ch. 1, p.4-09, 
refers to "Socinians, Arians and all other maintainers of what the same 
Caius calls the 'God-denying apostasy'." Bull is referring to Eusebius, 
who uses the phrase to describe the adoptionist theology of Theodotus 
the Cobbler, see Ecclesiastical History, trans., G.A.W.Williamson, <Penguin 
Books, 1965) Book V, Ch. 28, §5, p.236. The Greek phrase is 1:1Jf; 
apvrp t Orov aTCO<Traa tac; 
<176) Tract 73, p.95. 
§7 "Postscript": Newman and Schleiermacher 
(1) Gowler, pp.202-3: " ... his life as a country laird, his lack of 
theological training, his independence from all church parties, and his 
relatively narrow reading - which ranged to the Bible, Shakespeare, and 
Plato, rather than to the Fathers, Kant and Schleiermacher - all suggest 
that Erskine was a theological •outsider• ... 
<2> Essays Critical & Historical, I, pp.96-99. 
(3) The following works contain Schleiermacher's characteristic 
theology of 'feeling'. They were all untranslated into English at the 
time Newman was writing:-
On Religion, Addresses to its Cultured Despisers, 1799, revised edns., 
1806, 1821, 1831. 
Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, 1811, 2nd Edn., 1830. 
The Christian Faith, 1821-2, 2nd Edn., 1830-1. 
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(4) A marked feature of the Addresses was the descriptive approach 
to religion: by showing that religion is i:l psychological phenomenon sui 
generis, Schleiermacher bypassed the epistemological problems involved 
in proving the propositional truth of doctrines. His apologetic, then, is 
based upon human experience, rather than external authority, 
H.R.Mackintosh, I_y~ of Mo(iern Theology. <London & Glasgow: James 
Nisbet, Fontana Library, 1969) pp.66-71, " ... he gives, and designs to 
give, nothing more than a phenomenology of the religious consciousness", 
p.69 
{5) Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ET of 2nd German 
Edn., ed.H.R.Mackintosh & J.S.Stewart. <Edinburgh: T.&T.Clark, 1976) pp.6-7. 
~eeling' is presented by Schleiermacher as an awareness that one is 
thinking. Synonymous with 'feeling' is "immediate self-consciousness". 
That feeling which characterizes the religious impulse, or "piety", is an 
awareness of oneself as standing out of existence, pp.8-9, which in 
turn calls attention to the unavoidable fact of our contingency, the 
backcloth of all self-consciousness <See pp.l2ff, section 4).This 
feeling is called "God-consciousness" and is the basis of Soteriology 
and consequently Christology - see below. 
(6) Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, section 63, pp.262-4; in 
order to be liberated, God-consciousness must be seen as universally 
present seminally, as an unused and little-developed aspect of our 
consciousness. 
<7) Ibid., sect ion 8, pp .361-5. In redemption, Jesus's sin less 
perfection is communicated to us, in some measure. This does not mean 
merely that Jesus was a morallly excellent person, who provoked faith 
considered only as a construct on the part of the believer; 
Schleiermacher holds that were this only so, confidence in salvation 
would be eroded, in the search for another, and yet another, redeemer. 
Redemption, therefore, has to be a !!_ew element, a break-through into 
history, which is communicated and experienced as human 'feeling'. 
(8) Ibid., Ch.II, ''The Method of Christian Dogmatics", p.98. 
(9) Schleiermacher is negative about traditional Christological 
categories of person and nature <"utter fruitlessness", p.394, Thg 
Christian Faith), and bypassing such terms, prefers to re-present 
Christology in relation to the idea of "God-consciousness". The 
'divinity' of Christ is, then, the perfection of His "God-consciousness'", 
which was "absolutely clear and determined each moment to the exclusion 
of all else, so that it must be regarded as a continual living presence 
and withal a real existence of God in him", p.397. Jesus was a human 
person, with human ego and personality, but also with a fully receptive 
and continuous God-consciousness, an immense receptive power - and in 
this latter, particularly as communicated to us in salvation, his 'divine 
nature' consists, "He alone mediates all existence of God in the world 
and all revelation of God through the world, insofar as he bears within 
himself the whole new creation which contains and develops the potency 
of the God-consciousness", p.388. 
<10) Ibid., p.738; N.B. also p.739, "But the assumption of an eternal 
distinction in the Supreme Being is not an utterance concerning 
religious consciousness, for there it never could emerge." 
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(11) Schleiermacher, }he Christian Faith, p.748; also pp.194-203, where 
he declares that we do not know qualities of God in themselves - in 
fact, there are no real distinctions within God, because, if that !'!~re 
so, then the feeling of absolute dependency could not be universal. 
Attributes arise from the angle of perception of God in the various 
manifestations of the feeling of absolute dependency. 
<12) Ibid., sections 171-173, pp.738-51. 
<13> Schleiermacher's psychology of religion cannot be separated from 
his sociology, because the context of all distinctive religious feeling 
is the community which conditions it, "since Christian piety never 
arises independently of itself in an individual, but only out of the 
communion and in the communion, there is no such thing as adherence to 
Christ except in combination with adherence to the communion." Ibid., 
p.106. 
<14> Ibid., pp.49-50. 
<15) Sykes, pp.86-7. 
<16) E.g., in a letter to J.W.Bowden, 13 July, 1834. Newman was 
examining, with Bowden's help with the German, Mohler's Life of 
Athanasius. Newman says that he will learn German if Mohler, via 
Bowden, should prove fruitful, ~etters & Diaries, IV, p.303. See also 
p.320, where Newman also considers learning German. 
07> See n.3 above. 
08> Pusey. Pusey's visits to Germany and his meetings with 
Schleiermacher, see Liddon, I, pp.70-108. For the origins of the 
controversy with Rose, pp.l47-174. 
<19) Newman recorded the appearance of Pusey's "little book" in his 
1828 Diary. In a letter to his sister Harriet, 4th June 1828, he conveys 
little else but confusion, "It is very difficult even for his friends and 
the clearest heads to enter into his originality, fullformed accuracy 
and unsystematic impartiality. I cannot express what I mean." Writing to 
Samuel Rickards, 7 August, 1828, Newman criticizes the difficult style 
of Pusey's book, as the work of a man in haste. Letters & Diaries, II, 
pp.74, 98. It may be said in defence of Newman's incomprehension that 
Pusey's book, perhaps influenced by the German academic style, is 
characterised by a highly abstract level of discourse, and very long 
sentences. Moreover, Pusey's relentless even-handedness tends to blur 
the outline of the argument. 
<20) Pusey, p.48, "'The whole history of the Church furnishes the 
proof, that every new strong awakening of religious feeling brings with 
it a peculiar form of expressing that feeling; it gives, too, the painful 
confirmation, that in all cases the form has been continued, when the 
spirit which produced it has departed." Pusey contrasts the renewal of 
feeling piety and emotion <"earnest inward piety"> with the dry 
"orthodoxism" <a term borrowed from Neander> of 17th and 18th century 
Protestantism, which, though rigid and precise, has no Christian 
authority, being in reality a confused mass of heterogenous elements. 
See also pp.35, 39, 99, 144. 
Pusey met Schleiermacher in Berlin in 1825 and attended- his 
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lectures on N.T. and on Practical Theology, in 1825-6, Liddon, p.95. 
Pusey recorded his admiration for Schleiermacher in a footnote of his 
Historica.LEnquiry, "that great man, who, whatever be the errors of his 
system, has done more than any other (some very few perhaps excepted) 
for the restoration of religious belief in Germany" <Quoted in Liddon, 
I, p.95). 
(21> Yearley, p.149. 
(22) ):..oc.cit. 
<23> Tract 73, "Postscript", p.96. 
(24) The Biblical Repository and Quarterly Observer, 18 <April 1835> 
pp.265-353, & 19 <July 1835>, pp.1-116. 
(25) ]bid., 18, pp.270-6. 
(26) Yearley, p.149; Sykes, p.301, n.9. 
<27> As the translator, Moses Stuart, makes clear, Biblic~_l__Quf,!rterly, 
18, p.279. 
(28) l_bid.,18, pp.270-6. 
<29> Ibid.,18, p.329. 
{30) "If the Sabellian views had peaceably obtained admission, in the 
sequel they would doubtless have received more accurate and definite 
1 imitations. But they were overwhelmed in the stronger opposite current, 
before they had time to be fully unfolded." Biblical Repository, 19, p.39. 
<31> Ibid., 19, pp.61-2. 
(32) "the true method of representing the doctrine of the Trinity has 
not yet been hit upon or achieved in the common symbols. It still 
remains, according to the tenor of these symbols and the books of 
theology, in a state of oscillation between subordination and equality 
on the one hand, and on the other between Tritheism and such a 
Unitarian view as is inconsistent with the appropriate honours due to 
the Redeemer, or with confident trust in the eternal efficacy of his 
redemption.•• Ibid., 18, p.273. 
(33) Ibid., 19, p.52. 
(34) Ibid., 19, p.53. 
(35) Ibid., 19, pp.53-4-. 
(36) Ibid., 19, p.61. 
(37) Ibid., 19, p.66. 
(38) Ibid., 19, p.67. 
(39) "if we could even give an adequate and satisfactory account of 
all these distinctions and relations of the Godhead as it or:iginally was 
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in and of itself, this would have no important betwin.g on the 
operations of divine grace; whichafter all, are the appropriate objects 
of true evangelical doctrine and instruction." Bibl_i_c_E.]_~epository, 18, 
p.22. 
Schleiermacher is here discussing the teaching of one of Sabellius' 
predecessors, Beryll. 
<4-0) i.e., in the 3¥.! pages of his 1836 Postscript, Tract 73, pp.96-9. 
(41) Particularly relevant is Schleiermacher's criticism of the 
Alexandrine school for an Arian tendency, in reaction to Sabellianism, 
"On the whole, one may truly say that the blexandrine views so far as 
they were concerned with the contest against Sa bell ian ism, were Ar ian 
views. Plainly the Alexandrian Fathers misunderstood Sabellius." Biblical 
Repository, 19, p.77. Alexandrine Trinitarianism is depicted as involving 
internal contradictions, "In the Alexandrine Christology, there were two 
elements brought into connection with each other, without ever being 
consolidated into one; viz., the ~ubordination of the Son to the Father, 
and the Godhead of the Son as hypostatic Logos", ibid., p.77. Thus, p.79, 
their theology was always oscillating between disparate elements. 
Newman had already stoutly defended the Alexandrines from the charge 
of originating Arianism in j\rians, but he makes no use of this material 
in relation to Sch le iermacher. 
<4-2) Tract 73, "Postscript", p.97. 
(43) )..oc.cit. 
(4-4) Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p.749. 
{45) Tract 73, "Postscript", pp.97-8. 
<46) Ibid., p.99. 
<47) Loc.cit. 
<48) Ibid., p.97. 
(4-9) Biblical Repository, 18, p.316. 
<50> Ibid., 18, pp.309-10. 
(51> Ibid., 18, pp.282,301. Stuart even adds some confirmatory evidence 
of his own, quoting Bishop George Bull's Defence, to support the view 
that the Father saw God the Father as au'to9Ecx; or "self-existent God", 
and the source of the other persons' being, ibid., 18, p.282. 
<52> Ibid., 18, p.310. Stuart expresses himself strongly, "It is 
impossible for me in my own mind to hesitate in saying, that either 
what is but 1 itt le better than Arianism, or else what amounts to real 
theoretical Tritheism, must be the legitimate and inevitable logical 
result of their principles", p.311. For Stuart, then, there is an 
heretical tendency ~ithin orthodoxy. 
(53) Biblical Repository, 18, p.282, "A derived God, if words are all -
owed to their appropriate meaning, cannot be a self-existent God; a 
dependent God cannot be an independent one. We may assert what we 
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please, respecting the indescribable, unspeakable, wonderful manner of 
generation or process ion; we may disc Ia i m all similarities among created 
things ever so much or so strongly; yet all this goes only to the 
manner and not to the g~_9tter of the thing. The latter still remains. 
The idea of dependence and derivation is inseparably and by absolute 
necessity connected with the idea of generation and procession." 
(54-> Ibid., 18 , p .31 1 . 
<55) Ibid., 18, p.283. 
<56) Ibid., 19, p.82. This is Newman's sixth quotation in Tract 73, 
"Postcript", p.98. 
(57) Ibid., 19, pp.80-116. 
(58) Ibid., 19, p.96. 
(59> Loc.cit. 
<60) Loc.cit. 
(61) Ibid., 19, p.l04. N.B. also p.109, which appears to be a 
modification in the direction of orthodoxy," ... the full sense of the 
words Father, Son and Spirit, can be made out only by reference to \}og 
revealed. But the distinction in the Godhead itself, in which this 
revelation has its bas is, is e terna 1; the development of it was made in 
time." 
<62> Sidney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American Peqple, 
<New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1972> p.392. 
(63) _Ibid., p.394-. 
<64-) Ibid., p.396. 
<65) Ibid., p.4-02: " ... Unitarianism was a halfway house on the road to 
infidelity." 
<66) Biblical Repository, 19, p.115. 
(67) Quoted by Newman, in a series of nine quotations, in the 
"Postscript" to Tract 73, p.99. 
<68> Between 1811 and 1842. 
(69) Letters & Diaries, III, p.16, to J.W.Bowden, 15 Feb.,1832. The 
context of the letter reveals Newman's suspicion of critical autonomous 
scholarship. Newman was opposing the election of Horace Hayman Wilson, 
a layman, and distinguished orientalist, to the Oxford Chair of Sanskrit. 
Wilson had been a surgeon in India and was rumoured to have lived with 
a woman there. Newman championed a sound clergyman, of known moral 
uprightness, though admittedly inferior scholarship, William Hodge Mill. 
<70) Letters & Diaries_, II, Diary for 8 June, 1829, and 31 July, 1829, 
pp.14-7, 155. See also Liddon, vol.1, pp.l64-, 167. Rose accused Pusey of 
disbelieving in the inspiration of Scripture. Pusey's Historical Enquiry, 
-401-
Pt:u~t II clarified his position, which was opposed to crude literalism, 
and used patristlc: material to substantiate his cuse. Newman assisted 
Pusey with this. 
(71) Liddon, I, pp.147-8. Rose's book, DiscourJ3e2__on_llle State of 
Protestantism in Germany,arose out of four lectures delivered in 
Cambridge in May, 1825, and was published in Cambridge in the same 
year, in the context of general English ignorance of German theology, 
Liddon, I, p.147. Newman heard another voice surprisingly prepared to be 
positive about German theology: even R.H.Froude was, in 1832, reading 
Herbert Marsh's translation of Michaelis's Introduction to the New 
Testament, and was "much interested by it," Letter to Newman, 10 Jan., 
1832, Letters & Diaries, III, p.5. 
<72> Essays Critical & Historical, II, p.244. Schleiermacher is 
01eloquent" about moral regeneration, but "silent on the redemption from 
death." Milman's note is uncertain if this is indeed the teaching of The 
Christian Faith; Milman consulted an expert friend, H.H.Milman, History 
of Christianity, 3 vols.,New Edn., London: John Murray, 1884, Vol.!, p.341. 
It is true that Schleiermacher says that the bodily resurrection cannot 
be derived from the principles of his systematic theology, The Christian 
Faith, p.420, "we cannot conclude that because God was in Christ he 
must have risen from the dead and ascended into heaven." 
(73) Essays Critical & Historical, II, p.210. 
<74) Lettt<_:!rs & Diaries, XI, in a letter to James Hope, 28 November, 
1845, Newman recounts a discussion about the future of the Oxford 
converts, and his hope that as Roman Catholics they may have the role 
of writing against "Germanism". 
<75) Letters & Diaries, V, pp.228-9. 
<76) _Ibid., p.231. 
<78) Letters & Diaries, V, p.210, To Thomas Bowden, January 23rd, 
1836. 
<79) Letters & Diaries, V, p.251, To Simeon Lloyd Pope, March 3, 1836. 
<80) Ibid., p.251. 
{81) See §6 (b), n.170, above. 
<82> This is a reference to Hampden's A Course of Lectures 
Introductory to the State of Moral Philosophy, <1835). Rose wrote about 
it to NewmanJ,etters & Diaries, V, p.189, Jan.1st, 1836. See also Newman 
to Froude, ibid., p .191 for the phrase "worse than the Bamp tons". 
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§8. ~~oU_i.D_qr ic~nism Revisited 
(1) !,ettt_tt:_l appeared in the British Magazine on October 1st, 1833, 
and the last, Letter XX on May 1st, 1837. 
(2) Briti_2h M~, July 1st, 1836, Vol. X: London: J.G.&F.Rivington, 
1836, pp.35-41. Referred to hereafter as Letter XVI. 
<3> See above, §5. 
(4) The controversy over Hampden's appointment to the Regius 
Professorship was still fresh. Arnold's article on the 'Oxford 
Malignants' appearing in the Edinburgh Review in April, and in May the 
University Convocation, swelled by indignant non-resident members who 
came up from the country, voted against Hampden, Trevor, pp.186,188-9. 
(5) Letter XVI, p.35. 
<6> Ibid., p.36. 
(7) For a discussion of these sentences, see above § 5. 
<B) This biographical material appears, with a few alterations, in 
Primitive Christianl!y, chap.III, §§1-2, Historical Sketches, I, pp.392-7. 
(9) !,etter XVI, p.36. See Primitive Christian_!_U, pp.392-3. 
<10> Apollinaris "wrote & dedicated to Julian [the apostate emperor] a 
refutation of paganism on grounds of reason", Letter XVI, p.36, 
Primitive Christianity, p.393. 
(11) k~J;j;er XV~, p.38, Primitive Christianity, p.396 
<12 ) Loc .c i_i,_ 
<13> Ap_Q.l_linQ_ris' history <1835 MS>, pp.ll-12. 
<14.> Letter XVI, p.38, Primitive Christianity, p.396. 
(15) Letter XV~, p.38. Primitive Christianity omits the phrase). 
(16) i.e. Letter XVI, pp.39-41. <It does not appear in Primitive 
Christianity. 
<17) Letter XVI, p.39. 
(18) Loc.cit. <The 'refusal' to draw out the lesson is an example of 
the rhetorical device of occupatio.> 
<19) Letter XVI, pp.39-40. 
<20) Ibid., p.41. 
(21> A liberalist is an advocate of liber~alism, usually in the sense 
which became current in the early nineteenth century - i.e. an advocate 
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of political liberalism, one in favour of reform in the dir-ection of 
greater democracy. See N.E.D. 
<22) Letter XVI, p.4-0. For Butler and probability, see Part III. 
<23) Loc.cit. 
<24> Loc.cit. 
<25) Loc.cit. 
<27> Loc.cit. 
<28) Loc.ci t. 
(29) Loc.cit: " ... the simple question before us is, whether, in matter 
of fact, any doctrine is set forth by revelation as necessary to be 
believed in order to salvation," <Newman's emphases), and a few lines 
further on, "The question is simply about the matter of fact." 
<30) Loc.cit. 
<3 1) Lac .cit. 
(32) Letter XVI, p.40 - because the numbers of witnesses involved are 
considerably greater than in a law case. 
(33 > As he becomes in the Essay on Development, pp. 7 4 ff, when he 
repudiates the Vincent ian Canon. 
<34> Newman did not really face up to this problem until the 1840's. 
See Part lll. 
<35) Letter XVI, p.39. 
(36> Letters & Diaries, V, p.l35. 
(37) The Theological Society was mooted in July, 1835, see Letters 
and Diaries, V, p.94, and commenced in November with a general paper by 
Pusey, ibid., p.164. At the second meeting, Newman read a paper on the 
Rule of Faith - i.e. a justification of the 'Via Media• position, 
hammered out originally in controversy with the Abbe Jager, loc.cit. 
<See Part III>. It was soon interpreted as a party cell: the Heads of 
Houses were by January 1836, ''much annoyed" at it, ibid., p.191, In a 
letter of February 17th, 1836, to J.W. Bowden, Newman sees the role of 
the Theological Society as related to the struggle with Hampden and the 
"neologians" <so his holograph, p.236,n.3> of his party: the Theological 
Society is intended to "restrain the vagueries of such as he," ibid_,, 
p.237. Such a Society would be useful in the task of heresy-hunting, 
"pushing"formal investigations" into Hampden's teaching, should he be 
promo ted to a high posit ion ,lo<; .cit_,_ Moreover, the increasing con f lict 
between Government and Church will, Newman predicts, increase the 
"consequence" of the Society. Newman, then can hardly be seen as 
initiating a Society of impartial scholars. 
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(38) See §5, n.37. 
§9Sabellianism Revisite~ 
(1) Letters & Diaries, V, p.153, 18th October, 1835, Le. one month 
after the writing of Tract 73, i.e. 16th Sept., 1835, ibid., p.146. 
<2> Letters & Diaries, VI, p.133, 12th September, 1837. 
(3) See Dictionary of National Biography, p.133, and '=~tters & 
Diaries, VI, p.385. 
<4> See ibid., p.389. 
(5) In Tract 73, Newman described Pye Smith as "one of the most 
learned, orthodox and moderate of the Dissenters of the day", and 
reproves him for recommending "Mr.Abbott's language" as a means of 
reconciling Unitarians to Trinitarian Christians, Essays Critical & 
Historical, I, p.93. 
(6) Letters & Diaries, VI, p.133. 
{7) Lac .cit. 
(8) See the full title to the Lectures on the Prophetical Office:-
"viewed relatively to Roman ism and Popular Pro tes tan t ism", <my 
emphasis). 
(9) This abuse would, Newman argued, lead eventually to infidelity, 
passim this thesis. See Willey, p.77: " ... it was Protestantism, which, by 
exalting Scripture and 'private judgment' had opened the way to scism 
and sect, and finally to infidelity." 
<10) See §6 Tract 73, and (b) of this section, concerning 
Schleiermacher. 
<11 > This was his case against Hampden. Newman saw 
"'latitudinarianism" as synonymous with an acceptance of both heresy and 
infidelity for reasons of expediency. See Prophetical Office, p.61, Tract 
85, p.129-30, where such an attitude is seen as an evacuation of all 
truth. 
<12> Prophetical Office, p.20, Via Media, I. See text, below. 
'Latitudinarian' was, of course, a term from early Hanoverian divinity, 
describing the school of Tillotson, Cragg, p.61. 
<13) See below, and passim in the Lectures on the Prophetical O_fficg. 
<14-) As Newman argues in Tract 73 in his critique of liberalism as 
'Sabe llian' - see §6. 
<15> See Part III, §1, <c>. 
(16) Prophetical Office, Introduction, § 14-, Yia Media, I, p.19. 
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<18) Loc.cit. 
<19) See Part I, §2, for the influence of H.J.Rose's discussion of 
German rationalism and ''neology". 
<20) Prophetical Offic~, Via Media, I, p.20. 
<21) Ibid., p.4-4. This matter will be considered in detail in Part III. 
<22> Ibid., p.84. 
<23) Ibid., p.90. 
<24> Ibid., p.89. 
<25) Essays Critical and Historical, I, p.42. 
<26) Via Media, I, pp.89-90. 
(27) lbid., pp.91-2. 
<28) Ibid-', p.89. 
<29> Ibid., p.93. 
(30) l_bid., p.99. 
<31> koc.ci h 
<32) Loc.cit. 
(33) Loc.cit. 
(34) As was Erskine, see §6. 
(35) Via Media, I, p.99. 
<36) Via Media, I, p.99. 
(37) Ibid., p.lOO. 
<38> Delivered at St.Mary's, Moorfields, Lent, 1836, and published in 
the same year, 2 vols., London, Joseph Booker. Referred to as Wiseman, 
Lectures. 
(39) Via Media, I, p.101. 
<40) Ibid., p.lOO. 
<41) Newman implies surprise and regret, Via Media, I, p.lOO, " ... one 
might have hoped that the religion of Rome would have been clear of 
the fault into which the rival system has been betrayed." By "rival 
system" he means "the popular Protestantism of the day." 
<42> Ibid., p.102. 
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(43) Via Media, I, p.101, Newman quotes Wiseman's view "that there is 
something in Roman teaching 'beautifully contrasted to the eye of the 
philosopher"' with the "'imperfections"' of Protestantism. 
(44) Loc.cit. 
(45) Loc.cit. 
(46> Wiseman, Lectures, p.39: internal evidencing is an "error". It is 
a circular argument - the moral excellence by which we vindicate 
revelation itself is revealed. It is not, in any case, the Bible which 
changes men for good - but doctrines derived from it preached by the 
Church. He sees it as associated with the Protestant right of private 
judgment, by which, he argues, it would be necessary for each believer 
to be "internally convinced", of any belief that he holds, jbid., p.8. 
(47) Wiseman, Lectures, p.13. 
<48) Ibid., p.15. 
(49) Loc.cit. 
(50> Ibid., p.ll. On the other hand, shifts of perspective upon error 
reveal its faults, ibid., p.12. 
(51) In fact, what sounds to Newman rationalistic is the appeal to 
the peauty of Roman Catholicism's formal coherence, Ibid, pp.28, 30-31. 
(52) Conviction is essentially practical. Acceptance of Roman 
Ca tho lie ism necessarily entails the ''Ca tho lie" pr inc ip le of abed ience to 
the Church, ibid., p.16. 
(53) In other words, Wiseman comes close to Newman's later position, 
in the Qrammar of Assent <1870)! 
<54) Newman's preferred method of analysis, in any case, works by 
discerning unintended 'tendencies'. This is the essence of his 'Sabellian' 
critique. 
(55) Wiseman's sixth and seventh lectures consider the "Practical 
Success" respectively of the Roman Catholic and Protestant rules of 
faith. 
(56) Wiseman, Lectures, p.164. 
<57) Ibid., pp.22-3. 
(58) Newman does not refer to Wiseman's statistics in the Prophetical 
Office, but does refer to this aspect of Wiseman's apologetic in his 
earlier review of Wiseman's !,ectures, British Critic, XX <Jan., 1836), 
p.402. 
(59) Wiseman, !,.ectures, p.8. 
(61> British Critic, XX, p.374. 
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<62) Pr:.o_illletical Office, Via Media, I, pp.104-5. 
(63) There is a contradiction here to Newman's earlier approach, in 
the final pages of Letter XVI, Apollinaris, when he defeng_~ 
"technicality". See §8. 
<64) Via Media, I, p.106. 
<65> Ibid., p.117. 
(66) Ibid., p.99. 
(67) See § 4. 
(68) Newman referred to "such vile persons as O'Connell", Lettgrs ~ 
Diaries, V, p.124. He sees him as the popular demagogue, bullying the 
government to make concessions damaging to the Church of England, 
Letters & Diaries, II, p.l32. He is "disgusted" that anyone should defend 
him, Letters & Diaries, V, p.l19. 
<69) Via Media, I, p.40. 
<70) Ibid_,_, p.44. 
<71> "Milman's View of Christianity", Essays Critical and Histori~a~, 
II, pp.186-248. Milman's earlier Histlli:Y- of the Je\.ol_~ <1825) had treated 
the Old Testament as secular history and sought natural explanations 
for miracles, Storr, p.113. Jhe History of the Jews had already 
antagonized Newman, j..etters & Diaries, II, p.299, To Simeon Lloyd Pope, 
28 October, 1830, "It seems to me that the great evil of Milman's work 
lies, not in the matter of the history, but in the prophane spirit in 
which it is writ ten... the irreverent, scoffing Gibbon-like tone." 
<72) "Milman's View of Christianity," p.l86, "It is notorious that the 
English Church is destitute of an Ecclesiastical History; Gibbon is 
almost our sole authority for subjects as near the heart of a Christian 
as any can well be." 
<73> ]J:>iQ_,_, p.187 ," ... he has not pleased us." 
(74) See §6(b) above. 
<75> "Milman's View of Christianity", pp.187-90. Milman is quoted as 
disclaiming '"polemic views"', and as striving for a "'calm, impartial, 
dispassionate tone'," p.190. 
<76) Ibid., p.200. 
(77) Ibid., p.l88. 
<78) Ibid., p.l98. 
<79) Ibid., p.229. 
(80) Ibid., p.229. 
-4-08-
<B 1) This distinct ion is pointed out by J .Derek Holmes, Newman and _ thg 
Use of Hlst~, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cambridge, 1969, p.134., 
"though not a heretic", Milman's theory and approach forced him to admit 
only what was external, to see nothing but the humanity of Our Lord 
and therefore to seem to deny what he did not assert, so that the 
general effect of his work was heretical." But Newman is suggesting 
something even more alarming than this - the autonomous and separate 
operation of the text, see below, n.263. 
<82) "Milman's View of Christianity", p.229. 
(83) It is immediately after such ironic treatment of Milman that 
Newman adds the rider, "We are sure that Mr Milman does not see the 
tendency of the line of thought of which both his present and his 
former work give such anxious evidence; and therefore, while we need 
not, we clearly could not, if we tried, delineate the principles which 
are contained in them, as they are held by himself personally;- he 
would be sure to say we were unfair", ibid., p.229. 
<84) Ibid., pp.226-7. Another example is Newman's satire upon Milman's 
presentation of the end of Judas. Milman does not, as some writers, try 
to explain away Judas' guilt, but he does extenuate his suicide on 
grounds of insanity brought on by remorse,"This, we suppose, is to show 
that we need not have a verdict of folo de se recorded against him", 
p.228. 
<85> Ibid., p.202. 
(86) Ibid., p.203. 
{87) ]bid., p.203, "The great doctrines which the Socinian denies are 
Our Lord's divinity and atonement ... " 
(88) lQJd., p.203. 
(89) Loc.cit. 
(90) Loc.cit. 
(91) Loc.ci t. 
(92) Loc.cit. 
(93) Loc.cit. 
(94) Ibid., p.242. Newman follows this with a passage prophesying that 
if this tendency continues, Christianity will eventually be subsumed 
under the history of cultures, "as a past event which exerted a great 
influence on the course of the world,"like the steam-engine, useful in 
its time, but superceded. Such a 'post-Christian' perspective wjll be the 
consequence of the evacuation of Christianity's essence by means of a 
reductionist phenomenalist analysis, "What will be left of Christianity, 
if we assume that nothing is of its essence which is found 
elsewhere?" <p.240 > 
(95) "Milman's View of Christianity", p.213. 
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(96) "Milman's View of Christinnity", p.213, 
<97) Loc.cit. 
{98> Loc.cit.,"He does make a theory of the facts which he records, 
and such a theory as unhappily implies that they belong mainly to that 
external system of th~s of which he writes, and must be directly 
referred to visible causes and measures by intelligible principles." 
(99> Loc.cit., "His mode of writing does not merely pass over, but 
actually denies the existence and presence among us of that higher and 
invisible system." 
<100) Ibid., p.207. 
001) Ibid., p.208. 
0 03 > L._oc .cit. This Newman finds puzzling, " .. Strange to say .. " 
<1 04- > Loc .cit. 
<105 > Ibid., pp.208-9. 
006) Ibid., p.209. 
<107) Alf Hardelin, Ihe Tractarian Understanding of the f:ucl:@rist, 
<Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Historico-Ecclesiastica 
Upsaliensa, 8, 1965) deals with the Tractarian use of the sacramental 
idea against Evangelicals and liberals alike. The sacramental principle 
made the Tractarians see that man must hold to the specific forms of 
revealed language, because it is only in the ~Qr_@_ that we have access 
to the mystery. But sacramentalism, as a broad theological principle, 
avoids literalism by seeing the truth as hidden in the language rather 
than on its surface. This led to the high value placed upon the 
allegorical or typological interpretation of Scripture, pp.31-33. Such 
was the view of Froude, Pusey and Keble. Keble's Tract 89 took the 
Alexandrine, Origenistic, line, classing the biblical word with 
sacramental rites, pp.34-5. Pusey, in Lectures on J:Y-pes and Prophesie~ 
criticised liberals for their attempt to substitute abstract and 
definite notions for the figures and types of the Bible, thus 
trivializing the impact of revelation, p.33, n.4-4-. In Newman the 
sacramental principle combined many trends and interests: i) the 
balancing of economy and mystery as sign and signified, iD Butler's 
analogy of nature with supernature, iii> Platonism, iv) the Alexandrine 
Fathers, pp.65-70. Newman applied the idea to the Church as a whole -
the external is a channel of sanctifying grace, p.75. Human salvation is 
essen tia 11 y soc ta 1, because eccles ias tical, but, eq ua 11 y, the Church is 
itself the presence of Christ, p.79. This enabled a two-pronged attack 
upon 'external' religion, i.e. the separation of outward forms from the 
inner mystery which is its essence, p.87 - Evangelicalism and liberal 
rationalism, pp.87 ,91. See also John Coulson, ''Newman on the Church -
his Final View, its Origins and Influence," in ed. Coulson & Allchin, 
pp.123-143. Newman's ecclesiastical starting-point was "the objectified 
presence or 'Body' of Christ existing in the world, who is encountered 
sacramentally." p.130. Newman used the sacramental argument two years 
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befm~e his review of Mil!ilan, in "Holy Scripture in its Relation to the 
Catholic Creed", Tract 85, l)iscussions & Argument.::;, pol92, where he 
pointed to the inadequacy of surface meaning and first impressions of 
Scripture, and stressed the hidden meaning. 
<108) ''!\Ulman's View of Christianity", p.188, quoting, in the CaJ;g_c;his!!! 
the answer to the question, "hlhat meanest thou by this word 
sacrament?'' 
<109) Ibid., p.188. Newman adds, ''Christianity has an external aspect and 
an. internal; it is human without, divine within." 
(110) The phrase is borrowed from the Orthodox theologian, Alexander 
Schmemann, The World as Sacrament. 
(111> ''Milman's View of Christianity", p.193. 
<112) Ibid., p.193 
<113) Charles Frederick Harrold, "John Henry Newman and the 
Alexandrian Platonists", Modern Philology, XXXVII (1940), p.289. 
<114) See Louis Bouyer, "Newman et le platonism de Pame anglaise", 
Revue de Philosophie, VI <1936), p.289. 
<115) His so lips ism is expressed particular 1 y in Apologia Pro V ita Sua, 
London: Everyman's Library,1966, p.31, where he refers to "my mistrust 
of the reality of moral phenomena ... making me rest in the thought of 
two and two only supreme and luminously self-evident beings, myself 
and my Creator .. " 
<116> "Milman's View of Christianity", p.192. 
<117> Ibid., p.230. 
<118> Ibid., pp.231-2. 
<119) This is true both of Judaism and Christianity, "Milman's View of 
Christianity" ,p.196, "'Its Usrael'sl history is twofold, worldly to the 
world, and heavenly to the sons of heaven ... What is true of Judaism is 
true of Christianity. The kingdom of Christ, though not of this world, 
yet is in the world, and has a visible, material, social shape. It 
consists of men, and has developed according to the laws under which 
combinations of men develop. It has an external aspect similar to all 
other kingdoms. We may generalize and include it as one under various 
kinds of polity, as one among the empires which have been on the 
earth." The "twofold" aspect of history involves two perceptions, human 
and divine, which the theologian or church historian must hold in 
balance. 
<120> A.M.Allchin, ''The Theological Vision of the Oxford Movement", in 
ed. Coulson & Allchin, p.54. 
<121> "Milman's View of Christianity", p.203. 
<122> Henry Hart Milman,The History of Christianity from the Birth of 
Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire, 3 vols., 
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<London: John Murray, 1884) Vol. I, pp.356-7. This edition is virtually 
unchanged from that of 1840, see Preface, p.iii. 
<123) Duncan Forbes, The Liberal Anglican Idea of History. <Cambridge, 
C.U.P., 1952) p.llO. This led to the concept of 'progressive revelation': 
what was revealed at one stage in human history will be inappropriate 
to another and be superceded by a more developed view. Influential here 
was Vico's image of a nation developing from childhood to manhood. 
024> forbes, pp.16, 20H, 30, 56-7. 
<125) Ibid., pp.l32-3. In reacting against the static rationalist 
anthropology, liberal Anglicans thought that "the historian, if he is to 
truly understand the past, must endeavour to enter the mental worlds 
which are totally different from his own. If he is to do this he must 
find his criteria of experience in the time and place in which he is 
studying, and not import a standard of his own." 
<126> Ibid., pp.65ff. Man's moral progress was something which 
transcended cultural developments and could therefore be separately 
assessed. 
<127) Milman, History, I, pp.92-3. 
<129) Ibid., II, p. 352, ''From this period [the IVth century] we may 
date the introduction of rigorous articles of belief, which required the 
submissive assent of the mind to every word and letter of an 
established creed, and which raised the slightest heresy of opinion into 
a more fatal offence against God, and a more odious crime in the 
estimation of man, than the worst moral delinquency or the most 
flagrant deviation from the spirit of Christianity." 
<130) ]bid., II, pp.410-11 ," ... the great characteristic distinction of 
later history had begun to be developed, the severance of Christian 
faith from Christian love." 
<131> Ibid., III, p.411, for both forms of heresy. 
<132) " .. the dogmatic part of religion, the province of fai6th is 
constantly endeavouring to set itself apart, and to maintain a separate 
existence. Faith in this limited sense, aspires to be religion." Ibid., 
III, p.408. 
<133) Ibid., III, pp.314-8. 
<134) Ibid., III, p.314. 
<135) Ibid., III, pp.313-4. 
<136) Ibid., III, pp.318-9. 
<137) Ibid., III, p.319. 
<138) Ibid.,!, Appendix III, p.l09. 
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<139) Milman gives the Gerfil.an in a footnote, "Christi ubernaturliche 
Geburt, seine Wunder, seine Auf~rstehu..ng und Himmelfahrt bleiben ewige 
hlahrheiten, so sehr ihre Birklichkeit als historische Facta angezweifelt 
werder mag." "so sehr ihre" etc is more clearly translated, "even if 
their reality as historical facts may be called in question." Strauss is 
not flatly denying historical facts, but saying that they are less 
ifilportant than the "eternal truths" which are independent of them. 
<14-0) Milman, History, I, p.llO 
<141) Ibid., I, pp.ll0-12. Milnlan therefore sides with the more 
conservative Neander, whose historical researches are declared to 
coincide with Milman's own, pp.114-5. 
<142) Ibid., I, pp.263-4. 
<143> Ibid., I, pp.284-5. 
<144-> Ibid., I, p.300. 
<145) Ibid., I, p.308. 
<146> Ibid., I, pp.340-1. "The resurrection of Jesus is the basis of 
Christianity; it is the groundwork of the Christian doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul", p.340. 
<147> Ibid., I, p.341, note. 
<148) "Milman's View of Christianity", p.208. 
<149) Ibid., p.236. 
<150> Forbes, pp.5-6. 
<151> Ibid~, pp.7-8. Liberal Anglicans disliked the view of rationalists 
such as James Mill, who saw the progress of civilization as inevitable. 
<152) Ibid., p.lOl; they saw the march of mind as the crisis of 
civilization, " .. this sense of crisis was common to the Liberal Anglicans 
and to the Oxford reformers, the starting point of two opposite 
movements." 
<153) Ibid., p.107. Liberal Anglicans thought that a degree of 
rationalism could be accommodated, but there came a point when it had 
to be resisted, - i.e., when it began to threaten belief in God and His 
Providence, and the "essential truths of Christianity." 
<154> This phrase is used by Edward Farley, Ecclesial Reflection, An 
Anatomy of Theologjcal Method, <Philadelphia, 1982> cited by Gowler, 
p206. 
<155) "Milman's View of Christianity", p.219. 
-413-
§10. Conclusion: Heresy as Encodement. 
{1) The idea of a culture as a system whereby experience is encoded 
derives from Claude Levi-Strauss, Structuralist Anthropology. Levi-
Strauss considers the strange web of social custom <kinship, marriage, 
religion, eating-habits, tabu) as being a language in which a people's 
understanding of itself is encoded. His analysis of such codes - the 
deep structure beneath social behaviour - is exercised in regard to the 
so-called 'primitive' peoples - they are, as far as he is concerned, 
richer and in some ways more sophisticated than apparently more 
civilized societies, which, basing their culture upon writing systems, 
lost the capacity to apprehend the universal through the concrete 
structure of social existence. However, despite this difference, the 
'savage• and the 'modern' mind are not so very different: "the 'savage' 
mind is the quintessential human mind, operating in a mode that differs 
from that of the mind of 'civilized' man, but to no different end," 
Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, <London: Methuen & Co., 
1977) p.56. This underlying identity of attitude manifests itself both 
in 'primitive' myth and in modern literature - "the construction of the 
world they appear only to describe". The latter phrase may be extended 
to Newman's use of Christian Antiquity: he both appropriates and 
reconstructs it, in order that it may serve as a paradigm or structure 
upon which his rhetoric may be based. In Newman's case this is an 
individual, learned and self-conscious proceeding, rather than a social 
one - although there is a corporate dimension of a kind; a tradition of 
polemical history-writing stretching from the Fathers to Joseph Milner. 
<2> Newman, and the Tractarians generally, embraced the typological 
interpretation both of Scripture and of all human phenomena, 
considering it under the sacramenta 1 pr inc ip le, see §9 {b), n .1 08 . 
<3> The phrase is borrowed from the title of Northrop Frye's The 
Great Code. The Bible and Literature. <London: Ark, 1981) He, in turn 
borrowed it from Blake's ''The Old and New Testaments are the Great 
Code of Art," p. xiv. Frye declares himself to be interested in the way 
the Bible sets up an "imaginative framework - a mythological universe," 
p.ix. 
<4> Frei, pp. 26-7. 
(5) Boekrad, Personal Conquest, refers to Newman's 'Husserlian' 
0 phenomenalism, Walgrave, Newman the Theolgian, to his psychologism. See 
next note. " 
<6) In a disagreement be tween two great Newman scholars, Boekrad 
and Walgrave, Newman's possible closeness to the positions he is 
criticizing is revealed. In 1944, Walgrave saw Newman's "practical 
psychologism" as a weakness, i.e. "an attitude of thought on account of 
which one is convinced of having given the ultimate explanation of a 
thing when one has given a psychological explanation." Boekrad defended 
Newman against the charge: Newman's doctrine of conscience presents man 
phenomenologically in order to reveal the ontological transcendence of 
human nature, Boekrad, pp.262-6. Walgrave later moderatB d his position: 
Newman's 'psychologism' was not reductionist but neither was it 
conclusive as an argument for reaching metaphysical truth, pp.334-41. 
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CJ) Essays Critical and Historical, I, p.55. 
<8> See Thomas M.Parker, "The Rediscovery of the Fathers in the 
Seventeenth-Century Anglican Tradition", in ed. Allchin & Coulson. The 
Church Fathers permeated only slowly into Anglicanism, because of the 
unavailability of printed editions. It was therefore only the 
seventeenth century Anglican theologians who were profound patrists. 
See also S.L.Greenslade, The English Reformers and the Fathers of the 
Church: an Inaugural Lecture. <Oxford, 1966). Owen Chadwick, p.5, gives a 
different explanation: Anglican and Roman positions about the 
interpretation of Scripture were mutually exclusive - it was not a 
field of argument. Both, however, could agree that the early centuries 
were normative - so they could argue about them; historical research 
became the food for polemic.. Newman's interest in the Fathers of the 
Church preceded his acquaintance with seventeenth-century Anglican 
theologians, Parker, pp.4-1, 4-9, 4-2, 38. He came to the seventeenth-
century divines when compiling Arians, and discovered their theology 
more fully between 1834- and 1836, p.4-7. 
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PART III: RETREAT AND __ RgALIGl'l_!'i~T: PllonoP-hysit!Sf!l and the _.(:ollagse of 
the 'Via Media'. 
§1. Construction. 
(a) Tensions in t_Q_e Cl~ssi~aJ Concept of Orthogoxy. 
<1> Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: 
International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, 1970) p.lO. By "paradigm, 
he means '"models from which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research." To share a paradigm involves commitment to the 
same "fundamentals", which lay down "the same rules and standard for 
scientific practice," ibid, p.ll. The paradigm is, then, normative for 
belief and practice in the scientific coimmunity which holds it. 
(2) Apologia <Svaglic), p.lll. 
<3) 'V ia Med ia' refers to the concept, V fa Med fa to the war k of that 
title. 
(4) Apologj_a_ <Svaglic), p.l37. 
(5) Ibid__,, p.l45. 
<6> Chadwick, p.13. 
<7> Loc.cit. 
<B> Bossuet and the Gallicans applauded Bull's attack upon Petavius, 
because they saw it as a defence of their anti-papal, anti-Jesuit 
position, see F.L.Cross, Jghn H~nry Newman, <Glasgow: Philip Allan, 1932) 
p.107; Jean Guitton, La Philosophie de Newman, <Paris: Boivin, 1933) 
p.151. 
(9) Chadwick, p.l7. 
<10) Church history had become the common ground for debate between 
Roman Catholics and Protestants, since they could not agree about rules 
to argue about Scripture. Thus all historical research fed polemic, 
ibid., p.17. 
<11 > See the opening sentence of St. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, in 
The Treatise of Irenaeus of Lugdunum Against the Heresies, 2 vols. 
<London, S.P.C.K., 191q). 
<12) Ibid., I, 22. 1. For a summary of passages from Irenaeus, showing 
his view of the doctrine as prior to heresy, devolving upon the bishops 
by tradition from the apostles, see Bettenson, pp. 89-92. See also Jean 
Danielou, Gospel Mes~nd Hellenistic Culture, <London: D.L.T., 1980) 
pp.l39-157. The Church, according to Irenaeus, has a duty to preserve 
and guard the deposit handed down to it, J.b iQ.,_, p .14 7. The pr lor i ty and 
apostolicity of the deposit can be proved - against the Gnostic claim 
to a secret tradition - by its unity, which the identity of tradition 
throughout the war ld witnesses, ibid., p .149. 
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03) De Praescr ip tione Hacrc ticorum, chaps. VII- X IV, ed. Roberts & 
Donaldson, <A.-N.C.L.) Tertullian, pp.8-19. 
<14) Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, 
trans. Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins, ed. Robert A. Kraft and 
Gerhard Krodel. <Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), Introduction, 
pp.:odii-xxiv, where Bauer summarizes, and then distances himself from, 
the 'classical' view. George Strecker In the Foreword to the 2nd German 
Edn. summarizes Bauer's "thesis" as follows: "In earliest Christianity, 
orthodoxy and heresy did not stand in relation to one another as 
primary to secondary, but in many regions heresy is the original 
manifestation of Christianity," p.xi. 
<15) H.E.W.Turner, The Pattern of Christian Truth. A Study in the 
Relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Early Church, <London: 
Mowbray, 1954) p.26. 
<16) Ibid., p.29. 
<17) Dionysius Petavius CDenys P~tau)'s De Dogmatibus Theologicis 
provoked a debate about pre-Nicene orthodoxy. See below. 
<18) See §1 (c), below. 
<19) Turner, pp.9-10. Such evidence of fluidity is "sufficient to cast 
grave doubt upon any form which presupposed that heresy represented a 
series of deviations from a fixed and static doc tr ina 1 norm," p .9. 
<20) This was translated in 1851 and formed part of the Library of 
Anglo Catholic Theology, under the full title of A Defence of the Nicene 
Creed, out of the Extant Writings of the Catholic Doctors, who 
Flourished during the Three First Centuries of the Christian Church, in 
which is incidentally vindicated The Creed of Constantinople Concerning 
the Holy Ghost. 
<21) Apologia <Svaglic), pp.35-6. 
<22) Newman attributed to Bull's influence his view that "Antiquity 
was the true exponent of the doctrines of Christianity and the basis of 
the Church of England," Apologia, pp.35-6, and that "Bp. Bull's theology 
was the only theology on which the English Church could stand," p.145. 
In D iff leu lt ies of Anglicans, Newman always mentions Bu 11 as a pillar of 
the 'Via Media' position, Difficulties, I, pp.2-3, 5-7, 8, 224, II, p.45. 
<23) Letters & Diaries, II, p.371, To Samuel Rickards, 30th October, 
1831. He calls the "standard divines"- among them Bull - "magnificent 
fellows but ... Antiquarians or Doctrinists, not Ecclesiastical Historians." 
<2 4) See the dis cuss ion of Newman's purposes in composing Arian~, in 
Part I. 
<25) h_gglgg_ia <Svaglic), pp.35-6. Actually, Newman is hesitant - he is 
unsure from whom he gained the principle - but he 'takes it for 
gran ted' that it was from Bull. 
<26) lbid, p.l45. 
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<27> Bull accused Petavius of denigrating the pre-Niccne Fathers to 
promote papalism, Defence, p.ll. The fullest account of the problem of 
Petavius' intentions is Paul Galtier, "Petau et La Preface de Son De 
Trinitate", Recherches de Science Religieuse, 1921, pp.462-467: Petavius' 
historical analysis is concerned to lay bare the harmful influence of 
Platonism upon Christianity in the pre-Nicene age <p.462). 1.~•-,lih;e -+he 
Preface to the De Dogmatibus Theol., L.l, Ch.Vlll, no. 2, ed. Vives>. 
Galtier surveys the theories to account for this discrepancy: that he 
wrote the Preface under obedience <Turmel, O.Chadwick), ibid., p.4-65, that 
the Sorbonne required it before it would authorize printing <Bayle, 
Godet), loc.cit., or that he 'repented' of his denigration of the Fathers 
<Bossuet), loc.cit., but dismisses them all. Galtier sees Petau as 
pursuing two distinct but not irreconcilable purposes:- in the body of 
the work, he operated as historian, in the Preface as dogmatic 
theologian, ibid., p.471. In any case, the Preface was not an 
afterthought: it was wrtten co-terminously with the rest of the work, 
ibid., pp.466, 472-3. 
<28> Galtier, p.464. 
<29) Petavius, De Dogmatibus Theologk!.§_, L.I., ch.V, no.8; ed. Vives, 
t.Il, p.316A, quoted in. Galtier, p.463, <my translation of Latin>. The 
ante-Nicenes all believed that, the Word, existed from all eternity and 
. was connatural with the Father, but, with varying degrees of 
distinctness, they taught that, before the Creation, Christ was not 
fully a Son; this is because the Word became Creator - and sonship, 
although taking place outside time, nevertheless had a direct relation 
to the act of creation. Augustine saw the view as heretical, De Haer. 
50, see Jean Guitton, Appendix A, "Newman et Les Peres Anteniceens," 
p.l49. 
<30) passim, Bull, Defence, e.g. p.47, explaining fluidity of 
terminology by reference to an orthodox meaning underlying it. The 
antithesis emerges very sharply in the following sentence, p.84, "And 
thus far of the word homoousion, 'of one substance'. Let us now deal 
with the thing itself." He then commences an examination of the Fathers' 
teaching in chronological order, based upon this antithesis. See also, 
ibid., p.447, "For what purpose is it to wrangle about words and modes 
of speaking, when we are agreed about the thing itself." 
<31> Ibid., p.410 
<32) Ibid., p.248 
<33) Ibid., p.83 <Arianism is a later form of Gnosticism), also, p.397. 
(34) Hece Bull is reliant upon Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, chap. 8, 
which he quotes, ibid., p.82, see n.46 above. 
<35) Ibid., pp.661-2, where Bull answers the question "if Arius was so 
completely heterodox, how could it, in so short a time after it arose, 
prevail to such an extent," by reference to Arian fraudulence ('fraude'), 
which deceived "many over--credulous bishops". The latter were, of 
course, taken in by Ar ian language, although they were in re still 
orthodo:-;. 
<36) See below, the following quotation. 
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{37) Bull, p.598. 
{38) Loc. cit. 
(39) Bull declares that Petavius himself was an obedient Jesuit 
papalist: he had to destroy the unanimity of the early centuries, in 
order to advocate Infallibility - the Fathers are made heretics to keep 
the Roman Chur-ch sound, ibid., pp.11-12. 
(40) Christopher Sand <Sandius> was the appellation of two Socinian 
theologians, father and son, of the late seventeenth century. They were 
both Arians, that is, they attacked Trinitarian orthodoxy by reference 
to a revisionist interpretation of the pre-Nicene age, rather than, as 
the pure Socinians, relying on reason alone, see Robert Nelson, Life of 
Dr. George Bull, <London: Richard Smith, 1713> p.280-1. It was the 
younger Sand who wrote the Nucleus Historiae Ecclesiasticae. Sand had, 
like his father, studied at Konigsberg, but also at Oxford. He was based 
in Amsterdam. The Nucleus was his most important work: "a history of 
Arianism, ancient and modern, by way of showing that primitive 
Christianity was Arianism, which can be traced in a continuous stream 
down to the present." He also wrote Bibliotheca Antitrinitariorum 
<1684), a biographical survey of all antitrinitarian writers since the 
Reformation, with an account of their writings, Earl Morse Wilbur, !! 
History of Unitarianism, Socinianism and Its Antecedents, (Camb.,Mass., 
Harvard U.P., 1947) p.512. Newman owned a copy of the Nucleus, which 
remains in the Birmingham Oratory, Edgbaston. Bull refers to Sandius in 
the Introduction to his Defence,pp.vii-viii, and to the "modern defenders 
of Arianism", p.x. Bull is arguing against the tenet of the Arian branch 
of Socinians who held that before Nicea only the Father was believed to 
be God, p.5. According to Nelson, p.282, Bull's Defence was only partially 
completed when Sandius' work was published and circulated in England. 
His friends urged him to complete the work, which was eventually 
published in 1685 under the patronage of the Bishop of Oxford, Nelson, 
p.284. 
(41) The spread of their influence resulted in a questioning of 
'tests', initiating the agitation about 'subscription' to articles. See 
Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 
vols., 2nd edn. <London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1881) pp.421-5: in the second 
half of the 18th century, "Unitarian ism became the prevailing creed of 
the most intelligent dissenters," p.421. See also, Clarke, p.320. 
<42) Gibbon sees the Trinitarian controversies in the early Church as 
a "high and mysterious argument derived from the abuse of philosophy, 
The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. II, ed. 
Bury, <London, 1898) pp.335-7, where, like Petavius with whom he 
sympathizes <p.lOO>, he sees Platonism as the cause. Orthodoxy tried 
futile 1 y to reconcile Sa be 11 ian ism and Tr i the ism and was essentially 
circular, p.346, or an "invisible and tremulous ball", p.349. 
(43) University Sermons, VII, "Contest Between Faith & Sight," May 27, 
1832, p.l26, where Newman refers to Gibbon without naming him: " ... the 
celebrated work of a historian of the last century, who, for his great 
abilities, and, on the other- hand, his cold heart, impure mind and 
scoffing spirit, may justly be accounted as, in this country at least, 
one of the masters of a new school of error, which seems to have 
accomplished its destinies, and is framed mor-e exactly after the 
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received type of the author of evil, thEm the other chief antf-Chrtsts 
who have, in these last times, occupied the scene of the world." 
However, Newman read Gibbon in the Long Vacation of 1818 and was 
captivated by his style and undertook an analysis and imitation of it, 
see Ward, I, p.34; ed. Tristram, Autobiog_[!!P-hical Writing~, p.41; and the 
reminiscence in Idea of a UniversitY-, pp.322-3. Newman declared in the 
Introduction to his Essay on Devel9pment, "Perhaps the only writer who 
has any clalin to be considered an ecclesistical historian is the 
unbeliever Gibbon," Ward, 1, p.34. He ruefully aclmowledged in his review 
of 11lilman's History of Christianity, that Gibbon was "almost our sole 
authority for subjects as near the heart of a Christian as any can well 
be," Essays Critical & Historical, II, p.186. He regrets that Milman, "who 
is not a Gibbon but a clergyman" has not provided a replacement o f ''the 
infidel history," ibid., p.187. At the beginning of "Part II, Historical," 
Newman lists his "authorities" for the rest of the volume, amongst 
which is "Gibbon's Roman History," Arians, p.243, n.l. 
(b) The Arians of the Fourth Century and the Problem of Orthodoxy 
(44) Arians, pp.189-99. 
(45) Ibid., p.189. 
(46) Ibid., p.191. 
{47) Ibid., p.194. 
(48) Ibid., p.197. 
(49) Loc. cit. 
(50) Ibid., p.l98. 
(51) Of Newman's treatment in Arians, Ch. 2, §IV, R.H.Broker declares, 
"Newman not only took his examples of patristic teaching from Bull, but 
also followed Bull in his attitude towards the treatment of these 
Fathers." This is, in fact, truer of Newman in his 'Via Media' phase 
(1834 onwards) than of Arians. 
(52> Arians, p.185. 
(53> Ibid., p.184-5. 
<54 ) Loc. cit. 
<55> Ibid., p.l85. 
<56) M.Jamie Ferreir·a, Doubt and Relig_ious Commitment. The Role of the 
Will in Newman's Thought, <Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) p .6 7, compares 
Newman's understanding of religious language with that of Wittgenstein: 
to Newman, belief is "a function of centrality in our web of beliefs. 
The context according to which reasonableness, necessity or certainty is 
determined is a system of beliefs <or a \vorld picture) made plausible 
as a totality, dialectically issuing from and informing a way of life." 
See also p.94. Ferreira is discussing the Gr-ammaL__of Assent 0870>, but 
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the same might be said of Newman's tr-eatment of ear-l)' Chur-ch life and 
belief in Arian_?.. Similarly, P.J.Fitzpatrick, "A Stud>' in the Grammar of 
Assent", II <Irish Theological Quarterly> p.219: for Newman and 
Wittgenstein, "It is our life that shapes what is the setting that gives 
sense to our doubts and assertions." 
(57) A_rians, p.l85. 
<58> See §3 for a detailed discussion of the development of doctrine. 
(59) Arians, p.185. 
(60) Loc. cit. 
<61) Ibid., p.186. 
(62) See Selby, pp.l-43. The doctrine of reserve, the secrecy of the 
early Church, conveys their reverence which holds them back from 
publishing their dogmas <Disciplina ArcanD. On the other hand, the 
early Fathers unfolded the meaning of mysteries in expressions which 
were economies, a symbolic mode of expression. 
(63) Arians, p.91. 
<64) Ibid., pp.51, 54. 
(65) Ibid., p.57. 
<66) Ibid., p.168. 
(67) Lac. cit. See also, Wordsworth, Preface to The Lyrical Ballads, 
p.741, Poetical Works, <ed. Hutchinson). Oxford: O.U.P., 1969) 
<68) Arians, p.148. 
<69) Ibid., p.149 
<70) Lac. cit. 
<71) Ibid., p.150. 
<72 > Ibid__,_, pp .148-9. 
<73) Ibid., pp.150-1. This seems contr-adictory. 
<74) Ibid_,_, p.l49. 
<75) Lac. cit. 
<76) Ib.!fL_, p.152. 
<77) Ibid., p.l52. 
08) See J.M.Cameron, "Newman and the Empiricist Tradition" in Coulson 
,'1,( Allchin. pp.76-7, :rhe__!ii_ght_Batt_Jg <London: Burns & Oates, 1962) 
pp.203-l0. See also §3, be low. 
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(c) The Prob_lem of Def!Dit_ion:_A~urvey of th(~ 'Via Media'. 
<79) Primitive Christianity, p.347. See Part I, §3. 
(80) Butler declares his method to be "practical", being based upon 
the common pursuits of life," Analogy of Religion, Select Christian 
Authors, no.17 <undated), p.l76. For Butler's account of probability, see 
his Introduction, ibid., pp.171-207. 
(81) See George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and 
Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modem Times, (London: Croom Helm, 
1980) p.20: in the courts, appeal to probability concerning the 
commission of a crime was regarded as more reliable than testimony. 
(82) Records of the Faith were translations of extracts from 
patristic texts appended to the Tracts for the Times, to support their 
arguments. The translations of the Library of the Fathers commenced in 
1835, Newman and Pusey being the instigators, Ward, I, p.57. 
(83) See Via Media, I, pp.217-22. <Prophetical Office. 
(84.) The article Via Media consists of Tracts 38 and 41 C25th July, 
and 24th August, 1834.), published in The Via Media of the Anglican 
Church, II, pp.19-48, 28. 
(85> Ibid., p.41. 
(86> Ibid., pp.23, 48. 
<87> Ibid., p.31. 
(88) Ibid., p.32. Newman means that the Tridentine articles do not 
differ in king from the 39 Articles as being secondary additions to 
meet particular heresies. They differ from the 39 Articles in being 
simply 'untrue'. But Newman does not put himself so strongly: after all, 
1t is difficult to imagine the Tractarian position being fully 
consistent with the Articles either. Hence Newman takes refuge in a 
weaker word - "unsound". 
<89> Ibid., p.32. 
(90) Loc. cit. 
(91) Loc. cit. 
(92) lbi(L, p.40. 
<93) Loc. cit., "Yes". 
<94) [..oc. cit. n.4. 
<95) Loc. cit., i.e. The 39 Articles. 
<96) lbid., p.41, "Yes". 
<97> Ibid., pp.40-1. 
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(98) Anglican theology of the eighteenth century, notably that of 
Waterland, saw the distinction between fundamentals and non-
fundamentals as a matter of clarity and obviousness, such that the 
unlearned could understand them. The fundamentals were contained in 
Scripture, GUnter Biemer, Newman on Tradition. <London: Burns & Oates, 
1966) pp.9-10. 
<99) Harrison had his first letter published in the Universe, on 18th 
September, 1834-, see Louis Allen, John Henry Newman and the Abbe Jager, 
<London: Univ. Durham Publications I O.U.P, 1975) p.21. 
<100) Sykes, p.102. 
<101) Vincent of Lerins, The Common.J tory, Library of Christ ian Classics, 
X, "Early Medieval Theology," <London: S.C.M., 1957) p.37. 
( 102) Ibid., p.38. 
<103) Allen, p.22. 
(104-) Ibid .. , p.23. 
<105) Ibid., pp.23-4. 
<106) Ibid., pp.22, 26. 
(107) Ibid., p.35. 
<108) Ibid., p.36. 
<109) Loc. cit. 
( 110) Loc. cit. 
<111) Loc. cit. 
( 112) Loc. cit. 
<113) Loc. cit. 
(114) Ibid., p.40. 
( 1 15) Loc. cit. 
<116) Loc. cit. 
<117) Loc. cit. 
<118) Ibid., p.40. 
( 119) Loc. cit. 
<120) e.g. Via Media, II, p.36. 
<121) Allen, p.66. 
( 122) Jpi<;L_, p.76. 
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(123) A lien, p.81. 
024) Loc. cit. 
(125) Loc. cit. 
026) Lo~_,__c it. 
<127) lb ld ., p.87. 
( 128) Ibid., p.98. 
<129) Ibid., p.86. See also p.92, Newman quotes Athanasius De Synodis, 
§41," 'but as far as those who receive its <Nicea's) whole Creed, 
except the word consubstantial <Homoousion), but doubt about it, we 
must not regard them as enemies, for our opposition to them is not as 
if we thought of them as Arians, and impugners of the Fathers, but we 
converse with them as brothers with brothers, who hold the same sense 
as we do, only hesitate about the word'." 
<130> Loc. cit. 
031> Ibid., pp.94-5. 
032) Ibid., p.95. 
<133) Loc. cit. 
034) Ibid., pp.107, where Jager, replying to Newman's 2nd Letter points 
out that all previous controversy equated 'fundamental' with 'necessary 
for salvation' and that it was only Newman himself who had made a 
distinction between the expressions. In correspondence between Newman 
and Froude, the latter, too, criticized Newman's distinction, quoted by 
Allen, p.179. 
<135) Nicholas Wiseman, Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and 
Practices of the Catholic Church, delivered at St.Mary's Church, 
Moorfields, Lent, 1836, 2 vols., <London: Joseph Booker, 1836). The effect 
of these lectures was described to Newman by J.E.Tyler, on March 3rd, 
1836, see Letters and Diaries, V, p.252. 
<136) These lectures were eventually published as the Lectures on the 
Prophetical Office of the Church. 
037) Letters & Diaries, V, pp.246-7 
<138) lbid., p.91. 
<139) The monthly Brit ish Critic had been founded in 1793. In .February, 
1836, Newman became a contributor·; by July, 1838, he had become the 
editor, see Hough ton, pp .119-20. 
<140) British Critic, XX, July, 1836, published in Essays Critical & 
Histol'ical, I, 3, pp.102-37. 
<141) Ibid., pp.373-403 - "Wiseman's Le_c;;_tucgs on the Church. 
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<142) Newman was writing up his Lectures on the Prcm))_g_!:_ical __ Office, 
from already existing mater-ial, in November, 1836, Letters &_Diaries, V, 
p.385. 
<143) See "Note on Essay III," Essays Critical & Historical, I, p.137, in 
which Newman describes Apos to lica 1 Tradition as "being a continuation 
of a series of protests" against Hampden's theology, in the build-up to 
the latter's appointment to the Regius chair. 
(144-) Apostolical Tradition, Essays Critical & Historical, I, pp.112, 
113-141 117 
<145) The British Critic, XX, 1836, pp.373-403. published in October, 
1836. The article was actually written on 6th Sept., 1836, while 
Apostolical Tradition appeared in the British Critic in July, see n.93 
above. 
<146) Ibid., p.377. 
<147) Benjamin Harrison, who had initiated the debate with Jager, 
strongly criticized Newman's posit ion that there was no development to 
the fundamental Creed and suggested that "fundamentals" should mean 
"simply the rock on which the Church is built," see Allen, p.155. Newman 
popularized his terminology, bringing in "essentials" to gloss 
"fundamentals" but would not concede any developments in the Creed to 
have taken place. Newman described Harris on's critic isms as "mad" and 
"violent", p.162, and appealed to Hugh James Rose for his judgment. 
(148) British Critic, XX, p.378. 
<149) Lac. cit. 
<150) Ibid., p.379. Newman is quoting the 1571 Convocation. 
051) Ibid., p.380. 
(152) Ibid., p.380ff., where Newman quotes Laud, Stillingfleet, Hammond 
and Ussher on the distinction between fundamentals and essentials, and 
non-fundamentals and non-essentials. 
<153) Ibid., p.383. 
<15 4) Loc. cit. 
( 155) Ibid., p.384. 
( 156) Loc. cit. 
<157) See Letters & Diaries, v, p.385. 
<158) Via Media, I I p.212. 
( 159) Ibid., p.40. 
(160) See Prophetical Office, Yia Media, I, p.44: "we find that the 
necessary difference between us and them is not one of essential 
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principles, that is it is the diffecence of supei·stition, and not of 
unbelief, from religion." 
<161) Prophetical Office, Via Media, I, p.61. 
<162) For example, in Lectures IX-X of Lectures on the Prophetical 
Office, "On the essentials of the Gospel". By "essentials", Newman means 
the fundamentals, ibid., p.215. 
<163) Ibid., p.234, where Newman declares that the 39 Articles are 
'"Articles of religion' not of 'faith'." 
<164) The Creed, which contains the fundamentals or essentials, is "the 
primitive condition of communion, or fundamental faith," ibid., p.217. 
Articles of religion, however, are not terms of communion: they may, 
though, be useful in securing the order and unity of the Church in a 
time of heresy, ibid., p.234. 
<165) Ibid., p .203, where "Ca tho 1 ic agreement" is contrasted with "loca 1 
opinions." 
<166) Newman frequently presents the Creeds as broad outlines of the 
essential faith, ibid., p.222, where he refers to the "Symbol, or Rule, or 
Summary of Christian Doctrine," or ibid., p.249, "outline of sound words." 
See also p.212, 196-7, The Apostles' Creed is, for Newman, the simplest 
outline, but it is not different from the later, more technical, Creeds, 
such as the Nicene - they are respectively the western and the eastern 
forms of the creed, differing only in "immaterial points," ibid., p.227. 
The Homoousion was introduced into the Nicene creed "merely in 
explanation of a great article of faith, held from the first, but then 
needing, from circumstances, a more accurate wording," ibid., p .228. 
<167) That is, the view that the first five centur·ies of Christianity 
are normative for doctrine. This idea of the first five - or sometimes 
four-hundred - years goes back to Elizabethan divinity: Newman quotes a 
parliamentary act of the first year of Queen Elizabeth, which names the 
first four Ecumen ica 1 Councils <325- 451 A.D.). Anglican ism has tended, in 
fact, even in its thea logy courses up to this day, to consider 451 A.D., 
the date of the Council of Chalcedon, as the terminus ad quem for the 
normative Christian past. Newman, however, records the great diversity 
of view upon the extent of time to be included: Ken has 800 years, 
Bramhall 600, Hammond and Stillingfleet 680, while van t-11ldert was 
prepared to go as late as the great; Schism (1054), see Via Media, I, 
pp.205-6. Newman's honest record of this variety of opinion somewhat 
weakens his argument on behalf of Tradition. He imagines a weakening of 
the purity and authority of the Church, until a point arrives when 
Antiquity can no longer be regarded as 'normative' in view of the 
seriousness of the schisms that have taken place: "Such is the 
agreement in principle, such the immaterial disagreement of our Divines 
in determining the limit of that period to which we give the name of 
Antiquity. The principle is clear, the fact obscure. Different Judgments 
may be formed of the date when the East and West fell into Schism, but 
that 'love is the bond of perfectness' will be admitted on all hands," 
llll.cL. p .207. Newman agrees w 1 th his Anglican forebeat·s that the VI lth 
Ecumenical Council of 787 <2nd Nicea) cannot be accepted. He considers 
it only of local authority, p.208 - but clearly dr·aws back from it, as 
did other Reformation Fathers such as Bramhall, because it decreed 
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"worship of images" m· icons. In pcac t ice, Newman is a 
quinquesaecularlst: all his defences of Christological orthodoxy take 
Chalcedon as the norm. 
<168) Via Media, I I p.44. 
(169) Ibid., p.43. 
Cl70) Ibid., p.44. 
(171) Ibid 'I p.244. 
Cl72) Ibid., p.233. 
<173) See ibid., pp.254ff. 
<174) Ibid., p.254. 
Cl75) Ibid., p.258. 
Cl76) Ibid., p.259. 
(177) Ibid., p.224. 
Cl78) Newman sees the Church as always having known its own mind: 
dogmatic definitions are the clearing-up of verbal ambiguities -
"Surely it was not inconsistent with the reverence due to it [the 
Creed], for the Church Catholic, after careful deliberation, to clear up 
any ambiguity which, as time went on, might be found to exist in its 
wording," ibid., p.225. 
Cl79) Ibid., p.228. 
C180) Ibid., p.225. 
<18 1> Ibid., p .2 2 6. 
C182) Athanasius would not, however, let them hold any public office 
in the Church, ibid., p.231. 
<183> Ibid., p.231. 
C184) Ibid., pp.252-3. 
<185) Ibid., p.252. 
Cl86> Ibid., p.252. 
C187) Lac. cit. 
<188) Lac. cit. 
C189) Ibid_,_, p.l42. 
<190) Lac. cit. 
< 19 1 ) Lac. cit. 
-4-27-
<192) Via_f•1~dia, I, p.14-3. 
<193> Ibid., I, p.143. 
094) The Catechetical Lectures of St~il Q_f_)_§!rusalem, tr-ans., 
Richard W. Church, 1838, in Librm of the Fathers of thP Holy__Catholic 
Chu_rch, No.2. (Oxford,: Rivingtons, 1845); the E_reface <pp.i-xxiD was 
also written in 1838. 
<195) For example, Fr .G .D .Dragas, in "Newman's Greek Orthodox Sense of 
Catholicity", Ecclesiasticus, <Darlington, 1984) p.lOO, sees Newman as 
an exponent of the truly Catholic mode of interpreting the Bible: 
Newman asserted that the Bible and the Apostolic tradition cannot be 
properly unders toad outs ide their proper pa tr ist ic Sitz- in-Leben~' Fr. 
Drag as cites Newman's "long and very interesting Pre[__9ce" as an example 
of the truly Catholic Principle of scripture-interpretation. 
<196) i.e. 1839, see Part III. 
<197) see Liddon, I. 
<198) The Catechetical Lectures have no notes, but by 1842, Newman 
was surrounding his translations with compendious annotations - see his 
Select Treatises of St. Athanas ius. 
<199) Ibid., Preface, p.xii, "Nothing can be more certain than that 
Scripture contains all necessary doctrine; yet nothing, it is presumed, 
can be more certain either, than that, practically speaking, it needs an 
interpreter; nothing more certain than that our Church and her Divines 
assign the witness of the early ages of Christianity concerning 
A pas to l ic doctrine, as that interpreter." 
<200) Ibid., p.ii. 
<201) Ibid., p.iv. Cyril preferred Acacius' formula 'xcx-rcx n:cxv'tcx Of.J.Otov' 
<'like in all things'), to Athanasius' 'op.ooucrtov' ('of the same 
substance'). 
<202) Ibid., p.x. 
<203) i.e. when Newman was losing confidence in the 'Via Media', see §2 
(b), below. 
<204) He means Eusebius of Caeserea and Meletius. 
<205) Catechetical Lectures, Preface, p.x. 
(206) l.Q_i__Q__._, p .XV i i. 
<207> lQlQ__._, p.vii. 
<208) "Holy Scripture in Its Relation to the Catholic Creed", 1838, 
P is__.:;uss ions_ E__Q_9___A_cg_ymen !§_, I I I, pp. 109-253. 
<209) lbid__._, p.211. 
< 2 1 o > &t~L p .199. 
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<211) Discussion & Arguments, III, pp. 199. 
<2 12 > Ibid., p .2 52 . 
§2 . Collapse. 
{a) NQn_Qphysitism: 1839-4-1. 
(1) ~ <Svaglic>, p.108. 
<2> Loc.cit. 
(3) Ibid., p.109. 
(4) Le. Difficulties of Anglicans, lectures delivered in the Oratory 
Church in King ~illiam Street, Strand, London, starting M.ay 9th, 1850. 
Catholics and non-Catholics attended, Ward, I, pp.231-2. 
{5) i.e. the Apologia <1864), on the occasion of Charles Kingley's 
imputation of his intellectual integrity. 
(6) Apologia <Svaglic), p.91. 
(7) See §1 <c>, above. 
{8) Apologia <Svaglic), p.lOO. 
(9) Ibid., p.108. 
<10> Bard, II, pp.2ff. 
(11) Apologia <Svaglic), p.108. 
<12> Ibid., p.540, n. on 108-24. 
<13> Ibid., p.108. 
04) Difficulties of Anglicans, I, p.373. 
<15) See §3, below. 
(16) Birmingham Oratory, 8.2.9. Referred to hereafter as The 
Monophysite Heresy <Longer MS>. 
< 17 > Also entitled The Monophys i te Heresy, it is prefaced by the 
following declaration, in Newman•s hand: ''The following is an abstract 
of a MS. of this date, with Notes and References." It is pp.17-31 of a 
printed booklet also containing the printed paper on ApollinarianiSIJ!. 
This will be hereafter referred to as The M.onophysite Heresy <Printed 
Digest). Never published, it resides in the Birmingham Oratory . 
<18) Birmingham Oratory, B.2.8.c. This will be referred to as 
Monophysitism {Shorter M.S). 
<19) The M.onophysite Heresy <Longer M.S), p.2. 
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<20) The Monophysite Heresy <Longer MS>, p.2. 
<21> Ibid., p.3. 
<22) Loc.cit. 
<2 3 ) Ib id. I p .5 1. 
(24> Newman quotes the authorities (e.g. Vasquez) against the 
viability of the distinction, but eventually decides that there was, 
indeed, a school of opinion that might be described as "Semi-Arian," 
ibid., p.51. 
<25) Loc.cit. 
(26) Ibid., p.53. 
<27) Ibid., pp.54-5. 
(28) Ibid., p.58. They could appeal via Cyril back to Athanas ius. 
(29) Ibid., pp.68-9. 
(30) 
_Ibid., p.68. 
(31) Ibid., p.l. 
(32) Ibid., p.4. 
(33) Loc.cit. 
<34) Ibid., p.23: Touching this objection, Newman admits, "There is 
much truth in this." 
(35) Loc.cit. 
(36) Ibid., p.24. 
(37) Ibid.,p.24. 
(38) Ibid., p.9. 
(39) Loc.cit. 
(40) Ibid., p.7. 
(41) Ibid., p.8. 
(42) Ibid., p.9 - note on left-hand side of page. 
(43) Ibid., p.ll. 
<4-4) Ibid., p.l2. 
(45) Loc.cit. 
(46) Loc.cit. 
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(4-7) Jhe Monophysite Heresy, <Longer ~45), p.12. 
<48) For example, passim in Tract 73, See Part II. 
<49) The MonoP-hysite Heresy <Longer MS>, p.28. 
(5 1) lb id_,_, p .40. 
(52) Loc.cit. 
(53) ~oc.cit. 
(54) Ibid., p.42. 
(55) Ibid., p.45. 
(56) Ibid., p.47. 
(57) Ibid., p.47. 
(58) Ibid., p.48. 
(59) Loc.ci t. 
<60> Loc.cit. 
<61> Loc.cit. 
<62> Loc.cit. 
(63) Lac .cit. 
(64) At the very end is a summary of the proceedings leading up 
tothe Council of Chalcedon. 
<65) The Monophysite Heresy <Longer MS>, pp.34ff. 
<66) Ibid., p.70. 
(67) Loc.ci t. 
<68) Ibid., p.72. 
(69> "It was observed in the beginning of these remarks that it [ the 
principle that physis = person] was held by the Monophysites in common 
with Nestorians, Arians and Sabellians, A participation in the principle 
involved a participation in its consequences. As applied to the doctrine 
of the Trinity, it led to the direct conclusion either that there is but 
one Person in the Godhead because there is but one Divine Nature; or 
that there are Three Persons; that is, it led to Sabellianism or 
Tritheism," ibid., p.72. 
<70> Ibid., p.76. 
(71) Loc.cit. 
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<72> The Monophysite Heresy <Longer MS), p.77. 
<73) For the idea of heresy 1s development towards in.f1delity, see Part 
II. 
<74) The Monophysite Heresy <Longer MS>, p.26. 
<75) Loc.cit. 
<76) loc.cit. 
<77> Loc.cit. 
(78) Loc.cit. 
<79) Ibid., p.28. 
(80) i.e. Monophysitism <Shorter MS>. 
<81> Ibid., p.2. 
<82) Loc.cit. 
<83) This was a stock typologization of the patristic age, which 
Newman follows, ibid., p.2. 
(84) Loc.cit. 
(85) Ibid., p.3. 
(86) Loc.cit. 
(8 7 ) lb id.. p .5 . 
(88) Loc.cit. 
<89) Loc.cit. 
<90) Ibid., p.6. 
(91> i.e. pp. n, p , a. 
<92) Monophysitism, <Shorter MS>, p.9, "There was no difference of 
opinion what the true doctrine concerning the Eternal Son was ... 01 
<93) Loc.cit. 
<94-> See Apologia <Svaglic), p.109. 
(95) Ibid., p.llO. 
(96) Mozley, II, p.286. 
(97) Nicholas Wiseman, "The Anglican Claim of Apostolic Succession," 
The Dublin Review, VII, <August, 1839), p.144. 
(98> Ibid .• pp.144-5. 
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(99) Biseman, ''The Anglican Glahn", p.14-6. 
<100> Ibid., p.l49, 150, 155. 
<101) Biseman points to the argument of Cresconius who maintained 
that it was not necessary to be in active communion with the universal 
Church to be Catholic, ibid., p.160. Wiseman presents Ticonius as the 
leader of "a High Church party", which was attempting to revive 
Catholicity as universality within the Donatist Church. Perhaps Ticonius 
~epresents Newman. 
<102> Ibid., p.178. 
<103> Mozley, II, p.286. 
<10·0 Ibid., p.287. 
(105) Published in Essays Critical and Historical, II, under development 
of the Cyprianic concept of the Church's unity, "Epicopatus unus est, 
cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur" <"The episcopate is one and 
each bishop shares in its fulness.'). Newman argues that consequently 
every Church is independent of every other, being in itself the whole 
universal Church, p.31. He sees it as possible to be Catholic without 
being in communion with Rome. Against Biseman, Newman argues that 
unity is based on a local Catholicity - i.e. the true orthodox faith: 
"possession of the succession ... Episcopal form ... Apostolic faith, and the 
use of the sacraments," p.20. Newman argues "that the Church is 
complete in one bishopric; that a number of bishoprics are but 
reiterations of one and add nothing to the perfection of the system. As 
there is one Bishop invisible in heaven, so there is but one bishop on 
earth; and the multitude of bishops are not acknowledged in the Gospel 
system as many, or as if <viewed as representatives of the Bishop 
invisible> they were capable of mutual relations with one another, but 
as being one and all shadows and organs of one and the same divine 
reality," p.23. Newman is aware that such an ecclesiology does not match 
Augustine's, which Wiseman is citing. He takes refuge in the argument 
that Augustine's statements about universality should not be taken as 
first principle, but as rules of thumb by which to exclude heresy: Rome 
is still subordinate to the Tradition of the whole Church, p.4-1, rather 
than a definer of it. 
<106> Mozley, II, p.249, November 24-th, 1843. 
<107> Essays Critical & Historical. II, p.51. 
<108) Loc.clt. 
<109) Loc.clt. 
<110> Ibid., p.13. 
<111> Loc.clt. 
<112> Ibid., pp.13-14-. 
<113> Ibid., p.13. 
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(114) Essays Critical & Historical, II, p.14. 
<115) Loc.cit. 
016) Apologia <Svaglic), p.75. 
<117) Loc.ci t. 
<118> The Ecclesiastical History of M.L'Abbe Fle~rom the Second 
Ecumenical Council to the End of the Fourth Century, Translated, With 
Notes, and "An Essay On the Miracles of the Period," COxford: J.H.Parker, 
& London: Rivingtons, 184-2) p.vi. Newman's "Advertisement" is dated 4th 
June, 1842. Referred to hereafter as Fleury, I. 
<119) Apologia <Svaglic), p.75. The word had, in fact, come into the 
language in 1839 - see N.E.D. 
020> Fleury, I, p.V. 
<121> Ibid., p.vi. 
<122) Mozley, II, p.283. 
<123) The "Advertisement" refers to "Herbert's translation <London, 
1728), Fleury, I, p.vii. 
<124> Mozley, II, pp.284-5. 
025) Loc.cit. 
<126> Ibid., p.281. 
<127> Ibid., p.284-. 
<128) Ibid., p.4-00. This first volume contains hardly anything about 
heresy. 
029> The Ecclesiastical History of M. L'Abbe Fleury From A.D. 4-29 to 
A.D. 4-56, Translated with Notes. <Oxford: J .H.Parker & London: Rivingtons, 
184-4-) The "Advertisement" is dated November 8th, 1844-, referred to 
hereafter as Fleury, III, pp.15, 51, 136, 284-. 
030> Even here, there are only gentle hints, see §3 <c>, below. 
<131) Apologia <Svaglic), p.l13. 
<132> Mozley, II, to J.W.Bowden, 10th October, 184.1, p.352. 
<133) Ibid., p.353. 
(b) Semi-Arianism. 
<134.) Tract 90, "Remarks on Certain Passages of the 39 Articles," Via 
Media, II, p.259-356. 
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(135) The furore commenced in March, 1841. 
(136) See Apologia <Svaglic): Newman's "protest" against association 
with not only the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches, p.135, but also the 
Jacobite, Nestorian and Monophysite ones, p.l32. 
037) Ibid., p.136. 
<138) Ibid., p.130. 
<139) Apologia <Longmans), p.l39. 
(140) Mozley, II, p.392. 
<141) ~ <Svaglic), p.130. 
(142) Loc.cit. 
<143) Select Treatises of St.Athanasius, <Library of Fathers 
Translation, 1844) p.49, n. <p>. 
<144) Ibid, p.157, n.<D. 
(145) Ibid., p.103, n. (t). 
(146) Loc.ci_b 
<147> Loc.cit. 
<148) Loc.cit. 
<149) Apologia, p.130. 
050) So, for example, Jbiq_._, p.343; Newman gives an account of 
Athanasius' exegetical method in terms of the Vincentian canon and the 
Tractarian Rule of Faith; "he is explaining what is obscure or latent in 
Scripture by means of the Regula Fidei. 'Since the canon of Scripture is 
perfect,' says Vincentius, 'and more than sufficient for itself in all 
respects, what need of joining to it the ecclesiastical sense? because 
from the very depth of Holy Scripture all men will not take it in one & 
the same sense etc, Commonit. 2." 
§3. Rhetoric Refashioned 
(a) The Essay on Development: Anglican or Roman? 
(1 > Apologia <Longmans), p.234. 
(2) J.J.Byrne, ''The Notion of Doctrinal Development in the Anglican 
t1Jritings of J.H.Newman," ~b.emerides Theologicae Lovanenses, XIV, <1937>, 
p.230, n.l. 
(3) Ward, I, p.94. 
(4) Apologia <Longmans>, p.234. 
-435-
(5) E?sa_y, p .90. 
(6) Ward, I, p.176. 
(7) Loc.cit. 
(8) lblfh, p.86. 
(9) Ibid., p.83. 
00) Loc.cit. 
{11) Essay, p.72. 
(12) l'Jard, I, p.159ff. 
(b) The :I:ol. ~o. u. of Development and Heresy 
<13> Byrne, p.265. 
<14.) This letter is unpublished. I am grateful to Gerard Tracey of 
the Birmingham Oratory for this information. 
<15) See §1, above. 
<16) See Part II, passim. 
( 17) The Copybook on DeveloP-ment is in the Birmingham Ora tory. 
(18) The letter is dated lOth November, 1840, and is written from 
Oriel College: it resides, unpublished, in the Birmingham Oratory 
Archive. 
<19) Loc.cit. 
(20) Loc.cit. 
(21> Fleury, III, p.272, n. <o>. 
<22) Newman had two translations available to him, a French 
translation of Unity in the Church <pubd. 1839) and an English one of 
the Symbolic Theology, but there is little evidence that he studied 
either, see Chadwick, pp.lll-12. 
(23> Fleury, III, p.272, n.<o>. 
<24.> Ibid., III, p.359, n. <h). 
<25) lbid., p.345, n.(c). 
(26) University Sermons, pp.312-3. 
(2 7) Cameron, ed. Coulson & A llch in, pp .81-2 : the immediate 
"impression" upon the mind was seen by Hume as richer and more vivid 
than the combination of these into ideas. Newman applied this model to 
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reveiation: the object of faith is unknown in itself: it makes a vivid 
impression on us, which is later systematized in dogmas. 
(28) University Sermons, p.329. 
<29) Ibid., p.330. 
(30) Ibid., p.331. 
(31) Ibid., p.330. 
(32) Ib i<!,_, p.332. 
(33) Ibid., p.350. 
(34) Ibid., p.316. 
(35) "Wonderful, to see how heresy has but thrown that idea into 
fresh forms, and drawn out from it farther developments, with an 
exuberance which exceeded all questioning, and a harmony which baffled 
all criticism ... ", ibid., p.317. 
{36) Ibid., p.318. 
(37) Loc.ciJ..., 
{38) Jbid--'' p.337. 
<39) Ibid_,_, p.320. 
(40) Ibid., p.351. 
(41) Apolog_!9_ <Longmans), p.198. 
§3. The Essay on Development 
(42) Essay on Development, p.154. 
(43) Nicholas Lash, Newman on Development. <London, 1975) p.154. 
<44) "The Reformation of the 11th Century", Essays Critical and 
Historical, II, p.250. 
(45> Essay, pp.l00-1. 
<46) Lash, p.97. 
(47) Ibid., p.106. 
<48) Essay, p.316. 
(49) Ibid., p.318. 
(50) Loc.ciJ..., 
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<51) );:~say, p.322. 
<52) Ibid., p.29. 
<53) lbid_,_, p.328. 
(54) Newman still uses this idea in the Essay, p.329. 
(55) Ibid., p.275. 
(56) With the words "they were received back into the communion of 
the Catholic Church," ibid_,_, p.332. Newman's peroration then begins with 
"Dreary and waste was the condition of the Church." 
(57) Ibid., pp.332-3. 
(58) Ibid., p.309. 
(59) Loc.cit. 
(60) 
_Ibid., p.313. 
(61) Ibid., p.305. 
(62) Loc.ci t. 
(63) ~oc.cit, 
(64) ]_bid., pp.308-9. 
(65) Ibid., pp.336-342. 
<66) Ibid., pp.93-100. 
(67) Ibid., p.95. 
(68) Ibid., p.99. 
(69) Ibid., p.100. 
<70) Ibid., pp.356-65. 
(71) Ibid., pp.401-2. 
(72) Ibid., p.403. 
(73) Ibid., p.404. 
<74) Ibid., p.409. 
(75) 
_Ibid., p.411. 
<76) See Ibid, pp.124-6, on the "continuity of Principles" as a test of 
a true development. 
<77) Ibid., p.360. 
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(78) ~SS_i;l}f. 1 p.360. 
C79) Loc.cit. 
(80) ~Q~.cit 
(81) Broker, pp.6-7, accepts, unquestioningly, F.L.Cross's article in the 
Chu~h_Qua~terly R~view, January, 1933. Broker ignores the problem of 
Petavius's position on the status of post-Nicene dogma, see §1 (b), n.51, 
above. 
(82) Essa_y_, pp.40 1-12. 
(83) Ibid., p.4-01. 
<84) Ibid., p.402. 
(85) Loc.cit. 
(86) Ibid., p.202. 
(87) Loc.cit. 
(88) !;:_?say, pp.353-5. 
(89) Ibid., p.132. 
(1) For example, Oscar Cullmann announces a tension between the 
basic facts of biblical history, and the faith which constitutes them as 
revelatory, "Without this faith, not only is it impossible to ascribe any 
normative value to that entire Biblical history, but that history must 
actually seem to be without meaning," Christ and Time, trans. Floyd 
V.Filson, London: SCM, 1965, p.23. This normativeness produced by faith 
engenders a crisis for the modern his tor ica l consciousness, "here in the 
final analysis lies the 'offence' of the Primitive Christian view of time 
and history, not only for the historian, but for all 'modern' thinking, 
including theological thinking; the offence is that God reveals himself 
in a special way within a narrowly limited but continuing process," _loc. 
cit. 
<2> See S.I!J.Gilley, "Newman and Prophecy" for Newman's apocalyptic 
re-description of the present: he shared the view of "most conservative 
Evangelicals, in seeing the spirit of Antichrist in the infidelity of 
political liberalism," p.l80. indeed, the ferment of apocalypticismn 
generated by Edward Irving, the enfant terrible of Evangelicalism in the 
1830's fed upon the prevailing anxiety at social and political changes, 
see Newsome, pp.6-7. Newman was closer to Irving than Newsome admits: 
whereas Newsome sees him as directing his polemic against the 
Irvingites, Dr. Gilley has shown that Newman's own world-denying 
sprituality in the face of political events has much in common with 
Irving's apocalypticism, "Newman and Prophecy", pp.170-1. 
(3) Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Cent~, I, 
1799-1870, CNew Haven & London: Yale U.P., 1972) Ch.9. pp.l90-241. Welch 
classifies Tractarianism among such conservative strategies which arose 
from "the reaction of an ever-present piety to the threat of 
dissolution of the Christian substance in modern culture generally and 
in the new theological liberalisms of the century in particular," p.190. 
See ibid,_, pp.207-217, for Newman and the Tractarians. The Tractarians 
based their programme for spiritual renewal upon an "objective 
supernaturalism" of sacraments, for which the legitimating authority 
was incarnational, ibid., p.212. The "full systematic statement" of 
Tractarianism came with Robert Wilberforces's The Doctrine of the 
Incarnation <1848), where the patristic doctrine of the Incarnation is 
re-appropriated on behalf of the Tractarian pursuit of holiness in 
sacramental ism. 
(4) Welch, pp.l93-4, regards this as characteristic of mid-
nineteenth-century movements suffused by "the pervasive mood of 
restoration <or preservation and defence) and of churchly self-
consciousness." This "refusal" characterized Lutheran confessionalism, 
the "biblical realism" of Johann Tobias Beck, and the orthodox Calvinist 
reaction at Princeton against the "New Theology". 
(5) That is, of the seventeeth-century Anglican Fathers, whose 
defence of patristic orthodoxy is massive in citation but often evades 
either methodological coherence or readability, see above Part II. 
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(6) See I:Hlliams, p.5: "The Arians of the Fourth Century is, in large 
part, a tract in dP.fence of what the early Oxford Movement thoug·ht of 
as spiritual religion and spiritual authority." 
(7) Newman's list of "authorities" at the beginning of his historical 
narrative of Arianism lists mainly archaic sources for his secondary 
material. The "moderns" he mentions are Tillemont, Petavius, Maimbourg, 
and Gibbon! He does not cite what was then a recent work on Arianism -
that of the contemporary German Church historian, Neander, but then, he 
could not read German. 
(8) 'o oe: Apncx:; E&xppn "Cow· rrEpt El)(Je:j3wv, rroA.A.o: TE tpA.O:tp6lV, Et<JY)A8Ev 
ncr &mm; 6}(1 chor ](TCEto:v "Cl')<J yo:cr-rpO<;, xo:t EI;O:tq>VT}<; xa-ro: -ro ye:ypor~~Evov, 
rrpT}VT}<; yE<;O~EVO<; EA.ax~E ~E<TO<; xat rrEcr~v Eu6ocr arrE~UI;Ev l'\~q>O'tEf>6lV "CE, "rf)<J 
TE uotv~vta<; liO:t 1:ou (T)V Eulhx; E<T'tEPB'l,' Epistola ad Serapion de Marte 
Arii, PG, Col. 689, §5. The phrase 'rrpl)VT}<; ye:voJ.LEVO<; EA.axrpe: ~E<TO<;' <and 
falling headlong he burst open in the middle) is lifted directly from 
the account of Judas' death in the book of Acts, "Now this man 
purchased a field with the wages of iniquity; and falling headlong, he 
burst open in the middle and all his entrails gushed out," Acts 1:18. 
Athanasius, therefore appears to be establishing a direct parallel 
between the deaths of Arius and Judas. 
(9) John Lawrence Mosheim, An Ecclesiastical History Ancient and 
Modern from the Birth of Christ to the Beginning of the 18th Century, 
<London: 184-1) p.ll2. 
<10> Milner, II, p.54-, "When they came nigh unto the forum of 
Constantine, a sudden terror, with a disorder of the intestines, seized 
Arius. In his urgent necessity, he requested to be directed to a place 
of private retirement. Agreeably to the information he received, he 
hastened behind the forum; and there he poured forth his bowels with a 
vast effusion of blood. Such was the end of the notorious Arius." 
(11) Letters & Diaries, III, p.78, To H.J .Rose, 16th August, 1832. 
Newman invoked Gibbon, ''Even Gibbon, I believe, thinks his temperate 
notice of Arius' death striking." 
(12) Arians, p.276. 
<13> Loc. cit. 
<14> Ibid., p.277. Newman is here discussing the legitimacy of 
applying such an approach to events to occurrences in the contemporary 
situation. 
<15> Newman defended miracles as part of God's "moral government" of 
the universe, Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles, p.12. 
They form part of a whole system by which the human conscience is 
roused and sharpened by divine interposition, ibid., pp.12, 20, 16-17,26, 
33. 
(16) See A.D.Leeman, "The Variety of Classlcal Rhetoric," in ed. Brian 
Vickers, Rhetoric Revalued. <Birmingham & New York: Medieval & 
Rennaissance Texts, 1982) p.41; George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and 
Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times. 
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(London: Croom Helm, 1980) p.25. Notably Plato criticized the Sophists in 
the Gorgias: rhetoric cannot produce knowledge. 
<17> A.M.Fairbairn, Catholicism RomS~ciL_F,!.nd AnglicaQ, <London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1899) p.103. 
<18) I:Jilliams, p.6. 
<19) Gerard Verbeke, ed. J.D.Bastable,"Aristotelian roots of Newman's 
illative sense," ~ewman aQ.d GJ~gstone. Cg_nteQDl_al_Essa~, CDublin: 
Veritas Publications, 1978) pp.177-196. 
<20) Susan Carole Funderburgh Jarratt, A Victorian SoRhistic: The 
Rhetoric of knowle_ggg__jn Darwin, Newman qnd Pater, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Texas at Austin, 1985). 
<21> Ibid., p.5. 
(22> Ibid., p.95. 
<23) Arian~, p.30-32 (Aristotle), pp.28, 33 <Sophists). See Part I, §2. 
(24.) Newman's rhetorical denunciations of rhetoric, e.g. Arians, p.31, 
belong to an ancient tradition going back to Plato's <lm::gl~~. 
<25> A.rians, p.31, i.e. Part I, Section II, 1. 
<26> Marginal annotation on his own copy of Arians. 
<28> Martin Dibellus, Er.9m Tradition to Gos_Qg_l, trans. B.L.Woolf, 
<Cambridge & London: James Clark & Co., 1971) Chap. 1. 
<29) Verbeke, p.l78: Newman helped to draft Whately's Elem_en_l;_s_of 
!,ogic in 1822. Whately's La~ has a close relation to his rhetoric, 
because he sees the latter as a subordinate branch of the former. 
<30) Rhetoric is generally regarded as becoming obsolescent by the 
late 1820's, see Jarratt, p.l, Kennedy, p.240. 
{31) Kennedy, p.240: Whately's Rhetoric was the "last major treatment 
of the subject in the classical tradition.'' 
<32) Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, <London: B.Fellowes, 
1841 ). 
(33) Ibid., p.8. 
<34.) See, for example, his critique of Milman, Part II, above. 
<35) Louth, pp.96-119. 
(36) In his 1967 essay, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical 
Reflection," Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. & trans. David E.Linge, 
<Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977>, pp.23-4. 
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(37) Gadamer, p.7: in ''The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem," 
Gadamer points out that reading Mommsen today we can see clearly the 
historiographer's own social and political preoccupations, as he writes 
about ancient Rome, jbid-', p.4. 
<38) Ibid., p.7. 
<39) See ibicl, Editor's _1n_lrodus_tion_, pp.xiv-xvii. 
(40) Ibid., p.24, "On the Scope and Function". 
<41) Thus Louth, pp.99-103. 
(42) For example, the very opening sentence of the Essqy_g_~ 
Development, ''Christ ian i ty has been long enough o in the world to justify 
us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history," 1845 edn., p.69. 
Newman argues for an appeal to history, p.71. He is now, of course, more 
self-conscious about the problem of sources - indeed, the absence of 
straightforwardness of historical interpretation assists his argument, 
for it requires the need of some antecedent probability to act as an 
heuristic in any historical enquiry - his 'hypothesis', p.70. J .Derek 
Holmes points out that Newman always preferred historians who were 
personally engaged - he disliked impersonality or the pretence of it, 
Newman and the Use of History, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
<Cambridge, 1969) p.4-7. 
<43) i.e. in "Milman's View of Christianity". See Part II, above. 
<44) Sykes, p.81, describes Newman and Schleiermacher as "two 1Jl9..Qgrn 
theologians of unquestionable stature, 'fathers' of, respectively, modern 
Protestant and modern Roman Catholic theology." 
(45) For example, Lash, Introduction, p.4, where he argues that to 
take Newman "seriously as a theologian" will redeem English Catholicism, 
and especially the hierarchy from reactionary fear of the historical 
consciousness.-
(46) e.g. Fr. George Dragas, "Newman's Greek Orthodox Sense of 
Catholicity." Ecclesiasticus, (Darlington Carmel, 1984), pp.97-129, in 
contrast to "the modern liberal approach", Newman "asserted that the 
Bible and the Apostolic Tradition cannot be properly understood outside 
their proper pa tr is tic S i tz- im-Leben," p .1 00. 
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